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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Is life just a game where we make up the rules while we are searching for 
something to say? Or are we just simply spirally coils of self-replicating DNA?” 
(Eric Idle, The Meaning of Life Song, in: The Meaning of Life, 1983) 
 
1. Remarks regarding content 
 
This  dissertation’s  opening  quote  is  from  a  song  in  which  Eric  Idle  from 
Monty Python’s Flying Circus ponders on the meaning of life1. It suggests 
some of the central issues that I will analyze in this dissertation. As such, it will 
regularly  pop  up  throughout  the  text.  Its  first  line  nicely  corresponds  to  a 
specific liberal view of individuals and societies. Social life is a game where the 
players themselves can choose the rules that govern their actions. Authors who 
defend this view nicely capture the ability of human beings to act freely within 
these rules and even intentionally change them. However, they seem to neglect 
that human nature is to some extent fixed. In their attempt to design desirable 
rules and institutions, they systematically assume people to be instrumentally 
motivated  to  satisfy  their  egoistic  and  given  preferences.  In  contrast,  the 
quote’s  second  line  stresses  the  need  to  take  human  beings  as  they  have 
evolved  through  the  processes  of  natural  selections.  I  will  show  how  this 
emphasis on their evolutionary origins leads to a different stance in issues of 
institutional design. 
As always, it is a combination of both thoughts that shows the route to follow. 
While people can to some extent design and reform the rules and institutions 
that  guide  their  actions,  they  should  not  try  to  do  so  without  taking  into 
account their own nature. Nevertheless, even though people are made up of 
“spirally coils of self-replicating DNA”, they are not completely determined by 
their genetic constitution. After all, they have a unique ability to reflect upon 
their own nature. The underlying claim of this combination of both thoughts is 
                                                 
1  By  the  way,  the  true  meaning  of  life  –  which  has  intrigued  philosophers  for  over 
twenty-five centuries – is actually quite simple according to Monty Python: “well, it’s 
nothing very special. Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every 
now and then, get some walking in, and try and live together in peace and harmony with 
people of all creeds and nations” (Michael Palin, in: The Meaning of Life, 1983). General Introduction 
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that  one  has  to  take  people  as  they  are  when  thinking  up  good  rules  and 
institutions. If one wants to “make up the rules” of the game of life, one has to 
start from a realistic view of its players. 
In this respect, I will focus on the concept of rationality and argue that this can 
be conceived in a number of ways that are largely neglected in mainstream 
academic debates. While it is a quality that has evolved in the process of natural 
selection,  it  enables  humans  to  distance  themselves  from  mere  animality 
(Nozick 1993: 181). In this respect, it is central to the essence of what it means 
to be human. However, it does not fit the economic conception of rationality, 
which is based on a narrow model of people as egoistically and instrumentally 
motivated. As a result, this dominant conception of rationality proves inapt not 
only for explanatory but also for normative purposes. To think up desirable 
institutions, one needs to start from a more realistic view of people as they 
have been formed by the processes of natural selection. 
Because  the  notion  of  rationality  encompasses  a  wide  array  of  approaches, 
models  and  theories,  I  deem  it  useful  to  develop  in  the  first  part  of  this 
dissertation a systematic account of its different conceptions. The main aim 
here is to clearly define the relevant terms, models and assumptions. This way, 
I hope to avoid the rather vague terminology that has characterized rational 
choice  theory  over  the  last  decades2.  After  stressing  the  importance  of 
rationality for the study of human behavior, I focus on its standard, economic 
conception and its problems (first chapter). Next, I stress the relevance and 
value of a number of its alternative conceptions (second chapter).  
In the second part, I apply these models and assumptions to voting decisions. 
Here,  I  show  that  the  conventional  economic  conception  of  rationality  is 
grossly  inapt  to  explain  why  and  how  people  vote  in  large-scaled  elections 
(third  chapter).  In  addition,  I  argue  that  the  alternative  conceptions  of 
rationality are needed to solve some of the most fundamental problems that 
the economic one encounters (fourth chapter). In doing so, I show explicitly 
that each of these different conceptions has its value. Instead of replacing the 
economic one with its alternatives, I show that they can and should mutually 
complement each other. 
                                                 
2 In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I will clearly define the terms rationality 
and rational choice theory. For now, suffice to say that I see no reason to distinguish 
between both terms, which is why I use them interchangeably in this dissertation and its 
title. I thus do not follow the strategy of Pettit (1993: 282) who stresses that “rational 
choice theory should be distinguished from the abstract theory of rationality”. Whereas 
he limits rational choice theory to what I label the economic conception of rationality 
(Pettit 1993: 272), I stress the importance of a number of alternative conceptions of what 
it means for a choice to be rational. General Introduction 
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In the third part, I show how the theoretical assumptions and models lead to 
specific  normative  views  on  the  basic  institutional  structure  of  modern 
societies.  I  aim  to  develop  the  normative  implications  of  the  different 
conceptions of rationality by focusing on two areas of research. The first is that 
of Public Choice theory. Through a detailed analysis of the work of James 
Buchanan, I show that these theorists in this field defend a specific stance on 
issues surrounding institutional design on the basis of the economic conception 
of  rationality  (fifth  chapter).  The  second research  area  is  that  of  Analytical 
Marxism. Here, I show how authors like Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
amend the assumptions of the economic conception of rationality and, as a 
result, come to support quite different normative conclusions (sixth chapter). 
In  general,  I  want  to  argue  that  the  goal  of  designing  a  desirable  basic 
institutional structure for modern societies is inevitably based on the ways in 
which one models the motivations and actions of individuals. Finally, I try to 
formulate some general conclusions and point out what I believe is the value of 
this research project. 
The  central  insights  of  this  dissertation  have  already  been  published  in  a 
number of articles. The different conceptions of rationality in the first two 
chapters  are  discussed  in  Engelen  (2005).  The  third  and  fourth  chapter  in 
which I apply these conceptions to the decisions whether and how to vote 
draw heavily on Engelen (2006). The main argument in the introduction to Part 
III  has  already  been  published  in  Engelen  (2007b),  which  forms  the  most 
concise  expression  of  my  general  line  of  reasoning.  In  addition,  a  more 
condense  version  of  the  fifth  chapter  on  James  Buchanan’s  theory  of 
constitutional choice, has been published in Engelen (2007c). The same goes 
for the sixth chapter on Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, a part of which has 
been published in Engelen (2008b). While not addressing the main themes of 
this dissertation, the other articles (Engelen 2007a; 2007d; 2008a; Engelen & 
Nys 2008) all address some of its topics in one way or another. 
 
2. Remarks regarding style and methodology 
 
Before going more fully into the heart of the matter, I want to make some 
remarks regarding the style and methodology of the research I have conducted 
and  the  text  that  has  resulted  from  it.  First,  this  dissertation  is  written 
completely in English for the simple reason that this is the dominant language 
in the literature that I have studied. In order to contribute anything to the 
academic debates as they are held nowadays, one has no choice but to read, 
speak and write this scientific ‘lingua franca’. Since I am not a native speaker, I General Introduction 
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want to apologize for whatever flaws or errors remain in this text. In addition, I 
want to make clear that I make exclusive use of male terms (he, him, his) in 
referring to individuals, citizens, voters, et cetera. Of course, this is done purely 
for reasons of simplicity. 
Second, I refer extensively to the works of the authors that I have studied. I do 
so in a detailed and meticulous manner, primarily because it enables readers to 
check what the authors themselves have to say on the issues at hand3. In my 
view, literature study – which is the only method used for this dissertation – is 
at its best when it stays close to the literature itself. This also suggests why I 
make extensive use of quotes. Whenever I think that others have formulated 
arguments or insights as clearly and succinctly as possible, I deem it best to 
quote  them  literally  instead  of  simply  paraphrasing  them.  As  the  attentive 
reader  will  notice,  however,  I  do  not  simply  repeat  what  has  been  written 
elsewhere already. It is my humble hope that the originality of this text lies 
primarily in bringing together different arguments and insights in previously 
unseen ways.  
Third, I should perhaps explain why this PhD is completed at the Institute of 
Philosophy and not the Faculty of Economics or the Faculty of Social Sciences 
for that matter. After all, the bulk of the topics and literature analyzed here do 
not belong to philosophy in its strict sense. This is already clear if one throws a 
quick glance at the main parts of this dissertation. The first part largely centers 
round  the  conventional  model  in  economics,  namely  that  of  the  Homo 
Economicus. Since this also forms the starting point of my analysis of voting 
decisions, the same holds for the second part. One could also argue that my 
focus on institutional design in the third part is not particularly philosophical at 
all. This also shows in the fact that the main proponents in this dissertation’s 
story line can hardly be defined as full-blooded philosophers. Whereas authors 
like Amartya Sen and Jon Elster (Chapter I) are situated respectively within 
economics  and  the  social  sciences,  Public  Choice  theorists  like  Anthony 
Downs, Gordon Tullock (third chapter) and James Buchanan (fifth chapter) 
are (political) economists. In addition, authors like Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis (sixth chapter) would not consider themselves to be philosophers.  
Nevertheless, I want to argue that this dissertation is a philosophical one in the 
end. The proposed amendments to the economic conception of rationality and 
                                                 
3 I do not believe in the explanation of psychoanalysts that this is just a way of hiding my 
insecurity. Of course, I acknowledge that my rhetorical skills are no match for theirs: “it 
is like what happens if I say that Freudian theory is obvious nonsense: I am told that I 
only say that because of my relation with my mother. I protest that my mother had 
nothing to do with it. “See!” says my Freudian friend and walks away a sure winner” 
(Solow 1995: 241). General Introduction 
 
5
the  minimal,  broad  and  expressive  conceptions  that  arise  from  them  are 
distinctively philosophical in nature. In this respect, I make extensive use of 
insights from philosophers like Donald Davidson, Harry Frankfurt and Philip 
Pettit. While I refer to research within economics, psychology and the social 
sciences,  the  emphasis  always  lies  on  the  conceptual  and  explanatory  level 
rather than the empirical one. In addition, this dissertation’s primary aim is a 
normative  one,  namely  to  think  about  the  ideal  institutional  structure  of 
modern  societies  from  a  rational  choice  perspective.  As  such,  it  is  clearly 
situated within moral and political philosophy. In my view, this dissertation is 
therefore best characterized as multi-disciplinary, touching upon issues within 
economics,  psychology,  evolutionary  theory,  social  sciences,  political  theory 









RATIONALITY INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
 
 
“Man is a rational animal – so at least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I 
have looked diligently for evidence in favor of this statement, but so far I have not 
had the good fortune to come across it”  
(Russell 1950: 71) 
 
1. Why rationality? 
 
Rationality is a central concept within the analytical tradition in philosophy and 
the social sciences of the past century. But what is its exact meaning? While the 
economic conception is dominant within the social sciences, I aim to show the 
relevance of alternative conceptions. In my view, these are highly needed to 
understand what it means for humans to be rational. There are two interrelated 
reasons why I believe that this is a subject worth studying.  
First, rationality is  imbedded  in  the  ways  in  which people  understand  each 
other. As soon as one knows what an individual’s reasons are, one understands 
his actions. In everyday life, people unavoidably presuppose that the others 
with whom they interact are rational: “in our dealings with other people, we are 
compelled to treat them as, by and large, rational (...). To understand others, we 
must assume that, by and large, they have rational desires and beliefs and act 
rationally  upon  them”  (Elster  1989b:  28). Without  this  presupposition,  one 
would  be  at  a  total  loss  when  communicating  and  interacting  with  others 
(Davidson  1980:  290;  Davidson  1982:  301-303;  Elster  1999:  141).  In  this 
respect, Elster (1979: 153) argues that “there is a general presumption of rationality 
in human affairs”. Donald Davidson (1980: 221) is known for his claim that 
“we cannot intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an agent except 
within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, intentions, and 
decisions  (…).  Crediting  people  with  a  large  degree  of  consistency  (…)  is 
unavoidable if we are to be in a position to accuse them meaningfully of error 
and some degree of irrationality”. If one does not presume that others generally 
are  and  want  to  be  rational,  one  cannot  accuse  them  of  violating  the 
requirements  of  rationality:  “only  a  rational  creature  can  be  irrational” 
(Davidson 1982: 289). Part I: Rationality 
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The  fact  that  people  inevitably  frame  the  actions  of  others  in  terms  of 
intentions, beliefs, desires and reasons is captured in what has been labeled 
‘folk psychology’. One cannot engage in social interactions without supposing 
that  others  are  generally  rational.  In  this  respect,  I  want  to  argue  that  the 
different  conceptions  of  rationality  that  I  will  outline  are  essentially  a 
formalization  of  this  folk  psychology.  This  also  explains  the  intuitive 
attractiveness of the concept of rationality and provides the main reason why I 
believe that social scientists and philosophers aiming to explain human actions 
would do well starting from this concept.  
Second, people generally want to be rational and try to live up to the criteria 
that need to be fulfilled in order to be called rational: “we care about rationality 
because we want to be rational and want to know what rationality requires us 
to do” (Elster 1993: 189). To show this, one can refer to the fact that nobody is 
proud of his irrational behavior. Even though people will never be perfectly 
rational  beings,  they  fundamentally  conceive  of  themselves  as  rational. 
Rationality belongs to their deepest identity, what it means to be human. It is 
part of the self-image and the specific nature and status of the human species 
(Nozick 1993: xii). This does not mean that people are always rational, but that 
they have the capacity to be rational and that it lies in their nature to actualize 
this potentiality. Since people consider themselves to be rational, they want to 
express this in their actions. This is also why rationality plays such a central role 
in the way people understand themselves and others. 
To the degree that they fulfill the requirements specified in the normative ideal 
of rationality, they will actually be rational. In this respect, I want to stress that 
I understand rationality primarily in its descriptive and explanatory guise. In 
contrast,  Elster  (1986:  1)  believes  that  rationality  should  primarily  be 
interpreted as a normative notion that tells people that they should be rational 
and prescribes what this entails. In my view, the normative and explanatory 
variants of the notion of rationality belong together. People are rational insofar 
as  they  follow  the  prescriptions  of  rationality.  As  John  Harsanyi  argues, 
“rationality is a normative concept: it points to what we should do in order to 
attain a given end or objective. But, even at a common-sense level, this concept 
of rationality does have important positive (non-normative) application: it is used 
for explanation, for prediction, and even for mere description, of human behavior. 
Indeed the assumption that a given person has acted or will act rationally often 
has very considerable explanatory and predictive power” (Moser 1990: 272). 
Rationality thus forms an ideal that people care about: “rational choice theory 
is far more than a technical tool for explaining behavior. It is also, and very 
importantly,  a  way  of  coming  to  grips  with  ourselves  –  not  only  what  we 
should do, but even what we should be” (Elster 1993: 179). Introduction to Part I 
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All this, of course, does not imply that humans are rational all of the time. Like 
other animals, they are subjected to physical and physiological processes that 
fall completely beyond the domain of rationality. The fact that rationality is a 
normative  ideal  already  suggests  that  people  sometimes  fail  to  realize  it.  It 
explains why they do not like to be accused of irrationality and employ indirect 
strategies  to  guard  themselves  against  their  irrational  tendencies.  I  am  thus 
happy to acknowledge that a whole range of phenomena is properly labeled 
irrational. Indeed, it would be troublesome for the concept of rationality if this 
were  not  the  case.  While  interesting  in  their  own  right,  however,  these 
phenomena do not form the main focus of this dissertation. The fact that 
people are not rational all of the time, by no means implies that the concept of 
rationality should be discarded altogether within the social sciences. As I have 
suggested,  it  provides  the  necessary  background  against  which  the  label  of 
irrationality makes sense. An additional problem is that there is no overarching 
theory to explain when and why people are irrational. Elster (1989b: 35; 1986: 
26-27) argues in this respect that rationality will remain the central paradigm 
within the social sciences, as long as its alternatives do not make up a simple, 
unified theory. 
In trying to understand what it means to be human, I focus on the fact that 
most people conceive of themselves as rational beings. In this first part of this 
dissertation,  I  distinguish  between  different  conceptions  of  rationality  and 
show that it is not possible, and certainly not desirable, to reduce the concept 
of rationality to one of its meanings. In this respect, one of the aims of this 
dissertation  is  to  end  Bertrand  Russell’s  quest  that  is  expressed  in  this 
introduction’s  opening  quote.  This  emphasis  on  rationality  as  an  essential 
characteristic  of  humankind  dates  back  to  Aristotle,  who  refers  to  man  as 
“animal with sapience” (zoon logon echoon). In Porphyry’s tree, which was based 
on  this  view  and  remained  influential  throughout  Western  medieval 
philosophy, humans are defined as rational animals, which is still present in the 
notions of “Homo  Sapiens”  and  “animal  rationale”.  This definition  returns 
during modern Enlightenment, most notably in the work of Immanuel Kant 
who stresses the rational capacities of humans to think for themselves.  
 
2. Methodological individualism 
 
This  dissertation  starts  from  the  principle  of  methodological  individualism, 
according  to  which  social  phenomena  are  best  explained  by  referring  to 
individuals and their actions. In its ontological sense, individualism is quite 
straightforward.  Social  phenomena  do  not  exist  independently  from Part I: Rationality 
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individuals. It is simply impossible and inconceivable to encounter social facts 
like institutions. A society and its institutional structure only exist through the 
citizens that devise, uphold and embody them. From ontological individualism, 
one  can  conclude  that  individuals  should  form  the  center  of  explanations 
within the social sciences: “due to the biological separation of persons and the 
location of thought in the individual mind, action is a capacity of individuals 
and only individuals. The explanation of social action is the essential task of 
social science, from which it follows that individuals are the logical starting 
point of social theory” (Mayer 1994: 19). This, of course, leads to individualism 
in  its  methodological  sense,  which  claims  that  one  best  understands  social 
phenomena as resulting from the interactions between individuals. 
In this respect, I deem it useful to refer to a number of distinctions made by 
Philippe Van Parijs (1990: 49-52), who defines methodological individualism 
(1) as the claim that social phenomena can only be explained as consequences 
of  individual  actions.  This  is  to  be  distinguished  from  methodological 
intentionalism (2) that stipulates that these actions must be explained on the 
basis of individual reasons and methodological rationalism (3) that states that 
all  actions  must  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  good  reasons.  However,  the 
intentional images of individuals implied here are still more general than that of 
methodological utilitarianism (4) that claims that actions should be explained as 
means  to  serve  the  individual’s  self-interest.  Each  of  these  methodological 
principles must be understood as prescribing a methodology to be employed in 
the social sciences. The restrictions these principles put on the scope of valid 
research within the social sciences are increasingly stringent.  
Methodological individualism (1) is the least stringent principle, since it merely 
stipulates  that  valid  social  science  explanations  should  start  from  individual 
actions. It excludes only those theories that explain social phenomena through 
the  unmediated  impact  of  supra-individual  factors4.  Methodological 
individualism is, however, perfectly able to incorporate the influence of social 
norms  and  institutions,  insofar  as  these  are  understood  as  constraining  or 
determining  individual  choices.  Methodological  intentionalism  (2)  and 
rationalism (3) are more stringent in that they exclude theories that refer to 
social phenomena as directing individual behavior in some unintentional way. 
While such theories fulfill the conditions of methodological individualism – the 
                                                 
4  This  also  shows  why  I  will  not  focus  on  what  might  be  called  ‘systemic’  or 
‘evolutionary’  conceptions  of  rationality,  according  to  which  certain  individuals  with 
specific behaviors will be selected through the working of a number of evolutionary 
mechanisms. As will become clear later on, I surely do not want to deny the existence of 
such mechanisms. However, I do not believe that such processes should be framed in 
terms of rationality. In my view, this term should be reserved for individuals and their 
behavior.  Introduction to Part I 
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individual remains the main explanatory variable – they do not live up to the 
criterion  of  intentionality,  according  to  which  individuals  act  purposefully. 
Methodological utilitarianism goes even further and excludes any theory that 
refers to factors other than the self-interest of individuals.  
As will become clearer later on, this opens up a number of routes one can 
follow when trying to understand in what sense individuals make up a society. 
Whereas  some  theorists  stress  the  need  to  model  individuals  in  broad, 
intentional terms, others will stress the need to think of them as egoistically 
motivated.  Since  I  believe  that  rationality  has,  or  at  least  should  have,  a 
prominent  place,  I  support  not  only  methodological  individualism  (1)  but 
methodological  intentionalism  (2)  and  rationalism  (3)  as  well.  In  order  to 
explain social phenomena, one best refers to individual intentions and reasons 
to  explain  what  goes  on  in  society.  I  believe  that  this  results  from  the 
abovementioned fact that people interacting with each other on a daily basis 
inevitably interpret the other’s actions in terms of intentionality and rationality. 
Without this basic folk psychology, it is impossible to understand any social, 
cultural, economic or political interaction between fellow citizens. As I will 
show more fully later on, I believe that methodological utilitarianism is one 
bridge too far, since it excludes a number of valid and relevant models within 
the social sciences. 
One could add an extra category and label it methodological instrumentalism. 
This principle stresses that individuals should be modeled as being exclusively 
instrumentally motivated. Individuals are modeled as seeking to achieve their 
goals,  whatever  these  are.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  less  restrictive  than 
methodological utilitarianism (4), because it does not necessarily limit the range 
of goals to that of utility-maximization. On the other hand, it is more restrictive 
than methodological intentionalism (2) and rationalism (3), because it requires 
that  theories  should  restrict  their  scope  to  instrumental  behavior.  As  will 
become clearer later on, an individual may have good reasons to do something 
intentionally  (2  and  3)  without  aiming  at  the  realization  of  some  goal  (4). 
Intentionality  literally  means  to  be  directed  at  something,  which  is  not 
necessarily  to  be  equated  with  some  goal.  Methodological  intentionalism 
(directed at reasons) is thus broader than methodological rationalism (directed 
at good reasons), which is still broader than methodological instrumentalism 
(directed at goals, which are only one type of good reasons). The fact that 
rationality and intentionality (aimed at reasons) do not have to be understood 
exclusively  in  an  instrumental  sense  (directed  at  goals)  will  be  the  main 
argument in favor of developing an alternative, non-instrumental (expressive) 
conception of rationality. Part I: Rationality 
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After  analyzing  the  role  of  institutions  in  society  and  their  impact  on 
individuals living there, I will introduce a few nuances with respect to this 
postulate of methodological individualism. Nevertheless, let us first focus on 
individuals and what it means for them to be rational. CHAPTER 1 
 
THE ECONOMIC CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY 
 
 
“It may not be quite as absurd to argue that people always actually do maximize 
their self-interest, as it is to argue that rationality must invariably demand 
maximization of self-interest. Universal selfishness as actuality may well be false, 
but universal selfishness as a requirement of rationality is patently absurd” 
(Sen 1987: 16) 
 
1. The economic conception of rationality and its failures 
 
In order to analyze what the concept of rationality encompasses, I start by 
investigating how economists have developed it. After all, it is the economic 
conception of rationality, as it is expressed in the Homo Economicus model, 
that has become the dominant one within the social sciences5. In order to 
understand what economic rationality entails, I want to distinguish between the 
level of the relation between actions and their reasons and the level of the 
reasons themselves (Elster 1989a: 31). At each level, I will try to show that 
people do not always act as Homines Economici. As a matter of fact, they tend 
to violate almost every condition of economic rationality. I will thus analyze the 
different ways in which the Homo Economicus model fails to describe and 
explain individual behavior. 
                                                 
5 Next to indirect support for this claim, like the vast amount of articles and books that 
focus exclusively on the Homo Economicus model when talking about rationality, I want 
to refer to Thomas Christiano (2004: 123) who argues that “mainstream rational choice 
theory, as I shall conceive of it, adheres strictly to the thesis of homo economicus (…). The 
mainstream approach is still the dominant approach to rational choice theory, though the 
revisionist approach has acquired many allies over the years”. The notion of ‘Homo 
Economicus’  or  ‘economic  man’  was  implicitly  present  in  the  works  of  classical 
economists like Adam Smith (1776). Even though it was first articulated in detail by John 
Stuart Mill (1836), the term itself was coined for the first time only by John Kells Ingram 
(1888) (Engelen 2005: 69). Part I: Rationality 
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1.1. The level of actions and the relation with their reasons 
 
In general, one can define the Homo Economicus as an isolated individual who 
in all circumstances aims to serve his self-interest by choosing freely between 




Its  first  characteristic  is  that  of  maximization  or  optimization.  Economists 
typically  construct  a  preference  function  or  ordering  and  argue  that  the 
individual chooses the action that satisfies his highest-ranked preference: “there 
are two principal species of economic man: the consumer and the entrepreneur 
(…). The former wishes to maximize his utility, which is a known function of 
the goods and services he consumes; the latter wishes to maximize his profit” 
(Simon  1957:  197).  The  maximization  of  preference  satisfaction  is  often 
considered to be the core of the economic conception of rationality (Slote 
1989: 1).  
However, individuals do not always maximize or optimize. In his search for a 
more realistic conception of rationality, Herbert Simon (1957: 205) stresses that 
rational people do not always aim to find to find the best course of action but 
are satisfied with what is “good enough”. The fact that satisficing – settling for 
less than the very best – is characteristic of human actions leads Simon to 
question whether maximization is necessary or sufficient to speak of rational 
action. Such satisficing behavior is so widespread that it is deeply ingrained in 
our everyday intuitions about the behavior of others. As Michael Slote rightly 
argues, it is perfectly possible for individuals to have good reasons to choose 
what is less than best for themselves: “our ordinary conception of moderation 
allows it to be rational, or not irrational, for an individual modest or moderate 
in his desires to choose a given course of action while knowing that he could 
do better for himself by another” (Moser 1990: 471). Somewhat paradoxically 




A  second  characteristic  of  the  Homo  Economicus  is  its  instrumental 
motivation. Individuals are modeled as weighing off the expected costs and 
benefits of actions and choosing the action that they consider to be the best Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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means  to  reach  a  certain  goal,  namely  the  maximal  satisfaction  of  their 
preferences. Economic rationality is thus completely consequentialist in nature: 
an action is rational if the agent thinks it has the best consequences (Elster 
1991: 109). In this respect, one can speak of forward-looking or prospective 
rationality. The only thing that counts is what the action brings about, not how 
it has come about or how it is performed. Individuals are assumed to look at 
the outcomes of possible alternatives and choose the action they deem best 
given their ends on the one hand and the available means on the other hand 
(Pettit 2002: 207). 
Here too, I want to stress that individuals do not always act instrumentally. In 
this  respect,  the  Homo  Economicus  model  is  challenged  by  the  Homo 
Sociologicus  model  (Boudon  1993:  5;  Elster  1989a:  113;  Elster  1991:  109). 
According to this non-consequentialist model, individuals base their actions on 
socially and culturally inherited norms, without taking into account the future 
consequences  of  their  actions.  In  contrast  with  the  forward-looking  or 
prospective  attitude  of  the  Homo  Economicus,  the  Homo  Sociologicus  is 
characterized by a backward-looking or retrospective attitude (Elster 1991: 109; 
Vandevelde 1994: 95). Because of its non-instrumental character, norm-guided 
behavior is clearly economically irrational. 
According  to  Robert  Sugden,  a  norm  is  best  defined  as  “any  regularity  in 
behavior within a given community which is generally expected, not only in the 
empirical sense, but also in the normative sense. That is, conformity with the 
regularity  elicits  sentiments  of  approval  while  failure  to  conform  elicits 
disapproval” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 79). Norms can be cultural, political 
or moral – depending on the behavior they prescribe – but they are always 
social,  since  they  are shared  by  the  members  of  the  same group.  Sugden’s 
emphasis on the enforcement of norms through social sanctions perfectly fits 
the conventional strategy of economists to understand norm-guided behavior 
in purely calculating and instrumental terms. According to Robert Frank, such 
attempts are unconvincing, because they do not take into account the fact “that 
people often follow norms even when external sanctions are not a credible 
threat”  (Ben-Ner  &  Putterman  1998:  283).  Through  a  process  of 
internalization,  norms  have  an  additional  impact  on  behavior  that  is  more 
internal.  Norms  can  thus  constitute  people’s  goals:  “internalization  moves 
norms from constraints that one can treat instrumentally toward maximizing 
well-being to norms that are then valued as ends rather than means” (Bowles & 
Gintis 2003: 440). Norms can thus define preferences, rather than that they 
form means towards or constraints upon their realization (Gintis 2003: 156). 
Sociologist James Coleman (1990: 242) takes all this into account by defining 
norms as socially shared guidelines that specify “what actions are regarded by a 
set  of  persons  as  proper  or  correct,  or  improper  or  incorrect”.  These Part I: Rationality 
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behavioral  criteria  are  transmitted  across  generations  through  education, 
socialization and social learning. 
From a large survey of randomly selected cultures, Sober and Wilson (1980: 
166) conclude “that human behavior is strongly regulated by social norms in 
most cultures around the world and presumably throughout human history”. It 
is best understood as the expression of specific emotions, triggered by the fact 
that  one  has  internalized  certain  criteria  of  what  kinds  of  behavior  is 
appropriate  within  one’s  group.  Norm-guided  behavior  is  thus  typically 
motivated by emotions like shame, which mutually support more formal ways 
of enforcing norms through external sanctions: “where the emotion of shame 
is common, punishment of antisocial actions will be particularly effective and, 
as a result seldom used” (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 439). While strong social 
norms reduce the need of institutions enforcing them, they thus complement – 
rather than substitute – each other: “it is widely held that strong social norms 
reduce the burden on law enforcement; that laws supported by social norms 
are likely to be significantly more enforceable; and that laws that are formulated 
in  ways  that  are  congruent  with  social  norms  are  much  more  likely  to  be 
enacted than laws that offend such norms” (Etzioni 2000: 159).  
It  has  been  argued  that  norm-guided  behavior  can  still  be  understood  as 
instrumentally  motivated  towards  the  maximal  satisfaction  of  one’s 
preferences. However, I want to argue that it forms an inadequate account of 
norm-guided and dutiful behavior. First, people who act upon a sense of duty 
are concerned neither with circumstances nor with outcomes. They act as they 
do, regardless whether others do so as well. Their main motivation is their firm 
belief that this is the right thing to do and not that this is the best means to 
achieve a certain goal. While it may be useful to distinguish between norm-
guided and dutiful behavior, I want to argue here that duties can rightly be 
understood as internalized moral norms. In contrast with the forward-looking 
nature  of  instrumental  actions,  dutiful  and  norm-guided  behavior  is  thus 
typically backward-looking. Second, people who act upon an internalized norm 
of fairness are concerned not with outcomes, but with circumstances. They 
help others or contribute to the public good, only if others do their share as 
well. Fair friends all want to do the dishes, even if this leads to an overcrowded 
kitchen  and  thus  to  an  inefficient  way  of  achieving  the  desirable  outcome 
(Elster 1989a: 56-57). Clearly, both kinds of norm-guided behavior are non-
instrumental in nature. 





A third characteristic of the Homo Economicus is that of intentionality. An 
individual  acts  intentionally  if  he  has  reasons  for  his  actions  and  if  these 
reasons cause his actions in appropriate ways (Davidson 1980: 3-19). If one 
wants to understand why the individual at hand acts like he does, one should 
refer to his reasons6. Reasons constitute the purpose of his actions. I thus agree 
with  John  Ferejohn  and  Debra  Satz  (1996:  80-82)  who  argue  that  good 
explanations within the social sciences should be based on Davidson’s charity 
principle according to which individuals in general attribute intentionality to 
others. In this respect, I also sympathize with their view that rational choice 
theory should be recast on the basis of folk psychology, which centers round 
this notion of intentionality (Pettit 2002: 195). 
Nevertheless,  individuals  do  not  always  act  intentionally.  According  to 
Raymond Boudon, the main distinction between the Homo Economicus and 
Homo Sociologicus model is that the former stresses intentionality, whereas 
the latter does not. In the latter, behavior is assumed to be “basically causal 
(behaviour has to be explained by causes rather than reasons) and in that sense 
irrational or rather arational (no reasons, but causes)” (Boudon 1993: 5). As will 
become  clear  later  on,  I  want  to  understand  norm-guided  behavior  as 
intentional nonetheless.  
To be sure, I fully acknowledge that some behaviors can no longer be called 
intentional. First, there are bodily movements that lie completely beyond the 
individual’s control. Someone who trips over a stone is not acting intentionally. 
Second,  some behaviors,  like  ticks,  are performed on  an  entirely  automatic 
basis,  without  any  reason  whatsoever.  These  two  sorts  of  behavior  are 
completely unintentional and arational in nature. In such cases, the individual is 
not motivated by reasons at all. Third, there is the phenomenon of weakness of 
the will or ‘akrasia’, which constitutes the paradigmatic example of irrationality 
at the level of the relation between an individual’s actions and his reasons. A 
weak-willed individual fails to act according to what he believes is best and 
prefers most. An addict, for example, may believe that drinking is bad and 
                                                 
6 For reasons that will become clear, I postpone a more precise definition of what exactly 
is meant by a reason. For now, it should be clear that I do not agree with Elster (1986: 
12-13; 1989b: 3-4), who understands intentionality in exclusively instrumental terms. In 
his view, an action is intentional when it is aimed at the achievement of a goal: “reasons 
are reasons for the action if it is a way of realizing the desire (given the beliefs)” (Elster 
1983: 3). In contrast, I follow Davidson’s definition of intentionality, which allows me to 
distinguish  more  clearly  between  the  instrumental  and  the  intentional  aspects  of 
economically rational actions.  Part I: Rationality 
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prefer to quit, but is nonetheless overpowered by a craving for alcohol7. Here, 
the causal force of the visceral urge to drink turns out to be stronger than that 
of  the  reasonably  deliberated  intention  not  to  drink.  Such  an  addict  thus 
acknowledges that he has good reasons not to drink but nevertheless fails to 
translate these into action. His drinking behavior results from a loss of control 
over his own actions, which leads him to act against his own better judgment 
(Davidson 1980: 21-22, 42; Davidson 1982; 294-297; Elster 1979: 174-175). 
While the latter provides the better reason, it is bypassed by a causal force that 
does not count as a good reason itself. The resulting behavior is therefore 
obviously irrational. 
 
1.2. The level of the reasons themselves: beliefs 
 
Here,  I  distinguish  between  two  sorts  of  reasons,  namely  beliefs  and 
preferences, which is the term economists employ to model desires. Since the 
rationality  of  actions  is  dependent  on  such  beliefs  and  preferences,  Robert 
Audi  rightly  argues  that  it  is  necessary  to  “explore  what  constitutes  the 
rationality of motivational and cognitive elements, and how it bears on that of 
actions based them” (Moser 1990: 416). At this level of the reasons one can 
have  for  one’s  actions,  the  economic  conception  of rationality  indeed  adds 
further requirements. Most economists do not specify explicitly which criteria 
are to be satisfied in order to speak of rational beliefs. Nevertheless, I try to lay 




First, economists systematically stress the need for beliefs to be consistent with 
each other. A set of beliefs is internally consistent if they can all be true and 
believed at the same time (Elster 1983: 4-5, 61). Nevertheless, a lot of people 
often have inconsistent beliefs that cannot be true together at the same time. 
Take the example of an addict who is convinced that alcohol is bad for one’s 
health, but also believe that one (more) drink will not harm anybody. While 
inconsistencies  often  continue  to  exist,  because  they  belong  to  different 
domains of one’s life, such individuals can rightly be called irrational. When 
                                                 
7 For those who are interested in the extent to which phenomena like addiction and 
weakness of the will pose a threat to the rationality of individuals, I refer to my chapter in 
the book ‘Metallica and Philosophy’ (Engelen 2007a: 33-35). Here, I analyze more fully 
how an addiction leads to irrational actions, beliefs and preferences.  Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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such inconsistencies are made explicit, the individual at hand will usually adjust 
them (Elster 1979: 150-151). 
 
1.2.2. Perfect rationality 
 
Second,  economists  employ  more  demanding  requirements  concerning  the 
quality and quantity of information on which to ground one’s decisions. The 
Homo Economicus is typically assumed to possess perfect information, which 
means that he possesses all the relevant information of the alternative actions 
and their consequences. However, most decisions – if not all – are based on 
imperfect information. Often, people gather only limited information about the 
available  options.  In  addition,  the  Homo  Economicus  has  the  cognitive 
capacities required to perform whatever calculations are necessary to select the 
best of these alternatives. In this respect, one can speak of “perfect rationality” 
(Simon 1957: 199). Herbert Simon (1957: 241) summarizes all this as follows: 
“traditional  economic  theory  postulates  an  “economic  man,”  who  (…)  is 
assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, 
if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is 
assumed also to have (…) a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, 
for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these 
will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale”. 
Here too, people are not rational in the perfect sense of the word. They simply 
lack the cognitive capacities to calculate exactly which consequences will occur 
after  performing  specific  actions.  Studies  in  the  field  of  experimental 
economics have shown that people generally do not base their actions on such 
heroic calculations (Vandevelde 1994: 97).  
Simon  (1957:  202)  thus  rightly  criticizes  the  all  too  demanding  cognitive 
requirements of the Homo Economicus model, which is wrong “in seeking to 
erect  a  theory  of  human  choice  on  the  unrealistic  assumption  of  virtual 
omniscience and unlimited computational power”. His own model of bounded 
rationality is explicitly based on a more realistic view of the limited cognitive 
capacities of humans (Simon 1957: 241-243, 273-278; Simon 1990: 200). In 
Simon’s own words, it “describes the way people, in fact, make decisions and 
solve  problems.  The  theory  has  an  increasingly  firm  empirical  base  as  a 
description of human behavior” (Simon 1990: 200). He stresses that choices 
are always made in a context that is perceived by individuals in a specific way. 
Individuals always frame their choices by concentrating on specific aspects of 
the  options,  which  ensures  that  the  available  information  is  well-organized 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981: 453). Because of their limited capacities to deal 
with the complexities of the world they live in, they tend to rely on the rules Part I: Rationality 
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and understandings on how to act that are imbedded in culturally inherited 
norms, traditions and habits (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 157-160). 
 
1.3. The level of the reasons themselves: preferences 
   
Economists are more explicit about their requirements to speak of rational 
preferences. As Robert Sugden rightly argues, “neoclassical economics is based 
on very restrictive assumptions about the nature of preferences” (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman 1998: 75). The Homo Economicus is assumed to have consistent, 
transitive, complete, continuous, exogenously given and egoistic preferences 




The first requirement is that, like beliefs, preferences should be consistent. A 
rational individual always prefers a over b or b over a, but never both at the 
same time. However, people often have inconsistent preferences. An addict, 
for example, may want to quit but still long for another drink. In addition, 
people  often  have  different  preferences  when  the  available  options  are 
presented in different ways. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981: 457), 
the problem here lies in an inconsistency in the set of preferences. Take the 
case in which consumers have to pay extra if they use a credit card or receive a 
discount if they pay cash. Since the alternatives remain the same, different ways 
of framing them should have no impact on preferences. Yet, experiments show 
that consumers choose to pay cash more often in the first than in the second 
case8.  This  is  clearly  irrational,  since  “rational  choice  requires  that  the 
preference  between  options  should  not  reverse  with  changes  of  frame” 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981: 453). 
 
                                                 
8 According to Elster, the problem lies not with the preferences themselves, but with the 
causal influence of irrelevant changes in the choice situation on the preferences at hand: 
“preference  change  by framing  occurs when  the  relative  attractiveness  of  options  changes 
when the choice situation is reframed in a way that rationally should make no difference” 
(Elster 1983: 25). I will explain this view more fully, when discussing Elster’s broad 





The  second,  related  requirement  is  that  a  preference  function  should  be 
transitive. A rational individual always prefers a over c if he, at one moment in 
time, prefers a over b and b over c. Nevertheless, preferences sometimes turn 
out  to  be  intransitive.  The  problem  here  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  let  an 
individual choose between a and b, b and c and a and c at the same time. One 
can, for example, prefer a over b and b over c, but ultimately prefer c over a, 





The third requirement is that a preference function should be complete. A 
rational individual is always able to choose between a and b. Either he prefers a 
over b, or he prefers b over a, or he is indifferent. This is not always the case 
either. Preference functions are sometimes incomplete in the sense that the 
individual cannot say which of the available alternatives he prefers. A well-
known example is that of Buridan’s ass starving because he cannot make up his 
mind on which stack of hay to prefer (Vandevelde 1994: 91-92). Similarly, the 





The fourth requirement is that a preference function should be continuous, 
which means that a rational individual is always able to weigh off different 
options against each other. This implies that an increase in one good should 
                                                 
9 Someone who receives additional information will typically adapt his preference ranking 
accordingly. If he does not, this will lead to intransitivity and thus irrationality. A girl who 
wants to get to know a boy initially prefers a date with him (b) to a lonely evening on her 
room (c). Moreover, she would even like to invite the boy straight to her room (a > b). 
But when she finds out that the boy is a drug addict, she will prefer c over a, which leads 
to  intransitivity.  However,  this  is  only  so  if  she  sticks  to  her  other  preferences.  In 
contrast, she can stay rational by adjusting these preferences, for example by preferring a 
lonely evening over company of the boy (c > b) or by preferring a date in public over an 
evening with the boy in her room (b > a). 
10 This example is, of course, inspired by the novel ‘Sophie’s Choice’ (Styron 1979). Part I: Rationality 
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always be able to compensate a decrease in another good. This requirement 
allows  economists  to  construct  a  single,  comprehensive,  one-dimensional 
function that orders all of the individual’s preferences (Moser 1990: 2, 195, 
275).  
However, this does not always do justice to the truth. Preference functions are 
often not continuous. Individuals with lexicographic preferences do not accept 
less of a specific good, even if this is compensated by much more of another 
good.  Certain  things,  like  duties,  moral  principles  or  love,  fall  beyond  the 
calculating reasoning in which everything has its price. One could even argue 
that  what  is  essential  to  humans  is  the  extent  to  which  they  can  distance 
themselves from such calculations (Vandevelde 1994: 92-93). In this respect, 
Philip  Pettit  (2002:  189)  distinguishes  between  a  rational  system,  which 
systematically  and  automatically  calculates  which  option  is  optimal,  and  a 
reasoning  system,  which  is  characterized  exactly  by  this  capacity  to  reflect: 
“when  rational  explanation  assumes  an  interpretative  or  hermeneutic  form 
(…), then it casts the person as a reasoning or ratiocinative subject, not merely 
as a rational system. The rational system – the ideal subject of decision theory – 
may  realize  its  rationality  on  the  basis  of  a  purely  sub-personal  mode  of 
organization and attunement; it need not have what we would describe as a 
mental  life.  The  ratiocinative  system  –  the  sort  of  system  that  our  species 
implicitly or explicitly typifies – may be a more or less rational system in this 
sense but it is also something else besides; it is a rational system that attains 
rationality, to the extent that it does, on the basis of attention to reasons and 
what reasons require”. Whereas the first is properly explained in exclusively 
causal terms (Erklären), explanations of the latter’s behavior crucially involve 
some form of interpretation (Verstehen). As one can see here, Pettit criticizes 
the economic conception of rationality as missing the very essence of what it is 




The fifth assumption economists employ is that preferences are exogenously 
given (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 3, 75). There is a widespread tendency 
among  economists  to  consider  preferences  as  the  starting  point  for  their 
explanations, without asking how these come into being and are transformed. 
According to Amitai Etzioni (2000: 166), the assumption “that preferences are 
fixed (…) is still very widely held by neoclassical economists”. It is based on 
their basic view of individuals as isolated, free individuals who are to judge for 
themselves  what they  want and how  to  get  it. As  such, this  assumption  is 
grounded on the fundamental notions of freedom of choice and consumer Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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sovereignty (Miller 1990: 146-147). If preferences themselves change under the 
influence  of  all  sorts  of  factors  and  processes  lie  beyond  the  individual’s 
control, the latter’s behavior seems to be unfree and thus hardly rational.  
This  requirement  is  problematic  in  quite  a  few  instances,  since  preferences 
change  endogenously  through  a  number  of  mechanisms.  Even  though 
economists  tend  to  shy  away  from  issues  concerning  the  formation  of 
preferences,  research  in  this respect  can  complement rather  than  substitute 
economic models. I thus deem it useful to analyze more fully how individuals 
adapt their preferences and how “the structure of everyday social interactions 
affects both beliefs and preferences” (Henrich et al. 2004: 47). 
Norms, for example, have a clear impact on individual preferences. However, 
they have often been analyzed as part of the environment an individual faces 
when  making  a  decision.  They  constrain  the  available  options  or  at  least 
influence  their  costs  and  benefits  by  rewarding  some  and  punishing  other 
options. However, as Etzioni (2000: 161) rightly remarks, norms have a more 
internal impact, next to such an external impact: “social norms are not merely a 
part of the actors’ environment but also affect their intrinsic predispositions”11. 
The problem most neoclassical economists have in thinking this more internal 
impact of norms on preferences is that they “tend to assumes that preferences 




The  sixth  requirement  is  that  preferences  should  be  egoistic.  While 
controversial, this is often regarded as the pre-eminent characteristic of the 
Homo Economicus model. John Stuart Mill (1836: 321) refers to egoism as the 
defining characteristic of economics, which analyzes the individual “as a being 
who  desires  to  possess  wealth,  and  who  is  capable  of  judging  of  the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of 
the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit 
of  wealth.  It  makes  entire  abstraction  of  every  other  human  passion  or 
                                                 
11  This  insight  has  a  number  of  important  repercussions:  “the  significance  of  the 
distinction between treating social norms as part of the actor’s environment, affecting 
costs and constraints, and treating them as factors that shape the actor’s predispositions 
stands out in several important respects (…). The contrast is apparent in the levels of 
compliance  with  social  norms  achieved,  the  level  of  social  order  sustained,  and  the 
relative costs of enforcing norms” (Etzioni 2000: 163). If people follow norms out of 
fear for social sanctions, the level of adherence will be lower than it is when people have 
internalized these norms. Later on, I will go deeper into the normative implications of 
these issues. Part I: Rationality 
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motive”. As Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1881: 16) notes, “the first principle of 
economics is that every agent is only actuated by self-interest”. Both authors 
agree  that  individuals  might  be  motivated  by  considerations  beyond  self-
interest, but stress that the contribution of economics lies in explaining social 
phenomena by abstracting from such motivations. 
According to Amartya Sen (1977: 317; 1987: 1), the assumption of egoism 
forms an integral part of economic models throughout the twentieth century. 
In his view, the equation of rationality with self-interest maximization has a 
long tradition: “the self-interest interpretation of rationality goes back a long 
way,  and  it  has  been  one  of  the  central  features  of  mainline  economic 
theorizing  for  several  centuries”  (Sen  1987:  15).  Sen  argues  that  “many 
economic models tend to proceed as if the assumption of universal pursuit of 
self-interest is the only motivation that can be legitimately presumed in serious 
economic analysis” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: vii). In his view, “the world is 
made  to  fit  this  momentous  assumption,  rather  than the  assumption being 
made to fit the world” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: viii).  
Richard Thaler (1994: 8) agrees that “much economic analysis – and virtually all 
game theory – starts with the assumption that people are both rational and 
selfish”.  According  to  David  Schmidtz  (1993:  54),  Homo  Economicus  is  a 
combination of the assumptions of instrumentality and egoism: “the result is 
the Homo economicus model of rational agency. The Homo economicus model 
leaves no room for altruism”. It assumes pure self-regard, which implies that 
individuals “care about no one’s welfare other than their own and recognize no 
constraints on their pursuits beyond those imposed on them by circumstances” 
(Schmidtz 1993: 52). The conventional Homo Economicus model thus arises 
as soon as one combines instrumentality and maximization with the claim that 
preferences  are  typically  self-regarding  in  nature:  “the  conventional 
instrumentalist conception of rational choice sometimes is combined with a 
substantive  assumption  of  mutual  unconcern  (the  assumption  that  rational 
agents are immediately concerned with no one’s welfare but their own). This 
combination produces a model of rational agency that has become notorious in 
the social sciences: Homo economicus. By hypothesis, Homo economicus is purely 
self-regarding; she cares about others only because and insofar as responding 
to the actions of others is a means to her own welfare” (Schmidtz 1994: 250).  
 
1.3.6.1. Self-regarding preferences 
 
Pettit (2002: 223) argues that “the main question here is how far economists 
cast human beings as egocentric in their desires”. He distinguishes between Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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different variants of this assumption, which he believes are all implicitly present 
in economic models. According to its most demanding interpretation, egoistic 
literally means selfish, self-interested or self-regarding. In this view, the Homo 
Economicus is only concerned with the maximization of his self-interest, often 
understood in hedonistic and materialistic terms. Individuals are assumed to 
seek wealth, strive for pleasure, avoid pain and prefer more rather than less 
goods (Mill 1836: 322; Vromen 1998: 24-25). 
A less stringent interpretation states that egoistic considerations will outweigh 
other considerations when both come into conflict. According to Pettit (2002: 
226), economics “is committed to the assumption that people’s self-regarding 
desires  are  generally  stronger  than  their  other-regarding  ones  (…).  The 
assumption that people are relatively self-regarding in their desires shows up in 
the fact that economists tend only to invoke relatively self-regarding desires in 
their explanations and predictions”. This assumption is not as stringent as the 
one above, because it allows economists to recognize the presence of such 
considerations, even though they are less powerful than self-regarding ones. 
Even  less  stringent  is  “what  Wicksteed  called  ‘non-tuism’:  participants  in 
market transactions are assumed to be concerned about the extent of their own 
holdings (for whatever ultimate reason), but to have no direct concern for the 
welfare  of  their  contractual  partners”  (Miller  1990:  152).  Philip  Wicksteed 
(1910: 158) indeed stressed that he wanted to study “that complex of relations 
into which we enter with other people, and lend ourselves or our resources to 
the furtherance of their purposes, as an indirect means of furthering our own”. 
The interests of others may come into focus, but only if serving them serves 
one’s own interests12.  
Together  with  prominent  authors  like  Sen,  Thaler,  Schmidtz  and  Pettit,  I 
believe  that  the  assumption  of  egoism  in  its  stringent  interpretation  is  still 
rightly considered as an integral part of the Homo Economicus model. Even 
though  it  is  a  theoretical  abstraction  that  may  not  be  defended  by  all 
economists in all of its aspects, it nevertheless lies at the basis of the bulk of 
economic  handbooks,  explanations  and  models.  I  thus  feel  confident  in 
claiming  that  a  lot  of  economists  still  implicitly  or  explicitly  rely  on  the 
                                                 
12 According to Thomas Christiano (2004: 122-123), this variant does not diverge much 
in practice from the more stringent interpretation: “for the most part, rational choice 
theorists think of the mainstream approach as committed to the thesis that agents are 
self-interested (…). But some theorists have used the idea that the agents are “nontuistic” 
in  the  sense  that  they  are  not  inherently  concerned  with  the  interests  of  those  they 
strategically interact with (…). The differences between these two types of motivations 
are  important,  but  the  mainstream  approach  treats  the  nontuistic  motivation  as  if  it 
operated  in  the  same  way  as  the  purely  interested  motivation  that  takes  little  or  no 
account of the interests of others”. Part I: Rationality 
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assumption that “agents care only about what they personally gain and lose 
through an interaction” (Gintis et al. 2005: 6). As I will show more fully later 
on, it is this assumption that forms the basis of the centerpiece of modern-day 
economics,  namely  Adam  Smith’s  invisible  hand  mechanism,  according  to 
which  egoistic  individuals  will  reach  socially  desirable  outcomes  in  market 
settings13.  
However, the simple fact that people manage quite well to live together already 
suggests that most of them do not act in purely opportunistic ways: “under 
strictly self-interested motivation (…) human societies as we know them could 
hardly exist (…). Everyone would cheat whenever it was safe to do so; hence 
everyone would also have to be continually concerned with being cheated” 
(Margolis 1984: 121). Conventional economists “typically assume that people’s 
preferences are ‘self-regarding’ and ‘outcome oriented’. In other words, people 
want stuff for themselves, and care only about their personal costs in getting 
what they want. There is much evidence, both from within economics, and 
from other disciplines, that this view of human nature misses a lot: people care 
both about other people, and about how social transactions occur – not just 
the outcomes” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 1). 
I thus agree that there is need for “economists, anthropologists, psychologists, 
and behavioral scientists to develop systematically richer models of preferences 
according to which people take account of the effects of their actions not only 
on themselves, but on others as well, and in which the processes determining 
outcomes matter as well as the outcomes themselves” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 1-
2). Next to the self-regarding preferences on which economists typically focus, 
individuals  thus  have  other-  and  process-regarding  preferences  (Ben-Ner  & 
Putterman 1998: 7, 22-23, 283-285). People care not only about the outcomes 
of social interactions on their own well-being, but also about the well-being of 
others and about the way these interactions themselves proceed: “self-regarding 
preferences  are  the  essence  of  homo  economicus.  Other-regarding  preferences  reflect 
concern  either  for  the  overall  well-being  or  for  certain  of  the  activities  or 
outcomes of other individuals. They have both altruistic or benevolent and 
envious  or  malevolent  varieties  (…).  Individuals  care  about  the  manner  in 
which they themselves and others behave, including the ways in which they 
attain outcomes of interest. These are process-regarding preferences” (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman 1998: 20). Experimental evidence confirms that actions are often 
based  on  such  other-  and  process-regarding  preferences  (Ben-Ner  & 
                                                 
13 To be sure, Smith also focused on the role of other considerations in human behavior. 
Nevertheless,  these  writings  “have  become  neglected  as  these  considerations  have 
themselves become unfashionable in economics” (Sen 1987: 28). Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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Putterman 1998: 11). In what follows, I will analyze more fully both sorts of 
preferences. 
 
1.3.6.2. Other-regarding preferences 
 
People  with  other-regarding  preferences  want  to  serve  another’s  interests 
rather than one’s own. David Miller (1990: 101) aptly defines altruism as a 
concern for the interests of others, which motivates one to act on their behalf. 
He distinguishes between the calculating altruist who stops giving as soon as 
someone else gives, the reciprocal altruist who only gives when others do their 
fair share as well, the conscientious altruist who gives out of a sense of duty, no 
matter what others do, and the superconscientious altruist who fulfills not only 
his own duty but also that of others (Miller 1990: 111-117). Whereas the first 
primarily aims to bring about particular consequences (future) and the second 
focuses on the circumstances in which he gives (present), the third and the 
fourth give because they have internalized the norm that this is the right thing 
to do (past).  
Schmidtz (1993: 52-53) distinguishes between two forms of other-regarding 
preferences. First, people are often motivated by concern, which means that 
they care about the welfare of others. Second, they are often motivated by 
respect, which means that they adhere to self-imposed constraints on what they 
may do to others when pursuing their own goals. 
Sen (1995: 2-3) also stresses the fact that people often incorporate the interests 
of others in their considerations. If altruistic actions serve not only the interests 
of others, but also one’s own interests, he labels them acts of sympathy (Sen 
1977: 326). Crossing a beggar, it is in my interest to give him money if I believe 
that this will make me feel good. Some altruists do indeed derive satisfaction 
from the act of giving or helping itself. In essence, this is still egoistic and thus 
economically  rational  (Margolis  1984:  21).  Sympathy  is  to  be  distinguished 
from commitment, which entails helping others, even if this goes against one’s 
self-interest (Sen 1977: 326-333). Crucial here is that this can no longer be 
reduced to a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction.  
Similar motivations are “morale, civic virtue, social capital, trust, and intrinsic 
motivation”  (Ben-Ner  &  Putterman  1998:  439).  The  Homo  Economicus 
model  fails  to incorporate  them, because  it  focuses  exclusively on  extrinsic 
motivation through rewards and punishments. In contrast, intrinsic motivation 
is crucial to understand people who do something simply because they enjoy it, 
because they feel it is their duty or because they owe this much to the ones they Part I: Rationality 
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care about. Later on, I will go into the importance of intrinsic motivation more 
fully. 
The fact that people care about others does not immediately fit the narrow 
Homo Economicus model: “it is commonplace to point out that the Homo 
economicus  model  (…)  does  not  accurately  describe  human  agents.  Like 
Homo economicus, we have preferences, but unlike Homo economicus, we 
have preferences directly relating to the welfare of others. That is the obvious 
and much celebrated difference between Homo economicus and us” (Schmidtz 
1994: 150). The problem lies in the fact that conventional economists have 
equated  rationality  with  self-interest.  Sen  (1987:  12)  aptly  summarizes  their 
two-fold  strategy  as  follows:  “(1)  identifying  actual  behaviour  with  rational 
behaviour; and (2) specifying the nature of rational behaviour in rather narrow 
terms  (…).  There  are  two  predominant  methods  of  defining  rationality  of 
behaviour in mainline economic theory. One is to see rationality as internal 
consistency of choice, and the other is to identify rationality with maximization of 
self-interest”.  
As this chapter’s opening quote by Sen stresses, the problem lies primarily with 
the  second  step.  There  is  no  need  to  assume  that  rationality  presupposes 
narrowly self-interested actions or preferences. While I do not want to deny 
that rationality can be defined in self-interested terms, I deem it important to 
point  out  that  this  does  not  correspond  to  a  more  intuitive  and  common 
meaning of the word: “unless you are prepared to argue that, by definition, 
social motivation must be irrational unless it can be formulated in terms of self-
interest,  there  appears  to  be  something  wrong  with  the  conventional 
definition” (Margolis 1984: 16). The main strategy that I will follow in this 
dissertation is thus not to do away with the notion of rationality altogether but 
to propose alternative conceptions of what it entails. This way, I hope to show 
that  altruism  is  not  necessarily  irrational.  After  all,  as  Schmidtz  (1993:  54) 
rightly notes, one can have perfectly good “reasons for altruism (…). What we 
want is an account according to which it is rational for us to have concern and 
respect for others”. Before developing my own thoughts on what these reasons 
for altruism might look like in the next chapter, I first want to show how 
economists  try  to  conceptualize  them  and  which  problems  their  strategy 
encounters.  
 
1.3.6.3. Reducing other-regarding preferences to egoism 
 
In  spite  of  these  problems,  economists  typically  hold  on  to  the  stringent 
interpretation of egoism: “there is a strong tendency among economists and Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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philosophers  to  (…)  reduce  apparently  altruistic  behaviour  to  ultra-subtle 
forms of self-interest” (Elster 1982: 123). They develop several strategies to 
frame  altruism  in  self-interested  terms.  The  most  straightforward  strategy 
postulates a ‘warm glow’ effect and argues that altruistic actions always produce 
a feeling of satisfaction or help sooth one’s conscience. Kenneth Boulding, for 
example, stresses that “if my perception of an increase in your welfare makes 
me feel better off, I am benevolent” (Koslowski: 1985: 101). This strategy thus 
simply  defines  an  individual’s  self-interest  as  encompassing  all  sorts  of 
motivations (Van Liedekerke 2000: 108). 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  problems  with  this  strategy.  First,  such  a 
linguistic  move  turns  the  notion  of  self-interest  into  a  completely  empty 
“passe-partout”  (Ben-Ner  &  Putterman  1998:  156).  This  makes  it  hard  to 
falsify  or  verify  experimentally.  Because  this  strategy  of  systematically 
postulating  a  warm  glow  effect  is  ‘ad  hoc’,  its  scientific  legitimacy  is 
troublesome. After all, it is simply impossible to (dis)prove the existence of 
such psychic benefits each and every time someone acts altruistically. While “it 
is possible to define a person’s interests in such a way that no matter what he 
does he can be seen to be furthering his own interests in every isolated act of 
choice” (Sen 1977: 322), one should try to explain actions rather than simply 
rationalize them. In this respect, I propose to hold on to a narrow definition of 
self-interest  in  terms  of  personal  benefits.  While  these  can  be  materialistic, 
psychic or symbolic, they ultimately refer to the well-being of the individual 
itself. In this respect, one can argue that an action that is beneficial to someone 
else but performed with the primary purpose of gaining some personal benefit 
is not genuinely altruistic in nature. Even if such benefits arise, they do not 
necessarily form the only or even the main drive behind the action. The fact 
that one helps others because it makes one feel good does not necessarily mean 
that one does so only because it makes one feel good (Sober & Wilson 1998: 
244-247). Moreover, if I give to someone I love, I might take pleasure in his 
pleasure, but this is simply a by-product and not the primary motive (Elster 
1989a: 53). As Schmidtz (1994: 250) aptly puts it, “we reap psychic rewards 
from helping others, of course, but this fact does not begin to suggest that our 
real objective  is  psychic  benefit  rather  than  other people’s  welfare.  On  the 
contrary, there can be no psychic reward for helping others unless we care 
about others”. The satisfaction of preferences thus cannot be equated with the 
feeling of satisfaction this can but not necessarily does induce.  
Second, one can refer to empirical evidence that supports the common sense 
view that people sometimes want to help others, even if this does not cause 
them to feel happy themselves. Altruistic individuals are primarily motivated 
out of a concern for others, even at one’s own cost (Walsh 1996: 167). In this 
respect, Jane Mansbridge refers to interviews with people stressing that they act Part I: Rationality 
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altruistically without any concern for personal benefit whatsoever (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman  1998:  151).  In  his  experimental  psychological  research,  Daniel 
Batson convincingly shows that some acts of altruism cannot be explained by a 
desire to avoid negative emotions (people tend not to turn their back from 
misery), a desire for approval (people help even if nobody is watching) or a 
desire for shared joy (people help even if they do not know whether the other 
enjoys it) (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 158-159). In conclusion, there is no 
scientific evidence whatsoever that self-interest is the exclusive or even the 
main concern of individuals. Common sense tells us that people are typically 
motivated by a complex combination of different considerations (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman 1998: 5, 163). According to Sen (1987: 19), “the real issue is whether 
there is a plurality of motivations, or whether self-interest alone drives human 
beings”. It should by now be clear that the first view is the right one. While 
egoistic and other considerations can be closely related, this does not mean that 
the latter can systematically be reduced to the former (Sen 1987: 43-44). 
I believe these problems show that people can have reasons for being altruistic 
that go beyond a self-interested cost-benefit analysis. In this respect, I want to 
refer to Schmidtz (1993: 65), who starts off by arguing that it is in one’s self-
interest to care about things besides one’s own interests: “one crucial way to 
nurture self-regard is to nurture concerns that give us more to live for than we 
have if we care only about ourselves”. If one has time and means to go beyond 
the purely egoistic concern for survival, it is in one’s interest to belong to a 
community,  to  care  about  and  to  be  important  for  others.  It  may  thus  be 
economically  rational  to  develop  altruistic  preferences  and  take  on 
engagements and commitments. This might induce one to interpret Schmidtz 
as  following  the  abovementioned  strategy  of  reducing  altruism  to  egoism. 
However, he goes on to stress that motivations like concern and respect for 
others  –  and  one  might  add  sympathy  and  commitment  –  can  in  the  end 
induce people to go directly against their self-interest: “out of self-regard, we 
nurture  the  enrichment  of  our  utility  functions  so  that  they  come  to 
incorporate other-regarding preferences. As these preferences become part of 
the function, they acquire a certain autonomy, become more than mere means 
to  previously  given  ends”  (Schmidtz  1993:  58).  While  other-regarding 
motivations may arise from self-regard, they ultimately outgrow the narrow 
Homo Economicus model: “the concern and respect for others that reflective 
self-regard leads most of us to nurture may be of an entirely wholehearted and 
uncalculating kind” (Schmidtz 1993: 67). In the next chapter, I will try to show 
why this line of reasoning leads me to complement the economic conception 
of rationality with alternative ones. 
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1.3.6.4. Process-regarding preferences 
 
People  are  often  not  so  much  concerned  about  the  outcome  of  social 
interactions, as they are about the process of this outcome itself. To explain 
what this entails, I want to focus on what has become known as the Ultimatum 
game.  Here,  a  subject  is  given  an  amount  of  money  that  he  has  to  divide 
between himself (the proposer) and the other (the responder) (Thaler 1994: 22-
25). If the responder accepts the offer, he gets the proposed portion and the 
proposer gets to keep the rest. If the responder rejects the offer, both get 
nothing. If both were egoistic, one would expect the responder to accept any 
offer  larger  than  zero.  Anticipating  this,  the  proposer  would  propose  the 
smallest offer possible. In numerous experiments conducted throughout the 
world, however, “only a minority of agents behave in a self-regarding manner” (Gintis et 
al. 2005: 12). Instead, “the vast majority of proposers offer between 40% and 
50%  of  the  pie  and  offers  lower  than  30%  of  the  pie  are  often  rejected” 
(Bowles & Gintis 2000: 42).  
In Public Goods and Prisoner’s Dilemma games, where the threat of freeriders 
is present as well, the same results hold. Only a third of all people act in a 
purely self-interested way, which is to contribute nothing at all (Henrich et. al. 
2004: 66-67). Such experimental evidence clearly suggests that a lot of people 
often  do  not  act  opportunistically:  “many  people  deviate  from  purely  self-
interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity means that in response 
to  friendly  actions,  people  are  frequently  much  nicer  and  much  more 
cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response 
to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal” (Fehr 
& Gächter 2000: 159).  
When internalized, norms like reciprocity and fairness induce preferences that 
are aimed at the process of the interaction itself and that can outweigh a strictly 
egoistic calculus. Even though this can be individually costly, a majority of 
individuals are prepared to follow such norms and punish those who violate 
such norms. Fairness and reciprocity have therefore been interpreted as the 
main  sources  for  the  observed  “large  and  consistent  deviations  from  the 
predictions of the textbook representation of Homo economicus” (Henrich et al. 
2004: 8). 
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1.3.6.5. Reducing process-regarding preferences to egoism 
 
As  with  other-regarding  preferences,  the  main  strategy  of  economists  is  to 
reduce  norm-guided  reciprocal  and  fair  behavior  to  underlying  egoistic 
calculations: “neoclassical economists (…) try to obviate the need to modify 
their basic paradigms by arguing that when people abide by norms for what 
seems  like  intrinsic  predispositions  they  actually  have  extrinsic  motivations, 
such as aiming to please their friends or acquiring prestige” (Etzioni 2000: 164). 
This  reductionist  strategy  fails  to  capture  the  essence  because  of  the  same 
problems. First, acting in a reciprocal or fair way does not always give one 
satisfaction. Second, even if this is the case, it does not necessarily form one’s 
primary  motivation.  Such  behavior  can  thus  not  be  reduced  to  egoistic 
motivations: “a person who is motivated by the warm glow that comes from 
having done one’s duty is not acting out of duty but engaging in narcissistic 
role playing” (Elster 1989a: 53). 
In this respect, I want to refer to the French sociologist Marcel Mauss, who 
argues that gifts always create an obligation to reciprocate and are thus never 
truly free. This may lead one to conclude that all forms of altruism (giving) and 
reciprocity (giving back) can be reduced to pure self-interest. The problem with 
Mauss’ view is that it ignores the personal experience of the parties at hand. 
After all, from an internal point of view, the spontaneous and non-committing 
nature of gifts is crucial. As Alain Testart rightly argues, genuine gifts indeed 
have no strings attached at all. In fact, a donation stops being a gift as soon as a 
corresponding  return  is  obliged:  “to  give,  is  to  hand  over  something  to 
somebody free of charge. To give, is not to seek payment, it is even more or less 
the opposite” (Testart 1998: 97). Later on, I will argue more fully why I defend 




The  seventh  and  final  requirement  is  actually  the  least  demanding 
interpretation of the assumption of egoism. It stipulates that the individual is 
the final judge in evaluating and choosing an alternative from the available 
alternatives. This variant can be termed “egocentrism” or “egotism” (Dowding 
& King 1998: 12-14). It has led to a less stringent Homo Economicus model, 
in  which  preferences  should  only  be  consistent,  transitive,  complete  and 
continuous (Sen 1977: 323). As a matter of fact, one can distinguish between 
classical and neoclassical economists who respectively defend the assumptions Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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of egoism and egocentrism. In this respect, I am happy to admit that most 
economists  no  longer  explicitly  insert  substantial  requirements  into  their 
models (Vromen 1998: 32). This has allowed them to include other than purely 
materialistic  considerations  in  preference  functions,  like  the  desire  for 
recognition,  respect  and  love.  Whether  the  fulfillment  of  one’s  preferences 
provides pleasure or benefits is irrelevant in this view, as long as the individual 
himself genuinely holds these (Moser 1990: 1, 191).  
The assumption of egocentrism simply stipulates that people try to maximize 
the satisfaction of their preferences, without stipulating what these preferences 
are about (Vromen 1998: 24-27). In this respect, one can speak of a purely 
formal, subjective and instrumental conception of rationality: “to be rational in 
the instrumental sense is to be committed to serving preferences of oneself, 
but  one  may  or  may  not  be  committed  to  serving  preferences  regarding 
oneself” (Schmidtz 1993: 54). In this broader view, there is nothing irrational 
about preferring to serve the interests of others over one’s own interests. In 
essence, this assumption of egocentrism does not go much further than the 
requirement  of  intentionality  and  comes  close  to  John  Broome’s  view, 
according to which a rational individual simply maximizes what he deems good 
(Broome 1995: 136-139). To be sure, one’s conception of the good does not 
always correspond with one’s interests14. 
In his path-breaking essay on economic methodology, Lionel Robbins already 
moved  away  substantially  from  the  narrow,  classical  interpretation  of  the 
Homo  Economicus  model  towards  the  broader,  neoclassical  interpretation. 
Whereas John Stuart Mill still referred to egoistic motives, he no longer did so: 
“economic  subjects  can  be  pure  egoists,  pure  altruists,  pure  ascetics,  pure 
sensualists  or  –  what  is  much  more  likely  –  mixed  bundles  of  all  these 
impulses” (Robbins 1935: 95). Some authors argue that all the abovementioned 
evidence  showing  the  pervasiveness  of  other-  and  process-regarding 
preferences  has  facilitated  this  shift  from  classical  economics  (and  its 
assumption  of  egoism)  to  neoclassical  economics  (and  its  assumption  of 
egocentrism) (Henrich et al. 2004: 9).  
Here,  I  want  to  argue  that  other-  and  process-regarding  preferences  are 
perfectly  compatible  with  the  assumption  of  egocentrism,  as  long  as  the 
individual himself is genuinely motivated by such preferences. Sen’s notion of 
sympathy and Schmidtz’s notion of concern are easily interpreted within the 
                                                 
14 Sometimes, the same thought is formulated in different terms. John Rawls (1993: 51), 
for example, distinguishes between interests and benefits: “every interest is an interest of 
a self (agent), but not every interest is in benefit of the self that has it”. While framed in 
different terms, this perfectly corresponds to my distinction between preferences (which 
Rawls terms ‘interests’) and interests (which Rawls terms ‘benefits’). Part I: Rationality 
 
36
broad model of individuals as aiming to satisfy their preferences. After all, the 
welfare  of  others  systematically  enters  the  picture  through  their  own 
preferences (Schmidtz 199: 52). The same holds for less benign other-regarding 
preferences like jealousy and envy (Elster 1982: 123). It can be argued that 
jealous and envious individuals evaluate the situation from another’s point of 
view rather than their own and that they are moved by something alien to 
themselves (Van Liedekerke 2000: 107). In some interpersonal relations, the 
bond can be so powerful that it seems inadequate to claim that the individual at 
hand is sovereign in making his own decisions (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 
172). Pettit (2002: 230) seems to suggest something similar when referring to 
“concerns  that  dramatically  transcend  the  boundaries  of  the  self”. 
Nevertheless, I want to understand all of these phenomena as motivations that 
genuinely  belong  to  the  individual  himself.  It  remains  possible  to  say  that 
someone acting out of sympathy, concern, jealousy or envy still does what he 
himself prefers. 
In my view, the same holds for the phenomena of commitment and respect. In 
Sen’s view, a committed person is not primarily motivated by his own goals but 
by those of others with whom he identifies. This may suggest that commitment 
violates  the  assumption  of  egocentrism.  However,  Hans  Bernhard  Schmid 
(2005: 56) rightly shows that the process of identification leads one to endorse 
these goals oneself: “one cannot pursue the other’s goals without making these 
goals  one’s  own”.  This  way,  commitment  can  be  understood  within  an 
egocentric framework, namely as providing a reason to act against one’s own 
self-interest but not against one’s own goals and intentions. The thought that 
committed action can be based on good reasons while being not-egoistic and 
not-instrumental in nature is defended by Sen (2005: 5) himself in a recent 
article: “by living a in a society, one develops possible reasons for considering 
other  people’s  goals  as  well,  which  takes  one  beyond  an  exclusive 
concentration on one’s own goals, not to mention the single-minded pursuit of 
one’s own self interest. The recognition of other people’s goals may be a part 
of rational thought”.  
In a similar vein, it has been argued that norms cannot be studied within a 
rational choice approach (Coleman 1990: 292). However, I do not see why this 
should be the case. To understand the impact of norms on behavior, one has 
to refer to processes of socialization and internalization, through which the 
individual comes to identify with these norms (Elster 1989a: 119). This way, 
norm-guided  behavior  clearly  fits  the  egocentric  assumption.  After  all,  the 
individual remains the final judge in choosing whether or not to respect some 
norm. This also suggests that norm-guided behavior, in my view, also fits the 
assumption  of  methodological  individualism.  Since  norms  do  not  exist  as 
supra-individual  entities  (ontological  individualism),  they  cannot  have  an Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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impact  on  social  life,  independently  of  their  impact  on  individuals 
(methodological individualism). In this respect, I agree with Elster’s definition 
of norms as “emotional and behavioral propensities of individuals, not supra-
individual entities that constrain behavior” (Elster 1991: 113-114). 
A  number  of  authors  suggest  that  the  assumption  of  egocentrism  can  be 
violated, since individuals can act against their preferences. Jane Mansbridge, 
for example, defines duty as “the capacity to act against one’s preferences on 
the grounds that one ought so to act” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 155). The 
underlying  thought  is  that  preferences  are  but  one  of  multiple  criteria  to 
evaluate choice options. As Timur Kuran argues, these are not necessarily in 
congruence  with  each  other:  “in  addition  to  the  preferences  by  which  we 
choose among our options, I am suggesting, we have values that evaluate what 
we want and actually do” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 232). However, I do 
not  think  that  such  a  notion  of  counterpreferential  choice  is  instructive15. 
Instead,  I  want  to  define  preferences  in  such  a  way  that  they  encompass 
considerations that are other-regarding or process-regarding. In this sense, I 
thus want to conclude that the assumption of egocentrism is not violated in 
any of the abovementioned cases. 
 
2. The role of economic rationality within the social 
sciences 
 
One can ask on which grounds I am criticizing the economic conception of 
rationality.  Until  now,  I  have  referred  in  a  somewhat  loose  manner  to  an 
intuitive and common sense notion of rationality. Essentially, what I have tried 
to argue for is that the Homo Economicus model fails as a general account of 
individual motivation and behavior because of the unrealistic character of its 
central assumptions. Its requirements of maximization, instrumentality, perfect 
rationality, complete, continuous, egoistic and exogenously given preferences 
are so demanding that no individual can actually live up to them. Within the 
philosophy of economics, however, it has been argued that this is no reason to 
discard the model. After all, scientific models always and inevitably abstract 
from particular complexities of the concrete world. What matters is not to 
what extent a model’s assumptions are realistic, but to what extent they are 
instrumental in predicting events (Caldwell 1982: 173-178).  
                                                 
15 Schmidtz (1993: 59) also expresses his doubts whether this notion is useful in analyzing 
commitment and respect (which is a specific form of commitment, namely commitment 
to principles that specify what one may and may not do to others). Part I: Rationality 
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Milton  Friedman  (1953:  8-9)  is  widely  known  for  defending  this  kind  of 
instrumentalism,  according  to  which  each  “theory  is  to  be  judged  by  its 
predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to “explain.” 
(…). The only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its 
predictions with experience”. Because experiments are difficult to perform in 
the social sciences, it may be tempting to test a model’s validity by focusing on 
its  assumptions  rather  than  its  implications.  Assumptions  should  always  be 
valued with respect to the predictions they engender: “the relevant question to 
ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are descriptively 
“realistic,”  for  they  never  are,  but  whether  they  are  sufficiently  good 
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered 
only  by  seeing  whether  the  theory  works,  which  means  whether  it  yields 
sufficiently accurate predictions” (Friedman 1953: 15). In this spirit, a lot of 
economists  deem  it  irrelevant  whether  or  not  their  image  of  individuals 
corresponds to reality (Sen 1977: 319-324). 
To better understand this kind of instrumentalism, it may be instructive to 
consider Friedman’s example of the leaves of a tree. He stresses the validity of 
“the hypothesis that the leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought 
to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives” (Friedman 1953: 19). While 
clearly  unrealistic,  this  hypothesis  allows  one  to  explain  a  wide  range  of 
characteristics of the leaves. Despite its unrealistic assumptions, its implications 
actually conform to actual phenomena. A model is a theoretical idealization 
that is inevitably simpler than the real world. The very meaning of assumptions 
lies in focusing on specific aspects of the complex world while abstracting from 
other  aspects.  Such  a  hypothesis  is  best  understood  as  “stating  that  the 
phenomena it is desired to predict behave in the world of observation as if they 
occurred  in  a  hypothetical  and  highly  simplified  world  containing  only  the 
forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important” (Friedman 1953: 40).  
The criticism of the economic conception of rationality as providing an all too 
narrow and thus inadequate view of man can thus be answered by arguing that 
economists  –  like  other  scientists  –  choose  to  abstract  from  certain 
complexities of the actual world (Robbins 1935: 94). To be sure, the Homo 
Economicus  model  does  not  represent  real  human  beings  in  all  of  their 
particularities. Instead, it is a theoretical construction designed for explanatory 
and predictive purposes. If one would take into account all the complexities 
that make up actual individuals, these explanations and predictions would lose 
their  desired  exactness.  One  should  not  try  to  provide  a  fuller  and  more 
realistic view of individuals, since scientific insights only arise thanks to some 
level of abstraction.  Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
 
39
There are two ways of criticizing this instrumentalist defense of the Homo 
Economicus model16. First, one can argue that economics has a poor record in 
predicting  individual  behavior.  Sen  (1987:  79),  for  example,  stresses  that 
framing all behavior in terms of self-interest “is hard to justify on grounds of 
predictive  usefulness,  and  it  also  seems  to  have  rather  dubious  empirical 
support”.  As  I  have  tried  to  show,  the  economic  conception  of  rationality 
grossly fails to predict how actual people behave in a number of instances. 
Second,  one  can  argue  that  the  realism  of  the  assumptions  underlying  the 
Homo Economicus model does matter. The main goal of science is not to 
predict but to explain phenomena. That is why each scientific model aims to 
represent (something in) the real world. While it is hard to decide in a definitive 
way whether the model is true or false, it is in fact either true or false. If one 
wants to be an instrumentalist like Friedman, one has to accept that economists 
are only trying to predict phenomena and cannot provide any insight into the 
nature of individual actions and their social consequences (Caldwell 1982: 183-
186). In this respect, I believe that the aspects of human behavior that cannot 
be understood as economically rational are indispensable to understand what it 
is to be human. In my view, scientific models that make abstraction of the 
characteristic core of their objects are thoroughly deficient. The view that some 
degree of realism is an important criterion to evaluate them does not imply that 
they should completely reflect the actual – and indeed highly complex – world 
(Caldwell 1982: 39). 
This methodological discussion has a philosophical background that needs to 
be made explicit. In this respect, I want to refer to Bernard Williams’ well-
known distinction between “internal and external reasons” (Moser 1990: 387). 
Williams aims to analyze what it means when one says that an individual has a 
reason  to  perform  an  action.  According  to  the  internal  interpretation,  the 
individual at hand actually has a motive that drives him to perform this action. 
According to the external interpretation, this is not necessarily the case. The 
latter corresponds to Friedman’s instrumentalist view, in which the individual 
may – but does not necessarily – have the reasons that would drive him to act 
in the same way as he would do if he had these reasons. 
According to Williams, the internal interpretation is the only valid one when 
one tries to explain individual behavior as rational. If something is a reason for 
an  action,  then  it  must  figure  in  an  explanation  of  this  action  and, 
consequently, it must motivate the individual at hand to perform this action. 
The external interpretation neglects the question which motives the individual 
                                                 
16 In my fifth chapter on James Buchanan’s theory of constitutional choice, I criticize 
Buchanan’s way of defending a specific form of this instrumentalist methodology. For 
now, I hope two general remarks suffice to point out the main problems. Part I: Rationality 
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actually  has.  As  such,  it  can  never  provide  an  adequate  explanation  of  his 
action. In Williams’ own words, “if something can be a reason for action, then 
it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion, and it would 
then figure in an explanation of that action. Now no external reason statement 
could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s action (…). The whole point of 
external reason statements is that they can be true independently of the agent’s 
motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except 
something that motivates him so to act” (Moser 1990: 392). Of course, an 
external reason can become internal when an individual becomes convinced 
that it is a good reason to act on. However, as long as the individual himself 
does not endorse it, it cannot explain his actions. 
This implies that Friedman’s methodology is inappropriate within the social 
sciences. If one is trying to explain an individual’s behavior, one should refer to 
his actual set of motives. If an individual is driven by an internalized norm, one 
best explains his behavior by referring to this fact, just like one best explains 
the position of the tree’s leaves by referring to what actually goes on inside 
(namely a process of photosynthesis through which plants extract energy from 
sunlight to produce adenosine triphosphate)17. 
To explain an individual’s actions, one should not just provide a story of which 
the outcome corresponds to these actions, but one should show what causes 
him to act in such a way. In order to understand him as rational, one must 
demonstrate that he performs his actions because of the reasons he has and 
not because some accidental cause happens to produce this behavior (Elster 
1986:  13).  While  an  individual  can  do  what  is  best  for  him  without  even 
knowing it, this does not count as rational, since he does not perform this 
action for this reason. From the fact that there might exist some reason for a 
particular  action  (external  interpretation)  one  may  not  conclude  that  the 
individual  actually  has  performed  this  action  for  that  reason  (internal 
interpretation). Doing the (objectively) ‘rational’ kind of thing does not entail 
that  the  individual  is  (subjectively)  rational  when  doing  it.  As  Robert  Audi 
rightly stresses, “a particular action should be considered rational in virtue of a 
set of beliefs and wants expressing reasons for it, only if these wants and beliefs 
                                                 
17 To rephrase this thought, I focus on the internal or first-person perspective, which 
means that I aim to explain behavior by referring to the considerations, motives and 
reasons  that  motivate  the  individual  at  hand.  In  contrast,  evolutionary  theorists  for 
example, underline the external or third-person perspective, arguing that behavior always 
unconsciously  serves  the  individual’s  fitness  in  the  struggle  for  life.  Similarly,  game 
theorists  tend  to  argue  that  behavior  always  benefits  the  individual  that  performs  it, 
regardless whether or not this is deliberately aimed at. I acknowledge that actions might, 
in  fact,  be  in  the  self-interest  of  an  individual  (external),  even  though  they  are  not 
performed out of self-interest (internal).  Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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play  a  role  in  generating  or  sustaining  it”  (Moser  1990:  427).  In  his  view, 
external  reasons  statements  are  thoroughly  misleading  because  they  cut 
“rational actions off from the system of propositional attitudes from which, by 
virtue of an explanatory connection, they derive their rationality” (Moser 1990: 
445).  Since  rationality  consists  in  the  inherent  link  between  an  individual’s 
actions and his reasons for performing them, the external interpretation of 
reasons is simply incoherent (Moser 1990: 395). 
This  also  relates  to  the  discussion  on  the  distinction  between  reasons  and 
causes. Whereas unintentional behavior (falling to the ground) is explained by 
referring to what causes it (a stone over which one trips), intentional behavior 
is explained adequately only if one sees what its purpose is. This distinction 
underlies  the  dichotomy  between  (natural)  sciences  that  aim  to  explain  the 
causal history of events (Erklären) and (social) sciences that aim to understand 
the reasons behind particular events or behavior (Verstehen) (Pettit 2002: 159). 
In my view, however, this dichotomy is misleading in that there is a causal 
aspect inherent in the latter sort of explanation as well. As Davidson (1982: 
293) rightly argues, “the reasons an agent has for acting must, if they are to 
explain the action, be the reasons on which he acted; the reasons must have 
played a causal role in the occurrence of the action (…). Since beliefs and 
desires  are  causes  of  the  actions  for  which  they  are  reasons,  reason 
explanations  include  an  essential  causal  element”.  If  such  accounts  are  to 
explain actions, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the individual has a 
reason for them and performs them, one should also show that it was this 
reason why he did it: “central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the 
reason” (Davidson 1980: 9).  
In the end, one may wonder where the value of economics lies as it is currently 
performed  in  academic  circles  around  the  world18.  To  be  sure,  I  have  no 
quarrel with economists who accept that their model provides only a partial 
explanation. The problem, however, arises as soon as they treat their model as 
the only valid one and start to argue that all people in all circumstances act as 
their model predicts. This is what happened in the transition from classical to 
neoclassical economics. Economists like Edgeworth (1881: 17) applied their 
models only to specific domains, like the conduct of war and the signing of 
contracts, where an egoistic cost-benefit calculus is a plausible motive. Since 
then, however, economists increasingly applied their models to actions outside 
these  traditional  domains.  This  so-called  “economic  imperialism”  (Tullock 
                                                 
18 While I happily acknowledge and applaud the fact that (some) insights seem to gain 
more  attention  amongst  (some)  economists,  I  want  to  focus  in  this  dissertation  on 
possible ways of criticizing and complementing economics as it is currently practiced. Part I: Rationality 
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1972)  opens  up  possibilities  for  criticizing  the  adequacy  of  the  employed 
assumptions. While it may be so that all people are economically rational some 
of the time and some people may even be economically rational all of the time, 
it is certainly not so that all people are economically rational all of the time. 
While  consumption  decisions  are  indeed  likely  to  be  egoistically  and 
instrumentally motivated, other decisions are more likely to be based on other 
considerations. In the next part of this dissertation, for example, I will show 
that alternative conceptions of rationality are especially relevant when analyzing 
the rationality of decisions in an electoral context. 
Instead of limiting the economist’s object of study, Pettit aims to reconcile the 
economic model of human motivation (the economic mind in which egoistic 
considerations are relatively stronger than other ones) with the more everyday, 
folk psychological view (the common mind in which other considerations can 
be stronger). As I have shown extensively, this is not evident given the fact that 
“the  economic  explanation  of  individual  behavior  (…)  flies  in  the  face  of 
common sense; it conflicts with our ordinary assumptions about how we each 
feel and think in most situations” (Pettit 2002: 222). This clearly suggests that 
either common sense or economics is wrong. Nevertheless, Pettit argues that it 
is possible to reconcile both perspectives. 
In his view, the egoistic Homo Economicus is virtually present within people 
in that it refers to the limits to what they are prepared to do (Pettit 2002: 168). 
While they may generally be moved by non-egoistic dispositions under a more 
or less automatic, cultural pilot, their egoistic considerations can come into play 
as soon as the costs of some practice become greater: “at any point where a 
decision is liable to cost them dearly in self-regarding terms, the alarm bells ring 
and  prompt  them  to  consider  personal  advantage”  (Pettit  2002:  236). 
Individuals can then decide whether to listen to or ignore the alarm bells of the 
Homo  Economicus.  Pettit’s  reconciliation  allows  him  to  apply  his  model 
outside  the  traditional  area  of  market  behavior:  “the  assumptions  that 
economists  make  about  the  human  mind,  in  particular  about  human 
motivation, can be rendered consistent with the assumptions of commonplace, 
everyday thinking. And it shows that, so interpreted, the assumptions motivate 
a promising and indeed developing programme for economic explanation: and 
explanation, not just in the traditional areas of market behaviour, but across the 
social world more generally” (Pettit 2002: 241). 
If one wants to criticize the unrealistic character of the central assumptions of 
the  economic  conception  of  rationality,  one  should  provide  an  alternative 
(Friedman  1953:  31).  While  I  do  not  aim  to  present  a  unified  body  of 
alternative models, I hope to show in the next chapter that a more pluralistic 
approach in the social sciences is desirable. However, while the imperialistic Chapter 1: The Economic Conception of Rationality 
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tendency of economics is to be opposed, I see no help coming from a wide 
range of disciplines that perform their own research in a fragmented way. That 
is why I continue to focus on the notion of rationality and show the plausibility 
and desirability of a number of alternative conceptions of what this notion 
exactly means. CHAPTER 2 
 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF RATIONALITY 
 
 
“We believe that there is a real and extensive domain where economic man is a 
useful, analytically powerful abstraction (…). What we cannot accept, however, is 
that there is nothing ‘beyond economic man’ (…). What we see in the ‘beyond’ is 
the essential and distinctive human”  
(Lutz, in: Koslowski 1985: 116) 
 
1. Minimal rationality 
 
All of the abovementioned failures of the Homo Economicus model to explain 
actual behavior lead me to conclude that it simply cannot serve as a general and 
exclusive  conception  of  rationality.  Instead  of  dismissing  it  in  its  totality, 
however, I want to arrive at alternative conceptions by amending some of its 
requirements.  In  what  follows,  I  want  to  loosen  the  requirements  of  the 
economic conception of rationality that are too demanding. This way, I want to 
arrive at a less restrictive and thus more general conception that stipulates the 
minimal conditions to speak of rationality. In what follows, I will therefore 
analyze to what extent the phenomena that are economically irrational are also 
irrational in a more intuitive sense of the word. Whenever this is not the case, I 
will  eliminate  the  requirement  from  this  minimal  conception  of  rationality. 
Here too, I will distinguish between the level of the relation between actions 
and their reasons and the level of the reasons themselves. 
 




First, I want to argue that the requirement of maximization is too strict to be 
retained in a minimal conception of rationality. The definition of rationality as 
the  maximization  of  preference  satisfaction  does  not  fit  the  intuitive  and 
everyday use of the word (Van Liedekerke 2002: 111). Michael Slote (1989: 1) Part I: Rationality 
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bases his criticism of this assumption on what he labels an “ordinary intuitive 
understanding of practical rationality”. He argues that maximization is not part 
of  it: “our  common-sense  intuitions  about rationality  treat  some actions  as 
rationally  acceptable  even  though  their  consequences  are  less  than  the 
circumstantially best possible for their agents” (Slote 1989: 30). Some form of 
satisficing or moderation is not irrational, especially given the limited human 
capacities to process large amounts of complex information (Slote 1989: 11-
12). Slote (1989: 65) argues that individuals who systematically try to maximize 
the  satisfaction  of  their  preferences  would  be  labeled  irrational  by  most 
standards:  “something  seems  to  be  inherently  irrational  about  trying  to  do 
better when things are already satisfactory in every way”. Consequently, he 
concludes that the maximization requirement cannot function as a necessary or 
sufficient condition to speak of rationality (Slote 1989: 47).  
Jon Elster mentions three cases where a strategy of satisficing is inevitable, 
namely complete indifference (in which case the individual deems no specific 
option optimal), complete uncertainty (in which case the individual does not 
know which option to deem optimal) and some strategic settings (in which case 
there  is  no  single  solution  that  is  deemed  optimal  by  all  parties  involved): 
“these provide the special argument for satisficing (...). When the course of action 
‘than which none better’ is not defined, one will have to go for something that 
is good enough or satisfactory, rather than optimal” (Elster 1983: 14). In addition, 
Elster argues that there is an aspect of satisficing inherent in each choice. The 
fact that one does not know beforehand how much information to collect 
before taking a decision provides the general argument for satisficing. While it is 
clearly not rational to base one’s actions on no information whatsoever, the 
same is true for the strategy of endlessly collecting information. At a certain 
point, one simply has to make a decision: “a rational man will make a choice, 
rather  than  procrastinate  indefinitely”  (Elster  1986:  19).  For  example, 
“Buridan’s ass, which died of hunger being unable to decide which of the two 
haystacks in front of it happened to be superior, could have rationally chosen 
either of the haystacks, since it had good reason for choosing either rather than 
starving  to  death”  (Sen  1987:  68).  Because  rationality  clearly  does  not 
necessarily presuppose maximization, I propose to eliminate the latter from the 
minimal conception of rationality. 
In my view, it is crucial to stress that the individual’s goals are defined by 
himself so that it is perfectly possible for him to be happy with a suboptimal 
level of preference satisfaction19. Of course, the issue then arises which level a 
                                                 
19 This also shows that the minimal conception of rationality is still subjective in nature. 
It is the individual himself who chooses the option that he deems desirable in the light of 
his own beliefs and preferences. Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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rational individual will satisfactory. In this respect, satisficing theories tend to 
be become rather ‘ad hoc’. Whatever behavior is observed, they can refer to 
some aspiration level that corresponds to it. Until more psychological research 
is done in this respect, such theories only describe the behavior at hand instead 
of actually explaining it. Even though he wants to move away from an all too 
demanding conception of rationality, Elster (1986: 26) argues that the latter still 
has the advantage of being more general and more simple than its alternatives: 
“neoclassical economics will be dethroned if and when satisficing theory and 
psychology  join  forces  to  produce  a  simple  and  robust  explanation  of 
aspirations  levels  (…).  Until  this  happens,  the  continued  dominance  of 
neoclassical theory is ensured by the fact that one cannot beat something with 
nothing”. In this respect, I believe Simon’s satisficing theory is best interpreted 
as complementing the conventional theory when the latter fails rather than 




Second, I want to move away from the instrumental character of economic 
rationality. In my view, minimal rationality of actions requires only that they are 
based on what the individual at hand believes are good reasons. Here, I want to 
argue that the notion of a reason is broader than that of a goal. The economic 
focus on actions that are instrumentally aimed at the achievement of some goal 
leads  to  an  all  too  narrow  conception  of  rationality:  “it  is  a  thin  view  of 
rationality that reduces all rational action to instrumental action” (Miller 1990: 
268). Robert Nozick (1993: 133) rightfully argues that instrumental conception 
of  rationality  is  a  powerful  one,  but  questions  whether  it  is  the  only  one: 
“instrumental rationality is the base state. The question is whether it is the whole 
of rationality”. 
In this respect, I take on Donald Davidson’s broad definition of a reason as 
“some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind” (Davidson 1980: 
4).  He  mentions  different  sorts  of  reasons,  like  “desires,  wantings,  urges, 
promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic 
prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far 
as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a 
certain kind” (Davidson 1980: 4). According to Thomas Scanlon (1998: 23), 
rational actions are based on considerations that the individual himself judges 
to be reasons worth acting on. In his view as well, “to take there to be a reason 
for something is just to see some consideration as counting in favor of it” 
(Scanlon 1998: 50).  Part I: Rationality 
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For an action to be rational in the minimal sense, it should not always be a 
means towards the realization of some goal. While this may count as a reason, 
the latter encompasses much more: “a reason rationalizes an action only if it 
leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action – 
some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, 
prized  held  dear,  thought  dutiful,  beneficial,  obligatory,  or  agreeable” 
(Davidson 1980: 3). Later on, I will go into the issue how to analyze non-
instrumental reasons in a coherent way. 
Raymond Boudon also argues that actions based on reasons should be labeled 
rational,  even  though  they  are  not  aimed  at  achieving  some  goal.  He 
disconnects rationality from instrumentality as well: “rationality should also be 
defined for unpurposeful actions such as believing in a theory. On the whole 
rationality cannot be applied only to purposive actions” (Boudon 1993: 10). In 
his  “synthetic  theory  of  rationality”  (Boudon  1993:  18),  he  aims  to  apply 
rationality to both purposive and non-purposive actions, since both types of 
action can be based on good reasons: “a purposive action is rational iff (if and 
only if) X has good reasons for doing Z. Unpurposive actions are rational iff X 
has good reasons for being convinced by a theory T, to feel indignation when 
such and such an act is committed, etc.” (Boudon 1993: 10). In my view, these 
remarks are best understood as expanding the notion of rationality in two ways. 
First, they show the necessity to define the rationality of reasons in addition to 
that of actions. Second, they show that a purely instrumental framework is too 
narrow  to  define  rationality.  After  all,  the  rationality  of  one’s  beliefs  (in  a 
theory,  for  example)  does  not  depend  on  the  question  whether  these  help 




Third, Boudon’s use of the notion ‘purpose’ raises the question how minimal 
rationality relates to intentionality. While it might suggest that he is arguing 
against intentionality as a criterion of rationality, I contend that believing in a 
theory is clearly not instrumental but certainly intentional in nature. Beliefs are 
aimed at something – namely the truth of a theory – but not in the way means 
are aimed at ends. I thus believe that Boudon is wrong when he calls believing 
in  a  theory  not  only  “non-instrumental”  but  also  “unintentional”  (Boudon 
1993: 5). Whereas intentions are indeed situated at the level of the relation 
between actions and their reasons, intentionality can also be predicated from 
reasons themselves. Both beliefs and preferences are propositional attitudes 
that are about something and that refer to an intentional object.  Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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It is important to see that unintentional behavior, like tripping over a stone, is 
arational rather than irrational. To explain such behavior, one needs to refer to 
causes  other  than  his  beliefs  and  preferences.  Bodily  movements  that  fall 
completely outside the domain of intentionality and rationality should thus be 
understood as unintentional and arational. In contrast, other actions are still 
rightly labeled intentional and minimally rational, even though they are based 
on  certain  habits  and  traditions.  While  visiting  one’s  parents  every  Sunday 
afternoon  is  a  habit  that  is  performed  almost  automatically  without  much 
deliberation, one may still have good reasons for doing so (Moser 1990: 444). 
In this respect, Robert Nozick argues that actions (and beliefs for that matter) 
are rational if they are responsive to reasons for and against them. However, 
this does not imply some purely calculating attitude: “responsiveness to reasons 
does not require explicit consideration of them. Rationality can be modest and 
choose  to  step  aside  sometimes  or  even,  in  some  types  of  circumstances, 
almost always” (Nozick 1993: 106). While norm-guided actions are clearly not 
instrumentally motivated, they are still intentional20. The minimal conception 
of rationality thus allows one to understand such non-instrumental behavior as 
rational. In my view, internalized norms can thus be conceived as part of an 
individual’s set of reasons.  
In  this  respect,  I  deem  it  useful  to  distinguish  between  different  forms  of 
norm-guided behavior. First, there is norm-guided behavior as it appears in the 
Homo Sociologicus model. Such unconscious and purely mechanical behavior 
cannot be called rational in any sense of the word. It is caused by all kinds of 
impulses without these ever constituting a reason for his actions. Second, there 
is non-instrumental behavior that the individual performs for good reasons21. 
One’s reasons for following norms do not necessarily consist of goals one 
wants to achieve. Following the norm to tell the truth, for example, can be 
called rational in the everyday meaning of the word if this norm is internalized 
and  thus  forms  the basis  of  a  preference.  In  this  respect,  it  would  be  too 
simplistic and downright incorrect to systematically understand each instance 
                                                 
20 In some cases, these reasons even fit the economic conception of rationality. As I will 
explain more fully in the next chapter, such actions can still be called irrational in another 
sense of the word if they violate more demanding requirements of other conceptions of 
rationality. If they do not allow the individual to maximize the satisfaction of his egoistic 
preferences, for example, such behavior is rightly called economically irrational. 
21 One can, for example, decide to follow norms of etiquette, because one wants to avoid 
social  sanctions  connected  to  the  violation  of  these  norms.  However,  norm-guided 
behavior is often not motivated by such a calculus. In addition, one can question whether 
such economically rational behavior can still be called norm-guided. Since one’s actions 
are in accordance with the norm but are not caused by a respect for the norm, the 
connection with the norm is rather arbitrary. In this case, a theory referring to norms 
does not form an adequate explanation of the resulting behavior. Part I: Rationality 
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of norm-guided behavior as irrational. Yet, this is exactly what happens if one 
understands the distinction between rational and norm-guided behavior as a 
dichotomy  between  conscious,  intentional  behavior  and  unconscious, 
mechanistic behavior. 
The  way  in  which  Boudon  reduces  norm-guided  behavior  to  the  blind, 
mechanical  behavior  of  the  Homo  Sociologicus  and  juxtaposes  it  to  the 
rational behavior of the Homo Economicus is overly simplifying. Moreover, it 
leads to an all too simple equation of norm-guided behavior with irrationality: 
In this respect, I agree with Antoon Vandevelde (1993: 85), who argues that 
“the distinction between the Homo oeconomicus and the Homo sociologicus (…) is 
presented as one between conscious intentions on one hand and unconscious 
drives or causes on the other hand. In fact this characterization of the Homo 
sociologicus makes it a much too easy target for criticism”. In contrast, I want to 
keep  middle  ground  between  a  dichotomous  distinction  between  a  norm-
guided Homo Sociologicus and a rational Homo Economicus on the one hand 
and a complete rationalization of norms on the other hand. The latter strategy 
has often been employed by economists. However, their attempts to explain 
the  existence  and  functioning  of  norms  in  a  completely  instrumental 
framework  have  failed,  for  the  simple  reason  that  norms  indeed  form  a 
motivation independent from economically rational considerations. Instead of 
understanding norms as supra-individual entities that drive individual actions, I 
want to conceive of them as emotional and psychological propensities within 
the individual itself (Elster 1991: 113-114). This is exactly where the value of a 
minimal conception of rationality lies. It allows one to understand norm-guided 
behavior  within  a  methodologically  individualist  framework,  while  it  has 
traditionally been understood as lying outside, beyond and opposite to this 
framework. 
To show that norm-guided behavior can still be intentional in nature, I want to 
refer to distinguish between the following of a rule – or a norm, for that matter 
– and conforming to it: “the notion of following a rule, as it is conceived here, 
involves an important element over and beyond that of conforming to a rule. 
The conformity must be intentional, being something that is achieved, at least 
in part, on the basis of belief and desire. To follow a rule is to conform to it, 
but the act of conforming (…) must be intentional. It must be explicable, in the 
appropriate way, by the agent’s beliefs and desires” (Pettit 2002: 27). Whenever 
I talk about norm-guided behavior, I am thus referring to people following 
norms. 
 Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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1.2. The level of the reasons themselves: beliefs 
 
I  now  want  to  focus  on  the  level  of  the  reasons  themselves,  and  more 




First,  an  individual  with  inconsistent beliefs  is  called  irrational,  even  in  the 
common sense of the word: “if someone asserts ‘p and not-p’ we cannot even 
grasp what he has in mind” (Elster 1979: 151). Therefore, I will hold on to this 
requirement in the minimal conception of rationality.  
 
1.2.2. Perfect rationality 
 
Second, the requirements of perfect rationality are too demanding to fit such a 
minimal conception. As I have already suggested, it is often rational for people 
to make a decision on the information available to them at the time. Even 
though their beliefs are far from perfectly informed, they inevitably form the 
basis of their actions. In addition, an individual is not necessarily irrational if he 
makes a choice without performing detailed calculations about the probabilities 
of  all  possible  consequences  of  all  alternative  options.  Simon’s  bounded 
conception of rationality shows that rationality cannot be reduced to a theory 
of idealized choice situations, like in the economic conception of rationality. 
His  conception  is  based  on  an  explicit  recognition  of  the  limits  of  human 
cognition (Simon 1957: 2, 158). 
Robbins (1935: 93-94) already argued that these requirements at the cognitive 
level are too stringent to be fulfilled by actual individuals. These assumptions 
are  to  be  understood  as  theoretical  idealizations  of  what  rationality  ideally 
entails at the level of beliefs (Pettit 2002: 196; Vromen 1998: 28). Since then, 
however, most economists have neglected Robbins’ methodological warnings. 
In  contrast,  I  want  to  take  heed  of  his  remarks  by  eliminating  these 
requirements in the minimal conception of rationality. Since I retain only the 
requirement of consistency, minimal rationality at the level of beliefs is very 
formal indeed. The only difference with Robbins is that he continues to frame 
this  in  terms  of  the  Homo  Economicus  model,  while  I  distinguish  the 
economic from the minimal conception of rationality in order to get both as 
conceptually clear as possible. Part I: Rationality 
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1.3. The level of the reasons themselves: preferences 
 
The same is true at the level of preferences, where I want to hold on to the 
conditions of consistency, transitivity and egocentrism. In my view, individuals 




First,  I  want  to  distinguish  between  weak  and  strong  inconsistency.  Weak 
inconsistency  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  an  individual  has  inconsistent 
preferences  at  different  moments  in  time.  Since  he  does  not  violate  the 
consistency requirement as set out above – never to prefer a over b and b over 
a at the same time – I propose not to call him irrational. Strong inconsistency, 
however, means that a single individual prefers a over b and b over a at the 
same time, like the addict who wishes to quit but still longs for another drink. 
As long as he does not make up his mind in some definitive way, he is rightly 
called  irrational.  I  therefore  suggest  maintaining  this  requirement  within  a 
minimal conception of rationality. This is in line with Sen (1977: 323) who 
contrasts the Homo Economicus with a rational individual, of whom he only 




Second, I want to argue that a minimally rational individual has not only a 
consistent, but also a transitive preference function (Elster 1982: 122; Elster 
1983:  10;  Margolis  1984:  6;  Moser  1990:  410).  An  intransitive  preference 
function  is  rightly  considered  as  irrational,  because  it  leads  to  “the 
phenomenon  of  improving  oneself  to  death”  (Elster  1983:  26).  If  an  individual 
prefers a over b, he will be prepared to give money to exchange b for a. If he 
also prefers c over a and b over c, this also holds for exchanging a for c and c for 
b. This way, he will end up holding the same goods than in the initial situation 
(b) but with less money than before. If he does not adjust his preferences, he is 
rightly labeled irrational. 





Next,  I  want  to  argue  that  the  requirements  of  completeness,  continuity, 
exogeneity and egoism are too stringent for a minimal conception of rationality 
by  showing  that  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  to  call  incomplete,  lexicographic, 
endogenously changing and altruistic preferences rational as well. An individual 
can  have  good  reasons  for  refusing  to  make  a  choice  between  killing  his 
daughter  or  his  son.  While  this  means  that  one’s  preference  function  is 
incomplete, it is clearly not irrational (Vandevelde 1994: 92). Therefore, I want 
to eliminate the requirement that individuals always have to be able to choose 




The individual whose love or moral principles are not for sale has lexicographic 
preferences.  While  this  is  economically  irrational  –  he  does  not  grab  the 
opportunity to make a lot of easy money – common sense would not label him 
irrational.  In  fact,  it  is  exactly  this  ability  to  go  beyond  the  immediate 
experience of utility that is typically human. Therefore, I want to eliminate the 
requirement  of  continuity  as  well.  Later  on,  I  will  analyze  more  fully  this 





The fact that preferences can change endogenously in the process of making a 
decision  does  not  render  them  irrational.  In  my  view,  accounts  of  how 
preferences  arise  and  change  are  perfectly  compatible  with  the  notion  of 
rationality.  People  often  upgrade  or  downgrade  some  of  their  preferences. 
Moreover, this is sometimes done for the sake of rationality, as in the case with 
the addict who avoids situations in which alcohol is available in order to get rid 
of  his  preference  for  drinking.  In  addition,  an  adequate  conception  of 
rationality should take into account that, through their actions, individuals can 
acquire  relevant  information  that  induces  them  to  change  their  preference 
ordering.  While  the  assumption  of  completely  fixed  and  thus  invariable 
preferences is too strict, its complete opposite of extremely volatile preferences 
poses problems as well. Someone whose preferences continuously shift is likely Part I: Rationality 
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to be labeled irrational in a more everyday sense of the word. In this respect, I 
want to defend the requirement of more or less stable preferences, which can 





As  I have  already  shown  extensively,  other-regarding and process-regarding 
preferences  can  be  rational  as  well.  According  to  common  sense,  there  is 
clearly nothing irrational about wanting to serve another’s interests or to insist 
on fairness and reciprocity in social interactions. The requirement of egoism is 
thus  too  stringent  and  should  be  eliminated  in  a  minimal  conception  of 
rationality.  In  this  respect,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  economic 
models, which require that people act egoistically, and rational choice models, 




To conclude, I want to hold on to the assumption of egocentrism, because this 
is  based  on  the  underlying  assumption  of  methodological  individualism. 
According  to  the  minimal  conception  of  rationality,  actions  are  to  be 
understood  as  the  result  of  an  intentional  choice  between  a  limited  set  of 
possible  alternatives  on  the  basis  of  a  subjective,  consistent  and  transitive 
preference function. According to the assumption of egocentrism, they are to 
be understood as resulting from the individual’s evaluation and judgment of 
the  available  alternatives.  Since  they  all  place  the  individual  central,  the 
concepts  of  methodological  individualism,  rationality  and  egocentrism  are 
closely connected to each other.  
 
2. Broad rationality 
 
Both the economic and the minimal conception of rationality deal with their 
own problems. Whereas the economic conception is too demanding to be a 
plausible  account  of what  rationality entails,  the minimal  conception is  too 
formal. Someone who wants to commit a murder and believes in voodoo is 
minimally rational if he sticks needles into a puppet (Elster 1983: 3). This, 
however, goes directly against the grain of everyday intuitions, according to Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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which  something  is  wrong  with  such  beliefs  (and  perhaps  also  with  such 
preferences).  Instead  of  using  vague  intuitions  as  the  ultimate  bedrock  on 
which to ground more demanding conceptions of rationality, I aim to base 
them on explicit, philosophical grounds. 
By adding more requirements, I want to give more substance to the concept of 
rationality. The resulting conceptions limit the range of phenomena that can be 
understood  as  rational  but  not  in  the  same  direction  as  the  economic 
conception.  While  this  reduces  the  explanatory  scope  of  the  concept,  it 
enhances  its  explanatory  power  (Moser  1990:  421).  This  way,  it  avoids  the 
danger  of  turning  rationality  into  a  completely  empty  notion  that  can 
rationalize each action by referring to reasons that justify that action. In what 
follows, I will first develop a broad conception of rationality, which is primarily 
based on remarks from Jon Elster. 
 
2.1. The level of actions and the relation with their reasons 
 
The basic thrust of moving from a minimal to a broad conception of rationality 
is  that  actions  should  no  longer  be  based  on  mere  reasons  but  on  good 
reasons. The extra conditions imposed by the broad conception of rationality 
are  thus  situated  primarily  at  the  level  of  the  reasons  themselves.  The 
irrationality of a person sticking needles in a puppet is located at the level of his 
beliefs  (it  is  irrational  to  believe  that  one  can  kill  someone  this  way)  and 
perhaps  his  preferences  (it  is  irrational  to  want  to  kill  someone).  When 
somebody acts on the basis of irrational beliefs or preferences, the resulting 
actions are irrational as well, but the source of this irrationality lies deeper. At 
the level of the relation between the actions and their reasons, I will thus hold 
on to the requirement of intentionality, which was the core of the minimal 
conception of rationality. 
 
2.2. The level of the reasons themselves: beliefs 
 
People are not just ‘automata’ that select the action that best satisfies their 
preferences according to their beliefs, they are also concerned whether their 
preferences and beliefs are justified. To evaluate whether this is the case, one 
can refer to the ways these arise and change. In this respect, Elster (1983: 15-
26) stipulates that beliefs should be well-informed and that preferences should 
be  autonomous.  The  main  source  of  irrationality  at  this  level  is  that  of 
irrelevant causes bypassing reasons. The resulting beliefs and preferences “are Part I: Rationality 
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shown  to  be  irrational  if  they  are  explained  by  mental  causes  that  are  not 
reasons for them” (Davidson 1982: 299). The broad conception of rationality 
thus leaves the assumption of exogenously given reasons, which dominates the 
economic conception of rationality. Instead, it analyzes whether the formation 
process of reasons satisfies certain standards. 
Boudon  (1993:  5)  argues  that  it  is  crucial  to  construct  a  conception  of 
rationality that can be applied to beliefs, since all actions are ultimately based 
on beliefs about the way the world works. As I have suggested, one needs 
specific requirements to speak of rational beliefs, because believing in a theory 
cannot be explained instrumentally. Even though beliefs are not instrumentally 
formed,  they  can  be  based  on  good  reasons.  The  broad  conception  of 
rationality thus refers to the central notion of reasons as well. It stresses that 
beliefs are rational if they are supported by reasons that make them credible 
and arise from processes that reliably produce true beliefs (Nozick 1993: 64, 
176). 
To develop all this more fully, I want to refer to the work of Jon Elster. He 
argues that the information and cognitive processes available to the individual 
are crucial to speak of rational beliefs. Instead of requiring these to be perfect – 
as the economic conception does – Elster (1983: 16; 1986: 13-14) argues that 
beliefs  should  be  properly  grounded  in  and  derived  from  the  available 
information. A belief is rational in the broad sense when it is well-informed and 
based on a sound judgment of the available information. Beliefs that go against 
the available evidence are clearly irrational. To get a better grip on what this 
exactly means, it is useful to proceed ‘ex negativo’. To summarize, beliefs are 
broadly irrational when they “are generated by belief-irrelevant causal processes, 
i.e. causal processes where the causes include not only reasons” (Elster 1979: 
130). One can distinguish between two categories of broadly irrational beliefs.  
A first category consists of beliefs arising from cognitive defects. Evidence 
from  experimental  economics  convincingly  shows  that  people  rely  on 
heuristics to assess probabilities. While these are quite useful in general, they 
sometimes lead to cognitive errors (Moser 1990: 171). Take the case where 
people are asked to estimate the odds that a Third World War will break out in 
the next year. If the options are ranked from zero to hundred percent, the 
average answer will be lower compared to when one ranks them from hundred 
to  zero percent  (Elster  1989a:  34-35). Here,  one  can  speak  of  an  unsound 
judgment and thus of a broadly irrational belief. Another factor that can cause 
a cognitive bias in belief formation processes is the tendency of people to 
attach more importance to concrete than to abstract information. Unemployed 
people,  for  example,  tend  to  overestimate  the  unemployment  rate,  while 
employed people tend to underestimate it (Nisbett & Ross 1980: 19). Vivid Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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information, which is emotionally laden or close in time and space, is likely to 
have a greater weight on the formation of beliefs (Nisbett & Ross 1980: 43-51). 
Here too, there is a lack of sound judgment, which can be defined as the 
capacity  to  process  the  available  information  without  attaching  excessive 
importance to a particular part of it (Elster 1983: 16). These examples show 
that one can be rational in the minimal sense – as long as beliefs are consistent 
with other beliefs – but irrational in the broad sense. 
A  second  category  consists  of  beliefs  that  are  improperly  influenced  by 
volitional  urges.  Here,  the  best  example  is  that  of  wishful  thinking,  which 
means that individuals believe things to be as they want them to be (Elster 
1983: 148; Elster 1989a: 37-38). Since the available information is distorted by 
an irrelevant motivational bias, such beliefs are rightly called irrational. This 
defect in the belief formation process forms the main culprit of an individual’s 
irrationality. 
 
2.3. The level of the reasons themselves: preferences 
 
A  broad  conception  of  rationality  also  adds  requirements  at  the  level  of 
preferences.  Next  to  the  formal  conditions  of  consistency,  transitivity  and 
egocentrism, it stresses that preferences should be autonomously formed. Here 
too, Elster (1983: 22) proceeds to define autonomy ‘ex negativo’ by referring to 
those preferences that are surely heteronomous and thus irrational in the broad 
sense of the word. Heteronomous preferences are formed by processes over 
which the person has no control: “in such cases the individual is in the grip of 
causal forces operating ‘behind his back’ and governing his preferences in a 
way that he does not himself understand” (Elster 1979: 148). This is clearly 
irrational: “one cannot be rational if one is the plaything of psychic processes 
that, unbeknownst to oneself, shape one’s desires and values” (Elster 1989b: 6). 
I want to distinguish between two kinds of distorting influences. First, there are 
extra-mental  circumstances  that  can  have  an  impact  on  an  individual’s 
preferences beyond his control. Examples are adaptive preferences (I prefer 
something simply because it is available) and counteradaptive preferences (I 
prefer something because it is not available). The exemplary case of the former 
is La Fontaine’s story of the fox that no longer prefers the grapes – which he 
believes to be sour – simply because they lie outside his reach (Elster 1983: 
109-140). The logic of the latter is captured in the saying that “the grass is 
always  greener  at  the  other  side  of  the  fence”  (Elster  1989a:  8-9).  Other 
examples are conformism (I prefer something simply because others do so as 
well),  anti-conformism  (I  prefer  something  simply  because  others  do  not), Part I: Rationality 
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novelty (I prefer something simply because it is new to me) and inertia (I prefer 
something simply because it was already there for me) (Elster 1989b: 6). 
Second,  there  are  mental  forces  that  have  an  impact  on  an  individual’s 
preferences  beyond  his  control.  Here  too,  one  can  distinguish  between  a 
cognitive and a motivational bias. First, empirical findings from experimental 
economists show that changes in the way equivalent options are framed cause 
preferences to shift (Tversky & Kahneman 1981: 453). Second, preferences can 
be distorted by underlying volitional forces or urges. For example, someone 
who  wants  to  quit  smoking  can  be  overwhelmed  by  a  visceral  craving  for 
nicotine. The irrationality of his longing for a smoke lies in the fact that his 
preference ordering is influenced by unconscious and irresistible drifts and thus 
changes without any reason whatsoever. 
 
3. Expressive rationality 
 
I want to argue that Elster’s broad conception of rationality is problematic, 
since  actions,  beliefs  and  preferences  that  arise  heteronomously  are  not 
necessarily irrational. Even though most actions, beliefs and preferences are 
formed under the influence of the individual’s milieu and context, this does not 
make them irrational. In this respect, I want to make use of the insights of 
Harry Frankfurt, who argues that an individual can be autonomous, even if he 
does not act on the basis of consciously, intentionally or deliberately formed 
reasons. As long as the individual identifies with his reasons and thus regards 
them  as  genuinely  his  own,  he  can  be  considered  autonomous  and  thus 
rational.  
In one passage, Elster (1986: 15) seems to agree with Frankfurt’s view: “acting 
rationally  (...)  implies  that  the  beliefs  and  desires  behind  the  action  have  a 
causal history with which we can identify ourselves”. While I will go into the 
differences  between  Elster  and  Frankfurt  in  greater  detail  later,  I  want  to 
remark here that Elster claims that rational individuals should identify with the 
causal  processes  that  lead  to  the  formation  of  reasons,  whereas  Frankfurt 
stresses that they should identify with the reasons themselves, regardless how 
they  are  formed.  Instead  of  incorporating  Frankfurt’s  insights  into  Elster’s 
broad conception of rationality, I will treat them as constituting an alternative 
and divergent conception of rationality. In contrast with Elster, who does not 
stipulate any further requirements at the level of the relation between actions 
and their reasons, Frankfurt’s views allow to do exactly this. 
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3.1. The level of actions and the relation with their reasons 
 
Actions  are  expressively  rational  when  they  express  the  identity  of  the 
individual at hand (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 148-152). They can be understood 




To explain this more fully and stress the contrast with economically rational 
actions, I want to stress that expressive actions are not means to achieve some 
goal, but actions of which the performance is a goal in itself. Take Martin 
Luther’s famous quote: “hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders”22. In response to 
the question of why he does what he does, he would probably have referred to 
what he considered the most fundamental aspects of his identity. The fact that 
he is who he is gives him a good reason for doing what he does. It is the 
symbolic meaning of the action itself that counts, not its consequences. While 
people are often not instrumentally motivated, this does not imply that they are 
necessarily irrational: “one way we are not simply instrumentally rational is in 
caring  about  symbolic  meanings,  apart  from  what  they  cause  or  produce” 
(Nozick 1993: 139). In this sense, I believe that actions can rightly be called 
rational  in  an  expressive  sense,  even  though  they  are  clearly  economically 
irrational. 
The  expressive  character  of  such  actions  cannot  be  understood  within  the 
instrumental  framework  of  economic  rationality:  “what  is  missing  in  the 
means-to-given-ends vocabulary of instrumental rationality is the open-ended 
nature of action. It is a process sense of rationality or a ‘doing’ rather than an 
‘achieving’ model of rationality which we need. One final way of describing the 
open-ended nature of some actions, which brings out why it cannot be reduced 
to instrumental rationality, is to say that expressively rational acts are ends in 
themselves. Acts which are ends in themselves are ones which are valued for 
the  ‘doing’  rather  than  the  ‘achieving’”  (Hargreaves  Heap  1989:  173-174). 
Intrinsically valued actions have no goal outside the performance itself, they do 
not fit within an instrumental framework. According to Michael Taylor (1988: 
85-86), the instrumental character of the economic conception of rationality 
has two consequences: “first, that the pleasure or benefits of any kind which 
are  got  in  the  process  of  doing  the  action,  as  opposed  to  the  value  of  the 
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consequences of the actions, must be unimportant; and second, that expressive 
motivations – the desire to be “true to one’s self”, to act consistently with one’s 
deeply held commitments, and so on – play no important role”.  
The  distinction  between  instrumental  and  expressive  considerations  thus 
largely corresponds to what psychologists have labeled extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation. If an action is extrinsically motivated, it is performed for the sake 
of some kind of reward that is external to the action itself. Take an individual 
who performs his job only because of the paycheck he receives at the end of 
the  month.  His  main  motive  for  performing  his  action  is  the  fact  that  it 
achieves  some  goal.  In  contrast,  if  an action  is  intrinsically motivated,  it  is 
performed  for  its  own  sake:  “one  is  said  to  be  intrinsically  motivated  to 
perform an activity when he receives no apparent rewards except the activity 
itself” (Deci 1971: 105). Most people who choose to read a novel, for example, 
do not aim to achieve some kind of goal or reward that is external to the 
reading of the book in itself. 
Quite  a  few  consumer  decisions,  which  form  the  preeminent  domain  of 
economists, are best explained in expressive terms (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 
160-163). The way people choose their clothes, for example, is not guided in 
the first place by an instrumental reasoning how best to protect themselves 
against wind and rain. It should rather be understood as a non-verbal form of 
communication and thus as an expression of who they are. While the fact that 
they wear clothes is best understood in instrumental terms, the fact that they 
wear these clothes rather than others is best understood in expressive terms. 
Both  conceptions  can  give  more  or  less  valid  but  essentially  different 
descriptions of the same action. In addition, it is perfectly possible for a single 
individual to act instrumentally at one moment in time, but expressively at 
another  moment.  This  also  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  some  individual 
acting instrumentally and others acting expressively in a particular situation. All 
this  shows  that  the  expressive  conception  of  rationality  complements  the 





As these examples suggest, expressive actions are still intentional in nature. 
While the requirements of maximization and instrumentality no longer hold in 
the expressive conception of rationality, the characterization of rationality in 
subjective and intentional terms thus remains in place. This allows me to come 
back  to  the  relation  between  rationality and  norms.  In  its  economic  sense, Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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rationality is inapt to explain norm-guided behavior. Since non-instrumental 
considerations can form good reasons as well, the expressive conception of 
rationality  allows  one  to  further  specify  the  thought  that  non-instrumental 
behavior can also be rational. After all, norms often help constitute a person’s 
identity: “social norms help people form (and re-form) the self, by profoundly 
influencing  their  identities,  their  worldviews,  their  views  of  themselves,  the 
projects they undertake, and thus the people they seek to become” (Etzioni 
2000: 163). 
A person who identifies with a particular group expresses this by following the 
norms and rules shared by its members. Such a community can consist of 
humanity as a whole (as a human, I follow the norm not to kill others), a 
society (as a democratic citizen, I follow the norm that voting is a good thing to 
do) or a smaller group (as a friend, I follow the norm that others should be 
helped to whatever extent possible). The motivating force of such norms can 
only be understood by referring to the fact that the individual identifies with 
the group at hand. This allows one to understand norm-guided behavior as 
expressively rational: “if norms shape people’s preferences, they will tend to 
abide  by  these  norms  because  such  adherence  is  a  source  of  intrinsic 
affirmation” (Etzioni 2000: 163). Norms thus do not only affect the costs and 
benefits attached to the choice alternatives, but can also become part of his 
motivational array. This way, a view of the individual arises that lies beyond the 
dichotomy between the Homo Economicus and the Homo Sociologicus. He is 
not exclusively motivated by instrumental considerations how best to serve his 
interests, but neither is he completely overwhelmed by social forces.  
The rationality of instrumental acts depends on the extent to which they help 
achieve  the  desired goal.  The rationality  of  expressive acts depends on the 
extent to which they express the reasons with which the individual identifies. 
The notion of identification is crucial, since it allows one to understand a wide 
range of phenomena that cannot be grasped within the economic conception 
of  rationality. Relevant  in  this  respect are  issues  that  are often heavily and 
emotionally debated (like nationalism, religion, racism, gender, and so on) or 
more everyday phenomena (like empathy with and caring for one’s friends or 
one’s favorite sports team). Identification can thus be defined as “regarding 
one’s self as part of a whole (…) and caring about the fate of that whole (…). 
This same pattern of thinking is present in deeper and more pervasive types of 
identification – with family, clan, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. The “I” is 
defined by relation to a “we.” Human beings don’t simply belong to groups; 
they identify with them” (Sober & Wilson 1998: 233). 
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3.2. The level of the reasons themselves: beliefs 
 
The broad conception of rationality postulates that well-informed beliefs and 
autonomous preferences count as good reasons. The expressive conception 
stresses that good reasons are fundamentally connected to one’s personality. If 
an individual acts on the basis of reasons with which he identifies, his actions 
are authentic and thus expressively rational. Some beliefs are an essential part 
of an individual’s deeply-rooted identity. If he acts on the basis of such beliefs, 
he expresses his identity and is thus expressively rational. The source of such 
rational actions is ultimately situated at the relation between his beliefs and his 
deeply-rooted identity. As the example of Luther shows, one can have good 
reasons for having certain convictions and for basing one’s actions on them. In 
this respect, I want to call such beliefs – and the resulting actions – expressively 
rational.  
Since it is impossible to authentically believe in a proposition and its negation, 
the requirement of consistency remains valid in the expressive conception of 
rationality. In this respect, I also want to stress that beliefs are not to be treated 
as  exogenously  given.  While  their  formation  is  essentially  a  byproduct  that 
cannot be attained in a deliberate and intentional way (Elster 1979: 49-50), 
individuals can reflect upon and revise their beliefs. I will go into this thought 
more fully when discussing the expressive rationality of preferences. First, I will 
give some general suggestions what this entails. Next, I will give an overview to 
what  extent  the  requirements  of  economic  rationality  still  hold  in  the 
expressive conception of rationality. 
 
3.3. The level of the reasons themselves: preferences 
 
Like  actions  and  beliefs,  preferences  are  expressively  rational  if  they  are 
connected to an individual’s deepest sense of who he is. Rationality not only 
concerns decisions how to attain certain ends, but also which ends to attain23. 
Since these can and should undergo rational scrutiny as well, the question arises 
how one can rationally choose the goals that provide one with something to 
                                                 
23 Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998: 280-281) frame this issue in what they 
label  substantive  rationality:  “philosophers  disagree  about whether  “rationality”  refers 
just to the narrow ability to choose efficient means to achieve whatever ends one might 
have (sometimes called “instrumental” rationality) or should be understood in a fuller 
sense  to  mean  that  the  ends  themselves  are  morally  defensible  (“substantive” 
rationality)”. Nozick (1993: 163) also speaks of the “substantive rationality” of desires 
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live  for.  Economists  have  the  tendency  to  neglect  such  crucial  issues: 
“economic imperialism tends to reduce all acts of choice and the selection of 
goals to allocative problems of selecting means for ends” (Koslowski 1985: 8). 
As Nozick (1993: 139) argues, the rationality of these very ends cannot be 
framed in purely instrumental terms: “something is instrumentally rational with 
respect to given goals, ends, desires, and utilities when it is causally effective in 
realizing or satisfying these. But the notion of instrumental rationality gives us 
no way to evaluate the rationality of these goals, ends, and desires themselves”. 
John Harsanyi agrees that the basic problem of the economic conception of 
rationality “lies in the fact that it restricts rational behavior to a choice among 
alternative means to a given end, and fails to include a rational choice among 
alternative ends. Therefore, it cannot explain why a given person may shift from 
one end to another” (Moser 1990: 275). Sen (1987: 13-14) also believes that it 
is this capacity that is missing in both the economic and minimal conception of 
rationality,  stressing  that  these  should  “be  supplemented  by  rationality 
requirements on the nature of the reflection regarding what one should want, 
value, or aim at”.  
An expressively rational person can be said to possess his preferences rather 
than that his preferences possess him: “it is not enough for an individual to 
have a set of preferences; it is important that those desires be his or hers in a 
more active sense. They should belong to the individual because he/she has 
come through reflection to hold them as his/her own” (Hargreaves Heap 1989: 
148-149). This thought complements Elster’s broad conception of rationality, 
which centers round the notion of autonomy. It shows that rational people 
want  to  be  autonomous,  not  because  it  helps  them  realize  their  goals,  but 
because they want their actions to say something of who they are. In order to 
qualify  as  rational,  people  should  be  autonomous,  which  means  that  they 
should  use  standards  and  criteria  that  they  have  critically  scrutinized  and 
regards  as  authentically  their  own  (Taylor  1988:  87).  The  good  reasons  an 
autonomous  person  has  for  his  actions  are  derived  from  his  character,  his 
identity, his real self, what and who he essentially is. The crucial issue is that 
expressing all this is a perfectly rational way of acting in accordance with them: 
“action is rational if it manifests attitudes, values, or principles that it would be 
inconsistent in a person, under appropriate conditions, not to give expression 
to, given the character that he is generally content to acknowledge as his own” 
(Benn 1979: 294).  
Expressively  rational  actions  are  based  on  the  fundamental  things  that 
constitute a person’s identity: “it is important for us to guide our activity in 
accordance with the requirements of what we care about” (Frankfurt 1999: 84). 
However, this should not lead one to simply take these cares and the identity Part I: Rationality 
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that is based on them as rock bottom to explain expressive actions: “without an 
explanation  of  how  such  commitments  and  identifications  are  made,  this 
explanation of actions and their interactions is incomplete” (Taylor 1988: 89). 
In this respect, it is crucial to see that human beings have the distinctive ability 
to reflect upon, criticize and revise their own ends, goals and preferences. In 
contrast with Schmidtz (1993: 55), who speaks of a reflective conception of 
rationality, I deem it useful to incorporate this within an expressive conception 
of rationality. 
This reflective capacity cannot be captured within the economic conception of 
rationality:  “whereas  Homo  economicus  deliberates  only  about  alternative 
means of achieving stipulated ends, we also deliberate about ends themselves. 
We sometimes stop to wonder whether an end like maximizing profit is worth 
having. We have self-regarding ends, to be sure, but they are not given to us in 
the same way they are given to Homo economicus. On the contrary, we shape 
ourselves and our ends as we go. We are the outcomes as well as the makers of 
our choices (…). Thus, Homo economicus is a poor model of rational choice 
even  when  self-interest  is  all  that  matters,  for  even  then  there  is  a  crucial 
difference between Homo economicus and beings like us. The difference is 
this: we need to worry about our goals in a way that Homo economicus does 
not” (Schmidtz 1994: 251). 
Schmidtz (1994: 227) distinguishes between ends that are instrumental to some 
further end and final ends that are intrinsically valued. If I want to go running, 
this may be an instrumental end for the sake of acquiring a healthy condition, 
but it may also be a final end, if I want to go running just for the sake of being 
out there running. Like Frankfurt, Schmidtz (1994: 233) stresses that final ends 
are  not  always  deliberately  chosen:  “some  people  are  simply  gripped  by 
particular final ends. They do not think of the process of acquiring those ends 
as a choice process”. Such ends serve as a normative framework that allows 
people to evaluate the ends they can acquire by choice. Against this more or 
less fixed background, some ends are perceived as more valuable than others. 
Schmidtz focuses more extensively on the end of having something to live for, 
which gives people reason to adopt all kinds of goals and reflect whether these 
are  worth  striving  for.  It  makes  them  feel  that  they  are  doing  something 
valuable, relevant and important. While unchosen ends can, of course, never be 
chosen rationally, they can be called rational if adopting them gives the person 
at hand something to live for (Schmidtz 1994: 241). This does not imply that 
people adopt ends merely in order to have something to live for. 
In this respect, I want to go deeper into Harry Frankfurt’s anthropological 
views  (Frankfurt  1988:  11-25,  47-68,  159-190;  Frankfurt  1999:  95-107). 
According to Frankfurt, what is typically human is not that one has preferences Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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upon which people base their decisions – other animal species exhibit this form 
of intentionality as well – but that people can identify with certain preferences 
and  distance  themselves  from  others.  A  dissertation  on  the  rationality  of 
individuals that fails to take into account the fact that humans are not the 
mechanistic type of being most economists take them to be would be grossly 
inadequate. 
This  capacity  to  distance  oneself  from  the  motivational  impulses  one 
experiences  cannot  be  understood  within  the  economic  conception  of 
rationality, which focuses on a consistent, complete and continuous ranking of 
preferences that are weighed off against each other. In Frankfurt’s hierarchical 
anthropology,  which  provides  a  fuller,  richer  and  more  realistic  image  of 
individuals, people can have a preference (of the second order) to be motivated 
by particular preferences (of the first order). If one identifies at a higher level 
with an already existing preference, one’s entire preference function will be 
reorganized so that the latter becomes the most important one. Crucial is that 
such  higher-order  preferences  constitute  one’s  identity,  while  first-order 
preferences consist of more or less arbitrary tendencies. Accordingly, someone 
acts expressively rational when he acts on the basis of his meta-preferences.  
This also allows one to understand how people can experience some of their 
preferences as alien to themselves. An addict who wants to quit smoking but 
still  longs  for  a  cigarette  can  go  two  ways  (Engelen  2007a:  37-38).  If  he 
identifies  with  his  desire  to  smoke,  he  becomes  a  willing  addict  who  acts 
rationally  in  all  meanings  of  the  word  when  he  smokes.  However,  if  he 
identifies with his preference to quit, he becomes an unwilling addict and starts 
to experience the preference to smoke as alien, inauthentic and thus not really 
his own. If he decides to light a cigarette nonetheless, this may be economically 
rational, but surely expressively irrational: “what motivates his action is a desire 
by which, given the alternatives he confronts, he does not want to be moved to 
act. There is a conflict within him, between a first-order desire to do what he 
actually does and a second-order volition that this first-order desire not be 
effective in determining his action (…). In the conflict from which his action 
emerged, he was defeated by a force with which, although it issued from inside 
of him, he did not identify himself (…). In this respect it is alien to him” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 48). 
Like Elster, Frankfurt points at the importance of factors that underlie the one-
dimensional  Homo  Economicus  and  his  smoothly  ordered  preference 
function.  As  mentioned  above,  Elster’s  broad  and  Frankfurt’s  expressive 
conception of rational preferences are closely connected. An individual acts 
rationally  if  his  motivations  consist  of  autonomous  preferences  and  well-
informed beliefs (broad rationality) that the individual expresses through his Part I: Rationality 
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actions  (expressive  rationality).  He  acts  irrationally  if  he  is  moved  by 
heteronomous  preferences  (broad  irrationality),  which  push  the  individual 
without any process of internalization or identification (expressive irrationality). 
Yet,  there  is  a  crucial  difference  between  both.  While  Elster  stresses  the 
formation process of preferences, Frankfurt focuses on the extent to which an 
individual identifies with the resulting preferences or not (Frankfurt 1988: 54, 
170; Frankfurt 1999: 101-102). In what follows, I want to show that Frankfurt’s 
approach has a number of advantages over Elster’s. 
First, it allows one to understand preferences as authentically one’s own, even 
though they have arisen independently from one’s will and choice. According 
to  Frankfurt,  it  does  not  matter  whether  one’s  preference  is  formed 
autonomously but whether one has made it constitutive of his will. This way, 
one can act freely and autonomously on the basis of a preference that has come 
about heteronomously. For willing addicts who identify with their preference 
to smoke, it is completely rational to smoke, even if this preference has arisen 
heteronomously.  After  all,  it  expresses  how  they  think  of  themselves.  For 
unwilling  addicts,  who  identify  with  the  preference  to  quit  smoking,  it  is 
irrational to smoke. Whereas Elster argues that this irrationality arises from the 
fact  that  a  blind  motivational  urge  for  cigarettes  overwhelms  one’s  other 
motives,  Frankfurt  (1999:  136)  argues  that  it  is  not  the  blindness  or  the 
irresistibility of this urge that matters but the fact that one has not identified 
with  it.  While  Elster  suggests  the  right  direction,  Frankfurt  more  plausibly 
locates the exact source of this irrationality. 
Second,  Frankfurt’s  views  allow  one  to  move  further  away  from  an 
instrumental conception of rationality than Elster’s broad conception does. In 
contrast  to  the  latter,  the  first  suggests  that  people  do  not  want  to  be 
autonomous in order to achieve their goals better. Instead, they simply want to 
express themselves through their preferences and actions, since they want their 
lives to be meaningful. This clearly suggests that the instrumental framework of 
goals and means is too narrow (Frankfurt 1999: 82). 
Third, Frankfurt’s anthropology is richer than Elster’s, who stresses only first-
order  preferences  that  have  or  have  not  arisen  autonomously.  In  contrast, 
Frankfurt  (1999:  108-116)  shows  the  relevance  of  a  person’s  underlying 
identity. In this respect, Frankfurt speaks of “the things we care about most 
and with which, accordingly, we are most closely identified” (Frankfurt 1988: 
91). The use of the passive suggests that the process of identification is not to 
be  interpreted  in  a  completely  voluntaristic  way.  Nevertheless,  individuals 
sometimes  have  to  make  up  their  mind  and  decide  to  identify  with  some 
preference and distance oneself from its opposite. Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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Even  though  an  individual’s  most  fundamental  cares  are  not  typically  the 
object of a free choice, Frankfurt nevertheless stresses that individuals can, to a 
certain extent, choose them: “when someone undertakes to choose his final 
ends,  he  is  proposing  to  identify  the  goals  and  the  values  that  will  most 
basically guide and constrain his conduct. In other words, he is seeking to 
resolve the question of how he should live” (Frankfurt 1999: 91). This forms a 
constitutive moment in the construction of his identity. While one cannot but 
care about certain things, this forms no obstacle to but is a necessary condition 
to lead the life of a rational human being. After all, if these things were not 
given in some sense, one would have no basis whatsoever to adopt life projects 
(Frankfurt 1988: 94). As a result, a more substantial conception of rationality 
than the minimal one arises: “the will of a rational agent need not be, then, 
empty or devoid of substantial character. It is not necessarily altogether formal 
and contentless” (Frankfurt 1988: 190). In this respect, Frankfurt speaks of 
“fundamental rationality” (Frankfurt 1988: 188). Schmidtz (1993: 68) connects 
this to an expressive conception of rationality: “being rational in a full-blooded 
sense – developing oneself in a way that is true to oneself – is a profoundly 
demanding activity”. In other words, “we identify ourselves largely in terms of 
what we do, and therefore individual rationality requires us to do things that 
can ground the kind of self-conception we would like to have” (Schmidtz 1993: 
64). 
In  what  follows,  I  will  briefly  run  over  the  different  requirements  of  the 
economic conception of rationality at the level of preferences and try to show 




The  first  requirement  is  that  of  consistency.  On  the  basis  of  Frankfurt’s 
remarks, one can argue that inconsistency is not really problematic. Someone 
with inconsistent preferences can still be rational as long as he does not remain 
indecisive towards this inner ambivalence. Even if he identifies with one of his 
preferences, the opposite preference can continue to exist. Frankfurt (1988: 
172) stresses that inconsistent preferences often continue to exist, even after 
one has identified with one of them: “quite possibly, the conflict between the 
two desires will remain as virulent as before (…). The conflict between the 
desires is in this way transformed into a conflict between one of them and the 
person  who  has  identified  himself  with  its  rival”.  An  individual  is  thus 
expressively irrational not if he has inconsistent preferences, but if he fails to 
identify with one of these preferences or if he acts on the basis of preferences 
with which he has not identified. Irrationality thus consists in indecisiveness Part I: Rationality 
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rather than inconsistency. When a person remains indecisive which preference 
to  identify  with,  his  unity  is  at  stake  (Frankfurt  1999:  99-100).  Such  an 
individual is called a wanton. He is continuously led by arbitrary urges without 
ever asking himself whether he actually wants to be moved by them: “not only 
does  he  pursue  whatever  course  of  action  he  is  most  strongly  inclined  to 
pursue,  but  he  does  not  care  which  of  his  inclinations  is  the  strongest” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 17). A wanton has no higher-order preferences and thus “no 




The second requirement is that of transitivity. Since this is a further translation 
of  the requirement  of  consistency,  the  same  remarks  hold here as  well.  In 
addition,  one  can  argue  that  such  purely  formal  conditions  are  not  what 




The  third  requirement  is  that  of  completeness.  Here,  the  economic  and 
expressive  conceptions  of  rationality  coincide.  If  one  wants  to  be  called 
rational,  one  should  choose  between  two  options  or  decide  that  one  is 
indifferent  between  them.  Indecisiveness  is  irrational  in  both  conceptions. 
While economists emphasize the importance of one-dimensional preference 
functions for modeling purposes, authors like Frankfurt show the underlying 
rationale  of  this  condition.  If  a  person  does  not  identify  with  one  of  his 
preferences, he becomes a slave of his arbitrary urges and no longer employs 




The fourth requirement is that of continuity. In this respect, the economic and 
expressive  conceptions  of  rationality  diverge  widely.  This  condition,  which 
stresses that the individual should always be able to weigh off different options, 
turns out to be grossly inapt in an expressive conception of rationality. While 
clearly  economically  irrational,  lexicographic  preferences  fit  the  expressive 
framework perfectly. People often find it inconceivable to act against what they 
care about. They refuse to accept a decrease in one of these goods in exchange Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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for an increase in another good. Some things are so closely connected to one’s 
identity, that it is inconceivable not to honor them in one’s actions. Exactly like 
rationality implies logical constraints (one cannot belief both p and not-p), there 
are limits on what a rational person can prefer. 
Frankfurt’s hierarchical anthropology shows that some preferences are more 
closely connected to one’s deeply-rooted identity than others. Arguing that all 
goods can be substituted by other goods, economists fail to understand that 
some preferences are more fundamental than others and thus that preferences 
cannot be merged into an overall, one-dimensional preference function. In his 
evaluation of the main shortcomings of the Homo Economicus model, Mark 
Lutz  argues  that  certain  preferences  “resist  being  calculated,  quantitatively 
compared and balanced against each other. So it appears that the economists’ 
treatment of utility as a one-dimensional abstract concept is, for purposes of 
describing real human behavior, a highly misleading one” (Koslowski 1985: 
99). Next to basic material needs, which are so fundamental for one’s survival 
that they cannot be traded off, Lutz refers to moral motivations as an example 
of lexicographic preferences. He situates these at the level of a higher ‘self’ 
which conflicts with a lower ‘ego’ that is exclusively concerned only about the 
satisfaction of basic desires (Koslowski 1985: 104-107). 
Since the Homo Economicus is nothing more than a bundle of preferences, 
Lutz  properly  criticizes  it  “as  lacking  the  distinctly  human  qualities  and  so 
falling short of being the image of a genuine human” (Koslowski 1985: 103). 
This is why he has been called a moron and a fool: “the purely economic man 
is  indeed  close  to  being  a  social  moron.  Economic  theory  has  been  much 
preoccupied by this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose 
preference  ordering”  (Sen  1977:  336).  The  reduction  of  rationality  to  its 
economic  conception thus  results  in an all too  narrow view of  individuals, 
which inhibits a thorough understanding of human rationality. People are more 
than a one-dimensional bundle of mutually substitutable preferences. 
The main purpose of the expressive conception of rationality is thus to provide 
a  richer  view  of  people24.  Introducing  higher-order  and  lexicographic 
                                                 
24 Mueller (1993: 512) subscribes to my argument in favor of an image that is richer than 
the narrow one of Public Choice theorists: “too often rational, self-interested behaviour 
is  modeled  as  the  maximization  of  (…)  an  individual’s  wealth.  Although  such  stark 
simplifications  often  do  not  cause  trouble,  they  do  sometimes  lead  to  inaccurate 
predictions  (…).  Too  often  economists  (…)  reject  any  attempt  to  broaden  the 
behavioural  or  institutional  premises  of  their  models  on  the  grounds  that  such 
broadening will make their theory ad hoc; they then continue to accept the theory despite 
a very weak correspondence between its predictions and what is observed. More accurate 
predictions would be possible if we were to build our models on a richer behavioural 
base”. Part I: Rationality 
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preferences, it better captures what the life of a rational person is all about. As 
this chapter’s opening quote by Mark Lutz suggests, the Homo Economicus 
model fails to capture some of the aspects of rationality that are crucial in order 
to understand what it means to be human. Whereas the economic conception 




As should already be clear, the fifth requirement – that of exogenously given 
preferences – should be dropped in the expressive conception as well. This 
assumption is completely inadequate if one wants to take into account the fact 
that  people  can  reflect  upon,  revise  and  even  indirectly  transform  their 
preferences. The need for a radically different model of human beings in order 
to incorporate this thought is expressed by John Plamenatz (1966: 172-173), 
who  argues  that  the  conventional  view  can  stress  “that  men  are  as  much 
creatures as creators of their social environment and still fall far short of the 
truth in describing what is involved in being a social creature. Though we allow 
that men’s needs and ambitions differ greatly from society to society, and also 
that as society changes so too do the wants and interests of its members, we 
can still treat man as if he were no more than a subject of desires intent on 
satisfying as many of them as possible (…). The inadequacy of this account 
lies, not only in its hedonism and the strong (though sometimes unconscious) 
bias towards egoism, but in the quite unreal conception of what a moral and 
social being is (…). Man (…) is a self-conscious, self-communing, animal (…) 
who wants to be one kind of person rather than another and to live one kind 
of life rather than another”. 
Expressively rational persons not only think of their actions as expressing their 
identity but also realize that they have an influence on their identity. It is thus 
to some extent possible for a person to choose which life to live (Frankfurt 
1999: 91). After all, his actions partly determine the kind of person that he will 
become: “adopting one final end may lead a person to become engaged in a 
network of feeling, emotion, thought, and action that differs very considerably 
from the network in which he would be engaged if he were to adopt another. 
The life he will have if he pursues the one may therefore be much richer in 
meaningful activity, and in overall desirability, than the life he will have if he 
pursues the other” (Frankfurt 1999: 86-87). In contrast with the static model in 
which preferences are exogenously given, a more dynamic model is needed to 
incorporate  the  effects  of  one’s  choices  on  one’s  own  personality  and 
preferences: “the quality of our lives is a function not only of what we get, but 
also of what we are. And what we are, no less than what we get, depends on Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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what  we  choose  (…).  Reflectively  rational  agents  understand  that  their 
preferences can and will change over time” (Schmidtz 1993: 55).  
Preferences  and  identities  are  thus  not  only  formed  by  an  individual’s 
environment, but also by his own actions. While they are not under his direct 
control, they are influenced by the choices over which he does have control 
(Schmidtz 1990: 60). This is certainly the case for public choices. These have an 
impact on the institutional context, which in its turn forms the citizens, their 
beliefs,  preferences  and  personalities.  I  will  analyze  this  interplay  between 
individual actions and social institutions more fully in the third part of this 
dissertation. However, this same is true for private choices, such as consumer 
behavior:  “because  economic  activity  is  so  much  of  what  we  do,  it  has  a 
powerful  influence  on  who  we  are”  (Bowles  &  Gintis  1986:  127).  In  their 
criticism  of  the  economic  conception  of  rationality,  Samuel  Bowles  and 
Herbert Gintis (1986: 21) focus on the twofold relation between an individual’s 
preferences and his actions: “the individual is socially constituted in such a way 
that  preferences  and  action  are  mutually  determining,  and  hence  that 
preferences are formed through choice”. Individuals do not act only to get 
certain  things,  but  also  form  their preferences  and  their  personalities  while 
doing  so.  People  become  who  they  are  partly  through  their  own  actions. 
Intentional actions are still aimed at fulfilling one’s preferences (instrumental 
rationality),  but  one  should  realize  that  these  preferences  themselves  are 
formed by such actions (expressive rationality): “individuals and groups (...) act 
not merely to get but to become” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 22). This way, the 
endogenous formation of preferences can be incorporated in a conception of 
rationality. 
It is even possible to consciously and intentionally try to change one’s own 
preference ordering. In what can be labeled character planning, one deliberately 
aims to form particular preferences that one does not yet have (Elster 1979: 
177-179; Elster 1983: 117-118). This is rational if one has a meta-preference 
that provides a reason to develop strategies aimed at the formation of one’s 
character.  Take  a  person  who  has  a  tendency  for  laziness  (first-order 
preferences) but wants to become a sportive type (second-order preferences). 
In order to create such a personality, he can enroll for sports happenings or 
take  a  gym  subscription.  Such  attempts  to  become  someone  else  than one 
currently is are completely incomprehensible within the economic conception 
of rationality but can be interpreted within the expressive conception.  
To be sure, I do not want to defend the view that preferences are expressively 
rational only if they are deliberately formed. After all, the formation of one’s 
personality can only be achieved indirectly. The effects of one’s actions on 
one’s identity and preferences are essentially by-products and can thus never be Part I: Rationality 
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realized in a direct, intentional, conscious and deliberate way (Elster 1983: 43-
71). Nevertheless, the fact that individuals act primarily to fulfill or express 
their preferences, does not exclude the possibility that they take into account 
the  side  effects  of  their  actions  on  their  own  preferences.  Since  most 
preferences  are  not  consciously  and  intentionally  formed,  it  would  be 
preposterous to label them irrational. This is exactly why I refer to Frankfurt as 
an alternative to Elster in this dissertation on rationality. 
A good example is the role work fulfills in the life of individuals. Economists 
analyze  work  as  means  towards  the  realization  of  some  goal,  like  that  of 
receiving an income. Calculating the expected costs (loss of time) and benefits 
(increased income), the economically rational individual decides how much and 
which  work  to  perform.  This  purely  instrumental  view  does  not  take  into 
account  that  work  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  self-realization  and  self-
actualization  of  the  individual  at  hand:  “we  realize  ourselves  more  in 
production than in consumption” (Koslowski 1985: 54). People do not choose 
their  work  purely  on  the  basis  of  cost-benefit  calculations,  but  take  into 
account to whether it allows them to express who they are and how it affects 
their identity (Koslowski 1985: 112; Sen 1977: 333-334). Conceiving of one’s 
work as interesting and meaningful is crucial when one wants to lead a good 
life. Who I am is closely connected to what I do and the work I perform 
constitutes a large part of what I do. When applying for a job, most people will 
take into account to what extent they can identify with the role attached to it. 





The  sixth  requirement  is  that  of  egoism.  Here  too,  the  economic  and 
expressive  conceptions  of  rationality  clearly  diverge.  Whereas  the  Homo 
Economicus  is  egoistic,  an  expressively  rational  person  often  is  not.  Even 
though economists typically try to incorporate substantial aspects of people’s 
lives in some notion of enlightened self-interest, expressive considerations can 
hardly ever be reduced to pure self-interest. They are more or less disconnected 
from the aim of serving one’s purely private interests and connected to the 
image one wants to have (for others but also for oneself) (Engelen 2005: 65). 
People define themselves more through the things they care about rather than 
through their self-interested goals. Expressing the identity that is constituted in 
this  way  is  a  perfectly  rational  thing  to  do:  “action  is  rational  (…)  if  it  is 
consistent with these autonomously derived commitments to values, principles 
and ideals the individual cares about” (Taylor 1988: 87). Chapter 2: Alternative Conceptions of Rationality    
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Like the example of Luther suggests, people live for their ideals, principles and 
loved ones: “a person who does not have commitments has little with which to 
identify himself. What we are is in large part what we stand for. We think of 
having to make a stand on behalf of our ideals or on behalf of our loved ones 
as frightening and painful, and it often is. Yet to make a stand for what we 
think is right is one of the most self-defining things we can do” (Schmidtz 
1993: 62). Focusing exclusively on the level of the individual’s ‘ego’ and his 
self-interested  concerns,  economists  inevitably  leave  out  crucial  aspects  in 
human motivation, like moral commitments, personal engagements, and so on. 
Phenomena like trust and personal integrity are crucial in everyday social life: 
“when we trust we act on the assumption that the other is going to honor his 
or her commitment and to forego self-interest (…). Economic man, incapable 
of anything beyond self-interest, is also incapable of integrity and, as a result, of 
trustworthiness  and  a  capacity  to  trust  others”  (Koslowski  1985:  114).  By 
focusing on egoism, economists start from an abstraction that can be useful for 
scientific research, but neglects what is characteristic of humans. That is why 
their reduction of the individual to a one-dimensional utility-maximizing being 




One could argue that the seventh assumption of egocentrism is under pressure 
here is well. As I have suggested, there is something about an individual’s cares 
that transcends him. The individual is not fully in control, since the objects of 
his cares are to a large extent arbitrary and contingent. However, I believe it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that the assumption of egocentrism 
should be done away with. Even though an individual does not freely choose 
all of his final ends, the latter still remain his ends. It is always the individual 
himself  who  cares  about  certain  things  and  these  things  are  only  relevant 
insofar  as  they  constitute  the  identity  of  individuals.  The  fact  that  the 
expressive conception of rationality is based on more or less contingent objects 
of care that are not always freely chosen does not imply that one should give 
up  the  individual  as  the  final  judge  in  evaluating  and  choosing  from  the 
available alternatives. CONCLUSION OF PART I 
 
 
“It is theoretically unsatisfying to end the investigation into the nature of rationality 
with the pluralism of rationalities, since this viewpoint does not fulfill the reason’s 
need for unity. A plurality of rationalities is, however, more apt to save the 
phenomena than monistic economic rationality”  
(Koslowski 1985: 9-10) 
 
1. Schematic overview 
 
In order to avoid that one no longer sees the forest for the trees, I want to 
summarize schematically the main line of reasoning of the first part of this 
dissertation. The following scheme presents the requirements of the different 
conceptions of rationality at the different levels I have distinguished. 
 
         Actions       Beliefs    Preferences       
 
Economic rationality     maximization      consistency    consistency 
         instrumentality    perfect rationality  transitivity 
         intentionality         completeness 
                  continuity 
                  exogeneity  
egoism 
                  egocentrism 
 
Minimal rationality     intentionality     consistency    consistency 
                  transitivity 
                  egocentrism 
                   
Broad rationality     intentionality     consistency    consistency 
  judgment    transitivity 
        egocentrism 
        autonomy 
   
Expressive rationality     non-instrumentality    consistency    consistency 
   intentionality     authenticity    transitivity  
              completeness 
egocentrism   
authenticity   Part I: Rationality 
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The main strategy in the first chapter of this dissertation was to start from the 
dominant  conception  of  rationality  within  the  social  sciences,  namely  the 
economic one, and strip it from the requirements that are too demanding to 
speak of rationality in a more intuitive and common sense. When explaining 
individual behavior, it is wise to start by trying to understand it as economically 
rational. If this does not work, one should try to understand it as minimally 
rational. If it falls beyond this conception of rationality as well, one should still 
try to explain it as intentional (Elster 1983: 10). While the economic conception 
of rationality includes all requirements – egoistic rational intentional action – 
the minimal conception of rationality is less demanding – consistent intentional 
action – and the requirement of intentionality is even less strict, stipulating only 
that one’s actions should be based on reasons. While the minimal conception 
of  rationality  is  more  demanding  than  intentionality  (because  of  the 
requirement  of  consistent  reasons)  and  less  demanding  than  economic 
rationality (Van Liedekerke 2002: 116), it encompasses only a limited number 
of conditions. As such, it remains very formal: “consistency, in fact, is what 
rationality in the thin sense is all about: consistency within the belief system; 
consistency within the system of desires; and consistency between beliefs and 
desires on the one hand and the action for which they are reasons on the other 
hand” (Elster 1983: 1).  
Stripping down the economic conception of rationality to a minimal one, I 
have broadened the range of phenomena that can be understood as rational. 
The danger is that such a conception lacks analytical power and explanatory 
strength and thus turns into “a model that is pliable enough to explain anything 
and hence explains nothing” (Margolis 1984: 106). To avoid that rationality 
becomes  such  an  empty  notion,  I  have  proposed  more  demanding 
requirements in the second chapter, where I have developed the broad and 
expressive conceptions of broad rationality. I believe it is important to ground 
these alternative conceptions in empirical research in order to avoid this ‘ad 
hoc’ criticism. Here, I side with Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998: 19) who aim 
“to characterize individual preferences and behavior richly enough to conform 
with  commonsense  observations  and  with  the  findings  of  social-scientific 
research  (including  psychology  and  the  social  research  of  biologists),  and 
parsimoniously enough to be useful for systematic inquiry”. That is why I have 
referred  to  insights  from  experimental  economists,  psychologists  and 
sociologists  in  order  to  develop  these  still  largely  neglected  conceptions  of 
rationality. While the minimal conception is based on the central notion of 
reasons, these more substantial conceptions conceptualize – each in their own 
way – what exactly good reasons consist of. 
 Conclusion of Part I    
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2. The relation between different conceptions of rationality 
 
The first part of this dissertation can be interpreted as a return to authors like 
Adam Smith and Max Weber, who had a richer view of individual motivation 
than  conventional  economists  nowadays.  Whereas  Smith  explicitly 
acknowledged the relevance of other than purely self-regarding preferences, 
Weber distinguished between different types of rational action. First, there is 
instrumentally  rational  action,  which  “involves  rational  consideration  of 
alternative  means  to  the  end,  of  the  relations  of  the  end  to  the  secondary 
consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends” 
(Weber 1914:  26).  This  clearly  corresponds  to  the  economic  conception  of 
rationality. Second, there is value-rational action, which is not instrumentally 
aimed at achieving some goal but which is performed for its own sake. Weber 
(1914: 25) refers in this respect to “the actions of persons who, regardless of 
possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what 
seems to them to be required by duty, honor (…), personal loyalty, or the 
importance of some “cause” no matter in what it consists”. This corresponds 
to the expressive conception of rationality. Finally, Weber refers to affectual 
action, which is based on the individual’s emotions, and habitual action, which 
is  based  on  some  form  of  ingrained  habit.  According  to  Weber,  what 
distinguishes  the  first  two  types  of  action  –  and  what  makes  these  more 
rational  than  the  latter  –  is  the  degree  in  which  these  are  self-consciously 
performed and planned. 
Like Weber, I also defend a definition of rationality based on the notion of 
reasons. This implies a criticism of the exclusively instrumental conception of 
rationality in which “rationality cannot be anything else but an attribute of the 
relation means/ends (…). But nobody needs to accept the postulate that the 
attribute “rational”  can  be  applied  exclusively  to this  relation.  Weber  starts 
from a simpler, more natural and powerful assumption (…) when he says that a 
given behaviour is rational as soon as it is inspired by reasons” (Boudon 1993: 
8). The latter corresponds to the minimal conception of rationality. The fact 
that  the  individual  at  hand  has  reasons  for  doing,  believing  or  preferring 
something is enough to call him rational in a minimal sense. These reasons may 
consist of goals that he wants to realize, but they can also refer to certain 
aspects of his identity or to socially shared criteria on how to behave. 
Weber might have argued that I stretch the meaning of rationality too much by 
understanding expressive and norm-guided behavior – with their affectual and 
habitual characteristics – as rational. A multiplication of rationality conceptions 
may  indeed  seem  ‘ad  hoc’  in  that  it  allows  one  to  change  the  meaning  of Part I: Rationality 
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rationality depending on the phenomenon to be explained. Consequently, the 
purported meaning of rationality can be said to lack unity. I think this criticism 
is mistaken. The different conceptions of rationality are not constructed to 
make  up  a  single,  unified  theory.  Instead,  they  are  to  be  understood  as 
alternative  models  that  complement  each  other.  A  particular  action  can  be 
rational  in  one  specific  sense  of  the  word  but  irrational  in  another  sense. 
Wearing a particular sweater can be instrumentally rational (if it protects one 
against the cold) but expressively irrational (if it does not express how one 
perceives  oneself).  The  very  fact  that  it  remains  possible  to  speak  of 
irrationality  shows  that  rationality  has  not  become  a  ‘passe-partout’  that 
explains everything. As this conclusion’s opening quote by Peter Koslowski 
suggests,  distinguishing  different  conceptions  of  rationality  has  both 
advantages and disadvantages. While it lessens predictive force, it provides for 
a richer and more adequate view of individuals.  
While it is thus crucial to respect the multitude of meanings of rationality, I 
also  want  to  stress  the  unifying  capacity  of  the  minimal  conception  of 
rationality.  Not  only  does  it  closely  correspond  to  common  sense,  it  also 
functions as an umbrella, encompassing the more specific conceptions under 
one  general  heading.  This  allows  one  to  address  “a  fundamental  problem 
within the discussion between philosophy and economics (…). It is a question 
of reconciling diverse conceptions of rationality and of constructing, or rather 
reconstructing, one single concept of rationality” (Koslowski 1985: 141).  
To  be  sure,  the  instrumental  and  expressive  conceptions  of  rationality  are 
closely connected, since goal-oriented actions are crucial in anyone’s view of a 
meaningful  life:  “without  the  goal-directed  activity  that  is  the  locus  of 
instrumental value, we would lack the indispensably foundational sense that we 
have of ourselves as rational agents (…). The activity in which we engage (…) 
is valuable to us not only for the sake of its products or goals. It is also valuable 
to us in itself, because it is inherently important to us to have something useful 
to do” (Frankfurt 1999: 178). Without instrumental actions, life would simply 
have no meaning: “living without goals or purposes is living with nothing to 
do. Without ends, there are no means” (Frankfurt 1999: 84). In this respect, 
Frankfurt argues that the strictly instrumental distinction between ends and 
means has a blind spot: “in my opinion, however, the framework is too narrow 
and too rigid. It cannot accommodate a realistic appreciation of the issues we 
confront when we try to decide upon a good way of living. Our conception of 
the relationship between means and final ends has to be more spacious and 
more supple. Otherwise, it will impede our efforts to develop a comprehensive 
and authentic representation of what actually concerns us when we concern 
about how we should live” (Frankfurt 1999: 82-83). What we deem important 
in our lives cannot be grasped in an instrumental framework.  Conclusion of Part I    
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There is also a close relation between the expressive and the broad conceptions 
of  rational  preferences.  After  all,  heteronomous  and  thus  broadly  irrational 
preferences are typically inauthentic and thus expressively irrational as well. 
Both Elster’s broad conception as well as Frankfurt’s and Hargreaves Heap’s 
expressive conception of rationality center round the notion of autonomy.  
Now, it is crucial to see that the different conceptions of rationality are best 
understood  as  complementing  rather  than  substituting,  replacing  or 
undermining  each  other.  Take  the  relation  between  the  instrumental  and 
expressive conception of rationality. In this respect, I want to defend a model 
of individuals as motivated by different considerations of which the relative 
weight  depends  on  the  context.  Instrumental  considerations  dominate  in 
settings where individuals can directly realize their most preferred outcome, 
like markets. In contrast, expressive considerations tend to dominate in settings 
where individual behavior has little or no actual consequences, like large-scale 
elections. Here, no individual can directly choose the outcome he prefers, since 
all he can do is express his preference, while the resulting outcome emerges but 
is not chosen by anybody (Eusepi & Hamlin 2004: 125-126). Because such 
circumstances do not allow one to achieve one’s goals, it makes no sense at all 
to act in an instrumental way. Consequently, rational people will search for 
other ways to act on the basis of one’s values, principles and preferences. While 
some actions are best understood as attempting to satisfy one’s preferences 
(these  can  be  labeled  instrumental  actions),  others  are  best  understood  as 
expressing one’s identity (these can be labeled expressive actions). As I have 
already  suggested,  some  actions,  like  the  wearing  of  a  particular  piece  of 
clothing, are best understood as motivated by both instrumental and expressive 
considerations. 
Crucial in this respect is that rationality can and should not be reduced to one 
of its conceptions. Perhaps the main point of the first part of this dissertation 
is  to  provide  an  antidote  for  such  reductionist  strategies,  of  which  the 
economic  one  is  the  most  renowned. As Frankfurt  (1999:  86)  stresses,  the 
expressive aspects of rational actions can and should not be reduced to some 
sort of instrumental reasoning: “it is not essential that the activity he devotes to 
the things he cares about be successful. The extent to which a life is meaningful 
depends less upon how much it accomplishes than upon how it is lived. What 
counts primarily is the extent to which the person cares about the final ends at 
which he aims”. While instrumental rationality is important (actions are valued 
less if they are not successful in accomplishing what they are aimed at), it has to 
be complemented by broad rationality (actions often spring from a desire for 
autonomy and judgment) and expressive rationality (actions often concern the 
things one cares about and are thus often performed for their own sake and 
valued intrinsically). Part I: Rationality 
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By  pointing  out  the  plausibility  and  relevance  of  different  conceptions  of 
rationality, I hope to have shown that rationality is more widely applicable in 
the social sciences than its exclusively economic conception allows for. In this 
sense, I believe that the more realistic character of the alternative conceptions 
is a welcome improvement in any respect. More work is needed to develop and 
empirically test a general theory to explain under which conditions different 
sorts of considerations come to dominate. An important task for the social 
sciences is to answer the question when the economic conception of rationality 
is the most relevant one and when its alternatives are more plausible. In the 








THE RATIONALITY OF 
VOTING DECISIONS 
 INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
 
 
“Electoral participation is the most widespread form of political participation and, 
for a great number of citizens, the only one they exercise on a regular basis”  
(Perea 2002: 645) 
 
In this second part of the dissertation, I want to apply the insights gained in the 
first  part  to  the  domain  of  politics.  Starting  from  the  assumption  of 
methodological individualism, elections seem to be a logical place to start. As 
this introduction’s opening quote by Eva Perea suggests, they form the pre-
eminent occasion for most citizens to participate in politics. Because direct 
participation  in  policy  measures  is  practically  impossible  in  large  societies, 
modern  democracies  have  to  resort  to  some  type  of  representation.  Since 
democratic policy decisions should be made by a publicly elected government, 
voting is the most prominent and widespread act individual citizens perform in 
the public domain. 
In what follows, I want to distinguish between two voting decisions. The first 
is whether one will vote. Will one take the trouble of showing up at the polling 
station to register one’s vote? The second is how one will vote. Once inside the 
voting booth, which party or politician will one vote for? I will focus on these 
decisions in a context where attendance at elections is voluntary and abstention 
is thus not formally sanctioned. In the third chapter, I will analyze how these 
decisions are modeled in the economic conception of rationality and formulate 
a number of critical remarks. In the fourth chapter, I will show how alternative 
conceptions of rationality solve these problems and are thus highly needed to 
understand why and how people make voting decisions. 
Here,  I  am  gradually  moving  into  normative  terrain.  After  all,  democratic 
politics is the domain where citizens express what they believe to be a desirable 
society.  Whereas  the  first  part  of  this  dissertation  remains  on  purely 
explanatory terrain and thus does not engage in normative issues, the third 
explicitly aims to answer the normative question of how to improve society. 
This second part forms a bridge between both. Stressing that people should be 
analyzed as rational in their public role as citizens, it aims to analyze how they 
choose the representatives that are to implement what they believe to be a 
desirable society. CHAPTER 3 
 
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND VOTING DECISIONS 
 
 
“Persons’ voting behavior may have many explanations, but one that must usually 
have relatively little weight is the intention to produce a favored outcome. The larger 
the electorate, the less important a motivation to produce outcomes becomes” 
(Brennan & Lomasky 1989: 46) 
 
1. Economic rationality and voting decisions 
 
In  order  to  show  how  the  political  domain  can  be  analyzed  from  the 
perspective of the economic conception of rationality, I want to refer to the 
field of Public Choice theory25. This is aptly defined as “the application of 
economics to political science” (Mueller 2003: 1). Public Choice theorists thus 
aim  to  analyze  political  phenomena  by  modeling  individuals  as  Homines 
Economici in both their private and public roles: “the salient feature of all of 
public choice is its use of the homo economicus assumption (…). The bulk of the 
work in public choice employs this assumption to explain and predict behavior 
in a political context” (Mueller 1993: 405). As I have already suggested, I will 
focus more specifically on the decisions whether or not to vote and whom to 
vote for. 
 
1.1. Economic rationality and the decision whether or not to vote  
 
1.1.1. The calculus of voting 
 
The standard Public Choice analysis of the decision whether or not to vote was 
formulated first by Anthony Downs (1957: 260-276) and was later formalized 
by  Gordon  Tullock  (1967:  110-114).  They  argue  that  economically  rational 
                                                 
25 I will go into Public Choice theory more fully in the fifth chapter, where I analyze 
extensively the work of James M. Buchanan, perhaps its most important and best-known 
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citizens vote only if its expected costs (C for costs) do not exceed its expected 
benefits (B for benefits). The latter, however, only arise if their vote has an 
impact on the electoral result, which depends on the extremely low probability 
of  a  single  vote  being  decisive  (P  for  probability).  Because  the  resulting 
condition  to  vote  (PB  >  C)  is  almost  never  met,  these  authors  argue  that 
economically rational citizens systematically decide to abstain. Downs (1957: 
260) comes to this conclusion of rational abstention by assuming “that every 
rational man decides whether to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the 
returns outweigh the costs, he votes; if not, he abstains”.  
While all Public Choice theorists focus on such a cost-benefit calculus, they do 
not agree on its nature. According to some, citizens are to be modeled as trying 
to further their self-interest, further qualified as their subjective well-being or 
material wealth. In this narrow view, citizens vote if they think this will benefit 
them in self-interested terms. According to others, it is not necessary to assume 
that individuals act egoistically (Fiorina 1997: 408-409). This broader view still 
refers to the consequences that citizens want to bring about. It stresses the 
instrumental motivation of citizens going out to vote in order to achieve their 
goals, whatever these are. If one wants some specific candidate to win the 
elections – regardless whether this will benefit oneself – and one believes that 
one’s vote will help realize this, it is rational to go out and vote. To be sure, the 
assumption of egoism remains dominant among Public Choice theorists, since 
it allows them to make specific predictions. Nevertheless, I will focus mainly 
on the broader view, not only because it is intuitively more plausible, but also 
because any counterargument against it automatically applies to the narrower 
view as well.  
 
1.1.2. The paradox of voting 
 
Within the economic conception of rationality, it is thus hard to grasp why any 
rational citizen would ever vote. The crux lies in the fact that the impact of a 
single  vote  on  the  electoral  outcome  (P)  is  infinitesimal26.  Despite  the 
prediction that rational individuals will always decide to abstain, lots of citizens 
still vote. This has become known as the “the paradox of voting” (Blais 2000: 
2).  Even  though  one  would  expect  it  to  have  a  comparative  advantage  in 
explaining  voting  decisions,  Public  Choice  theory  is  blatantly  falsified  here 
(Margolis 1984: 3, 12). Its failed attempt to explain why people vote is even 
                                                 
26 Sometimes the electoral outcome is already known before citizens decide whether or 
not to vote, as was the case for citizens living in the West Coast states during the Nixon 
landslides in the 1980s (Brennan & Lomasky 1993: 35). Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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renowned for being “the Achilles’ heel of rational choice theory in political 
science” (Aldrich 1997: 373). 
To avoid misunderstanding, I want to stress that voting itself can hardly be 
called  a  paradox.  If  a  paradox  is  “a  tenet  contrary  to  received  opinion” 
(http://m-w.com), it is not so much voting that is paradoxical but the theory 
that no rational citizen ever votes. It is only within an exclusively instrumental 
account of human behavior that voting becomes a mystery. However, Alan 
Carling (1998: 21) is right in pointing out that even this is no genuine paradox, 
which  is  properly  defined  as  “an  argument  that  apparently  derives  self-
contradictory  conclusions  by  valid  deduction  from  acceptable  premises” 
(http://m-w.com). 
As  this  chapter’s opening  quote  by Geoffrey  Brennan  and Loren  Lomasky 
suggests,  any  explanation  of  voting  behavior  as  an  attempt  to  bring  about 
preferred goals is highly dubious. Because the influence of a single vote on the 
electoral outcome is infinitesimal, any instrumentally motivated individual will 
decide to abstain. A single individual’s decision to go out and vote cannot be 
understood as an attempt to bring about the consequences he prefers. It is 
completely irrelevant whether his goals are defined narrowly (in egoistic terms) 
or more broadly (in terms of ends, whatever these are): “whether one favors 
selfish or selfless ends, virtually any activity in pursuit of those ends would be 
more effective than the time spent on voting” (Friedman 1996: 6).  
In addition, even if one’s vote influences the electoral outcome, it will only 
select one of many political representatives. The problem then arises that one 
does not know for sure whether this politician will select the policy measures 
that one prefers. And even if he does, his choices are likely to have only a small 
impact on the state of affairs. The basic point is that “citizens voting in mass 
elections neither bear the full consequences of their decision nor have much 
impact  on  the  outcomes.  The  combination  of  these  two  features  of  large 
elections means that any conception of voting behavior that is instrumental in 
nature is highly suspect” (Fiorina 1997: 403). 
This situation resembles a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma in which it is rational for 
every individual to freeride and profit from the contributions of others to the 
public good. Even though all citizens want the democratic system to continue, 
the instrumentally motivated ones will give in to the incentive to abstain at 
elections. Since contributing to the public good of democracy is individually 
costly but not strictly needed, economically rational citizens will be tempted to 
freeride  (Bowles  &  Gintis  1986:  138).  While  the  abovementioned  analysis 
assumes a fixed environment of high turnout, this line of reasoning suggests 
that the decision to vote is a strategic rather than a parametric one. Carling 
(1998: 21-24) has argued that this gives rise to a genuine paradox of voting. Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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Whether it is rational to vote depends on the decisions of one’s fellow citizens. 
If everybody deems it rational to abstain, turnout drops to zero. This increases 
P drastically and makes voting the rational thing to do. If, however, everybody 
thinks this way, everybody will rationally decide to vote, resulting in the initial 
situation of high turnout. The conclusion that nobody votes if everybody votes 
and vice versa then forms a genuine paradox.  
 
1.1.3. Amending the calculus of voting 
 
To disentangle these mysteries and explain why so many citizens vote, several 
strategies have been deployed (Blais 2000: 3-10; Dowding 2005: 442-453). In 
search of alternative explanations of the decision to vote, most of these stress 
that rationality is wholly subjective in nature, thereby allowing for individual 
differences in aims, beliefs and preferences (Carling 1998: 29).  
A first strategy stresses that it does not matter what the objective probability of 
a single vote being decisive is, but how citizens assess this chance. This way of 
explaining  turnout  by  increasing  P  assumes  that  individuals  systematically 
overestimate  the  impact  of  their  vote  on  the  electoral  outcome.  One  can 
rationally decide to vote on the basis of the false belief that P is quite large 
(Riker  &  Ordeshook 1968:  38-39).  Some  empirical  studies indeed  find  that 
“many people are prone to overestimate P” (Blais 2000: 81). Nevertheless, this 
must not distract from the fact that “on any reading, the probability of any one 
voter’s being decisive (or more generally the extent of any individual voter’s 
influence on electoral outcomes) is bound to be small” (Brennan & Lomasky 
1993: 73). As a matter of fact, most of the available empirical evidence shows 
that P has only a weak impact on the decision to vote (Aldrich 1997: 387-389; 
Brennan  &  Lomasky  1993:  120;  Mueller  2003:  309-312,  319)27.  All  this  is 
reassuring with respect to both the intelligence and the rationality of voters 
(Mueller  2003:  329).  It  would  indeed be  odd  to  assume  that  a  majority  of 
citizens is wholly incapable of making fairly simple statistical estimates. 
A second strategy stresses that voting is often perceived as taking very little 
trouble (Blais 2000: 87). However, this strategy of minimizing the expected 
costs  (C)  is doomed  to  fail  as long as  P  remains infinitesimally  small.  The 
standard argument is that even a small cost (C) will discourage a rational citizen 
to vote, since the expected benefits (PB) are negligibly small (Barry 1970: 14-
15).  
                                                 
27 The most straightforward proof can be found in questionnaires: “when asked why they 
vote few people cite the probability that their vote will be decisive” (Dowding 2005: 448). Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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A third strategy increases B by stressing the importance of elections. Some 
citizens  believe  that  there  is  a  small  chance  of  their  vote  bringing  about 
enormous benefits, either for themselves or for society as a whole. Downs 
(1957: 261-262), for example, argues that people vote in order to uphold the 
democratic system they live in: “if no one votes, then the system collapses 
because no government is chosen. We assume that the citizens of a democracy 
subscribe to its principles and therefore derive benefits from its continuance; 
hence they do not want it to collapse”. However, incorporating a wide range of 
benefits to raise B does not help much as long as P remains negligibly small. 
While this strategy drops the assumption of egoism, it continues to explain the 
decision to vote in instrumental terms. This fails because of the simple fact that 
a single vote has no impact whatsoever on the way a democracy functions. The 
collective action problem remains that each individual may consider democratic 
government to be a public good, but choose not contribute to it.  
The fourth strategy to solve the paradox of voting is the most promising one. 
In line with William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968), it has been argued that 
individuals vote if they experience satisfaction from the act of voting itself. 
Voting is deemed pleasurable, no matter what the electoral result is and thus 
regardless  of  whether  one’s  preferred  candidate  is  elected.  In  other  words, 
voters perceive the trouble of going out to vote as a benefit28. Because a single 
vote is virtually unable to influence the electoral result, rational individuals will 
largely disregard such consequences and will only take into account the benefits 
and costs of the act of voting itself. Next to the instrumental benefits of voting 
(PB), one must thus incorporate the expressive benefits from the act of voting 
itself (D) (Carling 1998: 27). Often, these benefits arise from fulfilling what 
people consider their duty. This argument adds an extra term (D for duty) to 
the comparison so that the resulting condition to vote (PB + D > C) is met 
more easily. At first sight, this seems to be an empirically promising move: “the 
quantitative  importance  of  D  is  much  greater  than  that  of  either  P  or  B” 
(Mueller 2003: 311).  
Several authors follow this line of reasoning. First, Riker and Ordeshook (1968: 
28)  argue  that  expressing  one’s  vote  can  bring  about  various  sorts  of 
satisfaction: “1. the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting (…) 
2. the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system (…) 3. the 
satisfaction  from  affirming  a  partisan  preference  (…)  4.  the  satisfaction  of 
deciding, going to the polls”. Second, Morris Fiorina (1976: 395) distinguishes 
between  partisan  and  independent  citizens,  the  first  of  whom  experience 
                                                 
28 One could argue that this strategy lowers the cost of voting below zero, since voting is 
experienced not as a cost, but as a benefit. In the end, this is a purely terminological 
question. The underlying thought remains the same. Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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“utility or disutility of satisfying or violating one’s party allegiance”. Arguing 
that D plays a role for some citizens but not for others, he is able to explain the 
intermediate turnout levels that characterize elections in modern democracies 
with voluntary voting. Third, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1993: 33) 
argue that  “revealing a  preference  is  a direct  consumption  activity,  yielding 
benefits to the individual in and of itself”. This allows them to distinguish 
between  instrumental  voters  who  –  like  investors  –  seek  to  bring  about 
something that benefits them and expressive voters who – like consumers – 
gain  utility  from  the  act  itself  (Ferejohn  &  Fiorina  1974:  526)29.  Fourth, 
Alexander Schuessler (2000a) applies his “logic of expressive choice” to voter 
decisions, arguing that voting itself is thought of as agreeable. Waiting in line to 
vote is not perceived as an impediment to be overcome, but as an additional 
benefit of voting (Schuessler 2000a: 25, 56). Even though Schuessler (2000b: 
103-105)  explicitly  wants  to  move  away  from  Public  Choice  theory,  he 
continues to define the expressive aspects of voting wholly in terms of benefits. 
Stressing that voters experience satisfaction from the very act of expressing 
their preferences, this account has become known as the “expressive voter 
hypothesis” (Mueller 2003: 320-323). However, it should be clear that it stays 
squarely  within  the  instrumental  framework  of  Public  Choice  theory.  It 
understands the decision to vote as aimed towards a goal external to the voting 
act itself, namely that of experiencing “satisfaction” (Riker & Ordeshook 1968: 
28),  “intrinsic  benefits”  (Brennan  &  Lomasky  1993: 61),  “psychic  rewards” 
(Overbye 1995: 372), “utility gain” (Mueller 2003: 320) or “expressive returns” 
(Schuessler 2000: 107).  
Some authors instrumentally rationalize the decision to vote in a more indirect 
way. First, Einar Overbye argues that people vote in order to build a reputation 
that will benefit them in the long run. Since expressing their identity consists of 
sending signals to fellow citizens, people will take into account the possible 
impact of their acts on their social capital: “voting may be regarded as a rational 
investment decision: not an investment in a particular electoral outcome, but in 
a type of reputation which the individual is interested in maintaining when 
carrying  out  his/her  everyday  activities”  (Overbye  1995:  369).  Second, 
Schuessler (2000b: 88) argues that “voting is a means to express political beliefs 
                                                 
29  Authors  like  Brennan,  Buchanan  and  Lomasky  stress  that  the  electoral  context  is 
characterized by the complete absence of a connection between the individual’s action 
and the resulting outcome. In this respect, it cannot be understood as analogous with 
consumption. While citizens decide to vote irrespective of whether they actually get the 
outcome they prefer, consumers only pay the price if they know they will receive the 
desired product (Buchanan 1999: XIII, 163; Brennan & Lomasky 1989: 44). I will go into 
the  repercussions  of  this  thought  when  arguing  in  favor  of  a  completely  non-
instrumental account of voting decisions. Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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and preferences and, in doing so, to establish or reaffirm their own political 
identity”.  He  distinguishes  “between  strict  electoral-outcome-oriented 
rationality and expressively focused motivation which targets an outcome other 
than the electoral result” (Schuessler 2000b: 116). Once more, it is clear that 
these accounts continue to analyze voting as means towards the realization of a 
goal external to the act of voting itself.  
 
1.1.4. Problems with amending the calculus of voting 
 
Since the decision to vote has virtually no impact on the outside world, it is 
tempting to explain it in terms of purely psychic benefits. However, I want to 
claim that this does not adequately explain why so many citizens vote. In my 
view, there are several problems with such an instrumental rationalization of 
the decision to  vote.  Consequently,  I agree  with  Overbye  (1995:  371)  who 
stresses that none of the proposed explanations has been able to convince the 
critics so far. 
First, one may legitimately ask what exactly is so fun about voting. Would a 
hedonistic citizen not be better off enjoying his day as he usually does, rather 
than spending it in a queue before the voting booth? If voters thoroughly enjoy 
expressing  their political  opinions,  why  do  they  not  massively  join  political 
discussion  groups?  In  addition,  a  civic  sense  of  duty  simply  cannot  be 
understood in purely hedonistic terms. As moral philosophers know for quite a 
while now, people who feel they have to obey a duty will often do so even if 
they derive no satisfaction from it (Blais 2000: 93; Boudon 1997: 222). They 
simply do not weigh the benefits of fulfilling one’s duty (D) against the costs of 
doing so (C). They vote because they feel they have to, not because they like 
doing so30. 
Second, this account does not take seriously the thought that an activity can be 
done purely for its own sake. Because it continues to compare the benefits and 
costs of voting, it basically suggests that voting is not done for its own sake 
(Ferejohn & Fiorina 1974: 525). If voting is valued intrinsically, it is not to be 
understood  as  a  means  towards  some  extrinsic  goal,  like  the  satisfaction 
derived from it. All of the abovementioned accounts lump together the reasons 
                                                 
30 This objection essentially argues that “voters obviously do not consciously impute the 
above  type  of  complicated  calculations  before  they  decide  whether  or  not  to  vote” 
(Overbye 1995: 381). The typical defense is that people do not necessarily maximize their 
utility in a deliberate manner, but act as if they do (Ferejohn & Satz 1994: 76). I have 
already shown why I believe this strategy to be fundamentally wrongheaded if one aims 
to explain actions in terms of reasons that cause these actions to be performed. Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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for  voting  into  a  single  calculus  of  costs  and  benefits.  In  doing  so,  “they 
obscure  the  distinction  between  acting  for  the  sake  of  some  expected 
advantage to which the action is believed to be a means, and acting for the sake 
of a principle or from duty – between what Max Weber called Zweckrationalität 
and  Wertrationalität”  (Benn  1979:  299).  In  this  respect,  I  argue  in  favor  of 
distinction  between  instrumental  and  expressive  considerations  that  is  as 
conceptually clear as possible.  
Third, and most importantly, this account systematically posits a preference or 
taste for voting among voters. Simply rephrasing the issue, this comes down to 
a tautological explanation with no real explanatory power (Blais 2000: 9-10; 
Boudon 1997: 221; Mueller 2003: 3306; Overbye 1995: 372; Schuessler 2000a: 
47). In the end, all it says is that citizens vote if they like to vote and abstain if 
they  do  not  like  to  vote.  Such  an  account  does  not  explain  the  observed 
behavior in terms of a preference for voting, but derives the presence of the 
latter  from  the  observed  behavior.  Systematically  postulating  that  the 
expression of one’s vote gives satisfaction essentially begs the question. It is an 
‘ad hoc’ hypothesis which lacks predictive content and explanatory power: “the 
very fact that the conventional theory is driven to rely on psychic income raises 
the question of whether it has anything very interesting to say about psychic 
income, or whether it merely treats psychic income as a residual category of 
motivation  to  be  invoked  when  the  theory  otherwise  gets  into  trouble” 
(Margolis 1984: 87). Since it cannot be falsified, its scientific validity is highly 
questionable. Psychic benefits should not be invoked as the explanatory basis, 
but should themselves be accounted for (Margolis 1984: 60). In order to avoid 
that such explanations become completely trivial, one should show why “some 
people have this kind of motivation more strongly than others” (Barry 1970: 
16). I will try to do exactly this in the next chapter. 
 
1.2. Economic rationality and the decision whom to vote for 
 
1.2.1. The calculus of voting 
 
To understand how Public Choice theorists explain the decision whom to vote 
for, one simply needs to extend the analysis presented above. Basically, citizens 
are expected to vote for the party or politician that they think will benefit them 
most. Once more, the seminal formulation can be found in Downs (1957: 36) 
who assumed “that each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will 
provide him with more benefits than any other”. In his view, voters rank the 
alternatives by comparing “the different “streams of utility” to be derived from Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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the policies promised by each candidate” (Mueller 2003: 304). Economically 
rational citizens will try to maximize the benefits they expect to receive from 
the policy measures of the next elected government. This is essentially what 
Public  Choice  theorists  have  tried  to  capture  in  the  B-term  of  the  voting 
calculus.  
There is some empirical support for the claim that people vote for the party 
that promotes their interests. On the whole, low-income employees tend to 
vote for a left-wing party that favors income redistribution. In contrast, high-
income  employees  tend  to  vote  for  a  right-wing  party  that  favors  tax 
deductions and social security cut backs. However, this so-called pocketbook 
voting  is  heavily  disputed  (Fiorina  1997:  407).  That  is  why  Public  Choice 
theorists  increasingly  define  interest  in  a  broader  sense,  for  example  by 
including long-term and collective considerations. The argument then goes that 
citizens will vote for the party they think will help them most in realizing their 
goals,  whatever  these  may  be.  This  still  fits  the  economic  conception  of 
rationality: “though material self-interest is often a maintained hypothesis in 
public choice research, the rational choice approach admits a much broader 
range of preferences” (Fiorina 1997: 408). Such so-called sociotropic voting – 
voting to realize some public good – has been confirmed by empirical studies 
(Mueller 2003: 460-461). A rich self-employed business man may vote for a 
party that favors high taxes if he cares more about the realization of some 
public good than about the maximization of his own income. This broader, 
instrumental model is able to explain an individual’s decision to vote against his 
own narrowly defined self-interest (Mueller 2003: 323).  
 
1.2.2. Another paradox of voting? 
 
Here,  I  want  to  argue  that  proponents  of  the  economic  conception  of 
rationality cannot really defend these views. After all, the problem remains that 
instrumentally motivated citizens will not even take the trouble to show up at 
the polling station. If one consistently applies this instrumental reasoning, the 
vast majority of such citizens will decide to abstain and will thus not even have 
to make up their minds which party or politician to vote for. The few that 
wrongly believe that their vote will make a difference will probably indeed vote 
in their interest but they will make up only a small part of the entire voting 
population.  
In contrast, citizens who vote because of the pleasure they derive from the act 
of voting itself do not really care about whom to vote for. Since it is all about 
showing up at the polling station, having a chat with their fellow citizens and Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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enjoying the pleasant feeling of living up to social expectations, it is completely 
irrelevant for them what to do inside the voting booth. From the perspective 
of  the  economic  conception  of  rationality,  one  can  thus  expect  ordinary 
citizens to be rather apathetic and ignorant with regard to politics. Since their 
vote  decides  nothing,  they  have  no  incentive  to  become  engaged  in  or 
informed  about  politics.  Stressing  the  costs  of  acquiring  politically  relevant 
information, Downs argues that “ignorance is not the result of mere apathy; 
rather it stems from the great cost of obtaining enough information to exert 
effective influence” (Downs 1957: 253). For indifferent citizens, it may thus be 
rational to vote at random (Downs 1957: 274-276). In this respect, one can 
refer to phenomena like donkey voting (after the game in which a blindfolded 
child pins a tail on a donkey), invalid voting, voting for the candidate on the 
top left of the ballot or voting for a candidate with a funny name. Studies have 
shown that, depending on the nature of the electoral system, such votes may 
rise up to 5% of all the votes cast (Orr 2002: 575)31. However, this implies that 
95% of the voters apparently have a pretty firm idea whom to vote for. The 
prediction that a majority of the voters does not know whom to vote for is 
thus falsified by both common sense and empirical research.  
It has been argued that political apathy and ignorance are currently growing. 
This might suggest that more and more citizens start to reason in economically 
rational ways. It might also explain decreasing turnout levels throughout the 
world.  Ever  more  citizens  seem  to  understand  that  the  freeriding  option 
(abstention) is superior to political participation (voting) in any cost-benefit 
analysis. People no longer perceive voting as being in their self-interest, since 
there  is  nothing  in  it  for  them.  If  politicians  do  not  hear  my  voice,  the 
argument goes, why bother to express it? While this suggests that the economic 
conception of rationality is not without explanatory force, it also shows that it 
remains inadequate to explain the basic fact that a lot of citizens still vote in 
systems where voting is voluntary. 
Brennan  and  Buchanan  argue  that  the  insight  that  a  single  vote  has  only 
negligible consequences induces citizens not to take these into account inside 
the voting booth (Buchanan 1999: XIII, 162-164). As Loren Lomasky (1992) 
argues,  the  specific  nature  of  the  electoral  context  induces  citizens  to  vote 
irresponsibly: “because voters are unlikely to “get anything” from the direction 
of their votes, they have reason to indulge incentives that are not oriented 
                                                 
31 Notice that this study was performed in Australia, where attendance at elections is 
compulsory there. Such an institutional measure raises turnout by increasing the costs of 
abstention. This tends to prove an efficient way of solving the freeriding problem that 
arises if a lot of people act in economically rational ways. In doing so, however, it is likely 
to draw indifferent citizens to the polls who might otherwise had chosen to abstain. In 
systems of voluntary voting, therefore, the number of donkey votes will be even smaller.  Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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toward outcomes (…). Since how I vote is virtually certain not to make any 
difference  whatsoever  to  political  outcomes,  I’m  freed  to  indulge  any 
whimsical,  voyeuristic,  half-baked  impulse  that  happens  to  come  into  my 
head”.  Since  the  causal  link  between  an  individual’s  decision  and  the  final 
outcome is mediated by an aggregation procedure, he is less likely to think 
about  the  consequences  of  his  choice.  After  all,  the  outcome  will  arise, 
regardless whether he contributes to it or not: “the single individual loses the 
sense  of  decision-making  responsibility  that  is  inherent  in  private  choice. 
Secure in the knowledge that, regardless of his own action, social or collective 
decisions  affecting  him  will  be  made,  the  individual  is  offered  a  greater 
opportunity either to abstain altogether from making a positive choice or to 
choose without having considered the alternatives carefully” (Buchanan 1999: 
III, 38). 
As  I  have  already  suggested,  the  basic  problem  with  this  hypothesis  of 
uninterested and ignorant voters is that it assumes that people do turn up to 
vote. However, if they actually are instrumentally motivated, they will not take 
the trouble of doing so (Margolis 1984: 65). For now, suffice to say that the 
same line of reasoning opens up a whole range of possible motivations. The 
fact that people cannot benefit themselves in an electoral context might as well 
induce them to act on nobler motives. As I will show more fully in the next 
chapter, it may as well lead them to base their decision on purely principled 
considerations (Mueller 2003: 322-325). 
There is something paradoxical about the way Public Choice theorists try to 
explain how people vote. The main difficulty they face is that the problem of 
explaining  turnout  comes  back  with  full  force.  To  find  a  way  out  of  this 
conundrum, Public Choice theory often relies on a combination of both lines 
of thought, arguing that people vote because they like doing so (D), but change 
gears when deciding whom to vote for. Once inside the voting booth, they 
vote in accordance with their interests (B), bearing in mind that one never 
knows whether one’s vote might be decisive after all (P). Even though it will 
probably make no difference, I will cast my vote in my interest, because it 
might just help and will never hurt to achieve the electoral outcome I prefer 
(Aldrich 1997: 375-376).  
Public Choice accounts of the decision whether to vote thus typically refer to 
the  intrinsic  benefits  voting  yields,  while  Public  Choice  accounts  of  the 
decision how to vote typically refer to its instrumental benefits. As Mueller 
(2003: 329) rightly stresses, the view that “some individuals get utility from 
expressing their preferences for a particular candidate through the act of voting 
(…)  provides  an  explanation  for  why  a  person  votes,  but  not  for  how  she 
votes”. Similarly, Merrill and Grofman (1999: 164) present support for Public Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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Choice  accounts  of  how  people  vote,  while  explicitly  abstracting  from  the 
question of why people vote. 
This division of tasks suggests that there is no theory that aims to explain both 
the decision whether or not to vote and the decision whom to vote for on the 
basis  of  the  same  reasoning.  Most  explanations  why  citizens  vote  refer  to 
psychological characteristics such as political interest, political efficacy and a 
sense  of  duty.  In  contrast,  most  explanations  of  how  they  vote  refer  to 
completely different factors such as self-interest, candidate qualities, campaign 
issues  and  party  identification  (Fiorina  1976:  391).  Relying  on  two  wholly 
different models, Public Choice theory goes against its very own assumption of 
behavioral symmetry, according to which individuals typically act the same in 
different spheres of life (Buchanan 1999: X, 56-57). Whether they are making 
private  or  public  decisions  does  not  matter;  they  should  be  analyzed  as 
Homines Economici in every domain of life. After all, the individual remains 
essentially  “the  same  man  in  the  supermarket  and  in  the  voting  booth” 
(Tullock 1976: 5). As I will show more fully in my analysis of James Buchanan’s 
work,  Public  Choice  theorists  heavily  criticize  the  tendency  to  postulate 
different motivations for different decisions. Nevertheless, this is exactly what 
they  are  forced  to  do  here.  Their  attempt  to  consistently  apply  the  Homo 
Economicus model to different voting decisions thus fails. 
 
2. Reconciling rationality and democracy 
 
It can be argued that political philosophers face a huge dilemma if they – like 
myself – value both the rationality of individuals and the democratic nature of 
institutions. After all, both seem to be at odds with each other. While the 
participation of a vast majority of individuals is needed for a democracy to 
function well, it seems to be irrational to participate in mass political action: 
“where goals are at stake that require the participation of large numbers of 
people, any given individual’s participation is going to make no perceptible 
difference to the outcome” (Benn 1979: 292). This may lead one to conclude 
that a democracy of rational individuals could never survive. The dilemma that 
Public  Choice  theorists  face  is  clear.  If  they  stress  the  importance  of  the 
economic  rationality  of  people,  they  seem  to  neglect  the  importance  of 
democratic politics. And if they stress the value of the latter, they seem to give 
up their basic model of individuals. 
There  are  two  ways  out  of  this  conundrum.  First,  one  can  conclude  that 
participation  in  a  political  is  indeed  irrational.  However,  this  effectively 
degrades one’s valuation of both democratic politics. Here, one can refer to Chapter 3: Economic Rationality and Voting Decisions  
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Buchanan  (1999:  I,  85)  who  argues  that  “market  choice  tends  to  embody 
greater  rationality  in  individual  behavior  than  does  voting  choice”.  As  I  have 
shown, the connection between individual preferences and social outcomes – 
which is present in market settings but absent in electoral contexts – leads him 
to favor the market over the state. Second, and this is what I will argue for in 
the  next  chapter,  one  can  try  to  show  that  political  participation  can  be 
understood as rational in a different sense than the conventional one. In this 
respect,  I  want  to  show  in  what  ways  amending  the  most  problematic 
assumptions of the economic conception of rationality helps solve the paradox 
of  voting.  This  way,  it  becomes  possible  to  reconcile  both  rationality  and 
democracy.  
The paradox of voting crops up when one tries to explain the decision to vote 
in  an  exclusively  instrumental  framework:  “the  voting  paradox  arises  not 
because there is a problem when people vote, but because of the flawed notion 
of rationality held by public choice” (Pressman 2006: 251). Providing a fuller, 
deeper  and  more  adequate  view  of  the  way  in  which  citizens  make  voting 
decisions,  I  believe  alternative  conceptions  of  rationality  make  the  paradox 
vanish into thin air. They allow one to explain voting decisions as rational (the 
voter judges there to be good reasons for his decisions) without interpreting 
them as instrumentally motivated. Even though I will rely on suggestions from 
Fiorina, Brennan, Lomasky and Schuessler, I will not follow their strategy of 
reducing expressive aspects of voting to instrumental benefits.  
If one drops the assumption that people are instrumentally motivated to satisfy 
their egoistic and exogenous preferences, it becomes clear that voting is not a 
paradox but rather a rational response to the specific context of large-scaled 
elections. While it is rational to try and fulfill one’s preferences in situations 
where  this  is  possible,  it  is  rational  simply  to  express  them  whenever  one 
cannot have a substantial impact on the final outcome. As I will show more 
fully  in  the  conclusion  to  this  second  part,  this  does  not  imply  that  the 
economic rationality is superfluous or worthless.  CHAPTER 4 
 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF RATIONALITY  
AND VOTING DECISIONS 
 
 
“Rational choice modellers will be able to explain voting and nonvoting as soon as 
they solve the problem of why people salute the flag when they know that nobody is 
looking”  
(Kramer, in: Grofman 1983: 57) 
 
1. Minimal rationality and voting decisions 
 
The economic conception of rationality fails to grasp why and how people 
make  voting  decisions  the  way  they  do.  It  analyzes  voting  decisions  as 
investment or consumption acts. While the first model predicts abstention (PB 
< C), the second stresses that people vote for the pleasure of doing so (D > C) 
without  actually  caring  about  the  electoral  result.  Because  both  do  not 
correspond to one’s intuitive image of voters, I want to stress the relevance of 
alternative  conceptions  of  rationality.  This  way,  I  avoid  banning  voting 
decisions “to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational” (Riker & 
Ordeshook  1968:  25).  As  I  have  shown,  I  believe  voters  should  be  called 
rational in its minimal sense as long as they act on the basis of what they 
believe to be good reasons.  
 
1.1. Minimal rationality and the decision whether or not to vote 
 
Since  the  paradox  of  voting  arises  from  the  instrumental  character  of  the 
Homo Economicus model, it is crucial to drop exactly this assumption when 
trying to explain voting decisions (Aldrich 1997: 374; Brennan & Hamlin 1998: 
167;  Ferejohn  &  Fiorina  1974:  535;  Schuessler  2000a:  6-8).  The  minimal 
conception of rationality broadens the range of possible reasons that motivate 
people to vote. I want to argue that people can have reasons to go out and vote 
that  cannot  be  reduced  to  goals:  “even  without  an  extensive  psychological 
examination of voters, there is some empirical evidence that desire to affect Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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outcomes is not the only or primary motive for voting (…). We maintain that 
voters  are  not  predominantly  irrational,  and  thus  they  vote  as  they  do  for 
reasons that have little to do with an intention to affect outcomes” (Brennan & Lomasky 
1989: 49). In what follows, I will go into the nature of such reasons more fully. 
Here,  I  only  want  to  broaden  the  notion  of  rationality  beyond  its  purely 
instrumental meaning.  
 
1.2. Minimal rationality and the decision whom to vote for 
 
The same reasoning can be applied to the decision whom to vote for. There is 
a  wide  range  of  reasons  that  motivate  citizens  to  vote  as  they  do.  The 
economic  conception  of  rationality  focuses  exclusively  on  instrumental 
considerations that hinge upon the electoral outcome. It assumes that voters 
base  their  decisions  exclusively  on  the  expected  policy  outcomes  of  the 
electoral process (Brennan & Hamlin 1998: 164-165). However, people vote on 
the basis of a much wider range of considerations: “the voter may identify with 
the  candidate’s  moral  character,  good  looks  or  ethnic  origin  or  with  the 
candidate’s or party’s general ideology” (Brennan & Hamlin 1998: 156). Such 
aspects,  which  clearly  come  to  the  fore  in  surveys  and  polls,  cannot  be 
incorporated within a purely instrumental framework. Later on, I will show that 
an expressive account performs much better in this respect. 
 
2. Broad rationality and voting decisions 
 
The broad conception of rationality focuses on the ways in which people’s 
reasons for voting decisions are formed. It stresses that beliefs should be well-
informed  and  preferences  should  be  autonomous  in  order  to  be  broadly 
rational. As I have shown earlier on, it is useful to focus on the cases where 
voting decisions are clearly irrational in the broad sense of the word. 
 
2.1. Broad rationality and the decision whether or not to vote 
 
First, one can argue that people who vote because they believe they actually 
have an impact on the electoral outcome are broadly irrational. After all, their 
estimate  of  this  impact  (P)  blatantly  disregards  common  sense  surrounding 
statistics. It may be the case that people think their vote is crucial because they 




have  shown,  empirical  research  shows  that  only  a  minority  of  citizens 
overestimate the impact of their vote in such a degree that it motivates them to 
go out and vote. The underlying reasoning, which is based on the plausible 
assumption that others think like they do, often goes as follows. If I decide to 
abstain, others are likely to do so as well, thereby contributing to the downfall 
of the democratic system as such. However, if I decide to vote, others are likely 
to do so as well, thereby upholding democracy. Here, I want to leave open for 
interpretation whether this line of reasoning is best framed as increasing the 
expected impact of one’s vote (P) or as raising the stakes of one’s vote (B). 
What matters is that, while such beliefs make it minimally rational to go out 
and vote, they clearly go against widely available information surrounding the 
choice situation at hand. Labeling them broadly irrational makes explicit the 
intuitive thought that there is something wrong with this kind of reasoning. 
Second,  one  can  argue  that  preferences  for  voting  are  sometimes 
heteronomous in that they are formed through indoctrination or intimidation. 
In dictatorial regimes, for example, citizens go out and vote because they are 
heavily influenced by propaganda.  
Third, one could argue that a preference for voting is broadly irrational if it 
does not arise from rational deliberation. Marquette and Hinckley (1988: 59) 
empirically show that the most important factor to explain why people vote is 
their remembrance of their previous decision: “the best predictor of turnout is 
previous voting history”. Empirical results do indeed show that voting often 
“is an unreflective and habitual act” (Blais & Young 1999: 53). However, this 
does not mean that it is completely arational or irrational, since one can have 
good reasons to vote, even if these are not fully and consciously deliberated. 
The  assumption  of  exogenously  given  preferences  forms  an  important 
limitation of Public Choice theory. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1986: 
138-139)  for  example,  explain  the  decision  to  vote  by  amending  this 
assumption:  “the  most  fruitful  method  of  explaining  such  behavior,  we 
maintain, involves abandoning the instrumental conception of action itself and 
in  particular  jettisoning  the  notion  of  preconstituted  or  exogenously  given 
preferences (…). One does not merely register one’s preferences in (…) voting; 
rather, one constitutes and reaffirms oneself as (…) a good citizen”. The fact 
that preferences can change endogenously is thus crucial when trying to explain 
voting decisions (Mueller 2003: 324-332). 
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2.2. Broad rationality and the decision whom to vote for 
 
A lot of voters vote as they always have done, which is heavily influenced by 
their upbringing, education and peers. This is already intuitively plausible: if 
one grows up in a worker’s family with a father who is a trade unionist and 
one’s friends all criticize libertarian attempts to cut back pension schemes, one 
is simply more likely to vote left-wing. While it is not always fully deliberated, 
all this can provide one with good reasons to vote as one does.  
Here too, it is useful to focus ‘ex negativo’ on broadly irrational beliefs and 
preferences.  The  former  are  ill-informed  in  that  they  go  against  available 
evidence. If people vote on a socialist party because they believe this will help 
reduce  state  intervention,  they  can  be  called  broadly  irrational.  The  same 
conclusion holds if they are indoctrinated by socialist propaganda.  
The  fact  that  preferences  can  change  endogenously  can  be  relevant  in 
explaining the decision whom to vote for as well. By voting socialist, people 
(hope to) become a good socialist. While a possible impact on their identity is 
actually a by-product, this aspect cannot be ignored if one wants a full account 
of voting decisions. As I have stressed earlier on, however, such a conscious 
formation of one’s reasons is not required to speak of broad rationality, since it 
cannot be achieved in a deliberate and intentional way. 
 
3. Expressive rationality and voting decisions 
 
Whereas the broad conception of rationality focuses on the formation process 
of  beliefs  and  preferences,  the  expressive  conception  stresses  that  the 
individual  at  hand  should  identify  with  his  reasons  and  regard  them  as 
authentically his own. Whether his reasons stem from socialization (education, 
family, friends), indoctrination (media, propaganda) or rational deliberation is 
largely irrelevant. What matters is that there is a certain level of psychological 
and  emotional  involvement:  “the  motivation  that  guides  individuals’ 
participation in these activities is one of expressive attachment: through their 
participation,  these  voters  (…)  express  who  they  are,  and  they  attach  to  a 
collective that they feel is like them” (Schuessler 2000a: ix).  
In contrast with the abovementioned expressive accounts of voting that remain 
within  an  instrumental  framework,  I  want  to  provide  a  completely  non-
instrumental conception of expressive rationality. In my view, voting can be 




reasons”  (Benn  1979:  304).  An  expressively  rational  voter  simply  wants  to 
express  what  kind  of  a  person  he  is  and  what  he  values  highly  in  life: 
“individuals  do  not  necessarily  participate  in  collective  action  in  order  to 
produce outcomes, but instead often do so in order to express who they are” 
(Schuessler 2000a: 5). In what follows, I first spell out more fully why such a 
non-instrumental  characterization  of  expressive  considerations  is  needed  to 
explain voting decisions as most rational citizens make them. 
 
3.1. Why an expressive account is needed to solve the paradox of voting  
 
As  Barry  (1970:  16)  stresses,  one  should  not  simply  postulate  a  taste  or 
preference for voting if one really wants to explain why people vote, but find 
out why some citizens have this motivation more strongly than others. This 
search for “deeper reasons” (Dowding 2005: 453) is needed to avoid the ‘ad 
hoc’ character of Public Choice theories amending the calculus of voting. In 
what follows, I will therefore analyze some of the variables that underlie an 
individual’s motivation to vote, like social expectations, moral principles and 
democratic norms according to which voting is a good thing to do. In contrast 
with postulating that one votes because one prefers to, there are quite a lot of 
strings attached to the claim that one votes because one cares about these 
things.  After  all,  such  cares  typically  guide  more  decisions  than  those 
concerning whether and how to vote. 
In this respect, I want to argue that it is rational in an electoral context to 
express one’s identity, regardless of the consequences of doing so. After all, it 
is a way of bringing one’s actions in accordance with one’s cares (Boudon 
1997: 222; Schuessler 2000a: ix-x; Schuessler 2000b: 88). The purpose of voting 
is simply to express one’s identity, nothing more (one does not want to reach 
some goal in the outside world) and nothing less (one does not mindlessly react 
to environmental stimuli). As Amartya Sen (1977: 333) notices, voters may be 
“guided not so much by maximization of expected utility, but something much 
simpler, viz, just a desire to record one’s true preference”. 
The main argument is that the electoral context induces rational people to base 
their  decisions  on  non-instrumental  considerations,  because  it  breaks  any 
connection  whatsoever  between  the  individual’s  action  and  the  resulting 
outcome. Whereas private choices have a direct impact on my situation (and 
mine alone), public choices have almost no impact on my well-being. Whereas 
it is rational to base the former primarily on self-interested considerations, it is 
rational to base the latter on other considerations. However, this dichotomy 
should not be interpreted too strictly (Buchanan 1999: I, 66-70; III, 17-30). The Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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difference between both is gradual rather than absolute in nature. While people 
typically  take  into  account  all  sorts  of  considerations,  their  relative  weight 
depends on the choice situation at hand. 
While authors like Buchanan, Brennan and Lomasky rightly stress that this 
difference between private and public choices provides the decisive reason to 
go beyond conventional economics in explaining human actions, I believe they 
do not go far enough (Engelen 2008a). After all, the electoral context provides 
a setting where rational individuals will not act instrumentally because “they 
don’t  have  reason  to  care  greatly  about  the  consequences  of  their  acts” 
(Ferejohn & Satz 1996: 78). 
In such a setting, rationality does not require standard instrumental cost-benefit 
analysis (Brennan & Lomasky 1993: 21, 30). Rather, it recommends one to 
discount  the  possible  consequences  of  one’s  vote.  Since  a  potential  voter 
knows that he will not necessarily get what he chooses, he will not, in the first 
place, vote in order to get what he wants. If he knows that he may just as well 
not get what he votes for, it is rational for him not to vote in order to get it. I 
thus want to assume that citizens in general realize that – whatever they decide 
to  do  –  they  will  have  no  significant  impact  on  the  outcome  (Brennan  & 
Lomasky 1993: 171; Mueller 2003: 319).  
 
3.2. Expressive rationality and the decision whether or not to vote 
 
If most citizens understand that they cannot influence the electoral outcome – 
as I believe they do – they will base their decision whether or not to vote on 
other than instrumental considerations. In this respect, I want to argue that 
“turnout  should  be  considered  a  decision,  a  perfectly  rational  decision,  to 
express one’s preferences” (Aldrich 1997: 390). 
To  make  clear  the  difference  between  instrumental  and  expressive 
considerations  in  favor  of  voting,  I  want  to  refer  to  a  number  of  other 
distinctions.  First,  instrumental  considerations  always  refer  to  the  future 
consequences that individual citizens want to achieve: I vote because I think 
my vote will influence policy goals as I prefer them (PB) or because I will 
experience satisfaction from the act of voting itself (D). In contrast, expressive 
considerations refer to existing norms, traditions and values to which citizens 
are  committed.  In  this  respect,  voting  is  not  so  much  prospective  as  it  is 
retrospective  in  nature.  Whereas  instrumental  actions  are  thus  typically 
forward-looking (prospective), expressive actions are predominantly backward-




because they have always done so in the past32. Second, whereas instrumental 
actions  are  hypothetical  in  nature  (I  vote  if  I  want  to  achieve  my  goals), 
expressive actions are typically categorical (I vote, full stop). Third, whereas 
instrumental  actions  are  valued  and  performed  for  the  sake  of  their 
consequences, expressive actions are valued and performed regardless of their 
consequences (I vote for the sake of voting itself). Of course, these distinctions 
tend to overlap each other to a certain extent. 
The  decision  whether  or  not  to  vote  depends  upon  the  commitments, 
engagements and loyalties that constitute a person’s identity. One might argue 
that social expectations and the worries to live up to conventions can hardly be 
labeled  fundamental  things  to  care  about.  For  such  expectations  to  have 
motivational force, however, an individual has to identify himself with a certain 
community  and  its  accompanying  values,  norms  and  traditions.  There  are 
several interrelated ways to rephrase these general statements. In doing so, it 
will become clear that the expressive account is more fundamental than and 
cannot be reduced to simply positing a preference for voting. 
First, a large part of the electorate cares about democracy itself. Downs (1957: 
267)  stresses that  this  can  provide  an  incentive  to  vote.  However,  whereas 
Downs models this motivation as a rational consideration about the long-term 
benefits of democracy (hypothetical)33, I want to interpret this as a sense of 
social responsibility (categorical). André Blais (2000: 143) formulates it aptly: 
“like many of my fellow citizens, I feel that I must act in accordance with the 
principle  I  believe  in.  As  I  think  of  myself  as  a  democrat,  it  would  be 
incongruous not to vote. I vote, then, because I want to be consistent with my 
principles”. A lot of voters think of themselves as good citizens and want to 
express this part of their identity. Elections provide an excellent opportunity to 
do exactly this. 
Second, a lot of citizens experience a strong sense of a civic duty to vote. 
About half of the electorate decides to vote “out of a sense of moral obligation, 
because they  believe  it  would be  wrong not  to  vote;  they do  not  calculate 
benefits and costs” (Blais 2000: 137). Empirical research shows that such a 
sense of “duty is the overriding motivation for about half of those who vote 
and a clear majority of regular voters. Those with a strong sense of duty almost 
always vote” (Blais 2000: 112). Indeed, the number of citizens that decide to 
                                                 
32  This  does  not  refer  to  the  claim  that  voting  decisions  are  primarily  based  on 
retrospective  judgments  of  party  performance,  which  is  situated  wholly  within  the 
instrumental account in which decisions are completely goal-oriented. 
33 Downs thinks that citizens would in the end give priority to the short-term advantages 
of abstention over the long-term advantages of upholding democracy, which is why his 
instrumental model predicts (near-)universal abstention. Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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vote range from 13% among those with a low sense of duty to 85% of those 
with high sense of duty (Campbell et al. 1960: 105-106). The former tend to 
give greater weight to instrumental cost-benefit comparisons: “B, P, and C do a 
much better job of explaining the vote among those with a weak sense of duty” 
(Blais 2000: 102).  
As I have shown, most authors try to incorporate this sense of duty in the 
calculus of voting by adding a D-term. In doing so, they have to assume that 
people systematically experience satisfaction from fulfilling their duties. Here, I 
want to argue that the basic reason for living up to one’s obligations is not the 
pleasure  one  may  derive  from  it.  Whatever  the  costs,  benefits  and 
consequences  of  voting  are,  they  do  not  form  the  primary  reason  for 
performing  it.  Instead  of  instrumentally  rationalizing  this  sense  of  duty,  I 
simply want to take it at face value. Acting in accordance with one’s principles 
is  perfectly  rational  as  long  as one  identifies  with  them  and  takes  them  to 
constitute good reasons to act upon (Boudon 1997: 223-224). In this respect, I 
want to understand the civic sense of duty as “the main reason to vote” (Blais 
2000:  104-112).  Even  though  it  is  not  necessarily  instrumentally  rational,  it 
perfectly fits the requirements of expressive rationality.  
Third, voting is often deemed intrinsically valuable. It is not perceived as a 
means to produce some outcome, but as an act of which the performance itself 
counts. It is the action itself rather than its consequences that matters. Voters 
are mainly “oriented toward purely expressive or symbolic action, action that is 
undertaken  for  its  own  sake  rather  than  to  bring  about  particular 
consequences”  (Brennan  &  Lomasky  1993:  25).  Here,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish between voting as intrinsically valuable and voting as intrinsically 
pleasurable.  As  I  have  already  stressed,  I  believe  that  the  abovementioned 
accounts  systematically  incorporate  the  former  within  the  Public  Choice 
framework of the latter. Mostly, this is done by stating that “evidently voters 
take some psychic satisfaction in expressing their preferences” (Fiorina 1997: 
403).  
Fourth, a lot of citizens care about a particular ideology, party or politician. 
Those who consider themselves to be good republicans want to express this by 
going out to vote on a republican party or politician. This does not mean that 
they  think  their  vote  will  contribute  to  its  victory.  It  is  a  symbolic  act, 
expressing the way they see themselves. The stronger this so-called sense of 
party identification, the more likely it is that one will go out to vote. Because 
this also addresses the question how one votes, I will go deeper into it in what 
follows. 




3.3. Expressive rationality and the decision whom to vote for 
 
The argument that the electoral context makes it rational to act on the basis of 
non-instrumental considerations applies to decisions inside the voting booth as 
well: “in the market the agent is decisive (…). The chooser actually gets what he 
chooses (…). At the ballot box, in particular contrast, the agent is nondecisive 
(…). Whether option A or option B actually emerges as the electoral outcome 
is  a  matter  not  of  how  I  vote,  but  of  how  everyone  else  does.  Electoral 
outcome is detached from electoral ‘choice’ for each voter in a crucial way” 
(Brennan & Lomasky 1993: 15). 
In contrast with what Public Choice theorists are forced to assume and as I will 
explain  more  fully  later  on,  I  want  to  argue  that  the  considerations  that 
motivate the decisions whether and how to vote are basically the same. If one 
decides  to  turn  up  because  of  expressive  considerations,  these  will  also 
dominate the decision whom to vote for. As I have suggested, a strong sense 
of party identification provides an incentive both to show up and to vote in a 
specific way. Empirical research has shown that this “sense of attachment with 
one  party  or  the  other”  (Campbell  et  al.,  1960:  121)  is  among  the  most 
important  factors  in  explaining  how  people  vote.  If  people  identify  with  a 
particular party or candidate, it is rational to express their support for it by 
checking its box on the ballot. Moreover, citizens can have an affectionate 
attitude towards a particular candidate. This is not only the case when they 
know a politician personally, but also when a politician holds beliefs, values and 
ideologies similar to their own. In such cases, it is expressively rational for 
citizens to express support for these politicians and the things they stand for. 
One could argue that this line of reasoning does not apply to citizens who 
regard voting as intrinsically valuable or who experience a sense of duty to vote 
(Blais 2000: 111). Since they are mainly concerned with the act of voting itself, 
they have no clear preference about whom to vote for. While this may be an 
accurate description of some voters, I think it is too far-fetched to form a 
generalized account. The fact that they care about democratic values suggests 
that  they  are  not  so  indifferent  that  they  will  vote  completely  at  random 
(Fiorina 1997: 403). Even though their reasons for showing up do not provide 
a straightforward manual to guide their decision how to vote, they at least 
indicate a direction. Their impact inside the voting booth goes beyond the 
calculus of the potential benefits of one’s vote, for example by eliminating 
some candidates as inconsistent with their basic commitments.  
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3.4. The distinction between the decisions why and how to vote  
 
While not always made explicit, the distinction between the decisions why and 
how to vote is central in Public Choice theories. In the end, I believe that this 
distinction inhibits a proper account of the decision process that most rational 
citizens go through and thus tends to confound matters only further (Campbell 
et al. 1960: 89). In my view, it has contributed to the renowned paradox of 
voting. An instrumentally motivated citizen will indeed first calculate whether 
or not going out to vote is worth it. Only if voting is deemed beneficial, does 
he have to make up his mind whom to vote for. In contrast, I want to argue 
that the decision how to vote often precedes the one whether or not to vote. 
Expressive voters often know how to vote before deciding whether or not to 
vote. A devoted republican will vote republican, without first considering in 
some distinct moment of choice whether or not to vote, simply because he 
considers it a unique opportunity to express this aspect of his identity. His 
decision to vote is secondary to his decision whom to vote for. Even if he 
actually ponders whether or not to vote, his mind is already made up about 
whom to vote for.  
If one focuses on the expressive aspects that guide voting decisions, it becomes 
clear that the distinction between whether and how to vote is often irrelevant 
or even misleading. Most of the time, both issues do not present themselves 
independently from each other (Brennan & Hamlin 1998: 172). The expressive 
conception of rationality thus allows one to analyze both decisions as parts of 
the same overall reasoning: “turnout and candidate choice are not necessarily 
two separate decisions, but rather a joint decision based on the same sorts of 
factors” (Marquette & Hinckley 1988: 57). Among these factors are one’s party 
identification and one’s perception of differences between the candidates. As 
these fade, more and more citizens feel that it does not really matter who gets 
elected and start to question whether voting is worth the effort at all (Aldrich 
1997: 386). The fact that people without a clear idea whom to vote for tend to 
abstain  more  often  shows  that  the  decision  whether  and  how  to  vote  are 
strongly related34. In my view, stressing the importance of the issue of how 
citizens vote (partly) solves the paradox of why they vote.  
                                                 
34 Downs formulates this thought in purely instrumental terms: “men who are indifferent 
about who wins have nothing to gain from voting, so they abstain” (Downs 1957: 262). 
He argues that there should be a considerable difference between the utility they will 
experience if different parties gain power. If this so-called “expected party differential” 
(Downs 1957: 39) is zero, they will rationally decide to abstain. In contrast with Downs’ 




3.5. Expressive rationality and cheering 
 
To further illustrate the expressive rationality of voting, it can be compared to 
cheering for one’s favorite sports team (Mueller 2003: 320-32). Cheering, like 
voting, is intended not to influence the outcome of the contest, but to express 
support  for  one  of  the  competitors.  As  Brennan  and  Buchanan  put  it, 
“although spectators care about the outcome, they do not act to determine it, 
and they do not conceive themselves to be so acting” (Buchanan 1999: XIII, 
154).  Like  voters,  they  are  aware  that  their  actions  do  not  influence  the 
outcome.  Consequently,  it  is  rational  for  them  to  put  aside  cost-benefit 
calculations and act in non-instrumental ways. 
Here too, Public Choice theorists hurry to argue that cheering is instrumentally 
rational,  because  it  is  a  cost-effective  way  of  acting  according  to  one’s 
preferences: “the actor obtains personal pleasure from the act (…). A fan’s 
cheering is rewarded if his team wins; most fans cheer for the home team. 
Winning  home  teams  provide  more  positive  reinforcement  for  their 
supporters. Winning home teams tend to have higher attendance levels and 
more vocal fans than do losing teams” (Mueller 2003: 328). There is thus no 
fun if there is no cheering: “the sports fan’s expression of team support is 
required for him to enjoy his participation” (Schuessler 2000a: 46). Cheering is 
perceived not as a cost, but as a benefit, since it is agreeable in itself. This line 
of  reasoning  corresponds  to  the  abovementioned  strategy  of  instrumentally 
rationalizing  voting  decisions:  “expressing  support  for  an  outcome  can  be 
much  less  costly  than  actually  bringing  about  that  outcome  (…).  In  a 
democracy,  one  important  way  in  which  one  can  express  support  for  an 
outcome is by voting for it. When the number of voters is even moderately 
large, voting is a low cost way to give vent to sentiments that would, in other 
contexts, lie dormant” (Brennan & Lomasky 1989: 51). 
In contrast, I want to argue that cheering, like voting, does not always bring 
about a sense of joy. Fans do not cheer because it brings them cheer. I thus 
want to go against the tendency to reduce the act of cheering (a cheer as an 
encouragement for one’s favorite team) to the pleasure this may produce (a 
cheer  as  a  happy  feeling).  In  my  opinion,  this  attempt  to  explain  cheering 
instrumentally leads to the paradoxical prediction that nobody will cheer for a 
losing team. It cannot explain why fans continue to cheer if their favorite team 
is losing or why some people tend to support the underdog. The bottom line is 
that people do not cheer in order to attain, but to express the pleasure they feel 
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when their team wins. This basically comes down to the point I have made 
previously,  namely  that  systematically  postulating  that  individuals  enjoy 
expressing  their  preferences  does  not  explain  anything.  Not  only  does  it 
provide a tautological and circular account immune to empirical criticism (I 
cheer because I like to cheer and I like to cheer because I enjoy doing so), it is 
also  counterintuitive.  People  cheer  because  they  care  about  their  team, 
regardless whether this brings pleasure or frustration. 
To be sure, I do not claim that cheering and voting are the same, only that they 
are analogous. Voting is not cheering, it is like cheering. While this analogy – 
like every analogy – fails in some respects, it shows that both actions have 
something  in  common,  namely  that  they  both  belong  to  the  category  of 
expressive actions. According to Pressman (2006: 244-246), the analogy fails 
because cheering is a secondary act which costs almost nothing, since people 
attending a match primarily pay to enjoy the match itself. In contrast, voters 
take  time  and  trouble  to  vote,  even  though  this  has  no  purpose  beyond 
supporting their favorite candidate. However, it is perfectly possible that fans 
may not enjoy the match at all, just as much as voters may enjoy the act of 
voting  itself.  In  addition,  contrary  to  what  Pressman  (2006:  249)  thinks, 
drawing  an  analogy  between  cheering  and  voting  does  not  imply  that  an 
increase in the first automatically implies an increase in the latter as well. If 
people’s identities shift, the actions that express them will change accordingly. 
This perfectly accounts for the recent increase in all sorts of cheering behavior 
occurring  simultaneously  with  falling  turnout  levels.  One  could  argue  that 
people  increasingly  construct  their  identities  on  the  basis  of  personal 
commitments,  without  referring  to  political  ideologies.  In  this  light,  the 
covariance  between  more  cheering  and  less  voting  can  be  explained  by  a 
general  shift  in  the  way  citizens  conceive  of  themselves.  While  personal 
commitments may alter, the tendency to express them does not seem to be 
declining or increasing over time. 
In  this  respect,  I  want  to  refer  to  this  chapter’s  opening  quote  by  Gerald 
Kramer. He seems to suggest that voting – like cheering or saluting the flag on 
one’s own – is close to absurdity or at least irrationality35. In contrast with 
Kramer, I believe that the remarkable similarities between cheering and voting 
show that both are rational responses to a particular kind of situation. Both are 
ways of expressing particular aspects of one’s identity. If one cares about some 
team, one will express this by applauding at their performances. Similarly, if 
one cares about a specific political candidate, one will express this by going out 
                                                 
35 While Kramer focuses explicitly on the private nature of both actions (nobody sees 
whether or not one really votes inside the voting booth), I believe that going out to vote 




to vote for him. I think it is not necessarily irrational to express one’s loyalty to 
a team, a politician or a political party even if nobody is watching (Schuessler 
2000a:  15).  After  all,  cheering  on  one’s  own  –  which  is  not  as  unusual  as 
Kramer may think it is (Buchanan 1999: XIII, 154) – is not aimed at some goal 
external to the act itself, even not the goal of letting others know what one 
stands for. Fans cheer simply to express their involvement and honor certain 
fundamental aspects of their identity36. The analogy thus brings to the fore that 
both voting and cheering are based on good reasons that cannot be understood 
in instrumental terms.  
The  analogy  also  further  clarifies  that  I  do  not  randomly  shift  from  an 
instrumental to an expressive conception of rationality. Situations that induce 
people  to  cheer  for  their  favorite  sports  team  are  characterized  by  the 
impossibility of contributing anything to the event itself. Jumping on the field 
during  a  sports  match  is  impossible,  inappropriate  and  probably  grossly 
inefficient. After all, one can expect the athletes to do better than oneself. 
Because fans are aware that they cannot influence the outcome of the match, it 
is rational for them not to try and do so. The same holds for expressive voters. 
Because  elections  do  not  allow  them  to  promote  their  values  (they  cannot 
ensure the victory of their favorite party or candidate on their own), they have 
to  search  for  other  ways  to  bring  their  actions  in  accordance  with  their 
principles and commitments (Aldrich 1997: 390).  
In this respect, I want to argue that honoring and promoting are two possible 
ways of translating one’s cares into action (Pettit 1991: 230-231). A citizen who 
votes is honoring what he cares about rather than promoting it. After all, the 
latter would require him to try and persuade two other citizens to vote in the 
way he does. An attitude of honoring means that, while personally committed 
to certain things, he does not necessarily want others to uphold them as well. 
Since he is satisfied with living by his own standards and does not want to 
impose them on others, he lets his own actions exemplify his values. If a citizen 
who cares about democracy would not participate in elections, he risks being 
charged  with  hypocrisy  and  not  having  the  concerns  he  claims  to  have. 
Expressing one’s principles is often the only way of remaining true to oneself, 
even if it is not the most efficient means to promote one’s cares. 
The analogy also further clarifies that the distinction between whether and how 
to vote is often irrelevant from an expressive point of view. After all, a fan 
does not first make up his mind whether or not to go to the game (1), after 
which he has to decide whether to cheer or not (2) and for which team to cheer 
                                                 
36 The fact that fans may cheer louder when watching a game with others can be made 
consistent with the expressive conception of rationality, because the tendency to manifest 
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(3). Rather, it is because he is involved with a particular team (3) that he will 
cheer to express his support (2) and that he may even take the trouble of going 
to the game (1). Likewise, expressive voters have already acquired a certain 
party identification (3), which they express by supporting their favorite party 
(2), even before having decided whether or not to go out and vote (1).  
The fact that voting decisions are based on good, non-instrumental reasons 
thus shows that they can be perfectly rational in the expressive sense of the 
word. In this respect, I completely agree with Brennan and Hamlin (1998: 167) 
whose “first and most basic point to stress is that voters are rational: whether 
they vote instrumentally or expressively in any particular situation, they do so 
as  a  rational  response  to  that  situation”.  Perhaps  an  explanation  of  voting 
decisions  as  expressions  of  the  things  citizens  care  about  is  not  a  very 
sophisticated  one.  However,  this  poses  no  serious  problem,  since  these 
decisions themselves are not that complex either (Aldrich 1997: 390). CONCLUSION OF PART II 
 
 
“The elements of the calculus of voting play only at the margin, and only among a 
fraction of the electorate”  
(Blais 2000: 139) 
 
As I have suggested, I believe that the expressive conception of rationality is 
able to bring together both rationality and democracy without degrading either 
one  of  them.  In  my  view,  it  is  pre-eminently  suitable  to  understand  the 
importance of democracy and citizen participation. It connects rationality to 
one’s deeply-rooted identity and shows that voting is a profound expression of 
the  fundamental  values,  principles  and  commitments  that  constitute  one’s 
identity. To be sure, the different conceptions of rationality complement rather 
than substitute each other. In what follows, I want to analyze more fully how 
this comes to the fore when studying voting decisions. 
First, it may happen that one citizen votes out of expressive considerations 
while another abstains because of instrumental considerations. Since both have 
good reasons for their acts, they can both be called rational in a minimal sense. 
However, one can still call the former instrumentally irrational. Moreover, if 
the  latter  actually  cares  about  democracy,  he  is  expressively  irrational  if  he 
abstains.  Second,  a  single  individual  typically  regards  both  expressive  and 
instrumental considerations as legitimate reasons on which he can decide to act 
(Blais 2000: 126; Fiorina 1976: 393). My portrayal of citizens who are motivated 
either purely instrumentally or purely expressively refers, of course, to ideal-
type descriptions that form the ends of a continuum of citizens with mixed 
motives. Each citizen thus has to weigh off his inclination to act upon his 
principles  against  the  costs  of  doing  so.  Whereas  some  decide  to  act  in  a 
principled way, others tend to let the costs dominate more easily. 
In order to further illustrate the relation between instrumental and expressive 
considerations in voting decisions, I want to analyze two specific phenomena. 
Both seem to suggest that a number of voters overestimate the influence of 
their vote on the electoral outcome and will base their decision to vote at least 
partly  on  instrumental  considerations.  First,  there  is  the  empirical  fact  that 
turnout is larger in close elections (Mueller 2003: 314-318). Second, there is the 
phenomenon of strategic voting, which means that “a voter does not vote his 
or her  true preferences  in the  hopes  that  voting  for  one’s  second or  third Part II: The Rationality of Voting Decisions 
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choice will yield better results” (Pressman 2006: 245). Most citizens do not like 
to  see  their  vote  wasted37  and  therefore  narrow  down  their  options  to 
candidates who have a shot at winning the election. They may decide to vote 
for a less preferred candidate who has more chance of winning the election 
than their most preferred candidate. Someone who, for example, favors Ralph 
Nader might decide to vote for John Kerry, because he believes that Nader has 
no chance of winning at all and he deems Kerry a better option than Bush. 
Driven  by  a  concern  about  the  electoral  outcome,  these  voters  are  largely 
instrumentally  motivated  (Mueller  2003:  321;  Pressman  2006:  249).  Downs 
(1957:  145)  stresses  that  it  is  economically  rational  to  vote  in  favor  of  a 
candidate who has a shot at winning the election: “we define rational behavior 
in elections as that most efficiently designed to select the government a voter 
most desires from among those candidates with reasonable chances of actually 
governing”. 
It should be noted that increased turnout and strategic voting in close elections 
occur only at the margins. The bulk of the electorate votes sincerely and shows 
up  at  the  polling  station  even  when  the  electoral  result  is  largely  known 
beforehand. Voting sincerely for a fringe party that has no reasonable chance 
of winning and going out to vote even if elections are not close are ways of 
expressing the ideologies, principles and values one believes in. In my view, 
both phenomena show that instrumental and expressive considerations come 
into conflict with each other. On the one hand, people tend to vote for the 
candidate they consider to be closest to their views and values, which shows 
that they want to express what they care about most (Brennan & Hamlin 1998: 
156). On the other hand, they also realize that their vote will be a lost one if 
there will be a landslide victory or if their preferred candidate has no chance at 
all. Ultimately, they thus have to weigh off both sorts of considerations against 
each other. 
While more work should be done to develop an empirically supported theory 
about the relative weight of instrumental and expressive considerations, I have 
argued that – for most citizens – the former tend to be outweighed by the latter 
in elections, since individual choices here have only a negligible impact on the 
final outcome. This implies that instrumental considerations only come into 
play at the margin (Blais 2000: 10, 81, 137; Brennan & Lomasky 1989: 46; 
Brennan & Lomasky 1993: 65; Dowding 2005: 443-446). As this conclusion’s 
opening  quote  by  André  Blais  suggests,  the  instrumental  conception  of 
rationality has only limited explanatory power, since it works only for those 
                                                 
37  This  is  also  what  Ferejohn  and  Fiorina  (1974)  pointed  at  in  their  minimax  regret 
explanation of the decision to vote (Aldrich 1997: 378-381). In their view, voting is the 




citizens with only a weak sense of duty to vote. This is supported by empirical 
evidence that aggregate turnout levels are only marginally affected by changes 
in  the  external  conditions  on  election  days,  like  the  weather.  Citizens  who 
experience  a  strong  sense  of  duty  tend  to  vote,  regardless  of  the  pleasure, 
satisfaction or psychic benefit this might provide (Blais 2000: 137). Instead of 
framing such a duty as part of their overall utility function, I have analyzed it as 
a non-instrumental reason to vote.  
My  emphasis  on  the  specific  nature  of  the  electoral  context  ensures  that 
expressive rationality does not function as an ‘ad hoc’ explanation whenever 
instrumental  rationality  is  deemed  inadequate.  It  stresses  that  the  relative 
weight  of  expressive  and  instrumental  considerations  depends  on  the 
institutional context: “if we imagine a spectrum running from the case in which 
the chooser is decisive through cases in which the chances of his being decisive 
are increasingly remote, then the role of expressive relative to instrumental 
elements in preference revelation increases along that spectrum” (Brennan & 
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“Perhaps the two most central challenges in social and political theory are: first, to 
identify the sorts of public institutions that have best claim to be regarded as 
desirable; and, second, to demonstrate that those institutions are feasible, showing 
how they can be introduced and maintained among ordinary, unsaintly human 
beings” 
(Pettit 2002: 275) 
 
In the third and last part of this dissertation, I want to investigate what the 
normative implications are of the different conceptions of rationality at the 
institutional level. What does the economic conception of rationality lead to 
when thinking about the ideal institutional structure of modern societies? Do 
the alternative conceptions have institutional implications that diverge from 
this?  In  my  view,  criticizing  and  complementing  the  narrowly  economic 
conception  is  not  only  needed  for  explanatory  purposes,  but  opens  up  a 
number of interesting possibilities at the normative level as well. 
 
1. Why study institutions from the perspective of 
rationality? 
 
Ethics  is  traditionally  defined  as  the  philosophical  search  for  the  good  life 
(individual ethics) and the good society (social ethics). Paul Ricoeur combines 
both aspects in his definition of ethics as “the vision of the ‘good life’, with and 
for others, in just institutions”38. Institutions form an essential part in any study 
of the ideal society. They can be defined as relatively stable patterns of more or 
less formal rules, customs, practices and traditions that help organize, regulate, 
coordinate  and  structure  social  interactions  between  members  of  a  society 
(Abercrombie,  Hill  &  Turner  1994:  216-217).  Despite  their  characteristic 
stability, these social and structural phenomena can be changed by deliberate 
interventions of individuals (Goodin 1996: 24-28).  
                                                 
38 This is my own translation of the original quotation: “la visée de la ‘vie bonne’, avec et 
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According to Claus Offe, institutions are the formalized counterparts of more 
informal norms. Both embody the expectations people can legitimately have 
towards others: “institutions establish standards, both normative and cognitive, 
as to what is to be held to be normal, what must be expected, what can be 
relied upon, which rights and duties are attached to which positions, and what 
makes sense in the community or social domain for which an institution is 
valid.  Institutions  accomplish  a  socializing  function  in  that  they  serve  as 
examples and reminders of how people “ought to” behave and relate to each 
other, and what they legitimately can expect from each other” (Goodin 1996: 
199-200).  
While these characterizations still remain very broad, I want to focus more 
concretely on what Thomas Christiano (2004: 124-125) labels “basic structural 
institutions”, by which he refers to “the basic institutions of the market, the 
political system, and the basic informal institutions of society such as the family 
and religious institutions”. In what follows, I will limit the analysis to three 
basic  institutions,  namely  markets,  states  and  communities.  While  these  are 
spheres of social life that can be distinguished quite sharply on a conceptual 
level, they always overlap in actual practice. As such, they are best understood 
as ideal types that do not exist in their pure form. Modern societies always 
consist of a complex mixture of elements that characterize them: “‘market’, 
‘state’, and ‘community’ may be thought of as describing three ways in which 
people may relate to one another (…). As participants in a market, people’s 
relationships are those of voluntary exchange. Each obtains what he wants by 
offering  some  equivalent  benefit  in  return.  As  citizens  of  a  state,  people’s 
relationships are constituted by formal rules specifying what each is entitled 
and obliged to do. Goods are allocated by requiring some to provide them and 
empowering others to receive them. As members of a community, people are 
related by ties of identity which give rise to informal obligations of mutual aid” 
(Miller 1990: 17-18). 
Rational choice theory can be said to have two principle aims when taking on 
the topic of institutions. First, it tries to explain and predict the functioning of 
institutions  on  a  basis  of  the  conception  of  individuals  as  rational  beings. 
Second, it tries “to justify and criticize institutional structures by showing that 
when in place, the institutions are likely to bring about outcomes that are for 
the common good or not, under the assumption that they operate in the way 
that  the  explanatory  theory  says  they  do”  (Christiano  2004:  122).  In  what 
follows, I will address both the explanatory and the normative issue. 
First, I want to show how markets, states and communities can be expected to 
work given  the  insights  on individual  rationality  from  the  first part  of  this 
dissertation.  Second,  I  want  to  analyze  which  constellation  of  these  basic Introduction to Part III 
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institutions seems to be desirable from the perspective of rationality. As the 
subtitle of this dissertation shows, I aim not only to explain individual behavior 
in rational terms, but also to think about the normative issue of how a society 
should  look  like.  While  the  first  part  of  this  dissertation  is  devoted  to 
constructing theoretical models that explain individual behavior in terms of 
rationality, this third part has an explicitly normative focus.  
It has been debated to what extent the social sciences can and should be freed 
from normative judgments. According to positivists, scientific research should 
steer  clear  from  the  normative  level  altogether.  However,  positive  and 
normative issues are inevitably linked to some extent. In this respect, I want to 
argue that economics and other social sciences should always take heed of its 
normative implications. 
 
2. In search of a realistic utopia 
 
As I will show more fully in the following chapters, normative issues are best 
decided on the basis of adequate models of individuals. As Milton Friedman 
(1953: 5) rightly argues, “any policy conclusion necessarily rests on a prediction 
about  the  consequences  of  doing  one  thing  rather  than  another”.  In  this 
respect, I want to argue that the main task of political philosophers is to search 
for “a realistic utopia” (Rawls 1999: 12). This refers to a desirable constellation 
of institutions and policies that aim to facilitate interaction among individuals 
as they actually exist. Such a scheme is realistic in the sense that it could work, 
given the way real people act. It is utopian in the sense that it consists of an 
ideal  that  can  be  envisaged  but  is  not  yet  realized39.  Combining  these  two 
thoughts,  the  notion  of  a  realistic  utopia  stresses  that  visions  of  the  ideal 
institutional  structure  of  society  should  be  based  on  realistic  models  of  its 
members. In order to explain what it exactly means, Rawls (1999: 13) refers to 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau whose self-proclaimed “purpose is to consider if, in 
political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, 
taking  men  as  they  are  and  laws  as  they  might  be”40.  Samuel  Bowles  and 
                                                 
39  A  utopia  is  properly  defined  as  “a  place  of  ideal  perfection  especially  in  laws, 
government, and social conditions” (http://m-w.com). Alternative, it can be defined as 
“an impractical scheme for social improvement” (http://m-w.com). By adding the term 
realistic,  one  avoids  the  implication  that  a  utopia  refers  to  an  inherently  impossible, 
unrealizable or at least impractical ideal. 
40 In Rousseau’s own words, one should “inquire whether there can be some legitimate 
and sure rule of administration in the civil order, taking men as they are and laws as they 
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Herbert Gintis (1986: 186) stress that Rousseau already noticed the mutual 
dependence of individuals and institutions: “he recognizes the manner in which 
rules make actors and actors make rules”. In the following chapters, I hope to 
show that this insight leads them to defend a basic institutional structure that 
diverges from the one defended by James Buchanan, who largely ignores the 
causal impact of institutions on individuals. 
A realistic utopia is thus an institutional scheme that is “compatible with the 
facts of human nature and social life” (Beitz 2000: 677). What matters is which 
institutional and policy schemes work best in practice, given the way actual 
individuals are (Buchanan 1999: XVI, 109). In this sense, the assumptions one 
makes when modeling individuals should be based on knowledge of the actual 
motivations of individuals in their public roles (Le Grand 2003: 2, 24).  
Crucial in this respect is that human nature as it has evolved is characterized by 
more or less uniform regularities that are not given in some definite form but 
nevertheless present some boundaries. A realistic utopia is realistic in the sense 
that it could possibly work, given these general psychological propensities of 
human nature (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 37; Cohen 2002: 384). This is why 
explanatory models are indispensable to the normative purpose discussed here. 
However, while I agree that empirical research is crucial, political philosophers 
should  try  to  think  up  and  evaluate  different  institutional  schemes.  Their 
normative views can, in the end, motivate individuals to try and improve the 
institutional structure of their societies (Goodin 1996: 36-37). Since this is a 
dissertation in philosophy, I will not argue in favor of specific policy options or 
institutional  reforms.  Nevertheless,  I  hope  it  contains  a  number  of  useful 
suggestions with regard to the routes one might choose to follow in order to 
arrive at a better society. After all, this is what political philosophers should be 
concerned with: “political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political 
endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” 
(Rawls 1999: 128).  
The notion of a realistic utopia combines both of the tasks set out by Philip 
Pettit in this introduction’s opening quote. While most contemporary political 
philosophers have focused on the first task of institutional design as some kind 
of ideal theorizing, they have largely ignored the second task of investigating 
which design is fit to survive in actual practice. In what follows, I therefore 
want  to  take  on  the  issue  which  basic  institutional  schemes  can  be 
implemented  in  a  modern  society  full  of  people  that  are  rational  in  the 
meanings distinguished above. 
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3. Introducing Public Choice theory and Analytical 
Marxism 
 
In order to introduce the following chapters, I want refer to Robert Goodin 
(1996:  13)  who  distinguishes  between  two  dominant  fields  within  political 
thinking.  According  to  the  first,  individuals  are  analyzed  as  economically 
rational. According to the second field, individuals are analyzed as they are. As 
should  be  clear by  now,  I  am  convinced  that  the  second  strategy  is  to  be 
preferred,  even  though  I  believe  this  does  not  imply  doing  away  with  the 
notion of rationality altogether. 
I hope to analyze more fully what the institutional implications are of both 
fields.  In  the  fifth  chapter,  I  will  focus  on  Public  Choice  theorist  James 
Buchanan  as  the  main  proponent  of  the  first  field.  Public  Choice  theory 
essentially consists of two strands, which correspond perfectly with the two 
main aspects of any study of institutions from a rational choice perspective 
(Buchanan 1999: XVI, 331; Mueller 1993: 447-485). The first, positive strand 
analyzes  institutions as  they  function  in reality. How do  citizens elect  their 
representatives? Which policy decisions will the elected governments take and 
what does the resulting institutional structure look like? The second, normative 
strand  aims  to  analyze  not  what  institutions  are,  but  what  they  should  be. 
Given the knowledge of how economically rational individuals act, how can 
and should institutions be designed and reformed. Public Choice theory thus 
explicitly addresses both pillars on which this dissertation is based: rationality 
and its normative implications (Mueller 2003: 668-674).  
In the sixth chapter, I want to show that Analytical Marxists such as Samuel 
Bowles and Herbert Gintis have a legitimate say in these debates. They too 
want to improve (the basic institutional scheme of) society by starting from a 
rational  choice  perspective.  I  believe  they  form  a  welcome  counterpart  to 
Public Choice theorists in that they try to construct more adequate models of 
individuals that lead to completely divergent views of desirable institutional 
arrangements. 
To be sure, I think both fields make a valuable contribution to the issues at 
hand. This way, I hope to open up the debate as it is held in contemporary 
political philosophy. After all, this is completely centered round and dominated 
by the work of John Rawls. As Robert Nozick claims, “political philosophers 
now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not” (Nozick 1974: 
183). I choose not to address his theory, partly because I believe that there exist 
already (more than) enough decent and extensive studies of his work. Instead, I 
focus on authors like Buchanan, Bowles and Gintis whose views provide much Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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lesser known voices in the debates on a desirable basic institutional structure 
for modern societies. CHAPTER 5 
 
JAMES BUCHANAN’S 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
 
 
 “It is not that everybody is somehow narrow, self seeking, always out to grab his 
own interest and trying to increase his own income share. But if we are talking 
about institutions, that is the best presumption we can make”  
(Buchanan 1999: XVI, 108-109) 
 
1. Why study James Buchanan? 
 
1.1. Who is James Buchanan? 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to answer the question what the institutional 
structure of society should look like from a rational choice perspective. If one 
wants to analyze the role of institutions in a society of rational individuals, one 
cannot ignore the field of Public Choice theory. While this covers a wide range 
of  authors,  ideas  and  topics  (Mueller  2003),  it  is  useful  to  focus  on  the 
extensive work of James M. Buchanan41 rather than give an overview of the 
whole field. This 1986 Nobel Laureate in Economics is often considered to be 
the founder and most important proponent of Public Choice theory. After his 
first publications helped establish the field, he never stopped enlightening his 
colleagues  with  inspiring  ideas  and  new  insights.  Throughout  the  years, 
Buchanan  has  covered  a  wide  range  of  topics  from  a  number  of 
methodological  perspectives.  As  a  result,  his  extensive  body  of  work  is 
characterized  by  some  ambiguities  and  inconsistencies  as  well.  Where 
                                                 
41 Throughout this chapter and unless mentioned otherwise, I am referring to The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan as they have been edited and published by Liberty Fund 
(Buchanan 1999). This is by far the most complete collection of Buchanan’s writings. It 
consists of 20 volumes and over 6,500 pages. This collection contains – a few exceptions 
aside – all of Buchanan’s publications. For reasons of simplicity, I attribute the views 
expressed in co-authored works to Buchanan. This is in no way intended to downgrade 
the efforts of his collaborators. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
 
126
necessary, I will investigate these and try to clarify what Buchanan’s main point 
is. 
Buchanan consistently applies the concepts and tools of economics to research 
areas that lie beyond its traditional domain of market relations. In doing so, he 
has helped establish Public Choice theory, which he defines as the research 
area that “applies the techniques and analytic apparatus of modern economics 
to the study of political processes” (X, xvii). Public Choice thus consists of 
economists using their own conceptual apparatus and methodology in their 
analysis of the functioning of public institutions (Mueller 2003: 2). In order to 
see what the public domain looks like from this perspective, I will examine 
Buchanan’s  intellectual  background  (second  section),  his  theoretical 
assumptions  (third  section)  and  the  way  these  result  in  his  theory  of 
constitutional  choice  (fourth  section).  Then,  I  will  try  to  formulate  some 
criticisms  (fifth  section)  and  consider  their  implications  for  Buchanan’s 
normative  views  (sixth  section).  Finally,  I  will  try  to  draw  some  general 
conclusions (seventh section). 
I thus aim to show how Buchanan’s normative views arise from the specific 
theoretical assumptions in his economic conception of rationality. Of course, 
since  the  different  aspects  of  his  work  are  closely  entangled,  several 
assumptions tend to have the same normative implications, just as well as a 
single  assumption  can  have  a  number  of  normative  implications.  All  this 
inevitably leads to some overlap between and repetition in different parts of 
this  chapter.  While  I  believe  that  this  way  of  analyzing  and  evaluating 
Buchanan’s work has its value, it is up to the reader to decide whether it is 
worthwhile or not. 
If Public Choice theory is economics applied to politics, it is important to 
understand correctly what exactly economics is. In this respect, I immediately 
want to stress that Buchanan has a particular conception of economics. It is 
situated squarely within the Austrian tradition of von Mises and von Hayek 
who stress the subjective nature of choice and thus also of economics, which 
can  be  defined  as  the  science  of  choice.  Buchanan  proposes  a  completely 
subjective  definition  of  cost,  which  leads  him  to  discard  the  possibility  of 
determining  the  efficiency  of  some  choice  or  institutional  structure 
independently of an individual’s judgment (VI, 23-25, 30, 41, 87; XII, 8). In the 
same vein, Buchanan gives a subjective definition of economics as the “theory 
of exchange of whatever it is that persons value” (XII, 23). In the language of 
an  economist,  what  individuals  value  is  what  they  prefer.  Because  an 
individual’s preferences do not exist in some objective sense, independent of 
his choice, it is impossible to derive an objective utility function (XII, 26). This 
is also why Buchanan defines economics as the study of ‘catallaxy’ rather than Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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that of ‘maximizing’. Instead of limiting economics to the study of optimally 
allocating  the  existing  means  in  order  to  achieve  certain  goals  or  ends 
(maximizing), Buchanan wants to focus on the process of voluntary trade and 
exchange (catallaxy) (XII, 115-117, 470; XVI, 32, 60, 240). 
Applying  the  conceptual  apparatus  of  economics  to  politics,  Buchanan  has 
filled up a huge lacuna in theorizing about the role of the public domain in 
society. Until the foundation of Public Choice theory, the bulk of the literature 
on institutional design suffered from a lack of explicitly defined theoretical 
underpinnings  about  the  ways  institutions  like  markets  and  states  function. 
While  classical  economists  still  realized  the  importance  of  an  institutional 
framework for societal interactions to run smoothly, neoclassical economists 
increasingly  relied  on  concepts  of  the  market  and  the  state  as  ideal-type 
abstractions. The fact that these were reflected only to a greater or lesser degree 
in reality receded into the background. Instead of engaging in formal modeling 
of  idealized  equilibria,  Buchanan  wants  to  renew  the  attention  for  the 
institutional conditions to be fulfilled in order for socially desirable outcomes 
to arise. 
In doing so, Buchanan also explicitly criticizes most political philosophers and 
their romantic view of the state as benevolent despot (VII, 204; X, 39). They 
naively assume that governments automatically serve the public good, however 
this may be defined. Those who conceive of politics as being concerned about 
some general will, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762: 26), take for granted that 
public servants try to find out what this entails and how to realize it. Yet even 
those who think that politics is really about private interests trust the state to 
serve exactly these interests. Social choice theorists, for example, who aggregate 
private interests in order to construct a social welfare function, presume that 
governments systematically take this function as their main objective. 
Buchanan  deserves  credit  for  making  this  view  explicit  and  questioning  its 
validity. He urges one to be wary of the goodwill of political representatives 
and  public  servants.  Simply  assuming  that  they  are  benevolent  and  public-
spirited is a sign of grave naivety. In this respect, Buchanan wants to revitalize 
the classical insistence on a theoretically unified model of individuals. Instead 
of simply assuming a public-spirited nature, Buchanan relies on the model of 
individuals as Homines Economici in both their private and public roles. In his 
attempt to construe institutions that guarantee social order, he thus wants to 
avoid assuming that everybody is cooperative by nature. 
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1.2. Why study James Buchanan?  
 
As will become clear, I want to focus on what I believe is Buchanan’s main 
goal,  namely  to  formulate  proposals  concerning  the  design  and  reform  of 
institutional arrangements in order to facilitate social life, while respecting each 
individual’s  liberties  and  interests.  Within  the  game  of  life,  Buchanan  thus 
focuses on defining and adjusting the rules in ways that allow the players to 
play the game in mutually beneficial ways. I try to interpret Buchanan’s oeuvre 
in  this  light,  making  abstraction  from  themes  and  topics  that  do  not 
immediately touch upon this aspect. I fully acknowledge that such a thematic 
approach largely neglects the evolutions that his work has undergone during 
the last 45 years. Nevertheless, I believe that it can be valuable, partly because it 
is also how Buchanan’s Collected Works are structured. I aim to present a 
general overview of his work rather than perform a detailed study of his main 
works,  primarily  because  I  believe  that  quite  a  few  of  his  most  revealing 
insights can be found in some of his less well-known articles and monographs. 
Since not every aspect of his work can be treated in the limited space of this 
chapter, I realize that this method is a second-best solution. Nevertheless, I 
hope it helps the reader to understand and appreciate Buchanan’s insightful 
contribution to this dissertation’s central topic. 
Buchanan has consistently aimed to do what he considers to be the task of 
every social scientist, which is to propose institutional reforms that facilitate 
social  life.  In  this  light,  he  has  to  find  a  criterion  to  determine  which 
institutional changes form an improvement and which do not. To answer this 
meta-ethical  question  of  which  principles,  values  and  ideals  are  suitable  in 
deciding  what  is  morally  good,  Buchanan  argues  that  the  values  and 
preferences  of  individuals  are  the  only  relevant  standards.  What  is  morally 
desirable is to be equated with what is preferred by the individuals themselves. 
This implies that the public good is whatever individual citizens deem valuable. 
The most important value in Buchanan’s theory is freedom, which he defines 
“only in its negative sense: an individual is at liberty or free to carry on an 
activity if he or she is not coerced from so doing by someone else” (XIV, 219). 
Buchanan delineates private spheres in which individuals should be left alone 
without  outside  interference.  Within  these  “behavioural  spheres  of  action” 
(XVII, 162), each individual is free to choose his own goals and to try and 
realize these. Individual freedom is nothing more than the number of options 
open to the individual (XVI, 387). As I will show later on, this not only implies 
an instrumental image of individuals, it also leads to a view of institutions as 
externally constraining the action range of individuals. According to Buchanan, 
“rules define the private spaces within which each of us can carry on our own Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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activities” (X, 5). The general thrust of his work is quite basic: if individual 
freedom is a highly praised value, institutions and rules should be arranged in 
such a way that these protect the liberties of individuals (XVI, 329). 
An important reason for studying Buchanan therefore lies in his emphasis on 
the importance of institutions in society. As Robert Tollison remarks, “more 
than anything else, Buchanan’s basic insight that rules are important can be said 
to have driven most of his written work over his career. More than any other 
single scholar, he is responsible for this emphasis and its emergence in modern 
economics and political science” (X, xi-xii)42. In this respect, Buchanan places 
himself within the tradition of Adam Smith (X, 15), with whom he shares the 
view that, in short, “institutions matter” (VIII, 131). 
Buchanan’s  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  institutions  in  society  is  best 
understood using the analogy with rules of a game (IX, 5; XIV, 271-276 XVI, 
23, 103, 339; XVIII, 269). Providing the framework within which individuals 
interact,  rules  are  necessary  if  one  wants  to  play  a  game.  They  bring 
predictability and, as a consequence, enable individuals to engage in collective 
actions. As will become clear, Buchanan has his own take on the Monty Python 
dilemma from this dissertation’s opening quote. 
Buchanan  focuses  on  institutional  matters,  because  he  believes  that 
improvement is hard to think of when one treats the institutional setting as 
given. In contrast, improvement can be attained by changing this setting itself 
(XV, 290-294). Therefore, Buchanan ultimately aims to compare, evaluate and 
propose  alternative  institutional  arrangements  (XVI,  107).  One  could  argue 
that Buchanan is not a typical economist, since economics is the study of how 
choices are made within given institutions and rules. Studying how choices are 
made among institutions and rules, he conceives of himself as a constitutional 
political  economist  (XVI,  xi,  3-7,  127,  331,  357,  432).  Buchanan  wants  to 
analyze the role of the political economy, which consists of “the whole set of 
constraints, or structure, within which individuals act in furtherance of their 
own objectives” (XVI, 250).  
Buchanan thus returns to the classical insistence on studying “the choice of 
constraints as opposed to the choice within constraints” (XV, 4) which is the 
main focus of neoclassical economics. Analyzing individual decisions within 
given rules and institutions, neoclassical economists have largely ignored the 
                                                 
42 Notable contenders are the so-called institutional economists, like Geoffrey Hodgson 
(1988),  Keith  Dowding  and  Desmond  King  (1998),  who  stress  the  importance  of 
institutions  in  making  possible  and  regulating  economic  interactions.  Following 
Thorstein Veblen (1909), these economists show that theories that ignore the central role 
of institutions are inapt to gain insight in the functioning of an economy, since they form 
the preconditions for its survival. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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fact  that  the  latter  are  formed  through  individual  choices  (I,  377-383). 
Buchanan  systematically  stresses  that  society’s  rules  are  ultimately  made  by 
individuals in democratic discussions. This is also why he puts his hopes for a 
better society in institutional design and reform (XI, 5; XVI, 147).  
 
1.3. Why not study another political economist or political philosopher?  
 
There are several strands of thought that combine a proper recognition of both 
the importance of institutions in society with an emphasis on the need for 
rational individuals to consent to them. Claiming “that legitimate authority of 
government must derive from the consent of the governed, where the form 
and  content  of  this  consent  derives  from  the  idea  of  contract  or  mutual 
agreement” (Cudd 2003), these theories refer to some sort of social contract 
that is to be agreed upon by all relevant parties. In this field, theorists also think 
about normative issues – like the desirability of institutions – from a rational 
choice perspective. They basically argue that institutions are legitimate when 
they  are  agreed  upon  by  rational  individuals  who  are  expected  to  consider 
whether the arrangements at hand will help them to achieve their goals. Like 
Buchanan: “social contract theories take individuals to be the best judges of 
their interests and the means to satisfy their desires” (Cudd 2003). 
Within  this  field,  one  can  distinguish  between  contractarianism  and 
contractualism.  The  former,  which  stems  from  Thomas  Hobbes  and  is 
defended (amongst others) by David Gauthier and James Buchanan, argues 
that individuals should primarily be modeled as self-interested beings. In their 
view, institutions are legitimate insofar as they provide arrangements beneficial 
to each citizen: “justice, and so a social contract is only possible where there is 
some possibility of benefit to each individual from cooperation” (Cudd 2003). 
This strand conceives of justice as mutual advantage. The latter, which stems 
from Immanuel Kant and is defended (amongst others) by John Rawls, argues 
that  individuals  should  primarily  be  modeled  as  reasonable  beings.  In  their 
view, institutions are legitimate insofar as they provide arrangements that can 
be  justified  to  each  citizen  in  a  public  and  reasonable  way.  This  strand 
conceives  of  justice  as  impartiality.  As  will  become  clear  later  on,  these 
differences have implications for the way in which public arrangements are 
analyzed and evaluated. 
In  order  to  defend  my  choice  of  Buchanan  among  these  social  contract 
thinkers, I need to argue why I do not focus on the others. While interesting, 
the work of David Gauthier falls largely beyond the scope of this research 
project, since it focuses primarily on the connection between rationality and Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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morality.  As  a  contractarian,  Gauthier  (1986:  2)  defends  a  “conception  of 
morality as a rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest”. In search 
of a rational basis for morality, Gauthier argues that constrained maximizers – 
individuals  who  are  disposed  to  comply  with  mutually  advantageous  moral 
constraints  –  tend  to  benefit  more  from  social  cooperation  than 
straightforward maximizers do (Gauthier 1986: 15). This shows that behavior 
guided by ethical concerns is on the whole to the agent’s benefit. Gauthier 
therefore argues that all moral principles (prescribing impartial constraints) are 
rational (prescribing the maximization of one’s interests43) (Gauthier 1986: 3-
4). 
Instead  of  focusing  on  morality,  Buchanan  explicitly  wants  to  analyze  the 
connection  between  rationality  and  institutions.  Nevertheless,  Gauthier  has 
something  to  say  about  the  role  institutions  should  play  as  well.  He,  for 
example, argues “that in a perfectly competitive market, mutual advantage is 
assured by the unconstrained activity of each individual in pursuit of her own 
greatest satisfaction” (Gauthier 1986: 13). Gauthier thus reserves a large role 
for markets, since they are able to attain the most efficient outcome while 
respecting each individual’s freedom. Nevertheless, he also admits that there is 
need for politics since the world does not function as a perfectly competitive 
market  (Gauthier  1986:  18).  In  order  to  move  beyond  Gauthier’s  scarce 
remarks, I deem it useful to focus on the work of Buchanan who analyzes 
these issues more thoroughly and extensively. 
As I have already suggested, I choose to largely ignore the work of John Rawls. 
Even  though  I  will  try  to  stay  away  from  his  theory  to  the  largest  extent 
possible, I will touch upon some of his views, mostly in comparison with those 
of Buchanan. This way, I hope to show the appeal of Buchanan’s views as a 
way of answering some of the questions Rawls raises. 
 
2. Buchanan’s intellectual background 
 
If one wants to situate James Buchanan in the history of ideas, one should refer 
to welfare economics as it has developed since the 1960s (Gravelle & Rees 
                                                 
43 Gauthier remarks that his conception of rationality is a maximizing one, according to 
which rationality prescribes one to seek the greatest satisfaction of one’s own interests. 
Nevertheless, he quickly adds that this does not assume self-interest: “on the maximizing 
conception it is not interests in the self, that take oneself as object, but interests of the 
self, held by oneself as subject, that provide the basis for rational choice and action” 
(Gauthier  1986:  7).  This  touches  upon  the  distinction  between  of  egoism  and 
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2004: 293-304; Walsh 1996: 159-163). Indeed, the two fundamental theorems 
of  welfare  economics  form  a  major  part  of  Buchanan’s  general  intellectual 
background. The first states that any equilibrium in a perfectly competitive 
market  is  Pareto-efficient,  which  means  “that  there  is  no  other  feasible 
allocation which makes some individual better off and no individual worse off” 
(Gravelle  &  Rees  2004:  280).  However,  the  problem  remains  that  Pareto-
efficient  allocations  of  goods  can  be  widely  unequal.  The  second  theorem 
addresses this problem by stating that any Pareto-efficient allocation can be 
achieved  through  a  suitable  redistribution  of  the  initial  endowments  of  the 
parties involved. The basic conclusion is that perfectly competitive markets 
allow  consumers  to maximize  their  utility and  producers  to  maximize  their 
income without any form of regulation or intervention. In such an Arrow-
Debreu world, efficiency and freedom go hand in hand. The influence of this 
general line of reasoning on Buchanan will become clear as I more fully analyze 
his reliance on concepts like freedom, efficiency and Pareto-optimality.  
The  market  has  long  been  praised  for  its  ability  to  manage  in  an  efficient 
manner the social interactions between individuals in search of their own goals. 
This has been the case since Adam Smith defended the market on the basis of 
its  capacity  to  spontaneously  coordinate  self-interested  actions  into  socially 
beneficial outcomes. After all, “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own interest” (Smith 1776: Book I, Chapter 2: 26-27). In contrast with 
the inherently coercive measures of the state, the market enables individuals to 
freely go about their own business without interfering with each other. One 
can distinguish between different authors who have defended such views. All 
of them had a substantial impact on economics in general and on Buchanan in 
particular. 
First, there is the Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek. His main 
argument in defense of the market is that its alternative, namely government 
intervention, immediately and inevitably puts one on “the road to serfdom” 
(von Hayek 1944). In his view, the state has inherently totalitarian tendencies, 
which the market manages to avoid. Another advantage of the market is its 
capacity to disperse information that is too complex to collect and process in 
any centralized way. As fellow Austrian Ludwig von Mises (1920: 128-130) 
already predicted, centrally planned economies inevitably perform badly in this 
respect. In this light, von Hayek systematically stressed that only free markets 
are able to efficiently allocate existing resources into the domains where they 
are  most  productive.  In  his  view,  the  economic  problem  is  not,  as  most 
economists think, the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends. 
Rather,  it  is  about  how  to  use  the  available  resources  for  ends  whose 
importance only individuals know. The basic problem is thus an epistemic one: Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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because no single individual can take into account all possible factors of the 
complex economic reality, one has to rely on the impersonal mechanism of the 
market to transfer and coordinate the relevant information (von Hayek 1944: 
48-50, 75-76).  
This emphasis on the epistemic advantage of the market over the state has 
been the primary focus of von Hayek’s attention (von Hayek 1945: 524-526). 
In his view, the market generates a spontaneous order, indirectly caused by the 
actions of individuals interacting within its structures but never consciously 
intended by any of them. The fact that the market allows individuals to act free 
from coercion forms its main advantage: “the competitive system is the only 
system designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man 
over  man”  (von  Hayek  1944:  145).  In  contrast  with  the  market,  the  state 
requires deliberate planning and organization of such a kind that, at least in 
principle, a single individual should be able to understand the whole economic 
structure. The fact that the capacities of the human mind are limited leads von 
Hayek to be wary of state intervention.  
Von Hayek’s defense of the market based on the limited knowledge of its 
participants is rather unusual in light of the fact that most economists, as I have 
shown earlier, impose demanding requirements to speak of rationality at the 
cognitive level. In the same vein, critics of the market have argued that the 
market is bound to fail – and that therefore government intervention is needed 
–  because  real-world  individuals  cannot  possibly  live  up  to  the  epistemic 
requirements of perfect rationality. In contrast, von Hayek uses the fact that 
agents are not perfectly rational as an argument in favor of the market and 
against centralized planning efforts. 
According  to  von Hayek  (1944:  205), government intervention  unavoidably 
leads to the centralization of power in the hands of political elites, which entails 
that each citizen’s freedom is submitted to the arbitrary power of others. That 
is why governments are inherently less desirable than markets: “planning leads 
to  dictatorship  because  dictatorship  is  the  most  effective  instrument  of 
coercion  and  the  enforcement  of  ideals  and,  as  such,  essential  if  central 
planning on a large scale is to be possible. The clash between planning and 
democracy  arises  simply  from  the  fact  that  the  latter  is  an  obstacle  to  the 
suppression  of  freedom  which  the  direction  of  economic  activity  requires” 
(von Hayek 1944: 70). In the end, von Hayek’s main reason for defending the 
market is that it protects what he considers the most basic value of them all, 
namely freedom. Since this is to be understood as freedom from coercion, von 
Hayek  (1944:  52,  102-104,  241)  favors  the  impersonal  mechanism  of  the 
market over the personal power of political elites. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Second, there is the work of Milton Friedman, a free market advocate who – 
quite like von Hayek – defends the market because it forms the only guarantee 
to  economic,  human  and  political  freedom.  This  emphasis  on  freedom  is 
already present in his definition of the market as “a mechanism for enabling a 
complex structure of cooperation to arise as an unintended consequence of 
Adam  Smith’s  invisible  hand,  without  any  deliberate  design.  A  free  private 
market  involves  the  absence  of  coercion.  People  deal  with  one  another 
voluntarily, not because somebody tells them to or forces them to”44. The main 
thought in Friedman’s work in fields like monetary theory and tax theory is 
expressed in his motto: the government solution to a problem is usually as bad 
as the problem itself. He argues that the market is morally justified since it 
preserves individual dignity by leaving choices to the individual. It allows a 
society to be organized from the bottom up and not from the top down. 
Third, I want to refer to the libertarian views of American philosopher Robert 
Nozick,  whose  thoughts  are  partly  based  on  the  work  of  von  Hayek  and 
Friedman. Nozick (1974: 163-164) argues that any distribution of goods is just, 
insofar  as  it  arises  from  free  exchanges  by initially equal participants. As  a 
result, he provides a purely procedural defense of the market. Relying on its 
invisible hand mechanism, he ends up justifying a minimal state whose only 
task is to protect basic individual rights (like property rights) and to ensure the 
enforcement of contracts between free and sovereign individuals (Nozick 1974: 
333-334). 
As  Allen  Buchanan  states,  one  can  distinguish  between  several  types  of 
arguments for and against the market, namely those based on efficiency, justice 
and  freedom.  First,  economists  often  argue  that  markets  always  reach  an 
efficient outcome under ideal circumstances (Buchanan 1995: 14). This is the 
main thrust of the abovementioned theorems of welfare economics and von 
Hayek’s emphasis on the market’s epistemological advantage over a centralized 
planning  system  (Buchanan  1995:  17).  However,  there  is  the  widely 
acknowledged problem that actual markets do not always approximate their 
ideal. In the case of externalities and public goods, market equilibria are not 
nearly as efficient as they could be (Buchanan 1995: 22). Nevertheless, the 
burden  of  proof  in  this  respect  lies  with  the  advocates  of  government 
intervention, who do not – as market advocates do – have a solid explanation 
of why their preferred system would systematically produce efficient outcomes 
(Buchanan 1995: 25-26). 
                                                 
44 Friedman in a speech delivered to the Smith Center at California State University on 
November 1, 1991. The speech is titled ‘Economic Freedom, Human Freedom, Political 
Freedom’ and is available online at: http://www.sbe.csuhayward.edu/~sbesc/frlect.html. Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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Second,  economists  defend  or  attack  the  market  from  the  perspective  of 
justice. Nozick, for example, argues that the market is the only system that 
does  not  infringe  upon  inviolable  individual  rights,  like  the  basic  right  to 
private property (Buchanan 1995: 64-66). The state should only support the 
market (by enforcing contracts) and complement it when it fails (by correcting 
for externalities and public good problems) (Buchanan 1995: 71-74). Critics of 
the market argue that it allows for inequalities that prevent individuals making 
effective use of their rights, even though these may be equal for all participants 
in some formal sense (Buchanan 1995: 81-83). 
A third sort of argument refers to the value of freedom. As I have shown 
above, authors like von Hayek and Friedman argue that the market is to be 
preferred over other institutional arrangements because it does not intervene in 
the private spheres within which individuals are free to do what they want to. 
However, this ignores the possible side effects of market relations on third 
parties (Buchanan 1995: 80). Once more, externalities seem to be the main 
reason why markets fail. In what follows, I will therefore go deeper into these 
arguments and the way James Buchanan employs them. 
 
3. Buchanan’s theoretical assumptions 
 
3.1. Methodological and normative individualism 
 
Following  von  Hayek,  Buchanan  stresses  that  economics  should  be  about 
individual choices and the consequences thereof and not about the distribution 
of scarce means to attain certain goals. Economists should concentrate on the 
processes  of  exchange  and  trade  in  which  individuals  voluntarily  engage  in 
order to achieve mutually beneficial arrangements. In this respect, Buchanan 
labels  himself  “a  methodological  and  normative  individualist,  a  radical 
subjectivist,  a  contractarian,  and  a  constitutionalist”  (XVI,  238).  In  what 
follows, I will show how these notions relate to each other. 
Buchanan  is  a  self-pronounced  defender  of  methodological  individualism, 
which  states  that  individuals  are  the  necessary  starting  point  for  any  valid 
explanation within the social sciences. He systematically tries to explain social 
phenomena by referring to individuals and their choices (XIII, 16-17). In his 
view, social sciences should honor this principle, because it reflects the basic 
insight that individuals are the ultimate and only relevant source of value (I, 
203,  457;  VII,  163,  210;  XVI,  8-9).  This  points  out  that  Buchanan’s  main 
emphasis lies on normative individualism (XVI, 62). He explicitly argues that Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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the public good “can only be defined in terms of individual evaluations” (III, 
35) and is thus nothing more than what “tends to emerge from the voluntary 
agreement among persons” (XVIII, 322). Hence, individuals and their values 
are the only proper criterion to evaluate possible states of affairs.  
Buchanan’s normative individualism follows from the unshakable belief most 
economists have in what they call “consumer sovereignty” (XII, 416). This 
basically  states  that  the  individual  is  always  free  to  decide  what  he  wants. 
Traditionally, it applies to the individual in his private role as a consumer and 
equates “what a consumer prefers with what it is preferable for that consumer 
to have” (Walsh 1996: 188). Buchanan extends this thought to the individual’s 
public  role  as  a  citizen,  stressing  that  the  individual  is  the  only  and  final 
measure in public issues as well. The underlying thought is that each individual 
has  equal  value  as  a  human  being  (XVI,  19,  24,  89).  His  main  reason  for 
defending individualism is thus not an epistemic but a moral one45. He argues 
that  individuals  have  sovereign  power  to  make  choices  and  hence  are  also 
ultimately  responsible  for  them  (I,  290-291,  390;  III,  172).  In  the  end,  the 
notion  of  consumer  sovereignty,  which  means  that  all  value  comes  from 
individual preferences and never from outside (XV, 363, 369), boils down to 
the same thing as normative individualism. 
It  should  be  clear  that  Buchanan  systematically  defends  methodological 
individualism as Philippe Van Parijs defines it: “the individual is the unique unit 
of consciousness from which all evaluation begins. Note that this conception 
does  not  in  any  way  reject  the  influence  of  community  or  society  on  the 
individual  (…).  The  presupposition  requires  only  that  societal  or 
communitarian influences enter through modifications in the values that are 
potentially expressed by the individual and not externally” (X, 25-26). While 
social norms and institutions may exist, they only have an impact insofar as 
they influence individual behavior. Even though Buchanan does not deny that 
individuals  are  influenced  by  norms,  values  and  traditions,  he  consistently 
rejects  the  idea  that  these  exist  as  supra-individual  sources  of  evaluation, 
independent of individuals (I, 391; IV, 241; XI, 24; XIV, 73)46. According to 
                                                 
45 Buchanan does not place the individual at the center because the latter knows best 
what  it  wants  (I,  282-283).  Nevertheless,  Buchanan  argues  that  there  should  be  a 
considerable  degree  of  laissez-faire  within  the  basic  institutional  structure  of  society, 
precisely  because  individuals  are  the  only  ones who  know which  goals  they want  to 
realize (XVIII, 274-275). He also states that socialism is deficient primarily because an 
omniscient and benevolent despot does not satisfy preferences as well as the market 
(XVIII, 310). Even though Buchanan does not consider these Hayekian arguments to be 
decisive, one can see here that he subscribes to them nonetheless. 
46 In Buchanan’s view, the false belief in the existence of such supra-individual entities 
arose when neoclassical economists broadened the maximizing paradigm of economics Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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Buchanan’s normative individualism, there is simply no such thing as the public 
good, defined independently from individual values (IV, 286, VII, 210; XVII, 
161). In this respect, he situates himself in the tradition of von Hayek (1944: 
212), who already argued that the basis of morality lies in the individual and his 
evaluative capacity.  
Buchanan believes that social states of affairs do not exist as supra-individual 
entities. Moreover, they cannot be maximized simply because they cannot be 
chosen  in  a  direct  and  deliberate  manner  (XVI,  248).  In  Buchanan’s  view, 
whatever comes out of freely undertaken interactions is good, even though this 
result  is  not  deliberately  aimed  at  (XVI,  202).  Because  outcomes  can  be 
evaluated  and  ranked,  but  not  chosen  directly,  one has  to  choose  between 
alternative rules in the hope that these will lead to the desired outcomes (XVI, 
248-251). Even though individuals ultimately evaluate outcomes, they must choose 
between rules and procedures (XVI, 211). They can make up the rules of the 
game and choose strategies within the game, but they cannot directly choose its 
final result (XVI, 419). 
 
3.2. The Homo Economicus model 
 
Buchanan makes extensive use of the Homo Economicus model to analyze 
individuals  and  their  behavior.  In  order  to  give  a  general  idea  of  his 





As I have already shown, Buchanan believes that economics should drop the 
assumption of maximization at the level of actions and the relation with their 
reasons. In contrast, he does hold on to the notion of intentionality. However, 
since this is not unique to the economic conception of rationality, I will focus 
here  on  the  assumption  of  instrumentality.  Since  it  analyzes  individuals  as 
aiming to satisfy their preferences, the Homo Economicus model is essentially 
an  instrumental  one:  “the  conceptual  apparatus  here  involves  a  radical 
separation  between  means  and  ends  –  between  opportunity  sets  and 
preferences”  (X,  56).  Individuals  are  analyzed  as  being  instrumentally 
motivated to accomplish certain goals, which are defined by their preferences. 
                                                                                                                                            
from the individual to the social level (XVI, 106-107, 240-241). In what follows, I will try 
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3.2.2. Egoism  
 
Since Buchanan models the individual as motivated towards the satisfaction of 
his preferences, the latter form the central explanatory variable in his theory. In 
what follows, I will focus on the two most characteristic assumptions in the 
economic  conception  of  rationality  at  the  level  of  reasons,  namely  that  of 
egoism  and  exogeneity.  Like  most  economists,  Buchanan  stresses  that  the 
Homo  Economicus  model  focuses  on  egoistic  preferences  and  analyzes 
individuals “as seeking to further their own self-interest, narrowly defined in 
terms  of  measured  net  wealth  position”  (XIII,  21).  This  view,  which  has 
predominated  economics  since  John  Stuart  Mill,  implies  that  individuals 
systematically try to improve their own well-being.  
Buchanan argues that the conventional Homo Economicus model goes much 
further than the assumption of methodological individualism, since it assumes 
that people are only concerned about their narrowly defined self-interest (XVI, 
10). In this respect, it seems plausible to treat Buchanan as a methodological 
utilitarian. However, he is not completely unambiguous about the status of the 
assumption of egoism in this model. Some of his passages suggest that he takes 
on a different position. From time to time, Buchanan explicitly states that the 
Homo Economicus is not necessarily a full-blooded egoist (III, 3). Here, he 
seems to favor the broader, neoclassical variant of the Homo Economicus to 
the narrower, classical variant. While the latter analyzes individuals primarily as 
being out to acquire material wealth, the former understands individuals as 
trying to realize their goals, whatever these may be. For example, Buchanan 
explicitly  argues  that,  “for  the  purposes  of  constitutional  design,  (…)  no 
specification of arguments in Homo economicus’ utility function is required” (XII, 
82). Claiming that economic self-interest is not always the same as material 
utility (I, 460), Buchanan considers his theory to be economic, but not “in the 
restricted sense that denotes a pre-eminence of materialist motivation in man” 
(XVI,  385).  These  remarks  are  consistent  with  Buchanan’s  individualism, 
according to which preferences are not necessarily egoistic (I, 48-49, 391).  
In Buchanan’s view, not all individuals always act egoistically, but at least a 
substantial part of them do so in a substantial number of situations (XV, 26; 
XVI,  200).  Interpreting  the  Homo  Economicus  model  as  a  partial  one, 
Buchanan thus seems to limit the scope of phenomena it is apt to explain. Here 
too,  one  can  see  that  he  does  not  nicely  fit  the  label  of  a  methodological 
utilitarian, since he does not deny the explanatory force of theories that stress 
motivations other than narrowly defined self-interest. However, as I will show 
later on, Buchanan does not go the whole nine yards and continues to analyze 





Economists – and Buchanan is no exception in this respect – take preferences 
as the starting point for their explanations (X, 56). Refusing to investigate how 
they arise and develop in time, they want to take preferences at face value: 
“along  with  the  economist  and  other  social  scientists,  the  political  theorist 
should take his human actors as he finds them” (III, 309). In general, this way 
of analyzing preferences as exogenously given leads to an atomistic conception 
of the individual as an entity, already formed in all of its relevant aspects and 
largely detached from its social, cultural and institutional environment.  
 
4. Normative implications of Buchanan’s theoretical 
assumptions 
 
So  far I  have  tried  to  focus  exclusively on the  explanatory  and  conceptual 
aspects of Buchanan’s work. In what follows, however, I want to analyze his 
views of the good society and the role basic institutions should play in it. As 
Buchanan himself rightly argues, “there are important normative implications 
to be derived from the public choice perspective on politics, implications that, 
in their turn, carry with them an approach to institutional reform” (XIII, 19). 
In the end, his aim is not merely to analyze how things are, but to suggest how 
they should be and in what ways they should be changed: “the only purpose of 
science is its ultimate assistance in the development of normative propositions. 
We seek to learn how the world works in order to make it work “better,” to 
“improve”  things”  (III,  306).  In  this  respect,  one  could  even  argue  that 
Buchanan agrees with Karl Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, according to 
which it is the task of philosophers to change the world rather than to interpret 
it47. In Buchanan’s view, understanding the world is useful mainly because it 
ultimately serves attempts to improve the world48. 
                                                 
47 In Marx’s words: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the 
point  is  to  change  it”.  This  is  the  English  translation  of  the  original  quote:  “die 
Philosophen  haben  die  Welt  nur  verschieden  interpretirt,  es  kommt  drauf  an  sie  zu 
verändern” (Marx 1845: 15). 
48 Buchanan is fully aware that one’s evaluation of public arrangements depends heavily 
on the way one understands them. One’s analysis of the ways markets and governments 
function largely determines one’s normative opinions about the role these should fulfill 
in a society: “in a certain sense, the ought is derived from the presumed is” (XVI, 245). Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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4.1.  Normative  implications  of  methodological  and  normative 
individualism 
 
The assumptions of methodological and normative individualism immediately 
imply a specific stance on normative issues. It has been argued that they form 
the crux upon which the whole of welfare economics is built, including its two 
fundamental  theorems  and  the  resulting  appraisal  of  competitive  markets. 
Instead  of  exploring  this  general  argument,  I  want  to  go  deeper  into 
Buchanan’s own remarks and distinguish between different repercussions of 
his individualist perspective. 
 
4.1.1. Buchanan’s theory of constitutional choice 
 
In order to think about the ideal institutional structure of modern societies, 
Buchanan develops his theory of constitutional choice, according to which an 
ideal structure is one upon which all individuals rationally agree. Instead of 
relying on supra-individual norms to justify certain institutions and rules, he 
refers to the principle that all individual contractors should freely agree to the 
latter (I, 370; XVI, 363). This way, Buchanan is able to stay within the confines 
of his individualism (XV, 486-487).  
Buchanan defines the constitution as the agreed on set of rules within which 
the game of politics can and should be played (XVI, 43-45). Its main task is to 
restrict post-constitutional politics in such a way that the freedom of all citizens 
is optimally protected (XV, 459). It is in everyone’s interest to set up a basic set 
of rules to regulate social life (XVI, 179; XVIII, 178). Even though rules may 
have negative effects in the short run – they curb individual freedom – they can 
be freely chosen for their positive effects in the long run. The fact that they 
bring about overall benefits is why individuals will approve of coercive rules at 
the constitutional level (XVI, 73). The more the issue is framed in a general 
way, the easier it becomes to attain unanimous consent (III, 249-250; IV, 294). 
Buchanan thus strongly stresses that agreement is more easily attainable at the 
constitutional  than  at  the  post-constitutional  level  (XVI,  63,  74,  307-308). 
Whereas constitutional choices are typically situated in the long term, post-
constitutional policy choices are typically situated in the short term. 
Buchanan’s  analysis  of  the  constitutional  level  closely  resembles  Rawls’ 
Original  Position.  Rawls  also  wants  to  think  up  a  desirable  institutional 
structure by referring only to the views and values of individual participants in 
the social scheme. In both theories, it is the players themselves who on an Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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equal basis agree on the rules of the game (XVI, 38, 327, 366). Additionally, 
both  authors  rely  on  some  kind  of  constitutional  veil,  which  inhibits  the 
individual’s knowledge about his future preferences in order to avoid reliance 
on criteria external to the individuals themselves. However, there are several 
important differences.  
First,  Rawls  stresses  that  individuals  behind  the  constitutional  veil  are 
completely ignorant of the impact of their decisions on their own well-being. 
After all, they know nothing of their future position in society. In contrast, 
Buchanan stresses that individuals are not wholly ignorant but only uncertain 
about the impact of their choices among alternative sets of rules on their own 
position. 
Second, Buchanan stresses the purely procedural character of the constitutional 
level, whereas Rawls deduces more substantive results from it (I, 146, 308; IV, 
295;  XIV,  215-216,  503;  XVI,  22,  74;  XVIII,  181).  In  Buchanan’s  view, 
constitutional rules simply define the procedures of collective decision-making. 
Accordingly, he does not claim any insight into the content of the resulting 
outcomes. The basic thought is that outcomes are legitimate if all participants 
agree on them, or at least on the process through which they come about. This 
emphasis on the procedural aspect of rules does not imply that Buchanan has 
nothing  to  say  about  the  outcomes  of  constitutional  choices.  After  all,  he 
criticizes  Rawls  for  not  thinking  through  his  own  claim  that  freedom  has 
lexicographic  priority  over  efficiency  and  productivity  considerations. 
According to Buchanan, this would automatically imply a much larger role for 
the market than Rawls himself defends (I, 302). Moreover, when evaluating 
rules, their outcomes are the main thing to take into account. Rules are not 
valued intrinsically, but only in relation to the outcomes they produce (XVI, 49, 
159). However, since it is impossible to choose in a deliberate and direct way 
particular social outcomes, constitutional choice has to focus on reforming the 
procedures in such a way that the resulting outcomes evolve in a desirable 
direction. This way, Buchanan is able to think of rules and institutions in an 
individualistic framework.  
Third, even though both authors use the constitutional level as a device to 
think up and evaluate different institutional schemes (XI, 192), they interpret 
its  status  differently.  While  Rawls  explicitly  thinks  of  it  as  a  hypothetical 
construct, Buchanan considers it to be an aspect of actual political decision-
making. Whereas Rawls argues that individuals in the Original Position could 
have  chosen  the  rules  that  exist  here  and  now,  Buchanan  stresses  that 
individuals here and now have to obey the rules that would be the result of 
such a constitutional choice (XVI, 91). While Rawls’ veil of ignorance is thus a 
hypothetical thought experiment designed in order to construct principles of Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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justice, Buchanan’s veil of uncertainty aims to describe and guide the actual 
reality of constitutional choices. Accordingly, Buchanan models individuals at 
the constitutional level in a realistic way in that they are supposed to know 
something about the future (they are not completely ignorant) but do not have 
perfect foresight (they are uncertain) (XVI, 327).  
Since this touches upon the crux of his views, I want to explore Buchanan’s 
theory of constitutional choice still further by analyzing the criteria upon which 
such choices are made. First, there is the interest-component, which relates the 
expected outcomes to one’s interests (XVI, 128). Second, there is the theory-
component, which encompasses one’s expectations about the outcomes that 
result from the chosen rules. Both components are important: “how a person 
chooses among potential alternatives is not only a matter of “what he wants” 
but also of “what he believes”” (XVI, 157). Two individuals with the same 
interests may disagree because of different expectations about the outcome. 
The same is true for two individuals with similar expectations but different 
interests.  Buchanan  thinks  the  theory-component  is  especially  important  in 
making constitutional choices. In his view, it explains why politicians discuss 
on  the  basis  of  arguments  and  not  preferences  (XVI,  157-158,  171). 
Accordingly, Buchanan believes that – as a political economist – he can and 
should  contribute  to  the  constitutional  choice  process  by  gaining  and 
dispersing knowledge on the ways rules and institutions function (XVI, 169). 
As I have suggested, political economists should ultimately inform institutional 
design and reform (XVI, 353) and help citizens in their search for rules that 
enable them to better realize their goals (I, 466-467). 
The  context  of  constitutional  choice  places  citizens  in  a  framework  that 
constrains  their  narrowly  defined  self-interest49.  If  they  understand  that 
determining general rules has long-standing consequences, they will be led by a 
prudent consideration of their self-interest. Sensible egoism will incorporate 
long-term concerns as well, which implies a move towards impartiality (III, 96). 
This  allows  one  to  understand  the  exact  role  of  the  constitutional  veil  in 
allowing individuals to reach a compromise between their interests (XVI, 166, 
171).  Contractarian  theorists  systematically  argue  that  such  a  veil  facilitates 
agreement by ensuring that the private interests of individuals are shared to a 
larger extent. Buchanan argues that the veil can be lifted to whatever degree 
one  wishes.  As  it  is  lifted,  individuals  become  more  fully  aware  of  their 
interests and agreement becomes harder to attain (XVI, 161-162). It can be 
                                                 
49 In this sense, it resembles some kind of self-binding strategy (VIII, 163). Since the 
constitution  limits  everyday  democratic  decision-making,  it  might  imply  that  the 
electorate does not get everything it wants (VIII, 191). Later on, I will go deeper into 
Buchanan’s relation to public opinion. Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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made less transparent by making rules more general and stable in the long 
term. Ultimately, when the veil is completely opaque, it guarantees that every 
individual has the same interest in making constitutional choices (XVI, 129-
130, 187). Whatever conflict remains is to be attributed to the divergences 
between the theories and expectations of citizens.  
According to Buchanan, different strands of thought focus on different aspects 
of  constitutional  choice.  First,  social  contract  theorists  –  like  Rawls  and 
Buchanan – aim to converge the interests of citizens by introducing some sort 
of veil. This guarantees unity in the interest-component. Second, deliberative 
democrats – like Jürgen Habermas and James Fishkin – focus more on the 
convergence of the expectations of citizens. Through dialogue, individuals are 
able to discover the workings of different sets of rules and agree that a certain 
set of rules is just and fair for everyone (XVI, 131, 166-167). Rational discourse 
thus guarantees more unity within the theory-component. Whereas the former 
aim  at  agreement  as  compromise,  the  latter  aim  at  agreement  as  truth-
judgment.  In  the  end,  both  traditions  and  strategies  can  complement  each 
other  (XVI,  156).  Agreement  on  alternative  institutional  schemes  becomes 
more likely as individuals know more about their general functioning and know 
less about the impact on their own situation (XVI, 176).  
In  contrast  with  Rawls,  Buchanan  does  not  require  perfect  and  certain 
knowledge of the general workings of institutions. He realizes that individual 
expectations  about  institutional  mechanisms  can  diverge  widely  (XVI,  287-
289). First, among the obstacles on the road to agreement are the cognitive 
limitations  of  the  human  mind  to  grasp  the  complexity  of  institutional 
schemes. After all, it is hard to predict what the impact of rules will be in the 
long run. Second, there are motivational limitations of individuals to inform 
themselves of the ways different rules function (XVI, 131-132). Since the veil 
of uncertainty prohibits one from knowing what one’s interests are, one has no 
incentive whatsoever to invest in such information (XVI, 187-188)50.  
 
4.1.2. Buchanan’s view of the market 
 
Buchanan’s individualism justifies a libertarian ideal: “the recognition of the 
necessary  relativism  and  individualism  of  values  (…)  makes  the  libertarian 
                                                 
50 To solve these problems, citizens might decide to select experts and entitle them to 
make decisions in their name. However, Buchanan argues that the problem remains that 
one  has  to  become  informed  about  (the  views  of)  these  experts  (XVI,  136-138). 
Nevertheless, he believes that individuals act in their own interests when transferring 
their say in these matters to authoritative experts (XVI, 190-191). Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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social order meaningful” (XVII, 170). This means that the market is preferred 
to the state, because it spontaneously coordinates the interaction of individuals 
trying  to  realize  their  own  goals.  Buchanan  thus  endorses  Adam  Smith’s 
thought that markets have the unique capacity to coordinate egoistic individual 
actions (XVI, 443-444; XVIII, 266-267). It is best known as the “principle of 
the invisible hand, perhaps the major intellectual discovery in the whole history 
of  economics,  and  upon  which  the  normative  precept  of  laissez-faire  was 
constructed  and  defended”  (XVIII,  311-312).  According  to  Buchanan,  this 
“central principle of classical political economy remains untouchable” (XVII, 
243). It leads him to regard markets as the ideal way to guarantee social order 
while ensuring that individuals can maximally enjoy their freedom (XIII, 19). 
Buchanan  thus  praises  markets  for  their  ability  to  channel  egoistic  actions 
(private interests) into socially desirable results (public interest) (XII, 83-84; 
XV, 302-303).  
Wholly  in  line  with  authors  like  von  Hayek  and  Friedman,  Buchanan  thus 
favors the market over an inherently coercive government because it enables 
each and every individual to exercise his freedom to the largest extent possible 
(XII, 117; XV, 471; XVIII, 201-203). I will go deeper into this issue when 
discussing  the  normative  implications  of  Buchanan’s  Homo  Economicus 
model. 
 
4.1.3. Buchanan’s view of the state 
 
Nevertheless, Buchanan stresses that freedom is possible thanks to, and not in 
spite  of,  the  governmental  rules  that  are  agreed  upon  by  all  citizens.  They 
facilitate social life and allow people to interact without ending up in complete 
Hobbesian anarchy. According to Buchanan, freedom cannot exist in such a 
“warre of every man against every man” (Hobbes 1651: 188). It exists only 
within  and  because  of  an  institutional  context  that  defines  and  enforces 
individual rights (XVIII, 174-175, 205). 
 
4.1.3.1. Minimal protective and productive state 
 
That is why Buchanan stresses the need for a protective state that does exactly 
this (XVI, 260). Governments and the rule of law they uphold protect citizens 
from  arbitrary  interference  in  their  private  spheres  of  action  and  demand 
respect  for  individual  rights.  In  short,  the  protective  state  formulates  and 
enforces a basic set of rules necessary to allow individuals to realize their goals Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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(XVI,  246;  XVIII,  333).  In  Buchanan’s  view,  such  a  basic  politico-legal 
framework is the most important public good of all (XV, 25). Considering it is 
a  necessary  condition  to  make  markets  work  properly  (XV,  283-288),  he 
believes that each government is better than no government (VII, 223-224; 
XVII, 273; Buchanan 1986: 139)51. He believes that a completely libertarian 
system of laissez-faire, where rules and constraints are wholly absent and where 
every political action is illegitimate, is a romantic fiction (XVI, 244-245).  
Of  course,  the  question  remains  how  much  government  is best  (XV,  3-4). 
Different  forms  of  political  organization  can  be  analyzed  as  ranging  from 
complete anarchy (all is decided by freely interacting individuals) to complete 
totalitarianism (all is decided by a centralized government without any concern 
for  its  citizens).  As  the  title  of  one  of  his  best-known  books  indicates, 
Buchanan  situates  the  ideal  society  somewhere  in between: “The  Limits of 
Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan” (VII). Later on, I will try to show 
that his ideal is closer to the former than to the latter (XVIII, 167-169).  
In addition, the state also has a legitimate productive task, namely to produce, 
allocate and distribute those public goods that are agreed upon by its citizens. 
As I will show more fully later on, this emphasis on unanimity strictly limits the 




Buchanan believes that governments should respect the sovereignty of each 
individual to determine what is good to the largest extent possible (XVIII, 89). 
This makes him a contractarian, which states that legitimate institutions should 
ultimately be based on the consent of citizens (XVI, 21-23, 41; XIV, 304). 
While this is implicit in voluntary market exchanges, it has to be made explicit 
at the political level. To understand politics as arising from voluntary exchanges 
between rational individuals, Buchanan makes use of the concept of a social 
contract (V, 79-80; IX, 4, 7).  
                                                 
51 Even though this is often forgotten, Buchanan’s libertarian precursors also understand 
the desirability of a basic politico-legal framework. Von Hayek (1944: 39), for example, 
acknowledges the need for a state in order to allow markets to function in a competitive 
way: “in no system that could be rationally defended would the state just do nothing. An 
effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed and continuously adjusted 
legal framework as much as any other”. In this respect, he stresses the importance of the 
rule of law: “within the known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his 
personal  ends  and  desires,  certain  that  the  powers  of  government  will  not  be  used 
deliberately to frustrate his efforts” (von Hayek 1944: 73). Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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The purpose of Buchanan’s contractarianism is not to explain how institutions 
have come about, but to evaluate proposals how to design and reform them52. 
It provides a justification of institutions by tracing them back to the agreement 
reached in rational discussions among free and equal citizens (XVIII, 386). 
Since  coercion  should  ultimately  spring  from  consent,  Buchanan  considers 
agreement among citizens as the only proper criterion to evaluate rules and 
institutions  (I,  463,  III,  248;  IV,  248;  IX,  15;  XVI,  328; XVIII, 179).  This 
immediately implies strict limits on the scope of legitimate decision-making: 
“beyond  agreement  there  is  simply  no  place  for  the  contractarian  to  go” 
(XVIII, 181). 
In the end, it is the application of the catallactic perspective of economics to 
politics that leads to a contractarian view of the state (XVI, 62, 68-69). In 
Buchanan’s view, institutions are to be valued not to the degree in which they 
are  efficient  in  some  objective  sense,  but  in  which  they  embody  the 
contractarian principle of agreement (I, 263-277)53. Buchanan’s constitutional 
political  economy  combines  the  classical  political economy of  Adam  Smith 
(rational individuals trade freely) with the contractarian political philosophy of 
Thomas Hobbes (rational individuals agree freely to a coercive government) (I, 
387-389). In Buchanan’s exchange paradigm, politics is nothing more than a 
complex  process  of  exchanging  individuals  who  want  to  reach  their  goals 
collectively.  This  allows  him  to  analyze  the  state  within  a  methodologically 
individualist framework (I, 122-123; XVI, 215). Both Buchanan’s appraisal of 
the market and his contractarian view of politics thus find their origin in his 
insistence on individuals as the only relevant sources of value.  
 
4.1.3.3. Constitutional democracy 
 
In  his  attempt  to  avoid  referring  to  some  public  good  independent  of 
individual values, Buchanan stresses the need for democratic elections, since 
they ensure that policy measures reflect the wishes of the citizens (I, 93, 392; 
                                                 
52 According to Buchanan, the social contract in its historical guise is a myth (XVI, 89). 
In his view, contractarianism only claims that citizens could have agreed on constitutional 
limits of government. It does not claim that such a social contract was ever drawn up or 
signed (XVI, 21).  
53  In  his  catallactic  perspective  on  economics,  Buchanan  thus  gives  precedence  to 
freedom over efficiency. In this respect, he also argues that private property has to be 
defended because it maximizes the former instead of the latter (XVIII, 216). Enabling 
the  individual  to  engage  in  mutually  beneficial  economic  relations,  private  property 
enhances individual freedom. Even though it is not fully efficient – why does each family 
have its own lawnmower? – it reduces mutual economic dependency (XVIII, 240-246). Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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IV, 285; XV, 353, 380; XVI, 9). He defends democracy as the only regime that 
considers each individual’s values as equally worthy of consideration. He even 
regards the value of democracy as more important than that of equality and 
justice (XIV, 37). 
Buchanan defines democracy “as a means of allowing individuals to express 
their  own  values,  the  only  values  that  exist”  (XVII,  270).  In  his  view, 
democracy is nothing more than the aggregation of expressed preferences (IV, 
143). Within the economic conception of rationality, it can indeed be expected 
that democratic politics is reduced largely to the aggregation of preferences into 
a  collective  preference  ordering  that  has  to  be  maximally  satisfied. 
Nevertheless, Buchanan does not favor democracy in its simple majoritarian 
form. Aiming to minimize coercion, he not only opposes dictatorship, but is 
also aware of the dangers of majoritarian democracy, which allows a majority 
to discriminate a minority to its own advantage (XI, 38, 120; XVI, 39, 183). 
This  way,  it  systematically  tends  to  violate  the  liberties  and  interests  of  a 
minority as well (I, 423; III, 148; V, 150). Any majority rule inevitably implies 
that some individuals are able to use force against others (IX, 9-10). Since it 
allows for collective decisions on which certain citizens disagree, it inevitably 
constrains the liberties and interests of these individuals (XVI, 393) and thus 
no longer guarantees Pareto-optimality (IV, 289).  
In addition, discriminatory policy measures are costly because they induce rent-
seeking (XI, 123). It motivates individuals and interest groups to invest part of 
their resources in attempts to influence politicians to change the policies and 
laws to their advantage. This directs governmental decisions towards piecemeal 
interference  in  specific  sectors  and  domains,  which  in  turn  leads  to  an 
inefficient use of time and money (XVI, 258, 341, 437). Through the creation 
of budget deficits and inflation, it eventually turns politics into a negative-sum 
game (XVI, 272, 424-426). In the end, it will result in complete arbitrariness, 
which will cause inefficiency to rise and the growth of the economy to slow 
down (XIV, 310-315). In short, rent-seeking in politics causes special interests 
to dominate the interest of the electorate as a whole (XVI, 268).  
To  avoid  the  exploitative  discrimination  that  inevitably  results  from 
unconstrained  majoritarianism,  Buchanan  urges  that  democracy  has  to  be 
constitutional (XVIII, 259). A strong constitution that delineates, protects and 
enforces individual rights is needed to avoid such discrimination (XVI, 180). In 
this respect, Buchanan favors a constitutional democracy, stressing “that both 
words are important, with constitutional taking precedence over democracy” (XVI, 
226). Because any democratic government has the tendency to favor one group 
over another, the constitution constraining it ought to have priority (XVI, 448).  Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Buchanan’s emphasis on constitutional politics is completely in line with his 
individualism and gives more plausibility to his contractarianism (I, 50, 386; 
XIV, 24; XVIII, 189). Because it is easier to agree on a set of general rules than 
on a set of particular values, preferences or opinions, constitutional politics is 
more  likely  to  provide  win-win  opportunities  and  thus  to  resemble  market 
interactions (positive sum games). In contrast, post-constitutional politics tends 
to be rigged with conflict and therefore often results in win-lose (zero sum 
games) or even lose-lose situations (negative sum games) (I, 384-386; XVI, 
249).  As  I  have  suggested,  agreement  is  thus  more  easily  attainable  at  the 
constitutional than at the post-constitutional level (I, 23, 238-239, 462-464; IV, 
220-221; IX, 15; XV, 486; XVI, 83, 102-103). If certain rules are anchored 
constitutionally,  there  is  less  room  for  rent-seeking  and  conflicts  between 
majorities and minorities (XI, 170-174). By default, constitutional politics is 
more inclusive than post-constitutional politics (XVI, 379). 
 
4.1.3.4. Unanimity and near-unanimity 
 
Buchanan argues that the only grounds for evaluating institutional reforms are 
actual agreement, consensus and unanimity (which he associates with Vilfredo 
Pareto and Knut Wicksell) and hypothetical agreement in the Original Position 
(which he associates with John Rawls) (I, 430-432). Fully aware that unanimous 
agreement  is  hard  to  attain,  Buchanan  focuses  on  the  constitutional  level: 
“agreement seems more likely on general rules for collective choice than on the 
later choices to be made within the confines of certain agreed-on rules” (III, 
78). 
Buchanan  defends  unanimity  as  an  actual  decision-making  rule  in  order  to 
avoid the discrimination of majoritarian politics (I, 147-148, 205-206, XIV, 260; 
XVI, 220-221; XVIII, 322-323, 351). Giving each individual veto power, the 
unanimity rule effectively prohibits one group of individuals from forcing costs 
on another group through collective decisions (III, 201). Buchanan’s claim that 
all  governmental  arrangements  should  be  justified  by  unanimous  consent 
solves  the  problem  of  majoritarian  discrimination,  since  it  ensures  that 
everybody’s liberties and interests are respected. If everybody agrees, the state 
does not have to coerce any of its citizens (von Hayek 1944: 60-69). 
As such, the unanimity rule closes the gap between private interests and the 
public interest (XVI, 29, 74, 409). It guarantees that politics consists of Pareto-
optimal rules, as it ideally should (I, 192, 229; III, 189). Indeed, the concepts of 
Pareto-optimality and Pareto-improvement stress each individual’s voluntary 
agreement  as  crucial  when  evaluating  a  situation.  Because  they  refer  to Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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whatever individuals themselves deem best, they are based on minimal moral 
presuppositions. Good is whatever emerges from procedures in which each 
individual chooses freely (I, 244-245; V, 183).  
Because individual values are the only ones that exist, unanimity serves as a 
conceptual test for evaluating possible reform proposals: “the Wicksellian test 
of  conceptual  unanimity  offers  the  only  defensible  normative  criterion  for 
evaluating reform proposals” (XVI, 451). This directly results from Buchanan’s 
individualist stance that individual values are the only ones that count (XVI, 10, 
113). His focus on unanimity is a direct result of his application of economic 
tools to the sphere of politics: “market decisions are comparable to political 
decisions only when unanimity is present” (I, 102). Only if every party agrees, 
can there be voluntary exchange relations in politics similar to those in the 
market (XVI, 71). 
Additionally, the unanimity rule is able to solve the problem of freeriding. With 
respect to the provision of public goods, every individual faces the incentive to 
freeride on the contributions of others (V, 10, 25). In order to avoid this, one 
has to design institutions that involve everybody in the agreement and make 
sure that enough individuals contribute. Requiring the voluntary consent of 
each  and  every  citizen,  the  unanimity  rule  ensures  that  any  individual’s 
abstention leads to the breakdown of the public good as such. This way, it 
makes sure that its provision is linked to individual contributions (IV, 114-117; 
V, 83-88). 
However, because of its large negotiation costs, the unanimity rule is of limited 
practical use (XVI, 318-319). According to Buchanan, deviations are legitimate 
if the decision costs involved are extremely high (XV, 462-463). Even though 
unanimity remains the ideal, less-than-unanimity rules are necessary to avoid 
complete  conservatism  (I,  226-227;  V,  90-93,  146-147).  Citizens  can 
unanimously agree to install such rules in order to increase the efficiency of 
collective  decision-making:  “if  general  agreement  is  too  costly  and  time-
consuming, there is some rational basis for having political decision structures 
that do not require general agreement” (XVI, 319). According to Buchanan, 
one thus has to weigh the benefits against the costs of different sets of rules. 
The large decision-making costs of attaining unanimity may outweigh the costs 
of violating liberties (III, 93).  
In  this  respect,  Buchanan  argues  that  there  is  nothing  inherently  desirable 
about  simple  majority  (III,  127, 171). He proposes using different  decision 
rules for different decisions (V, 148). He insists on unanimity with respect to 
constitutional issues but grants that less far-reaching matters can be handled 
with less-than-unanimity rules (XVI, 122). Of course, the more inclusive the 
decision-making  rule  is,  the  more  its  resulting  decisions  tend  to  serve Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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everyone’s interests (III, 226). That is why Buchanan favors more inclusive 
rules  than  are  currently  present  in  actual  politics  (XVI,  223).  He  severely 
restricts the scope of less-than-unanimity rules, which are justified only if they 
increase  overall  efficiency54.  Making  it  harder  to  change  existing  rules, 
unanimity  increases  their  stability  and  thereby  decreases  rent-seeking  (XVI, 
270-273). In this respect, Buchanan calls himself a conservative: he thinks rules 
should  have  some  stability  in  order  to  generate  a  desirable  degree  of 
predictability (XVI, 314-315)55. 
In order to resolve the problem of majoritarian discrimination, Buchanan thus 
defends (near-)unanimity in constitutional politics. This way, political decisions 
automatically serve the goals of all citizens (XVIII, 110, 117). A simple majority 
rule  will  always  generate  (ex  post)  inequality,  which  violates  the  central 
principle of contractarianism and democracy, namely political equality (XVI, 
219-220). If all political decisions are made with a rule of near-unanimity, the 
amount of public goods provided by the government and the amount of taxes 
levied  by  it  will  be  quite  minimal  (V,  151-155).  Hence,  Buchanan  favors  a 
strong  constitutional  politics  (where  unanimous  agreement  is  required)  in 
combination with a minimal post-constitutional politics (where unanimity is no 
longer  needed).  Everything  that  is  decided  in  such  a  state  can  be  called 
legitimate (XI, 25).  
As governments expand, they are increasingly likely to run into objections from 
some of their citizens. Starting from complete anarchy and construing an ever 
larger government, Buchanan argues that the size of government should be 
limited to the degree that the individual most critical of government will agree 
(V, 127). Once more, this thought is already present in the work of von Hayek: 
“common action is thus limited to the fields where people agree on common 
ends”  (von  Hayek  1944:  60).  In  this  respect,  Buchanan  proposes  several 
specific measures to reduce the state to a minimum. 
 
                                                 
54 Buchanan even argues that this increases rather than constrains individual freedom: 
“when  he  adopts  a  rule  and  insures  its  enforcement,  the  individual  is  exercising  his 
freedom, at a more comprehensive planning stage of choice, only through restricting his 
own freedom in subsequent potential choice situations” (VII, 190). Analogously, citizens 
agree at the constitutional level to refrain from certain actions in order to allow each 
other to interact without fear of domination. 
55 In the extreme, lobbying would be completely abolished if rules could not be changed 
(XVI, 323-324). Buchanan only uses this thought to illustrate his point, since he does not 
favor such complete conservatism. In contrast, he strongly believes in the perfectibility of 
society and its basic institutions and rules.  Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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4.1.4. Buchanan’s proposals to downsize the state 
 
First, he strongly stresses the need for a constitutional principle of generality, 
according to which “all citizens must be made to play by the same rules, and all 
politics must be non-discriminatory in its application” (I, 428). Essentially, it 
requires that political decisions must always apply equally to every citizen (XVI, 
151,  275).  Making  discriminatory  policy  measures  impossible,  it  effectively 
prohibits  rent-seeking  (XI,  51-54).  Buchanan  wants  to  move  away  from  a 
politics  by  interest  (a  majoritarian  democracy  with  rent-seeking  and 
discrimination)  towards  a  politics  by  principle  (a  constitutional  democracy 
without  rent-seeking  and  discrimination)  (XI,  205)56.  This  would  strongly 
curtail the extent of redistributive transfers, which are discriminatory by nature 
(III, 195-198; XIV, 42). This thought is already present in the work of von 
Hayek (1944: 78-83) whose emphasis on the need for the complete absence of 
discrimination leads him to put restrictions on the possibility of governments 
to enforce redistributive measures. Redistributive policy measures can only be 
legitimate insofar as they are based on altruistic preferences (I, 198; IV, 198). 
Here, redistribution will be voluntary and allows for win-win situations and 
Pareto-optimal results57. Whenever it turns into a win-lose situation, there is no 
longer a rationale for redistribution (XV, 22, 482, 487). 
A  second  way  of  downsizing  governments  is  through  federalization  and 
decentralization.  In  this  respect,  Buchanan  argues  that  “where  possible, 
collective activity should be organized in small rather than large political units” 
(III, 115). This makes the exit-option at the political level cheaper, thereby 
serving the ability of individuals to try out and evaluate different institutional 
schemes  (XVI,  142-145,  296).  The  smaller  governments  are,  the  more 
competition there will be (IX, 197, 216; XVIII, 79, 81-82, 125-133). Next to 
the possibility of participating in elections (“voice”), this enables citizens to 
vote with their feet (“exit”) (XV, 35-36). It increases their freedom (XV, 476) 
and reduces rent-seeking behavior by making exploitation in politics practically 
impossible  (XII,  449-452).  Von  Hayek  (1944:  145)  also  thinks  of 
decentralization  as  a  way  of  minimizing  governmental  power:  “to  split  or 
                                                 
56 Stressing the constitutional level seems to lead Buchanan away from the assumption 
that everybody always acts egoistically (XIV, 43; XVIII, 286). I will go deeper into this 
issue later on. 
57  Buchanan  argues  that  egoistic  motivations  often  lead  individuals  to  support 
redistributive  measures  as  well  (XVI,  97).  Individuals  who  gain  financially  obviously 
experience some good. Individuals who lose financially can do so as well. This good can 
be private (the sensation of a warm glow knowing that they have helped someone) or 
public (the decrease in robberies or neglected neighborhoods) (XV, 483-485).  Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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decentralize power is necessarily to reduce the absolute amount of power, and 
the  competitive  system  is  the  only  system  designed  to  minimize  by 
decentralization the power exercised by man over man”.  
Another way of controlling government, even though it does not necessarily 
restrict its size, is to require its budget to be in balance (IX, 236; XIV, 382, 454; 
XV,  381;  XVI,  58).  This  is  needed  for  the  simple  reason  that  “elected 
politicians like to spend money and they do not like to impose taxes” (XV, 
423). As I have already suggested, politicians in majoritarian democracies tend 
to further the interests of small groups with the money of the large group of 
taxpayers.  According  to  Buchanan,  democratic  decision-making  is  likely  to 
follow  Keynes’  advice  of  increased  public  spending.  This  may  lead  to  the 
creation of public deficits, which lower the perceived cost of public goods 
(VIII, 113, 144). This provides the perfect excuse for governmental officials to 
enlarge the bureaucratic apparatus (XV, 456). As a consequence, they will grab 
every opportunity to enlarge the state while leaving the citizens in the dark 
about the taxes they pay (XIV, 52). 
 
4.2. Normative implications of the Homo Economicus model 
 
Buchanan’s  use  of  the  Homo  Economicus  model  leads  him  to  favor  the 
market over the state as the main allocation mechanism: “if individuals are 
assumed to behave solely in homo economicus terms, in all of their decision-taking 
roles, there would seem, on first argument a strong normative case for the 
widest possible usage of market and market-like institutions” (Buchanan 1986: 
238). I will try to distinguish the arguments Buchanan employs in this respect 
by referring to the characteristics of the Homo Economicus model that I have 
outlined above. 
 
4.2.1. Normative implications of instrumentality 
 
The instrumental Homo Economicus model leads to an instrumental view of 
institutions as means to satisfy as much preferences as possible. Even though 
Buchanan himself claims that he does not want to analyze institutions as means 
towards  the  realization  of  some  goal  (I,  37-38)58,  I  believe  his  view  of 
                                                 
58 Buchanan himself uses the term “teleological” instead of instrumental (I, 257-258, 458-
461). He does not want to analyze the market as a teleological process aimed at the 
maximization  of  efficiency,  but  as  a  creative  process  formed  by  free  choices  of 
individuals. According to Buchanan, the market does not maximize anything directly, but Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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institutions  are  rightly  characterized  as  instrumental.  After  all,  he  explicitly 
defines them as “means through which individuals may co-operate to secure 
certain mutually desired ends” (III, 90). The main goal of institutions is to 
facilitate societal interaction and bring about social order (XI, 13). He thus 
thinks of the public domain as a cooperative scheme that exists only because it 
enables citizens to attain mutually beneficial agreements (VII, 88-90). Both the 
market  and  the  state are  instruments  constructed  by  and  for  individuals  in 
search of their own objectives (XV, 155). If public institutions no longer serve 
their interests, they will ultimately be replaced. They are nothing more than a 
means to safeguard each individual’s freedom to pursue his own ends without 
interference of others (VII, 17-18). 
Buchanan analyzes politics as a means to realize individual values and interests 
(XVI, 62). This applies to both levels of politics. At the constitutional level, 
individuals try to agree on a set of rules, rights and claims in order to create a 
form of “civil order” (XIV, 238) thanks to which they “can go about their own 
things in harmony and mutual respect” (XVI, 179). At the post-constitutional 
level, individuals try to make collective decisions that make everybody better 
off (VII, 66). At both levels, the main task of the state is to resolve conflicting 
interests and arrange social interaction in such a way that allows everyone to do 
what they want to (XVII, 161-162). 
In Buchanan’s ideal of ordered anarchy, there is a maximal amount of choice 
and a minimal amount of power of one individual over another (XV, 7-10). To 
approximate this, Buchanan assigns a large role to the market and a minimal 
one to the state: “that government is best which governs least” (VII, 117). 
Buchanan proposes the following division of tasks: “to the extent that markets 
work, there is no need for the state. Markets allow persons to interact, one with 
another, in a regime that combines freedom and order, provided only that the 
state supply the protective legal umbrella” (XVII, 243). The state should not 
replace the market, but only support and complement it when it fails. Wherever 
there is a decently functioning market, there is thus no need for a bureaucratic 
state that is inherently more coercive and costly (XVI, 254-259). Decentralizing 
power, the market is able to depoliticize certain domains (XVI, 227, 264, 354). 
Since  he  believes  this  will  serve  everybody’s  long-term  interests,  Buchanan 
strongly  defends  a  constitutional  politics  of  non-intervention  (XI,  101-102, 
109-111; XVI, 228, 381, 421).  
Buchanan’s ideal is thus situated between anarchy and Leviathan, be it closer to 
the former than to the latter (XVI, 27, 444). He argues that this will result from 
                                                                                                                                            
simply allows individuals to satisfy their preferences (XVIII, 292-309). I maintain that 
this implies an instrumental view of the market as well, since its main characteristic is its 
ability to coordinate social interaction into mutually advantageous outcomes (XVI, 112). Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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a genuine constitutional choice process (XVI, 41). Because of the presence of 
decision costs, externalities and public goods, Buchanan thinks it is legitimate 
to move somewhat further – as little as necessary – towards a Leviathan-like 
state. He thus considers the state to be a necessary evil, wholly in service of the 
market (XVII, 244)59.  
 
4.2.2. Normative implications of egoism 
 
Buchanan’s contention that citizens only resort to public arrangements if they 
find  these  profitable  (III,  43)  not  only  confirms  the  abovementioned 
instrumental  view,  but  also  follows  from  his  assumption  that  citizens  are 
generally motivated by self-interest. 
 
4.2.2.1. Political failures 
 
Buchanan heavily criticizes the bifurcated image of individuals that is implicit in 
the  works  of  most  contemporary  political  philosophers,  who  assume  that 
individuals tend to serve their own interests within the market and the public 
good within the state. Buchanan stresses that such a motivational dichotomy 
has to be argued for. He believes that motivational differences can arise within 
different institutional contexts, but suggests that these should be understood 
not as a strict dichotomy, but as positions along a gradual continuum (I, 68-69). 
As this chapter’s opening quote already suggests and as I will show more fully 
later on, Buchanan continues to defend behavioral symmetry as the apt starting 
point for analyzing and evaluating institutional schemes, insisting on egoism as 
the overriding motivation in all domains of life. Individuals in their public roles 
as citizens, politicians and public servants are in this respect no different from 
individuals in their private roles as consumers and producers (IX, 8; XV, 33; 
XVI, 69). This view is shared by a number of theorists who do not strictly 
belong to the strand of Public Choice. Take, for example, Howard Margolis 
(1984:  7),  who  wonders:  “if  it  is  possible  to  gain  insight  into  aggregate 
economic phenomena by exploring models that start with idealized individual 
                                                 
59 Buchanan’s preference for the market over the state also comes to the fore in an 
autobiographical  piece,  where  he  states  that  someone  who  “encounters  the  solid 
arguments  of  economic  theory  (…)  understands  that  (…)  markets  tend  to  maximize 
freedom of persons from political control, that liberty, which has always been his basic 
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actors choosing rationally, why should not the same methods lead to fruitful 
results in politics? The short answer is that it does”60. 
Since  Buchanan  does  not  believe  that  individuals  suddenly  become  public-
spirited in a political context, he vigorously criticizes the romantic view of the 
government as a benevolent despot, which was omnipresent in socialism (I, 
180) and Keynesianism (XIV, 471). In fact, it was the orthodox view of the 
state in most of the works of modern political philosophy (IX, xvii). Instead, 
Buchanan defends a view of “politics without romance” (XVI, 439). In his 
view, “the romantic image of politics as the pursuit of public interest has been 
shattered, perhaps beyond repair” (XVI, 348). 
Buchanan argues that governments do not always provide the ideal response to 
instances of market failure, because they often imply huge decision costs. While 
market failures provide a necessary condition for governmental intervention, 
they do not provide a sufficient condition (XV, xi). The plain existence of 
externalities is not sufficient to legitimize governmental intervention, because 
individuals can bilaterally decide to enter and enforce a contract (XV, 121, 184, 
256). In this respect, Buchanan argues that most political philosophers neglect 
to show that the state is more efficient than the market when the latter fails (V, 
186). Before transferring power to the state, one must first make sure that this 
is  desirable  (XI,  65).  Because  this  is  not  the  case  in  any  systematic  way, 
Buchanan  stresses  the  importance  of  comparing  different  institutional 
structures  with  the  hypothetical  case  in  which  all  possibilities  for  mutually 
advantageous trade are exploited (XI, 56). 
Buchanan  thus  deserves  credit  for  pointing  out  the  existence  of  political 
failures next to the better-known market failures (XVIII, 278). The former 
exist within undemocratic politics, which curbs individual freedom (XVI, 50) 
and within democratic politics, which produces discriminatory results. Even 
though the state can be a useful supplement to the market, Buchanan stresses 
that it does not fully get rid of negative externalities (I, 46, 63, 72-73; XI, 148-
151).  Since  both  the  market  and  the  state  have  to  deal  with  problems  of 
freeriding  and  externalities,  Buchanan  considers  them  to  be  second-best 
solutions (XV, 32). 
 
                                                 
60  In  fact,  Margolis  favors  a  more  general  conception  of  rationality  than  the  strictly 
economic one that Buchanan does. He defends a model of individuals as motivated by 
both  egoistic  and  altruistic  motives. As  I will  show  in what  follows,  I  disagree with 
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4.2.2.2. The state as Leviathan 
 
In Buchanan’s perspective – which dominates Public Choice theory – egoism is 
the  main  reason  why  politics  is  doomed  to  fail.  He  argues  that  political 
representatives  use  whatever  discretionary  power  they  have  to  influence  to 
their own advantage – and not that of the electorate – the laws and policies that 
are to be implemented (XV, 34; XVI, 107). Even though they may know what 
the public good consists of, they will not necessarily aim to realize it. Instead, 
they all try to keep as much as possible of the public resources for themselves 
(I, 104; IX, 163; XV, 362; XVIII, 285-288). Because it is in the interest of 
politicians and bureaucrats, governments have a tendency to expand. As the 
post-constitutional level of politics expands, negative effects arise and grow in 
number (I, 113-114, 186). After all, small groups with a lot to lose (or gain) 
have a larger impact on public policy than large groups with only little to gain 
(or  lose)  (XV,  396).  Sectional  interest  groups  increasingly  influence  elected 
politicians and their policies (XVI, 53). 
Buchanan  argues  that  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  public  servants  are 
“motivated to expand the size and scope of the governmental sector of the 
economy” (VII, 201). This expansion will ultimately lead to a Leviathan-like 
state that becomes so large that it invades almost every domain of social life 
and systematically breaks its legitimate boundaries (VII, 151; XIII, 75). In this 
respect,  Buchanan  argues  that  the  rise  of  the  welfare  state  since  the  1950s 
implies a move away from the ideal society and that the tendency to privatize 
and downsize public activities since the 1980s is a step in the right direction. 
He thinks of something like the United States of the 1950s as coming close to 
his view of the ideal society (III, 297). 
Keeping in mind Buchanan’s emphasis on the methodologically individualist 
reduction of collectivities to individuals, his model of the state as a revenue-
maximizing Leviathan eventually comes down to the claim that people who 
work for the state act egoistically. Of course, such a state will systematically be 
deemed  inferior  to  the  market,  which does  not  forcefully  intervene  in  free 
exchange relations (XVIII, 68-69). Insofar as governments do indeed resemble 
a Leviathan, there is an obvious need for constitutional constraints on their 
range of action (VII, 203-204; X, 38; XIV, 178). Only if the state turns out not 
to be a benevolent despot, does the question arise to what extent it should be 
constrained (XVI, 108, 368, 445). 
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4.2.2.3. The need for constitutional constraints on the state 
 
According to Buchanan, it is thus the egoism of citizens and politicians that 
forms  an  important  reason  to  put  constitutional  restrictions  on  political 
decision-making (IX, 40-41; XIV, 443). Thomas Hobbes (1651: chapter XVIII) 
argues that this is simply impossible: the state is a Leviathan that cannot be 
bound, except by itself. In contrast, Buchanan thinks that a Leviathan can be 
constrained by a constitution that is agreed upon by all people (IX, 32-33; XVI, 
47-48, 104-105, 447). The required “constitutional parameters of democracy” 
(XVI, 229), which Buchanan considers to be the most desirable institutional 
reform proposal, can be procedural (like unanimity or qualified majority rules) 
or fiscal in nature (like maximum tax rates) (IX, 182-196; XVI, 56-57, 310-311). 
Both are able to serve the purpose of restricting the domain of politics to its 
legitimate boundaries (IX, 9). 
In  order  to  avoid  or  stop  the  continuous  expansion  of  the  state,  the 
constitutional level has to “specify in detail the operation and the limits of the 
productive state” (VII, 93). It has to keep a watchful eye and make sure that 
post-constitutional  politics  stays  within  its  constitutionally  agreed-on 
constraints  (XVII,  53,  274).  In  order  to  achieve  economic  growth,  social 
stability  and  individual  freedom,  strong  constitutional  rules  have  to  restrict 
governmental power to a greater extent than they currently do (XVI, 278, 438-
439). Buchanan’s argument in favor of such constraints thus heavily relies on 
the claim that governments – or at least the people working for them – should 
not be trusted. In this respect, he situates himself in the tradition of David 
Hume, whom he often quotes: “in constraining any system of government and 
fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to 
be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his action, than private 
interest”61. 
 
4.2.3. Normative implications of exogeneity 
 
Buchanan argues that his entire constitutional project is primarily built on the 
assumption of exogenously given preferences: “if the individuals’ capacities and 
objectives are given, the only way the pattern of outcomes can be changed is by 
                                                 
61 It is significant that Buchanan systematically quotes Hume as having written that his 
goal is that of “constraining any system of government” (IX, 42; X, 68; XII, 87; XVI, 11). 
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alteration  of  the  rules.  And  changes  in  the  rules,  obversely,  will  alter  the 
outcomes that emerge from any society of individuals” (X, 19). Buchanan is a 
rational constructivist who aims to improve the rules within which individuals 
play the game of life. As Monty Python’s lyrics reveal, this is easier and faster 
than changing human nature, which cannot be reformed in a deliberate manner 
(XVI, 16; XVIII, 317-323).  
This  assumption  leads  Buchanan  to  propose  institutional  reforms  without 
assessing their impact on the individuals and their preferences: “individuals are 
assumed to seek to maximize their own utility within the limits of the effective 
constraints imposed on their action. Not bringing the underlying motivational 
assumptions  into  question,  economists  tend,  therefore,  more  or  less 
automatically to think in terms of modifying the set of constraints on individual 
action” (III, 280). Later on, I will show that this provides an all too narrow 
view of the role norms, rules and institutions play in social life. 
 
5. Criticizing and complementing Buchanan’s theoretical 
assumptions 
 
5.1.  Criticizing  and  complementing  methodological  and  normative 
individualism 
 
On  a  few  occasions,  Buchanan  seems  to  question  his  own  assumption  of 
individualism. In his account of social norms, for example, he suggests going 
beyond a purely individualist model (X, 162-165). He nevertheless sticks to it 
and stresses that individuals remain the apt starting point for any explanation 
within  the  social  sciences.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  Buchanan’s 
insistence on the assumption of normative individualism is without problems62. 
Considering  consensus  as  “the  only  defensible  normative  criterion  for 
evaluating reform proposals” (XVI, 451), Buchanan has to ensure that his own 
libertarian  view  of  the  ideal  society  is  shared  by  a  vast  majority  of  fellow 
citizens (XVIII, 106, 117). If one takes seriously his normative individualism, it 
                                                 
62 There are quite a few philosophical and moral problems with the moral relativism that 
seems to flow from the principle that no preference is of more value than any other. One 
might legitimately object to the moral claim – made by economists like Buchanan – that 
well-being is the same as the satisfaction of one’s preferences. After all, people often 
desire things that are bad for them (Broome 1995: 132). For now, I want to lay aside 
such criticisms that remain external to Buchanan’s project and focus more extensively on 
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is not Buchanan himself but each and every citizen who should, according to 
his own preferences, decide which tasks institutions ought to take on (XVIII, 
72).  In  this  view,  there  are  no  reasons  for  tearing  down  the  state  if  not 
everyone agrees to do so. Ultimately, Buchanan is forced to ground his defense 
of a minimal state in popular opinion (III, 319-321). 
This is why Buchanan argues that, “by widespread agreement, the state has 
become too powerful, too pervasive in its influence over private affairs” (VII, 
19) and that preferences are in general evolving “toward individual freedom 
and away from constraints” (VII, 162). He even claims that everybody agrees 
with his conclusion that governments have become too large: “most welfare 
states are overextended: this diagnosis is almost universally accepted” (XI, 209). 
In other passages, Buchanan states that the growth of welfare states is not in 
line with the preferences of their citizens (IX, 28-30) and that people will be 
persuaded by his ideal of a minimal or at least limited state (XVI, 22).  
Of course, the problem is that Buchanan’s proposal of downsizing the state 
will  inevitably  leave  some  individuals  less  well-off  and  will  thus  not  be 
welcomed by all. This not only applies to public servants but to citizens who 
benefit from the welfare state and its social security and pension schemes. I 
therefore refuse to believe that a vast majority of people would agree on the 
transition from an extensive to a minimal state. Buchanan’s attempt to move 
beyond mere conceptual analysis towards actual reform fails because of his 
unanimity criterion, which effectively binds the hands of anyone in search of 
real  institutional  change.  He  too  heavily  relies  on  the  criterion  of  Pareto-
improvement,  which  is  overly  stringent,  since  changes  will  almost  always 
produce winners and losers. 
 
5.2. Criticizing and complementing the Homo Economicus model 
 
Despite  his  self-pronounced  devotion  to  the  Homo  Economicus  model, 
Buchanan from time to time moves away from it. Admitting that it has often 
been  used  as  a  descriptive  model  and  defended  on  empirical  grounds, 
Buchanan  acknowledges  the  problem  that  it  fails  to  explain  quite  a  lot  of 
actions (XII, 74-76). This explains his tendency to amend certain aspects of the 
model itself. Nevertheless, the revisions he proposes are only minor, since he 
never  questions  the  model’s  basic  structure.  If  taken  seriously,  these 
amendments  can  have  far-reaching  consequences.  In  what  follows,  I  will 
discuss Buchanan’s remarks in this respect and think them through in ways that 
Buchanan has neglected. 
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5.2.1. Criticizing and complementing instrumentality 
 
In order to show the deficiency of an exclusively instrumental conception of 
rationality, I have already suggested that an expressive conception of rationality 
is possible and desirable if one wants to account for non-instrumental behavior 
like the following of norms. Even though Buchanan seems to situate the latter 
beyond a purely instrumental framework (I, 250), he never really abandons his 
instrumental conception of rationality (X, 163-165). In Buchanan’s view, social 
norms stipulate what is to be done in a society and thus contribute to some 
shared  sense  of  the  public  good.  His  emphasis  on  methodological 
individualism is crucial in this respect. Whether it concerns private or public 
interests, individuals are always out to further something they value highly. 
 
5.2.2. Criticizing and complementing egoism 
 
According to Buchanan, egoism is not necessarily a defining characteristic of 
the Homo Economicus model. He often argues that individuals want to satisfy 
their preferences without specifying what these are (III, 3). It is not so much 
the  content  of  their  preferences  that  is  important,  but  the  way  these  are 
structured. The individual is expected to fulfill whatever preference is ranked 
highest. In contrast with the narrow assumption of egoism, this assumption of 
egocentrism is consistent with Buchanan’s normative individualism, according 
to which individuals are sovereign in determining what they value. Similarly, it 
is in line with his methodological individualism. Even if an individual prefers 
altruism  above  egoism,  it  is  always  his  preference  for  helping  others  that 
provides motivational force and remains the central explanatory variable. 
According to Buchanan, the most widespread “argument is that Homo economicus 
offers  a  better  basic  model  for  explaining  human  behaviour  than  any 
comparable  alternative.  Most  modern  economists  would  probably  take  this 
position”  (X,  58).  I  blame  Buchanan  for  not  distancing himself  completely 
from this argument, which becomes clear in passages where he stresses the 
need for economics to accurately reflect reality (III, 28-29; VI, 37-38; X, 35-36). 
Characteristic of Buchanan’s ambiguity in this respect is his contention that his 
“approach starts with the empirical realities of persons as they exist, moral 
warts and all” (X, xvi). 
However, Buchanan’s remarks on the status of the assumption of egoism are 
ambiguous,  to  say  the  least.  As  he  self-avowedly  admits,  “economists  have 
great difficulty in moving beyond the rather simplistic, if powerful, models of Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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human behaviour grounded in self-interest motivation. We claim no exception 
to this generalisation about our disciplinary peers. Nonetheless, (…) we must 
introduce elements that violate the self-interest postulate” (X, 162). As I have 
already  suggested,  Buchanan  seems  to  do  exactly  this  by  focusing  on 
constitutional  choice  (XVII,  249).  Placing  the  individual  behind  a  veil  of 
uncertainty, the constitutional context induces him to take into account other 
than purely egoistic considerations (III, 95). 
Nevertheless,  Buchanan  does  not  think  this  through.  His  vocabulary  of 
individual “interests, whatever these may be” (X, 59) suggests that he wants to 
allow for a wider array of motivations (whatever these may be), but also that an 
individual only does something when he expects to gain from it (what is in his 
interest). While admitting that not every individual is purely egoistic, Buchanan 
wants to leave “other possible motivations, such as genuine altruism, out of 
account”  (XIII,  73).  He  also  argues  that  an  economic  analysis  consists  in 
assuming that individuals maximize their utility, which means that they try to 
attain what they value highest (XV, 303-304). Whereas the first formulation 
seems to endorse the assumption of egoism, the second only endorses that of 
egocentrism.  
In  full  awareness  that  the  assumption  of  egoism  amounts  to  an  unrealistic 
abstraction  (XII,  51),  Buchanan  thus  holds  on  to  it  nonetheless,  primarily 
because  he  believes  that  it  is  appropriate  for  his  purpose  of  comparing 
different  institutional  alternatives  (I,  392;  XII,  70-71).  In  this  respect,  he 
strongly insists on the principle of behavioral symmetry. To compare different 
institutional arrangements, one has to use the same model of individuals that 
act within each of these schemes. The belief that people act differently under 
different institutions cannot simply be postulated but has to be argued for (X, 
56-57; XII, 77-79). Buchanan wants to see how much of political decision-
making can be explained by assuming that all preferences are egoistic (III, 20, 
295-298). 
As this chapter’s opening quote clearly suggests, Buchanan uses the Homo 
Economicus  model  as  a  tool  to  derive  “normative  propositions  about 
appropriate institutional design” (XII, 76). Together with Geoffrey Brennan, he 
states that, “like Adam Smith, we believe that Homo economicus remains the 
appropriate model of behaviour in the derivation of normative propositions 
about the institutions themselves” (XII, 86). Buchanan thus defends this model 
on conceptual rather than empirical grounds (X, 60-61; VII, 103; Buchanan 
1986: 238). The basic argument is “methodological and analytic rather than 
empirical” (X, 58). It does not imply that men actually behave as the model 
predicts: “the battle over the empirical status of Homo economicus is not, in our 
view, the crucial issue at all” (XII, 86). He deems the empirical record of the Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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model to be largely irrelevant (XVII, 48-49). Even in a world where individuals 
are  benevolent  or  public-spirited  to  some  extent,  Buchanan  would  favor 
institutions based on the assumption that they are not. Assuming egoism is 
justified even if – or even though – it does not occur in reality (XII, 98-99). 
Hence, Buchanan believes the Homo Economicus model is appropriate exactly 
because, and not just in spite of the fact that, it predicts outcomes that are 
worse than the actual state of affairs (XII, 106)63.  
Buchanan  thus  argues  that  the  degree  to  which  individuals  do  indeed  act 
egoistically is irrelevant when thinking about institutional design and reform. 
When signing a contract, one does not necessarily believe the other to be a 
crook.  Nevertheless,  one  acts  as  if  this  may  well  be  the  case  (XII,  79-81). 
Analogously, in trying to find out what the apt constraints on politics are, one 
should not naively assume that public servants always serve the public good 
(VII, 103-104; X, 60-61). Presupposing such a benevolent or public-spirited 
motivation would simply beg the question. Buchanan argues that it is safest to 
assume that public servants are egoistic, even though things may not be that 
bad at all (IX, xxiii). He thus does not consider the assumption of egoism as a 
depiction of individuals as they actually exist, but as they might exist. For the 
particular purpose of institutional design and reform, Buchanan fully agrees 
with Hume that it is better to assume that individuals are egoistic even though 
this may not correspond to actual reality (IX, 42; XVI, 11-12). 
Buchanan’s “sceptical or pessimistic view of human nature” (III, 27) represents 
the individual, not in his most common but in his most malicious aspects, 
which must be taken into account at all times. He argues that this view is 
appropriate  regardless  of  whether  it  truthfully describes  real-life  individuals. 
Because  one  cannot  be  sure  that  everyone  will  act  benevolently,  one  must 
assume  otherwise  in  order  to  design  appropriate  institutional  reforms.  The 
counterfactual  scenario  is  the  relevant  one:  “what  matters  when  we  are 
considering alternative “constraints” is not what their consequences would in 
fact be, but what their consequences would be if all men were knaves” (Hausman 
1998: 71). 
For any criticism on Buchanan’s assumption of egoism to have validity, one 
must  show  (1)  that  the  empirical  issue  is  the  crucial  one  and  (2)  that  the 
empirical record of the Homo Economicus model is abominable. With respect 
to (1), I want to stress that Buchanan himself believes that egoism is what 
                                                 
63 In fact, the Homo Economicus model is not necessarily the worst possible scenario 
(Elster 1989a: 59). Buchanan admits that a society full of jealous or envious people may 
be even worse than one full of egoists (XII, 107). While I believe this poses an additional 
problem for Buchanan’s conceptual defense of egoism – why assume that the others are 
egoistic when they might as well be jealous or envious? – I will not go into this here. Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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actually causes governments to fail. In order to be consistent, he should think 
of his Homo Economicus model as a somewhat realistic depiction of real-life 
politics (I, 45). Externalities arise only if individuals do indeed act in their self-
interest. Politics should not be constitutionally constrained if public servants 
would  voluntarily  act  in  a  public-spirited  manner.  In  the  end,  Buchanan’s 
argument in favor of constitutional constraints is based on the assumption that 
governments do in fact strive for budget-maximization and thus indeed consist 
of egoistic utility-maximizers. 
Both Buchanan’s analysis of the state as a Leviathan and his model of the 
individuals as Homines Economici are in need of empirical validation (XIV, 
68). That is why he gives empirical arguments in favor of them and stresses 
that revenue-maximization is indeed the dominant motivation of most political 
actors (XIV, 153-155). He maintains that egoism has an important impact on 
behavior, even though it is not the only explanatory variable (IV, 195-196). In 
his view, it is sufficiently present to allow for economics to become a valid 
science (IV, 169). 
Each  proposal  on  the  division  of  tasks  between  the  market  and  the  state 
depends on the way these function in reality and this, in turn, depends on the 
ways individuals behave. Buchanan himself argues that normative views should 
always  be  backed  by  empirically  adequate  underpinnings  (II,  115;  XV,  37). 
Ultimately,  the  validity  and  legitimacy  of  Buchanan’s  constitutional  project 
hinges upon the empirical adequacy of his analyses of existing institutions and 
the individuals interacting within the latter. If Buchanan takes seriously his own 
claim that individuals matter, institutional reform should be based on adequate 
models of them. In this respect, he stresses that political economists should 
take preferences as they are and not as they should be (I, 194).  
Normative issues should therefore not be decided upon the obviously false 
claim that citizens, public servants and politicians systematically act egoistically. 
Instead, institutional schemes should be adapted to individuals as they actually 
exist. If not everyone is a knave, institutions designed for a world full of knaves 
will not be optimal. The argument is as straightforward as it is simple: “if the 
outcomes  of  institutions  designed  for  knaves  are  much  worse  than  the 
outcomes designed for actual individuals and the odds of everybody being a 
knave were low, then it would be foolish to choose the institutions designed 
for knaves” (Hausman 1998: 74). 
All this still assumes that maximal preference satisfaction forms the main goal 
of politico-legal institutions. One might also argue that a world full of knaves is 
the worst possible one and then argue in favor of some maximin principle. 
However, this is not a desirable criterion, since it “could condemn all mankind 
to stunted lives to protect against a one in a billion chance of a society of Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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knaves” (Hausman 1998: 75). Robert Goodin (1996: 42) agrees: “whether our 
institutions should be designed with knaves or with potential angels primarily 
in view depends crucially upon our views as to the relative frequency of each in 
the population, and as to the relative damage that will be done (or good that 
will be missed) by making one assumption rather than another given those 
frequencies”. Of course, it might be reasonable to adopt policies on a realistic 
estimate that some proportion of the population acts in a purely opportunistic 
manner. It makes sense to lock your door even if you think that only a fraction 
of all individuals are thieves. This, however, is not Buchanan’s strategy, since 
he  wishes to reform institutions  that  matter  to everyone on  the basis of a 
model that fails as a generalized account of individuals. By taking into account 
the  reactions  of  only  the  wholly  opportunistic  citizens,  he  risks  making 
everyone worse off. 
To  summarize  the  first  step  in  my  criticism  of  Buchanan’s  defense  of  the 
assumption of universal egoism, I want to stress that – in contrast to what he 
proclaims – his argument is not purely analytical or conceptual in nature. His 
arguments in favor of strict constitutional limits to keep post-constitutional 
politics in check are based on the implicit claim that individuals actually are 
egoistic in their public roles. Otherwise, the state simply would not fail or turn 
into  a  Leviathan.  If  one’s  reliance  on  the  assumption  of  egoism  would  be 
purely analytical, it would carry no weight whatsoever in normative discussions. 
For this assumption to have any relevance, it should at least be somewhat 
realistic or empirically adequate.  
This brings us to the second step (2). Here, I want to refer to this dissertation’s 
first  chapter,  in  which  I  have  shown  that  the  economic  conception  of 
rationality fails to explain individual behavior, not in the least because of its 
assumption of egoism. In this respect, it is important to see that Buchanan 
realizes  that  the  egoistic  Homo  Economicus  model  does  not  have  an 
outstanding  empirical  record.  He  admits  “the  possibility  and  indeed  the 
likelihood of nonself-seeking behaviour by human agents in all institutional 
settings” (XII, 86). Buchanan even explicitly argues that individuals rarely act as 
Homines  Economici  (XII,  18).  They  often  choose  against  their  own  self-
interest, for example when they are motivated by internalized norms (I, 363; 
XII, 88-89; XVI, 377). 
 
5.2.3. Criticizing and complementing exogeneity 
 
Buchanan  admits  that  his  assumption  of  exogenously  given  preferences  is 
problematic as well, since the institutional context has repercussions on the Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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motivations  of  the  individuals  living  in  it  (XII,  118,  434).  In  their  role  of 
consumers  of  public  goods,  for  example,  individuals  tend  to  demand 
increasingly more of those public goods, since they are freely available. In their 
role  of  producers,  however,  the  same  individuals  have  to  choose  between 
alternative options to spend the collected tax money. Different institutional 
contexts lead to different results in that individuals demand more than they 
want to provide (XV, 347-350)64. This is why Buchanan stresses the need to 
pay  attention  to  the  social,  cultural  and  institutional  context  in  which  the 
individual is situated (XVI, 371).  
This criticism of the assumption of exogenous preferences is already present in 
his  emphasis  on  unanimity  in  politics.  After  all,  this  is  based  on  the  very 
possibility of citizens persuading each other in public debates (XVI, 320). It 
ultimately hinges upon their ability to adapt their preferences and opinions 
throughout the decision-making process. If these were fixed, agreement would 
simply be impossible. His view of politics as “the process through which the 
initial preferences are expressed, discussed, compromised, and, finally, resolved 
in some fashion” (I, 236) clearly goes against the very claim of exogenously 
given  preferences.  He  stresses  that  “the  definition  of  democracy  as 
“government by discussion” implies that individual values can and do change 
through the process of decision-making” (I, 99). Buchanan even claims that 
politicians should not take into account the preferences as they are given but as 
they are formed through rational discussion and public deliberation (I, 207). 
The assumption of exogenously given preferences leads to a purely aggregative 
model  of  democratic  politics:  “to  take  preferences  as  given  allows  us  to 
recognize  democracy’s  contribution  to  the  proper  aggregation  of  wants 
through the counting of votes” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 123). Here, however, 
Buchanan seems to move towards what might be called a deliberative model of 
democratic politics as a process of discussion in which preferences are not only 
expressed, but also transformed and selected65.  
                                                 
64 As a solution for this imbalance, Buchanan suggests that governments should not only 
decide which public goods to provide, but also how much. If citizens want more than 
unanimously agreed on, they will have to pay for it themselves (XV, 356). 
65 Different models of democratic politics can be traced back to different conceptions of 
rationality. Whereas economic rationality leads to an aggregative model, a deliberative 
model  is  based  on  alternative  conceptions  of  rationality.  Whereas  broad  rationality 
stresses that beliefs should be well-informed and preferences should be autonomous, 
expressive  rationality  stresses  that  the  individual  should  identify  with  such  reasons: 
“dialogue  politics  is  an  alternative  to  interest  aggregation  politics.  Under  interest 
aggregation  politics,  actors  are  irredeemably  egoistic  and  have  essentially  immobile 
opinions grounded in fixed interests. The essence of politics is reconciling interests to 
forge a coherent majority coalition. Dialogue politics, on the other hand, assumes that 
political actors seek the common good and that opinions can change drastically as a Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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In  some  passages,  Buchanan  seems  to  go  deeper  into  this  issue  of 
endogenously changing preferences, for example when stating that individuals 
take on different roles in different situations: “persons do behave differently 
under differing institutions that place them in differing roles because the roles 
do modify the constraints and may also affect motivation” (Buchanan 1986: 
239). He admits that institutional changes can affect individuals in the long run 
(IV,  175;  XVI,  386)  and  that  their  preferences  can  be  influenced  by  their 
previous  choices  (X,  85).  Just  like  institutions,  rules,  values  and  norms, 
preferences  are  molded  by  one’s  previous  choices.  Yet  their  malleability  is 
limited, since they are typically quite stable (XVI, 230-231, 415)66. That is why 
Buchanan labels them “relatively absolute absolutes” (I, 445-447; XVIII, 322, 
339). 
This already suggests that Buchanan never fully explores this line of reasoning. 
His examples of preference formation (VII, 193) never lead him to genuinely 
recognize  the  fact  that  institutions  influence  the  reasons  upon  which 
individuals  base  their  actions.  Ultimately,  Buchanan  continues  to  treat 
preferences as fixed at any moment in time. As with the issue of egoism, he is 
aware of the blind spot this implies, but is reluctant to do anything about it. 
Accordingly,  he  continues  to  analyze  norms,  rules  and  laws  primarily  as 
external constraints on one’s actions, not as factors that have a more internal 
influence on one’s preferences (X, 5).  
Buchanan  does  not  think  through  his  own  thought  that  the  world  can 
transform the individual living in it (X, 25-26). This would lead him to adopt a 
broader view of the individual and its place in society. Constitutional choice 
concerns not only the institutional structure one lives in, but also each and 
every individual’s identity. I will go deeper into this issue in what follows. For 
now, I want to refer to Geoffrey Brennan’s notion of “compound symmetry” 
(Brennan & Lomasky 1993: 13-16; Engelen 2008a; Eusepi & Hamlin 2004: 37-
40).  Whereas  Buchanan  assumes  that  individual  behavior  is  perfectly 
symmetrical – namely egoistically motivated – in different institutional settings, 
Brennan allows for marginal changes in individual motivation and behavior. In 
                                                                                                                                            
result of communication” (Mayer 1994: 270). Since rationality has instrumental, broad 
and expressive aspects, democratic politics should not be reduced to either its aggregative 
or its deliberative characteristics. The claim that the active engagement of citizens in such 
discussions is needed to speak of genuine democratic politics suggests that the latter 
should not be reduced to elections. 
66 With respect to values, this allows for a position between absolutism (my values are the 
only right ones) and relativism (no moral judgment about values is possible) (I, 451-452). 
With  respect  to  rules  and  norms,  this  avoids  the  complete  immobility  that  is  the 
inevitable  result when  everything  is  always  up  for discussion. While  it  is  possible  to 
change laws at the constitutional level, there is always the current rule of law that treats 
the existing laws as given when interpreting and enforcing them (XVI, 127; XVIII, 399). Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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his view, one needs to start from a model of individuals as heterogeneously 
motivated by a whole gamut of considerations that gain more or less weight in 
different contexts. As should be clear from my analysis of voting decisions, I 
support the general thrust of Brennan’s argument. 
 
6. Normative implications of criticizing and 
complementing Buchanan’s theoretical assumptions 
 
6.1.  Normative  implications  of  criticizing  and  complementing 
methodological and normative individualism 
 
The main problem with Buchanan’s individualism is that it forces him to rely 
on  public  opinion  when  defending  his  own  proposals  to  restrict  post-
constitutional politics to a bare minimum. Since his proposals to downsize the 
state fail his own test of unanimous agreement, he should either continue his 
search for reforms or conclude that the current state of affairs is best (XVII, 
245-246). One way of avoiding absolute conservatism might be to relax the 
requirement  of  unanimity,  for  example  by  relying  more  on  majoritarian 
democracy. One could argue that institutions and policies in current welfare 
states have come about in roughly democratic ways. Although they are not 
agreed upon by all citizens, they can be thought of as second-best solutions. In 
the imperfect world we live in, the best thing we can do is rely on democratic 
procedures to produce results that roughly reflect popular opinion. This seems 
to be in line with Buchanan’s procedural conception of democracy, according 
to which whatever comes out of the democratic process is legitimate. 
 
6.2. Normative implications of criticizing and complementing the Homo 
Economicus model 
 
6.2.1. Normative implications of criticizing and complementing of instrumentality 
 
There are two problems an exclusively catallactic view of society has to deal 
with.  The  first  is  that  a  contract  is rarely  voluntarily  fulfilled  (even  though 
mutual benefits could be attained by voluntarily upholding them), because the 
incentives  to  freeride induce  each party  to break  it  (XVI,  93).  The  second 
problem is that it tends to neglect that third parties can undergo negative side Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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effects of a contract. One could argue that the core of Buchanan’s work in 
mainstream economics lies exactly in his discussion of negative externalities. 
Such costs occur when an exchange influences the situation of a third party 
without his permission (XV, 15-16, 110, 215). Both forms of market failure 
have to be  weighed against  the  market’s  enormous  advantage of regulating 
social  life  while  leaving  intact  each  individual’s  freedom  (XII,  124-126). 
Nevertheless,  they  provide  a  justification  for  governments  to  intervene  in 
market processes (XV, 17).  
With respect to the first problem, Buchanan argues that there is a need for a 
protective  state  to  enforce  contracts  and  existing  rules,  which  form  the 
framework required for markets to function properly (XII, 476-477). Without 
this, the problem of freeriding would inhibit markets to coordinate interaction 
in mutually beneficial ways (I, 39, 350; XV, 30). In Buchanan’s view, citizens 
will mutually agree to such a protective state in order to avoid a suboptimal 
outcome (I, 323-325; XV, 98-99; XVIII, 186-188). Even though the resulting 
coercive institution may use power, it ultimately receives its legitimacy from the 
consent of its citizens (XVI, 15; XVIII, 196). 
With  respect  to  the  second  problem,  Buchanan  stresses  the  need  for  a 
productive state to provide the public goods that markets fail to supply (XVIII, 
121-122)67.  Here too, he  argues  that  citizens will  agree  on  the necessity  of 
eliminating negative externalities (XV, 19, 328) and the need for a coercive 
government to provide mutually beneficial arrangements (XI, 81-83; XV, 22). 
After all, negative externalities prevent markets from exploiting all possibilities 
for trade (XVI, 243) and thus from reaching an optimal equilibrium (XVI, 82-
83,  112).  The  state  should  compensate  those  who  suffer  from  externalities 
through side payments. Compensation allows the parties to attain a Pareto-
optimal  solution  (XV,  120,  132-133)  and  facilitates  consent  on  proposed 
reforms (XVI, 116-117, 375, 456). 
Buchanan  analyzes  extensively  the  problem  of  public  goods,  which  are 
characterized by their non-rivalry and non-excludability (IV, 11). A good is 
public if it is equally available to all individuals. Once it is in place, everybody 
can enjoy it without prohibiting others to enjoy it as well (V, 48). Because this 
creates a freerider problem – nobody will produce and maintain such goods if 
one can make use of them without doing so – markets cannot provide them 
efficiently. Since the market equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal in such cases, a 
                                                 
67 In one passage, Buchanan argues that his defense of a governmental provision of 
public goods shows that he does not defend a minimal state (XVIII, 93). As I have 
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coercive state is necessary to provide such public goods (V, 161; IX, 175; XI, 
143; XV, 126)68. 
Buchanan also analyzes more specific forms of freeriding. As I have shown, a 
first example can be found in the decision to vote. Why should I vote if I can 
enjoy  the  benefits  of  democracy  while  abstaining  as  well  (IV,  121-124)?  A 
second example occurs when citizens want their government to provide public 
goods without being willing to pay the required taxes (VIII, 130). Because they 
impede one’s freedom and have a coercive impact on the individual’s choices 
with  respect  to  labor  and  leisure,  Buchanan  generally  disapproves  of  taxes 
(XIV,  219,  327-329;  XV,  135).  However,  he  argues  that  the  state  can 
legitimately take what is needed to provide the goods that are agreed upon. 
Taxes  are  the  flipside  of  public  goods,  just  like  prices  are  the  flipside  of 
consumer goods (XIV, 214). According to Buchanan, taxes up to 10% of a 
country’s gross national product are enough for the state to fulfill its basic 
protective and productive roles (XIV, 228-234). Of course, this is a lot less 
than the 30 to 40% that is publicly spent in the United States (XV, 441). In 
most European welfare states, the total amount of taxes currently even runs up 
to half of the country’s gross national product. 
Once more, Buchanan’s amendments to his own theory can have far-reaching 
consequences, if he would properly think them through. His claim that the 
state  should  complement  the  market  in  its  failures  allows  for  more 
governmental intervention than one might think at first glance. It enables the 
state to legitimately levy taxes to provide public goods like stability, order and 
law  enforcement  (protective  state)  but  also  like  roads,  schools,  et  cetera 
(productive  state).  In  this  respect,  nothing  can  prevent  governments  from 
implementing far-reaching measures if there is enough public support for the 
public goods at hand. If citizens want clean air but the market is unable to 
reduce  pollution,  governments  are  justified  to  levy  consumption  taxes  (for 
example on plastic bottles) or production taxes (for example on companies that 
do not comply with environmental laws). Both thoroughly intervene in the 
market process and its allocative and distributive results. 
In  a  similar  vein,  Buchanan  argues  that  the  state  should  make  sure  that 
everyone follows the agreed-on rules and gets “a fair chance to play the game” 
                                                 
68 Buchanan stresses that citizens ought to make sure that the money they pay on taxes is 
spent on public goods and not on politicians themselves (IX, 170). In this respect, he 
proposes that governments finance a public good rather than produce it themselves. This 
way, it can still be provided within the competitive environment of the market (XV, 34-
35). Similarly, Buchanan believes that the monopoly of a bureaucratic government over 
certain areas – like social security or pension schemes – should be broken by allowing 
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(Buchanan 1986: 141). If this aim of equalizing opportunities is to be taken 
seriously, one can justify a much more generous state than Buchanan defends. 
The inequalities that arise through market exchanges can be thought of as the 
result of voluntarily chosen actions – a Nozickian procedural defense of the 
market holds up to this extent – but are continuously passed on to children 
who  do  not  deserve  this.  If  one  wants  to  guarantee  that  every  generation 
entering the socio-economic game receives an equal start, one has to design 
rules  that  interfere  with  market  processes  continuously  and  diachronically 
(Dworkin 2002: 85-88). Once more, one can see that Buchanan does not think 
through his own suggestions.  
Regarding  issues  of  distributive  justice,  Buchanan  (1986:  151)  distinguishes 
between inequalities in natural and social endowments. Although he mentions 
that one should correct for social bad luck, just like one does for genetic bad 
luck, he further neglects this possible justification for redistributive measures. 
An individual’s environment functions not only as an external constraint – as 
Buchanan  would  argue  –  but  influences  the  individual’s  capacities  in  more 
internal ways as well. Poor education might inhibit the development of a child’s 
potentialities. Such an argument might justify the rectification of inequalities 
that are due to social circumstances as well. The thought that social inequalities 
should be taken into account as well can be applied to an individual’s capacities 
as well as to his preferences, which are continuously formed by one’s social and 
cultural  environment  (Rawls  1993:  269-270).  The  bottom  line  is  that  the 
distinction between social and natural endowments, as Buchanan’s formulates 
it, ultimately cannot be upheld.  
 
6.2.2. Normative implications of criticizing and complementing egoism 
 
There is a fundamental ambiguity in Buchanan’s reliance on the assumption of 
egoism. While he values it highly in the private domain, he wants to restrict it 
as  much  as  possible  in  the  public  domain.  The  underlying  thought  is  that 
egoism  produces  Pareto-optimal  results  in  a  competitive  market,  but 
systematically disrupts the proper functioning of governments. A first problem 
with this analysis is that – as examples of market failures show – egoism in 
private decisions does not always result in Pareto-optimal outcomes. Even if 
one  accepts  Buchanan’s  assumption  of  egoism,  one  can  thus  oppose  his 
predilection for markets over governments. Because one individual’s egoistic 
actions in market behavior can violate another’s interests, politico-legal rules 
have been designed to prevent individuals from harming each other.  Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
 
171
A second, more fundamental problem lies with the assumption of egoism itself. 
Since not all individuals are egoists, the ideal set of institutions and rules for the 
actual world does not coincide with the ideal one for a world full of knaves. To 
this, Buchanan might reply that constitutional constraints necessarily follow 
from  any  model  that  does  not  assume  complete  benevolence  (IX,  226). 
However, this does not undermine the basic tenet of my argument, namely that 
the degree of such constraints should depend on the ways actual institutions 
function and actual individuals behave. If public servants act egoistically and 
excesses are inevitable at the political level, then constraints should be strict. 
However,  if  public  servants  act  benevolently,  then  there  is  no  need  for 
constraints  whatsoever.  Indeed,  the  very  idea  of  constraining  government 
arises  only  if  one  no  longer  assumes  complete  benevolence  on  its  part. 
Buchanan himself argues that the need for constitutional constraints is reduced 
significantly in a world of benevolent and public-spirited individuals: “moral 
restraint is a substitute for institutional-constitutional restraint, and in a society 
with more of the former there will be less need for the latter” (III, 303). As 
always, the truth lies somewhere in between. Excesses should be avoided and 
citizens need some guarantee that their government does not turn into an ever 
enlarging Leviathan. However, this does not mean that there is no room left 
for post-constitutional politics to impose policy measures in the name of the 
public good.  
Of course, one should take into account the possibility of others being knaves 
when engaging in contracts or when leaving one’s house. However, this does 
not mean that one should assume that all others are knaves, since that would 
imply that one no longer engages in contracts at all. While it makes sense to 
close your door, even if (you know that) not everybody is a thief, it is rational 
not to turn your home into a fortress. Nevertheless, this seems to be the only 
right thing to do if you actually assume that everybody is out to steal your 
possessions.  Similarly,  the  fact  that  a  constitution  should  indeed  keep  a 
watchful eye on politicians does not imply that it should confine their range of 
options to a bare minimum. Safeguard measures must always be proportionate 
to  the  extent  to  which  they  are  needed,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the 
probability of individuals trying to take advantage of their power. 
 
6.2.3. Normative implications of criticizing and complementing exogeneity 
 
Buchanan acknowledges that his defense of the market fails “if it might be 
demonstrated that the process itself exerts predictable effects on the character 
of  the  participants,  effects  that  are  generally  deemed  to  operate  to  make 
participants  worse  than  they  would  be  under  some  plausible  institutional Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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alternative” (XII, 124). Buchanan does away with this criticism by arguing that 
the  disadvantages  of  the  market  are  smaller  than  its  advantages.  In  what 
follows, however, I want to argue that the negative effects of the market on the 
formation  of  the  individual  and  his  preferences  are  greater  than  Buchanan 
admits. 
Buchanan  argues  that  altruism  survives  better  in  the  market  than  in  a 
majoritarian democracy, because the latter does not have an exit-option like the 
former  does  (XII,  436-440).  He  defends  the  market  as  a  mechanism  that 
supports a morality of fairness (XII, 452) and that reinforces internalized moral 
codes such as honesty, reciprocity and respect for rights (XIII, 73-74). One 
could also argue that market relations induce and sustain mutual trust since 
they  typically  take  place  in  small-scaled,  personal  and  often  repeated 
environments. The flipside of this argument is that cheating is rewarded in 
anonymous interactions like tax paying. 
The basic problem here lies in the fact that Buchanan uses these arguments 
exclusively  in  favor  of  the  market  and  against  the  state.  First,  Buchanan 
essentially neglects that it is the state that upholds rather than erodes existing 
social norms through the imposition of legal sanctions against misbehavior in 
social interactions. Second, the public domain is full of mechanisms, like public 
scrutiny  and  deliberation,  which  induce  morally  praiseworthy  behavior. 
Incentives to be trustworthy and accountable are generally more pervasive in 
the public than in the private domain.  
Third, the impact of institutions depends on the quality of their services. If 
state officials are seen to be abusing their power to their own advantage, the 
government will be distrusted, which will induce an egoistic reflex amongst its 
citizens.  In  Buchanan’s  view  of  post-constitutional  politics,  expanding 
governments are partially responsible for the current decline of social capital, 
stability and order, since they have disillusioned their citizens. The latter will, as 
a result, increasingly behave as “moral anarchists” (XVII, 198) who treat others 
as means to further their own ends. If, however, governments effectively fulfill 
their tasks, I believe they will prevent rather than facilitate the deterioration of 
existing  social  norms.  As  I  will  argue  more  fully  later  on,  I  believe  this 
discussion on the perceived legitimacy of public institutions should be decided 
empirically. In contrast, Buchanan thus relies on a worst case scenario (which is 
inappropriate)  that he  applies  to  the  state but  not  to  the  market  (which  is 
inconsistent). He argues that the actions of self-interested individuals inevitably 
lead to an ever increasing Leviathan-like state. Even though there is growing 
dissatisfaction with the government, the bureaucratic apparatus continues to 
expand because of the egoism of public servants and citizens alike (XVI, 348-
349,  397).  In  the  end,  Buchanan  relies  on  motivations  outside  the  Homo Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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Economicus  model  to  start  the  constitutional  revolution  he  is  hoping  for 
(XVIII, 182-184). 
In my view, the political context is more likely to induce or support other- and 
process-regarding considerations than the market. The basic argument is that 
political decisions affect one’s fellow citizens. Since market decisions influence 
only the parties to the contract (V, 139), the sensitivity for the consequences of 
one’s choices on one’s own situation will be large. As a result, market decisions 
will be primarily based on egoistic considerations (VI, 92). Because the impact 
of choices in a political context resorts primarily on the collectivity as a whole, 
one will be led to a greater extent by their consequences on others. As I have 
shown in my analysis of voting decisions, egoistic considerations tend to move 
to the background in an electoral context, which does not allow its participants 
to have a direct impact on the end result, let alone on their own situation69.  
Buchanan explicitly wants to change the rules of the game in ways that have an 
impact only in general and in the long term (I, 220-221). In this respect, he 
favors lagged implementation, which means that the rules agreed upon now 
will be adopted later (IV, 302). Because of this enlarged time horizon, decisions 
will be made on a more impartial or “dispassionate” basis (XVI, 403). Egoistic 
considerations, which tend to dominate short-term decisions, will be replaced 
by  considerations  of  fairness  at  the  constitutional  level  and  its  veil  of 
uncertainty (I, 239, 464-465; IX, 6, 24; XI, 8-9; XVI, 90; XVIII, 411). Because 
no player knows beforehand what his hand of cards will look like, all players 
want rules that are fair rather than those that would serve their self-interest 
(XVI,  45).  One  can  see  clearly  here  how  Buchanan  admits  that  a  political 
context can bring about nobler motivations among its participants. 
Conversely, I want to argue that it is probably the market and not the state that 
can  be  blamed  for  turning  noble  citizens  into  egoists.  Because  it  rewards 
egoistic behavior, the market tends to bring about market-oriented and thus 
self-interested  individuals.  The  market  is  not  a  neutral  mechanism  allowing 
individuals to do whatever they want to – as Buchanan sees it – but inevitably 
has an impact on their preferences and identities (Hodgson 1988: 173-179). As 
I will show more fully in the next chapter, it may be so that the measures to 
downsize  government  through  liberalization  and  privatization  and  the 
                                                 
69 As I have shown, Buchanan endorses the thought that one individual’s decision in an 
electoral context has almost no impact on the final result, which is an aggregation of the 
decisions of all citizens. Therefore, he expects such a context to induce the individual to 
choose  irresponsibly  without  paying  attention  to  the  consequences  of  this  choice 
(Buchanan 1986: 230-234). However, my main point still holds: an electoral context can 
turn the individual away from his egoistic impulses. As I have suggested, it may induce 
citizens to express what they care about, regardless of whether this promotes their well-
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increased importance of market relations induce more and more self-regarding 
preferences within people. 
As people are placed in a particular context more often, they will identify with 
its corresponding role more easily. Individuals tend to behave in accordance 
with the context they are in and learn to act in this way, even if this context is 
no longer present. While this goes against the grain of Buchanan’s claim that 
“persons do not become saints as they shift roles” (Buchanan 1986: 239), I 
think it can be made consistent with some of his own remarks. Buchanan, for 
example,  acknowledges  that  different  institutional  contexts  induce  gradually 
differing motivations (I, 68-69). 
To  further  explain  this  line  of  reasoning,  I  want  to  refer  to  two  areas  of 
research.  The  first  is  that  of  institutional  economics,  which  criticizes  the 
assumption of exogenous preferences by stressing ways in which preferences 
are formed by the institutional context (Hodgson 1988: 10-17; Dowding & 
King 1998: 1-5). It rightly argues that institutions form the main blind spot of 
conventional economics, which naively assumes that the institutions needed for 
markets to function properly would somehow arise spontaneously. Institutional 
economists also question the claim that a good society is one where actual 
preferences are maximally satisfied. Instead of taking preferences at face value, 
they  tackle  the  problem  of  why  preferences  should  be  fulfilled.  If  the 
satisfaction of one’s current preferences may make one worse off (Broome 
1995:  132),  it  should  be  decided  which  preferences are  to  be  satisfied  and 
which not (Hausman & McPherson 1995: 263). Dropping the assumption of 
exogenous preferences thus opens up a range of possibilities at the normative 
level: “the assumption of exogenous preferences, while often necessary, limits 
many important policy and normative conclusions derived from the analysis. 
The reason is that when we write about the satisfaction of wants (…), it is hard 
to avoid the issue of the origin of the wants in question, and why these wants, 
as opposed to others which could as well have emerged from different initial 
conditions, should be satisfied” (Bowles & Gintis 1993: 100).  
The second area of research answers the question how this selection should be 
thought  of.  Defenders  of  a  deliberative  model  of  democracy  argue  that 
individual opinions and preferences should first survive rational scrutiny before 
they are to be taken into account at the political level. Because participants 
must  justify  their  position  publicly,  they  are  likely  to  give  arguments  and 
reasons that refer to the public interest (impartiality) instead of their private 
interests  (partiality)  (Elster  1998:  101-102).  Here  too,  the  influence  of  the 
context on its participants is not restricted to the short term. Through the 
psychological mechanism of cognitive dissonance reduction – the tendency of 
individuals to bring their actions and preferences into correspondence with Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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their utterances – this civilization of speech ultimately leads to a civilization of 
minds: “as representatives cannot publicly depart from the principled views 
they have expressed earlier, they may begin believing in what they say, even 
though they may not have been holding such views at the time they began 
expressing them” (Gosseries 2005).  
A political context can thus bring nobler motivations to the fore. In general, 
this leads to a more generous view and positive appreciation of the role of 
politics. Even though one does not become an angel when placed in a political 
context, there is something to say in favor of a continuum in which individuals 
are more public-spirited in public life than in private life. Repeatedly having to 
make choices at a constitutional level may increase the inclination of individuals 
to actually become motivated by more impartial concerns. The aim of this 
section therefore was to combine Buchanan’s constitutionalist perspective with 
the insight that individuals become who they are through the impact of social 
interactions, rules and institutions. 
The fact that individual preferences are subject to change opens up possibilities 
for social engineering. As I have already shown, Buchanan is searching for “an 
institutional setting that operates so as to transform private self-interest into 
behaviour that is profitable to individuals other than the actors” (X, 61). He 
relies on the market’s invisible hand to coordinate egoistic actions into social 
order.  However,  Buchanan’s  formulation  leaves  open  the  possibility  of 
transforming  egoistic  motivations  into  nobler  ones,  which  in  their  turn 
generate mutually beneficial actions and socially desirable outcomes.  
Buchanan admits that such outcomes can be attained by changing individual 
behavior or changing institutions (XV, 306-307). In his view, ethics deals with 
the former question (what individuals should do), whereas political economy 
focuses on the latter question (what institutions should look like). Buchanan 
focuses exclusively on the latter strategy, because institutions can be molded 
more  easily  than  human  nature.  However,  his  strict  distinction  between 
changing the individual and changing his institutional environment (III, 309; 
XVII,  200)  is  highly  simplifying  and  even  misleading  (Cohen  2002:  378). 
Without replacing means for ends – and aim at better citizens as the ultimate 
policy  goal  –  I  want  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  institutions  affect 
citizens, quite like individuals change the institutions surrounding them. Both 
forms of causal influence have to be taken into account when one hopes to 
improve  society.  This  forms  an  additional  reason  to  endorse  Ricoeur’s 
definition of ethics that encompasses both the individual and the institutional 
issue. 
One has to keep in mind that the institutional context also has an impact on 
social,  cultural  and  moral  norms  (XII,  436).  According  to  Buchanan, Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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institutions  function  as  external  constraints on  individual behavior,  whereas 
norms function as internal constraints (I, 364; XII, 359, 427-428). Defining the 
constitution in a way that includes political, legal and moral rules (XVI, 429), he 
stresses the importance of morality in creating social order. In contrast with 
Buchanan, who does not go deeper into this issue, because he thinks deliberate 
reform of norms is hard to achieve (XVI, 435), I think more attention should 
be paid to the impact of norms on individual preferences.  
In Buchanan’s view (VII, 168), there is some kind of paradox involved in trying 
to  understand  how  norms  can  motivate  people.  Compliance  is  largely 
dependent upon enforcement, which is always costly: “enforcement has two 
components.  First,  violations  must  be  discovered  and  violators  identified. 
Second,  punishment  should  be  imposed  on  violators.  Both  components 
involve costs”. How then can norms help people out of prisoner’s dilemmas if 
they  all  have  an  incentive  to  freeride  on  the  efforts  of  others  to  sanction 
potential violators? The enforcement of such norms itself constitutes a public 
good, since it provides benefits for the group. As such, however, it remains 
vulnerable  to  freeriding  behavior  (Boyd  &  Richerson  2005:  189).  Relying 
exclusively on the egoistic disposition to avoid sanctions therefore shifts the 
problem  of  explaining  cooperation  to  a  higher  level.  It  is  indeed  hard  to 
understand punishment in a world where everybody is purely egoistic. In the 
next  chapter,  I  will  show  which  motivations  do  induce  people  to  sanction 
freeriders. 
Philip  Pettit  suggests  that  the  solution  lies  in  the  fact  that  enforcement  of 
norms is not costly at all, since it does not rely on the explicit imposition of 
sanctions. If one believes that others think ill of those who violate a socially 
shared norm and think well of those who comply with it, one will have a 
reason to comply with it. After all, “we care not just about the rebukes and 
commendations we receive from others but also about whether they take a 
negative or positive view of what we do” (Pettit 2002: 324). This very same 
belief is often sufficient for norm-violators to feel ostracized, even if nobody 
actually  expresses  his  indignation. People  thus  do not  intentionally  have  to 
identify violators and sanction them; it is enough for them just to be around. If 
norms are internalized by a large number of people, there is no need for costly 
incentive schemes for them to be effective: “social norms are powerful because 
rewards and punishments can be imposed at low cost” (Sober & Wilson 1998: 
183).  The  mere  possibility  and  threat  of punishment are  enough  to  induce 
potential freeriders to cooperate (Henrich et. al. 2004: 68). 
According  to  Pettit  (2002:  340),  “norms  are  regularities  such  that  nearly 
everyone  conforms;  nearly  everyone  approves  of  nearly  anyone  else’s 
conforming  and  disapproves  of  his  deviating;  and  this  pattern  of  approval Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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helps  to  ensure  general  conformity”.  He  shows  that  informal  norms  are 
compatible with more formal institutions that regulate behavior: “norms are an 
important species of social institutions, on a par with conventions, customs, 
laws, and other brands of established regularity (…). Like the other institutions 
norms reinforce certain patterns of behaviour, but they do so in their own way, 
by  representing  those  patterns  as  peculiarly  desirable  or  obligatory”  (Pettit 
2002: 308).  
Buchanan admits that governmental intervention is needed to a lesser extent 
whenever informal norms are present (XV, 26-27). He stresses that norms are 
typically  advantageous,  for  example  because  they  can  avoid  negative 
externalities by inducing cooperative behavior (I, 357-358). A solid work ethic, 
for  example,  leads  to  greater  efficiency  and  productivity  without  additional 
monitoring costs (XII, 374)70. If such norms are eroding – as Buchanan thinks 
they  are  –  they  should  be  replaced  by  more  formal  rules.  The  internal 
constraints norms imply should be complemented by the external constraints 
of politico-legal rules (XIV, 487-491). Buchanan does not seem to be aware 
that he is essentially justifying an expanding government that has to take on 




7.1. Buchanan as an economist 
 
If Public Choice is the application of economics to politics, it is important to 
understand what economics consists of. In this respect, Buchanan distinguishes 
between different levels of economic analysis (XII, 5-13, 128). The first is what 
he calls “the logic of choice” (XII, 4), according to which an individual simply 
chooses  what  is  ranked  highest  in  his  preference  ordering.  Because  such  a 
choice is free, the individual’s goals are not specified further. Buchanan equates 
this logic with the empirically empty rational choice theory, according to which 
utility is maximized and utility is whatever is maximized (XII, 32-33). The agent 
acts intentionally in order to achieve his goals, whatever these are (XII, 88). As 
one can clearly see, this does not correspond to the minimal conception of 
rationality  as  I  have  constructed  it,  since  Buchanan  immediately  narrows  it 
                                                 
70 As I will show more fully in the next chapter, this analysis of social norms can lead one 
to  stress  the  importance  of  a  third  form  of  institution.  Next  to  the  anonymous 
institutions of the market and the state, they emphasize the existence of communities 
where informal norms govern social life. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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down to instrumental rationality. The second level goes even further by adding 
the assumption of egoism. In this “abstract science of economic behaviour” 
(XII, 6), free choice is transformed into predictable behavior by assuming only 
self-interest (XII, 72-73). At the third level, the “predictive science of economic 
behaviour”  (XII,  10) makes  empirically refutable  predictions  about  the  way 
people  react  to environmental  stimuli.  The fourth  level,  the  “behaviouristic 
science” (XII, 12), incorporates insights from psychological research that point 
towards “motivational patterns that may be considerably more complex than 
the simple postulates of standard economic theory” (XII, 12). This may even 
lead  one  to  completely  drop  the  utilitarian  framework  most  economists 
employ. 
Buchanan does not want to restrict economics to the first level. This “general 
but empty” (XII, 8) logic of choice is of no use when proposing practical 
reforms. Most of Buchanan’s work can be labeled explanatory (second level) or 
predictive  (third  level).  Among  the  latter  is  his  work  on  market  and 
government  failures,  in  which  he  predicts  to  what  extent  the  outcomes  of 
egoistic  actions  within  a  certain  institutional  context  will  be  Pareto-optimal 
(XII, 134-135). Surprisingly, Buchanan explicitly states that it is the fourth way 
that “offers the only avenue of advance for social science” (XII, 13). In this 
respect, he stresses that institutions influence behavior “that may be, but need 
not be, economically motivated” (XII, 15).  
As I have shown, the problem is that Buchanan does not fill in the details of 
such a behavioristic science. The reason might lie in his conviction that models 
lose their explanatory power as soon as they start incorporating a broader array 
of motivations. In the end, they may no longer be able to function as a guide 
for solving normative issues, even though this was Buchanan’s main aim from 
the start (XII, 135-137). In this respect, one can roughly distinguish between 
two ways of thinking about economics. The first – economics as the science of 
freedom – mainly focuses on the freedom of individuals and therefore refuses 
to limit its analysis to purely egoistic considerations. The second – economics 
as  situational determinism –  analyzes how egoistic actions  lead  to  different 
results as the institutions that channel these actions change. Both views have 
their advantages and disadvantages. While the first may be empirically more 
plausible, it risks turning into an empty theory, which is clearly crippled when it 
comes  to  making  predictions  about  individual  behavior  and  designing 
institutional  reforms  for  the  better.  While  the  second  view  allows  one  to 
improve society by changing its rules, it is problematic to the extent that self-
interest does in fact not provide the main motivation for most citizens. I want 
to argue that economics should steer clear both from an all too narrow model 
of individuals (second and third level) and an all too broad model (first level). Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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As a result, I agree with Buchanan who favors the behavioristic science of 
economics, which is modeled on the basis of empirical research (fourth level). 
Whilst Buchanan does not consider the Homo Economicus model to be a 
completely accurate description of individuals, he still believes in its general 
empirical  validity:  “the  Homo  economicus  construction  is  an  abstraction  from 
reality. Its purpose is that of allowing economists to impose intellectual order 
on  the  observed  chaos  of  human  interaction,  without  excessive  distraction 
detail in dimensions of the analysis that are not centrally relevant” (XII, 73). In 
contrast, I think the Homo Economicus model fails to capture what it is to be 
a human being (I, 249). The fact that people realize that they are more than 
automatic  pleasure-seekers  is  what  distinguishes  them  from  other  animals. 
Endogenously changing preferences are characteristic for human beings, who 
have a sense not only of what they are but also of what they could be. People 
are to a certain extent free to become who they want to be. As Buchanan 
himself  puts  it,  “we  are,  and  will  be,  at  least  in part,  that  which  we  make 
ourselves to be” (I, 247). As I have argued, people can rise above their natural 
inclinations (I, 251-259). With Harry Frankfurt, I have stressed the importance 
of higher-order preferences that allow individuals to reflect upon their first-
order preferences.  
Even though science necessarily makes abstraction from the complexities of 
reality, it should never leave out the essence of its object. Economists explain 
human actions as the fulfillment of a one-dimensional set of preferences. In 
doing so, they leave out the very essence of man, namely his capacity to reflect 
upon his actions, his preferences and ultimately his life. My emphasis on the 
hierarchical account of human nature, in which an individual does not coincide 
with  his  bundle  of  first-order  preferences,  thus  implies  a  criticism  towards 
orthodox economics. Even though Buchanan from time to time seems to take 
a step in the right direction, he admits that his own thoughts have not “yet fully 
rid itself of the paradigms of neoclassical orthodoxy” (XII, 21).  
 
7.2. Buchanan as a political economist and a political philosopher 
 
Buchanan strongly believes in the ability of citizens to change the rules and 
institutions of their society. In a democracy, people are not only subject to the 
regime they live in but they are also responsible for it. They do not only play 
the  game  of  life,  since  they  can  partly  determine  its  rules  as  well  (I,  370). 
Buchanan  claims  that  people  should  adopt  what  he  calls  a  constitutional 
attitude,  which  consists  in  continuously  questioning,  evaluating  and,  if 
necessary, reforming the rules and institutions as they currently exist (I, 417-Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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418; IX, 240; XV, 16; XVI, 45-47). Trying to imagine what life would be like in 
a society with different rules and institutions, this attitude is really about having 
hopes in the future: “hope emerges for sustainable social order through the 
appropriate design, construction, and maintenance of rules that set limits on the 
way in which each person is allowed to order his conduct toward others” (X, 
xvi). 
As I have already stressed, it should be taken into account that institutions do 
not  only  influence  social  interactions  in  an  external  way  (constraining  or 
regulating individuals and their actions) but also in an internal way (molding 
individuals  and  their  preferences).  Whereas  Buchanan  focuses  almost 
exclusively on the first of these considerations, I have argued that both are 
indispensable for a proper understanding of the role of institutions in society. 
Joshua Cohen (2002: 380-381), who joins Rawls in his search for principles of 
justice,  gives  two  reasons  why  institutions  ought  to  be  the  main  focus  of 
political  philosophy:  “a  first  reason  is  that  institutions  play  a  large  role  in 
shaping economic and political outcomes, given preferences (…). The second 
reason is that institutions play a large role in shaping a society’s culture and the 
identity of members” (Cohen 2002: 381). Rawls (1993: 269) agrees that “the 
institutional form of society affects its members and determines in large part 
the kind of persons they want to be as well as the kind of persons they are”. 
This impact should thus be taken into account when thinking up desirable 
political institutions and policies. This brings me to the next point. 
 
7.3. Buchanan in search of a better society 
 
As  I  have  shown,  Buchanan  combines  a  pessimistic  belief  in  “the 
nonmalleability of basic elements in human motivation and behaviour” (XVI, 
360) with an optimistic belief in the perfectibility of rules and institutions. The 
latter  is  what  distinguishes  him  from  conservatives  and  traditionalists  who 
question  the  capacity  of  citizens  to  change  the  world  (XVI,  177,  358). 
Buchanan  is  convinced  that  individuals  are  able  to  shape  their  own  future 
(XVI,  415).  He  strongly  believes  that  they  should  reform  the  world  as  it 
actually  exists:  “any  proposal  for  change  involves  the  status  quo  as  the 
necessary starting point. “We start from here,” and not from some place else” 
(VII, 101). Since he wants his advice to have real-life implications, Buchanan 
shifts his attention from institutional design (how to create an ideal society ‘ex 
nihilo’) to institutional reform (how to improve current society) (XIV, 21). He 
argues  that  not  every  conceivable  social  outcome  can  be  attained,  since 
individual reactions to situational changes are limited. These “uniformities of 
human nature” (XII, 50) lead to freeriding behavior, which makes it practically Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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impossible  to  choose  in  a  deliberate  way  a  particular  social  state,  even  if 
everybody agrees that it would be desirable (XII, 34-41; XVI, 204, 208, 241). 
Even though the latter is physically possible, it does not lie within the domain 
of what Buchanan calls “behavioural feasibility” (XVI, 206) and is therefore 
unattainable in practice (XVI, 352). This seems to correspond perfectly with 
the abovementioned search for a realistic utopia in which one takes individuals 
as they are and institutions as they might be.  
Even though his primary goal is normative, Buchanan stresses the importance 
of  adequate  theoretical  models:  “political  economy  will  produce  useful 
normative propositions only to the extent that its analytical underpinnings are 
correct” (II, 115). Before choosing among different sets of rules, one should 
first understand how these work in practice (XIV, 27; XVI, 105). Buchanan 
thus  systematically  combines  the  descriptive  and  normative  aspects  of  his 
constitutional  political  economy  (XVI,  335).  This  is  already  present  in  his 
definition of political philosophy as thinking about what politics is and what it 
should be (XI, 20). Since both markets and states fail in some respect, he insists 
that a criticism of the former should always be supplemented with an argument 
of why the latter will not fall into the same pitfalls. However, this also works 
the other way around. Before abolishing or reducing governmental activities, 
one should always compare it to other realistic alternatives (III, 209; XV, 50, 
157). 
In Buchanan’s view, each individual is entitled to his own conception of the 
ideal society. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that all individuals will agree 
on a single ideal. In this respect, politics differs from science (I, 240-242). Since 
well-informed  individuals  can  ultimately  disagree  at  the  political  level,  it  is 
misleading to speak of truth here (XVI, 175). Because there is no external point 
of view from which an omniscient being can evaluate things, there is simply no 
truth to discover, independently from individuals and their preferences (XVI, 
118-120)71. This is in line with Buchanan’s contractarianism, in which the focus 
is not so much on the results of political decision-making – as it is in the truth 
judgment conception of politics – but on the process itself (XVI, 366-367). 
Starting from society as it exists here and now, Buchanan wishes to improve 
things by analyzing which institutional reforms would be agreed upon by all 
(XIV, 255; XVI, 98-99, 372-374, 410-411; XVIII, 72, 86). If no proposal is 
unanimously  agreed  upon, he has  to  conclude  that  the  current  institutional 
                                                 
71 With respect to tax reforms, for example, Buchanan argues that “there is no “best” tax 
system in terms of evaluation by external criteria for the simple reason that there is no 
single set of criteria upon which agreement exists or can exist” (XVI, 317). This is exactly 
why  Buchanan  wants  to  evaluate  tax  schemes  “on  the  basis  of  the  desires  of  the 
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structure is Pareto-optimal. However, this does not mean that the status quo is 
the best of all possible worlds (XV, 390; XVI, 114, 451). Even though there is 
automatically a bias in favor of the current situation (XVI, 389), Buchanan does 
not consider it to be free from faults. Accordingly, he refuses to treat current 
institutions as sacrosanct (XVI, 49). In order to move “from what we have to 
what  is  proposed”  (XV,  418),  Buchanan  favors  “a  continuing  critical 
examination of the institutions that we observe and which should be designed 
to serve our objectives” (XV, 420).  
In essence, this is what his constitutional approach is really all about, namely 
“concentration  on  the  institutions  of  social  order  and  on  reforming  these 
institutions as opposed to simply going out and looking at what would be ideal 
and discussing the ideal type of policy without recognition of the institutions of 
social order” (XVI, 102). It is therefore not so much the ideal that is crucial, 
but  the  way  of  getting  there.  If  a  certain  ideal  is  unattainable,  because  of 
previously  made  decisions  or  because  of  the  relatively  fixed  boundaries  of 
human nature, it is important not to become completely immobilized. In this 
respect,  Buchanan  gives  the  example  of  a  marriage  gone  wrong.  At  some 
moment in time, one might come to think that it would be ideal if there never 
were a marriage. Be this as it may, one should still start from the situation as it 
exists  and  try  to  think  what  steps  would  improve  the  condition  of  both 
partners (XVI, 449). My main criticism towards Buchanan is that he focuses 
exclusively on the rules that govern the actions of both partners and not on the 
fact that the partners themselves can change. This basic insight may not only 
explain the problem, it might open up possibilities to solve it as well. 
 
7.4. Summing things up 
 
Buchanan’s  emphasis  on  rules,  institutions  and  norms  is  based  upon  his 
insistence on preferences as the starting point of analysis. He judges it better to 
redesign the rules of society than to try and change its members: “good games 
depend  on  good  rules  more  than  they  depend  on  good  players”  (X,  167). 
Buchanan suggests that Monty Python’s opening quote is misleading. After all, 
there is no real dilemma here. It is precisely because we are “simply spirally 
coils of self-replicating DNA” that we should focus on the game of life “where 
we make up the rules while we are searching for something to say”. Buchanan 
might thus argue that it belongs to the genetic constitution of humans that they 
will ultimately serve their self-interest. In the following chapter, however, I will 
show  that  other  motivations  –  like  altruism  and  public-spiritedness  –  have 
evolved through processes of natural selection as well. Chapter 5: James Buchanan’s Theory of Constitutional Choice 
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In contrast, I have tried to show that in the game of life the players are at least 
as important as the rules. In this respect, I have argued in favor of a richer and 
more adequate model of the individual. To be sure, situating it in a context that 
shapes its identity is not necessarily at odds with methodological individualism. 
After all, the latter only claims that the individual is the ultimate – and not the 
only – explanatory variable and thus does not imply “a refusal to examine the 
institutional or other forces which are involved in the moulding of individual 
preferences  and  purposes”  (Hodgson  1988:  54).  Stressing  the  individual’s 
ability to reform institutions, I believe the individual remains – and ought to 
remain – central when explaining what goes on in society.  
Because I do not think that Buchanan’s analysis of institutions (as externally 
channeling individual actions in mutually beneficial ways) is entirely without 
value, I do not want to replace it completely. While the politically economic 
approach  to  politics  –  changing  institutions  –  complements  that  of  social 
engineers – changing individuals – both have their blind spots. Each focusing 
on different aspects, they have to be combined if one wants to understand and 
improve society.  
My main criticism is thus that Buchanan, who aims to change the institutional 
structure as it exists here and now, does not start from the individual as it exists 
here and now. I have tried to show that his reliance on the Homo Economicus 
model draws him into the pitfall he himself warns against, namely “to advance 
proposals that fail to recognize man for what he is” (XVIII, 323). This is why I 
have argued in favor of a richer and empirically more adequate model of the 
individual. In this respect, I will focus more fully on the insights gained by 
authors like Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. CHAPTER 6 
 
THE ALTERNATIVE OF  
SAMUEL BOWLES AND HERBERT GINTIS 
 
 
 “If all that really matters is that individuals should satisfy as many as possible of 
their desires in the order of their strength, then it matters how they live together, 
what kind of community they form, only to the extent that their living one way 
rather than another enables them to get more of what they want at the cost of less 
effort (…). If, however, we suppose that men want more than to succeed as much as 
possible in satisfying one desire after another, their own or other people’s; if we 
suppose that they also care what sort of persons they are (…), what kinds of life 
they lead, it is easy to see how they come to be attached to the community as much 
as to one another. How men see themselves, as they are or as they would like to be, 
is intimately connected with their mental images of the community; they are not mere 
competitors and collaborators, however benevolent, in a market for the supply of 
personal wants; they are members of society, and their hopes and feelings, both for 
themselves and others, would not be what they are apart from their group loyalties”  
(Plamenatz 1966: 175) 
 
1. Why study Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis? 
 
1.1. Who are Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis? 
 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis are among the most important heterodox 
American economists of the past decades. Their academic lives largely overlap 
and therefore show remarkable similarities. While Bowles received his doctoral 
degree in Economics from Harvard University in 1965, Gintis did so at the 
same university four years later. Since then, they have frequently cooperated in 
an impressive number of projects. Currently, both are Professor Emeritus at 
the  University  of  Massachusetts.  In  addition,  they  are  connected  to  the 
Behavioral  Sciences  Program  at  the  Santa  Fe  Institute  in  Santa  Fe,  New 
Mexico.  While  Bowles  and  Gintis  are  economists,  they  both  have  a 
considerable interest in issues situated at the borders of economics, sociology, Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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evolutionary psychology, political science and philosophy. Whereas Bowles has 
taught numerous courses on microeconomics and the role of institutions in 
economics, Gintis has taught primarily on game theory and collective action 
problems. 
Their  intense  collaboration  has  resulted  in  co-authored  monographs  and 
articles, co-edited books and jointly organized conferences and projects. Much 
of their research is carried out in conjunction with other members of the Santa 
Fe Institute and the MacArthur Research Network on Preferences. The latter is 
an  interdisciplinary  group  which  includes  –  besides  Bowles  and  Gintis  – 
authors like Robert Boyd, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Joseph Henrich, Dan 
Kahan,  Daniel  Kahneman  and  George  Loewenstein,  who  have  jointly 
conducted theoretical as well as experimental research. Since its inception in 
1997, this Preferences Network aims to develop models of individual decision-
making that can be used for policy purposes. It focuses on the evolution of 
cooperation, trust and prosocial behavior in general. I hope to show why and 
how  its insights are  indispensable to  gain a  thorough  understanding  of  the 
central themes of this dissertation. 
 
1.2. Why study Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis? 
 
The research conducted jointly by Samuel Bowles and Herbert focuses on a 
number  of  topics,  all  of  which  relate  to  this  dissertation’s  topic  of  the 
normative implications of rationality. For example, they show how non-egoistic 
motives  are  crucial  to  explain  individual  behavior  and  how  institutions 
influence their relative importance. Bowles and Gintis focus explicitly on the 
mutual dependence of a society’s members and institutions. Not only do they 
describe and explain the different causal links between the individual and the 
institutional level, they also look at the normative conclusions one can derive 
from all this: “structures change because people change them. Making good the 
promise  of  the  democratic  accountability  of  social  change  demands  an 
understanding of why and how people change or fail to change the rules that 
govern  their  lives.  This  understanding  in  turn  requires  a  more  searching 
treatment of individual choice and collective action” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 
120). Bowles and Gintis thus aim to address issues at both the explanatory level 
and  the  normative  level.  The  close  relation between  explanatory models of 
individuals and normative views surrounding institutional design has been the 
focus of their work from the very beginning. 
Bowles and Gintis are convinced that the crucial challenge of improving the 
basic institutional structure of modern societies can only be addressed properly Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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through  a  better  understanding  of  how  people  behave  and  how  their 
interactions  produce  social  outcomes.  Until  now,  the  behavioral  and  social 
sciences have failed to adequately take on this task, partly because of the highly 
fragmentized nature of contemporary academics. In this respect, Bowles and 
Gintis subscribe to the argument – which is crucial for the general line of 
reasoning  in  this  dissertation  –  that  normative  issues  should  be  based  on 
empirically adequate models of individual behavior and motivation. In what 
follows,  I  hope  to  show  how  both  their  explanatory  models  and  their 
normative views diverge from those of James Buchanan.  
To  be  sure,  Bowles’  and  Gintis’  primary  goal  is  the  normative  one  of 
improving society by enhancing people’s capacity to govern their own lives 
(Bowles  &  Gintis  1986:  3).  It  is  this  focus  on  normative  issues  that 
distinguishes  them  from  most  of  the  other  authors  of  the  Preferences 
Network, whose work is mentioned here when relevant but does not form the 
center of attention. Bowles’ and Gintis’ basic ideals are those of democracy and 
popular sovereignty, according to which power should be accountable to those 
affected by its exercise (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 209). This applies not only to 
the political domain (the relation between the state and its citizens) but also to 
the economic domain (the relation between employer and employee). In order 
to make these more democratic and improve the lives of people, Bowles and 
Gintis focus on the shortcomings of the conventional economic models that 
dominate recent political philosophy: “we will point to the poverty of virtually 
all  strands  of  economic  theory  as  a  basis  for  thinking  about  democracy, 
illustrate  the  unfortunate  consequences  of  the  dominance  of  economic 
metaphor in our political and moral thinking, and demonstrate the need for 
integrating  genuinely  political  concepts  –  concerning  power  and  human 
development – with economic reasoning” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 7). 
Bowles and Gintis aim to show that a number of theoretical assumptions in the 
Homo  Economicus  model  are  grossly  inadequate  to  explain  actual  human 
behavior  in  a  large  number  of  cases  and  settings.  After  elucidating  their 
intellectual background, I want to show in what ways they criticize and amend 
the  assumptions  of  the  economic  conception  of  rationality  when  modeling 
individual  actions  and  reasons.  Next,  I  derive  some  normative  implications 
from all this. Finally, I draw a number of conclusions. 
 
2. Bowles’ and Gintis’ intellectual background 
 
Because they aim to develop a more accurate model of individuals than the 
economic one, Bowles and Gintis have close links with behavioral economics. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Here, models are explicitly constructed on the basis of empirical research that 
focuses on the (lack of) rationality of individuals. Since they heavily stress the 
role institutions play in both micro- and macroeconomics (Bowles 2004: 6-7), 
they  can  be  labeled  institutional  economists  as  well.  In  this  respect,  both 
Bowles and Gintis clearly qualify as heterodox economists, who are critical of 
their  mainstream  colleagues.  They  want  to  revive  political  economy  by 
analyzing economic and political behavior on the basis of assumptions that do 
not fit orthodox economics. In doing so, their Marxian roots clearly show, 
even though these are more straightforwardly present in their earlier works 
than in their more recent articles and books. Instead of analyzing the individual 
in an atomistic way and the economy as some vacuous equilibrium, Bowles and 
Gintis  show  the  importance  of  power  at  both  the  microeconomic  and 
macroeconomic level. 
Bowles  and  Gintis  state  that  their  work  brings  together  three  strands  of 
thought:  radical  democracy,  liberalism  and  Marxism.  With  their  “political 
critique of economic thinking” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: x), they show in what 
sense  liberalism  –  which  encompasses  neoclassical  economics  –  lacks  the 
concepts  to  understand  modern  social  life.  Because  of  its  focus  on  the 
voluntary nature of exchange relations, liberalism neglects power relations in 
both the private and the economic domain (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 65-71). 
Essentially,  Bowles  and  Gintis  argue  that  markets  are  not  simply  neutral 
mechanisms  that  allow  free  individuals  to  voluntarily  engage  in  mutually 
beneficial arrangements on an equal footing. In this respect, they are highly 
critical of “the conviction among social scientists and political philosophers 
that as an arena of voluntary contractual exchange, the capitalist economy is 
devoid of political content” (Bowles & Gintis 1992: 324). This immediately 
suggests that their views diverge widely from those of Buchanan. Bowles and 
Gintis refer to the conventional economic theory of markets as the Walrasian 
model,  according  to  which  power  and  coercion  are  absent  if  competitive 
markets  are  in  equilibrium.  After  all,  as  Buchanan  stresses,  markets  are 
characterized by free and voluntary exchange relations between its participants.  
If one thinks through the neoclassical assumption that individuals are narrowly 
self-interested,  one  should  conclude  that  the  parties  to  a  voluntarily  closed 
contract will tend to take advantage of each other. Here, the Walrasian model 
assumes “that exchanges between agents in the economy can be enforced by a 
third  party  (for  example,  the  judicial  system)  at  no  cost  to  the  exchanging 
parties” (Bowles & Gintis 1992: 328). This has led economists to interpret the 
market as the locus of voluntary and costless exchanges and the state as the 
locus  of  power.  Bowles  and  Gintis  (1993:  85)  refer  to  Buchanan  as  the 
preeminent  defender  of  this  neoclassical  textbook  view  of  both  basic 
institutions. After all, the main function of Buchanan’s protective state was Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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exactly to enforce a politico-legal framework that allows market exchanges to 
run smoothly. 
In  what  follows,  I  try  to  show  how  Bowles  and  Gintis  diverge  from 
Buchanan’s  views  of  markets  and  states  by  focusing  on  their  notion  of 
contested  exchange,  which  stresses  that  contracts  are  not  always  perfectly 
enforceable: “consider agent A who purchases a good or service from agent B. 
We call the exchange contested when B’s good or service possesses an attribute 
that is valuable to A, is costly for B to provide, yet is not fully specified in an 
enforceable  contract”  (Bowles  &  Gintis  1992:  332).  In  such  cases,  the 
enforcement of  the  contract  is  typically endogenous,  which  means  that  the 
parties to the exchange monitor and sanction each other. If there is no third 
party to enforce the contract, conflicting interests will give rise to a struggle 
over the terms of the contract itself. In relations where exchange is contested, 
“unlike the transaction of Walrasian economics, the benefit the parties derive 
from the transaction depends on their own capacities to enforce competing 
claims” (Bowles & Gintis 1993: 85). 
The  relevance  of  such  endogenous  enforcement  mechanisms  suggests  that 
power  is  relevant  in  market  relations  as  well.  As  a  consequence,  the 
conventional strategy of equating the market with freedom and the state with 
power no longer holds (Bowles & Gintis 1992: 353). This shows the urgent 
need to extend democracy to the workplace as well. The basic reasoning is 
quite simple: since the employer exercises power over the employee, the former 
should be held accountable, exactly like politicians should be held accountable 
for their use of power over citizens. Essentially, Bowles and Gintis (1993: 98) 
question the validity of the first theorem of welfare economics, according to 
which  any  equilibrium  in  perfectly  competitive  markets  is  Pareto-efficient. 
They argue that such markets do not always clear in equilibrium. Because of 
enforcement  costs,  “contested  exchange  markets  (…)  generally  fail  to 
implement  socially  efficient  resource  use,  in  the  sense  that  there  exist 
transactions that are Pareto superior to the competitive equilibrium” (Bowles & 
Gintis 1993: 88).  
The Walrasian paradigm that dominates welfare economics is based on two 
assumptions,  both  of  which  Bowles  and  Gintis  deem  fundamentally 
wrongheaded. The first assumption is that “contractual claim enforcement is 
executed at zero cost and hence may be considered exogenous” (Bowles & 
Gintis 1993: 98). The state is supposed to enforce contracts without any cost to 
the exchanging parties themselves. Bowles and Gintis have shown that this is 
problematic by stressing that exchanges are often contested and, hence, that 
enforcement  is often endogenous  to  the  exchanging  claimants.  The  second 
assumption is that of exogenously given preferences that stipulate the goals for Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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the individual to realize: “the goals are determined by individual preferences 
(whether selfish or altruistic), and thus action is instrumental to the satisfaction 
of pregiven wants” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 20). As I have shown in my analysis 
of  Buchanan,  this  leads  to  a  view  of  institutions  as  guiding  the  actions  of 
wholly formed individuals rather than forming these individuals. Accordingly, 
institutions  “are  evaluated  primarily  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  to  record, 
aggregate,  enforce,  or  satisfy  preexisting  interests.  The  manner  in  which 
institutions engender preferences and interests is thereby obscured” (Bowles & 
Gintis  1986:  22).  Bowles  and  Gintis thus propose  to  move away  from  the 
instrumental  conception  of  action  aimed  at  fulfilling  exogenously  given 
preferences.  As  I  will  show  later  on,  their alternative  essentially constitutes 
what I have tried to capture in the expressive conception of rationality.  
If contracts are complete and exogenously enforced, conventional economic 
models  predict  and  explain  individual  behavior  quite  well  (Ben-Ner  & 
Putterman 1998: 337). However, if contracts are incomplete – and this is often 
the case – a lot of people act in ways that do not serve their self-interest: “most 
social relations are not governed by explicit contracts but by implicit informal 
agreements.  Moreover,  when  explicit  contracts  exist  they  are  often  highly 
incomplete, which gives rise to strong incentives to shirk” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 
74). Take the labor market, where the promise of the employee to provide 
some amount of work effort typically cannot be externally enforced: “work is 
subjectively costly for the worker to provide, valuable to the employer, and 
costly  to  measure.  The  manager-worker  relationship  thus  is  a  contested 
exchange. The endogenous enforcement mechanisms of the enterprise, not the 
state, are thus responsible for ensuring the delivery of any particular level of 
labor”  (Bowles  &  Gintis  1992:  333).  If  contracts  are  incomplete,  external 
control mechanisms will not suffice and intrinsic motivation will start to play 
an important role. If employees identify with the goals of their company and 
participate in its governance, they will develop an intrinsic motivation to work. 
Consequently, surveillance costs will be lower (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 78).  
Clearly,  the  assumption  of  egoism  is  under  pressure  here.  Even  though 
conventional economists think that relations on the work floor are typically 
governed  by  self-interest,  research  has  shown  that  both  employers  and 
employees act on the basis of internalized norms of fairness and honesty, even 
when they know that opportunism would serve them better (Gintis 2003: 164; 
Gintis et al. 2005: 15). In addition, Bowles and Gintis (1993: 88-89) also stress 
that contested exchange leads one to question the assumption of exogenous 
preferences: “while the assumption of exogenous preferences strains credulity 
in  the  Walrasian  model,  it  is  simply  incoherent  in  a  model  of  contested 
exchange.  Unlike  the  Walrasian  model,  where  agents  are  “endowed”  with 
preferences  that  they  then  take  to  market,  contested  exchanges  shape  the Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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character  and  consciousness  of  the  exchanging  parties  (…).  Because  the 
exchange is durable and personal, the exchanging parties have an interest in 
shaping the structure of the transaction to mold the personalities, objectives, 
and other characteristics of the other parties to the exchange”. Dropping the 
central  Walrasian  assumptions,  Bowles  and  Gintis  (1993:  99)  thus  distance 
themselves from neoclassical economics. 
As I have already mentioned, a last way of situating Bowles and Gintis is to 
refer to Analytical Marxism. This strand analyzes normative issues in the work 
of Karl Marx from the perspective of rational choice theory. Bowles and Gintis 
thus  share  with  other  Analytical  Marxists  their  explicit  focus  on  normative 
issues (Mayer 1994: 2). In this sense, Analytical Marxism is quite similar to 
Public Choice theory, which also employs economic tools to analyze the public 
domain72.  However,  Analytical  Marxists  typically  amend  some  of  the 
assumptions of conventional economists. For example, they focus more on the 
impact of social and structural factors on individuals, their identities and their 
preferences, thereby filling in the gap in conventional economics concerning 
preference formation. As a result, Analytical Marxists give a more complex 
view of the relation between individuals and the institutions that guide their 
lives: “individuals are formed by society, and these individuals react rationally 
to  their  environments  to  produce  tomorrow’s  environment,  which  in  turn 
produces individuals who think somewhat differently from before” (Roemer 
1986:  196).  As  I  will  show  more  fully  later  on,  the  individual  and  the 
institutional level should be understood as mutually dependent on each other. 
While some Analytical Marxists – like Jon Elster – continue to defend a strong 
version of methodological individualism (Mayer 1994: 3), I will show that only 
a more sophisticated view has the explanatory power needed to understand the 
complex interplay between rational individuals and social institutions.  
 
3. Bowles’ and Gintis’ theoretical assumptions 
 
In this section, I spell out the ways in which Bowles and Gintis amend the 
assumptions that dominate the Homo Economicus model. In order to do so, I 
focus on their research on prosocial actions and the motivations that underlie 
such actions. Among the latter, I distinguish between self- and other-regarding 
                                                 
72 John Roemer (1986: 193) – perhaps the best-known defender of Analytical Marxism – 
defines it as “the programme of applying neoclassical tools to studying what might be 
called Marxian questions”. As I will show more fully in this chapter, however, I believe 
that several Analytical Marxists do not merely adopt but quite thoroughly amend the 
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preferences (3.1). Next, I focus on strong reciprocity, which does not fit this 
motivational dichotomy (3.2). In order to solve the evolutionary puzzle all this 
poses,  I  first  analyze  the  standard  accounts  that  dominate  the  fields  of 
psychology,  philosophy,  economics  and  other  social  sciences  and  their 
respective problems (3.3). Then, I focus on what I believe is the most plausible 
account of the evolutionary origins of strong reciprocity (3.4). Finally, I sum up 
the theoretical implications for the conventional Homo Economicus model 
(3.5). 
 
3.1. The motivational dichotomy 
 
In order to set out Bowles’ and Gintis’ criticisms of the conventional Homo 
Economicus model, I will focus on those actions that are prosocial and thus 
confer benefits to others73. More specifically, I focus on cooperation, which 
can  be  defined  in  two  ways:  “the  broad  definition  includes  all  forms  of 
mutually  beneficial  joint  action  by  two  or  more  individuals.  The  narrow 
definition is restricted to situations in which joint action poses a dilemma for at 
least one individual such that, at least in the short run, that individual would be 
better off not cooperating” (Richerson et al. 2003: 358). Cooperation refers to 
the  level  of  actions,  which  can  arise  from  a  wide  variety  of  individual 
motivations,  considerations  and  dispositions.  Most  modern  economists  and 
political philosophers assume that people act in ways that serve either their 
private  interest  or  the  public  interest.  This  corresponds  to  the  distinction 
between self- and other-regarding preferences. 
 
3.1.1. Self-regarding preferences 
 
Cooperation  can  arise  from  purely  self-interested  considerations.  Following 
John  Stuart  Mill  and  Adam  Smith,  economists  have  focused  on  mutually 
beneficial trade relations when explaining cooperation. Indeed, there is no need 
to presume that socially desirable or morally praiseworthy actions always arise 
from socially desirable or morally praiseworthy motivations74. As I have shown 
                                                 
73 Evolutionary theorists would frame such actions in terms of altruism: “a behavior is 
altruistic when it increases the fitness of others and decreases the fitness of the actor” 
(Sober & Wilson 1998: 17). However, I reserve the term altruism for the level of the 
reasons that motivate prosocial behavior. 
74 The thought that one does not have to be noble in order to act in noble ways is the 
main reason why notions like cooperation should be defined in a morally neutral way. 
Tolerance, for example, can be defined as allowing for some practice that one deems Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
 
193
extensively,  economists  like  Buchanan  defend  the  assumption  of  universal 
egoism, stressing that people in their public roles of citizen, politician or public 
servant  are no different  from people  in their private roles  of  consumer or 
producer. 
Everyday as well as experimental observation, however, suggests that not all 
forms of cooperation can be understood as egoistically motivated. When joint 
action is needed – for example to provide a public good – purely self-interested 
individuals  will  not  cooperate,  since  freeriding  will  benefit  them  most, 
regardless  whether  others  will  cooperate  or  not.  While  Buchanan’s  work  is 
valuable in showing that collective and prosocial action can arise from purely 
self-regarding  considerations,  the  fact  that  humans  cooperate  extensively 
suggests that these considerations are not as omnipresent as he would think 
and  thus  that  his  reliance  on  the  assumption  of  universal  egoism  is 
wrongheaded.  A  number  of  prosocial  actions,  like  anonymous  giving  and 
participating in massive demonstrations, simply cannot be understood in self-
interested terms. Framing the economic conception of rationality in terms of 
thin rationality, Michael Taylor (1988: 85) wonders: “if these actions are not 
thin-rational,  are  they  rational  in  some  other  sense,  or  are  they simply not 
rational at all?”. As I have shown, I believe the correct answer is the first one.  
 
3.1.2. Other-regarding preferences 
 
Cooperation  is  thus  often  motivated  by  other  than  self-interested 
considerations. Among such other-regarding preferences, one can distinguish 
between altruism and public-spiritedness. While altruists take the furtherance 
of another’s interest as their main goal, public-spirited people concentrate on 
the public interest. The implicit presupposition in the bulk of modern political 
philosophy is that individuals, at least in their public roles of citizen, public 
servant or politician, are concerned with the public good, however this may be 
defined. Some of them conceive of it along the lines of a general will – as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau does – and assume that people try to find out what it entails 
and how to realize it. But even those who conceive of it as some function of 
private interests – as social choice theorists do – implicitly trust the people 
working in governments to take the furtherance of these interests as their main 
objective.  As  Buchanan  has  shown,  political  philosophers  often  defend  a 
bifurcated image of individuals, who are modeled as egoistic within the private 
                                                                                                                                            
unacceptable while having the power to do something about it. Such a broad definition, 
which does not stipulate which reasons one may have for deciding to tolerate what one 
deems wrong, goes against the grain of recent literature in which tolerance is generally 
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realm of the market and as public-spirited within the public realm of the state. 
Rousseau (1762: 26), for example, argues that “each individual can, as a man, 
have a private will contrary to or different from the general will that he has as a 
citizen. His private interest can speak to him in an entirely different manner 
than the common interest”.  
Both altruism and public-spiritedness perfectly fit the model of neoclassical 
economists, who follow Lionel Robbins (1935: 24) in analyzing individuals as 
instrumentally  motivated  to  achieve  their  ends,  whatever  these  may  be.  In 
contrast with their classical colleagues, they refuse to stipulate what the content 
of preferences is or should be. In an egocentric framework, preferences can be 
self-  or  other-regarding.  Whereas  egoists  prefer  to  help  only  themselves, 
altruists prefer to help others and public-spirited people prefer to achieve the 
public interest. These paradigmatic types form the extremes of a motivational 
dichotomy. In between, there lies a whole continuum of individuals with mixed 
motives.  Julian  Le  Grand  (2003:  27)  describes  both  extremes  of  this 
motivational  dichotomy  in  terms  of  knaves  and  knights:  “knaves  can  be 
defined as self-interested individuals who are motivated to help others only if 
by  so  doing  they  will  serve  their  private  interests;  whereas  knights  are 
individuals who are motivated to help others for no private reward, and indeed 
who  may  undertake  such  activities  to  the  detriment  of  their  own  private 
interests”.  He  argues that  both  types of  considerations  interact  in  complex 
ways and motivate people in their public roles. While people do not always act 
in a purely knightly manner, one should not – as Buchanan does – exclude 
such motivations completely (Le Grand 2003: 38, 118). 
 
3.2. Beyond the motivational dichotomy 
 
The problem with the motivational dichotomy is that it fails to explain certain 
actions. While some individuals indeed seem to act in purely egoistic or public-
spirited  ways  (Fehr  &  Gächter  2000:  162;  Gintis  2000:  316),  a  majority  of 




It has been argued that people often base their actions on norms prescribing 
reciprocity,  which  “means  that  in  response  to  friendly  actions,  people  are 
frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-
interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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much more nasty and even brutal” (Fehr & Gächter 2000: 159). Sometimes, 
the reaction is immediate, direct and perfectly equivalent to the initial action. If 
I buy something in a shop, I pay the exact price of the product in order to take 
it home with me. However, not all sorts of reciprocity are characterized by 
such a strict relation between action and reaction. As Adam Smith (1759: Part 
III, Chapter VI, 9) notices, reciprocity in interactions between kin, friends and 
acquaintances are typically less determinate. 
People  tend  to  answer  a  gift  with  a  gift  (positive  reciprocity)  and  punish 
antisocial  behavior  (negative  reciprocity)  (Fehr  &  Gächter  2000:  160-164). 
Reciprocators  have  internalized  the  norm  that  costs  and  benefits  in  a 
relationship are to be balanced out roughly and hence consider it their duty to 
repay gifts and sanction people who do not perform their fair share of the 
work. Since reciprocity can involve more costs than benefits, it cannot readily 
be  understood  as  self-interested  and  thus  goes  against  classical  economics. 
Here too, it has been argued that reciprocity provides the individual with a 
feeling of satisfaction, because it makes him feel good or because it stops his 
conscience from nagging. As I have already suggested, this does not provide an 
adequate account of the principled nature of such actions: “a person who is 
motivated by the warm glow that comes from having done one’s duty is not 
acting out of duty but engaging in narcissistic role playing” (Elster 1989a: 53). 
Once  more,  neoclassical  economists  come  to  the  rescue,  arguing  that 
reciprocity is not necessarily egoistically but always instrumentally motivated. 
Reciprocators aim to achieve the goals they deem important, like furthering 
their self-interest (in the case of trading), making another happy (in the case of 
giving) or upholding a social norm (in the case of imposing social sanctions). 
Here too, I want to argue that this also forms an inadequate account of the 
specific nature of reciprocal behavior. Reciprocators act in a non-instrumental 
way, since they are concerned neither with circumstances nor with outcomes. 
They reciprocate, simply because they think it is their duty. In contrast with the 
forward-looking nature of instrumental behavior, dutiful behavior is typically 
backward-looking.  In  Kant’s  words,  it  is  typically  categorical  and  not 
hypothetical in nature: I fulfill my duty, no matter what the consequences of 
my actions may be (Kant 1785: 69).  
 
3.2.2. Strong reciprocity: definition 
 
In what follows, I want to show that people often act on the basis of strong 
reciprocity, which can be defined as “a propensity to cooperate and share with 
others similarly disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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those who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is 
personally costly” (Bowles & Gintis 2000: 37). This immediately suggests the 
following distinction: “a person is a strong reciprocator if she is willing (a) to 
sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind (= strong positive 
reciprocity) and (b) to sacrifice resources to punish those who are being unkind 
(= strong negative reciprocity)” (McElreath et al. 2003: 136)75. 
Reciprocity  can  be  either  weak  (when  the  individual  expects  benefits  for 
himself)  or  strong  (when  the  individual  receives  no  benefits  whatsoever). 
Strong reciprocity thus differs from the abovementioned forms of reciprocity 
that are ultimately egoistic in nature (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 433). It motivates 
people to reward friendly actions and to punish hostile actions although this is 
costly for themselves (Henrich et. al. 2004: 56). 
 
3.2.3. Strong reciprocity: empirical evidence 
 
While evidence for strong reciprocity can be found in a number of real-life 
situations – like neighborhoods, families and work places (Fehr & Gächter 
2000:  168)  –  I  want  to  focus  on  experiments  with  one-shot  interactions 
between  completely  anonymous  strangers.  Laboratory  experiments  allow 
researchers to control the conditions and to eliminate the possibility of mutual 
or long-term benefits to arise. As such they are extremely suited to demonstrate 
the presence of strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 8; Gintis 2003: 
161). Experimental evidence can thus provide insights that ethnographic and 
anthropological research often lacks: “anonymous one-shot experiments allow 
us  to  distinguish  clearly  between  behaviors  that  are  instrumental  towards 
achieving  other  goals  (reputations,  long  term  reciprocity,  and  conformance 
with social rules for expediency sake) and behaviors that are valued for their 
own sake” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 10).  
As I have shown, the behavior of only a minority of the subjects in Ultimatum 
games  can  be  understood  in  self-interested  terms.  In  general,  such  egoists 
(about  a  quarter  of  all  subjects)  are  clearly  outnumbered  by  strong 
reciprocators (about half of all subjects) (Fehr & Gächter 2000: 162; Gintis 
2000: 316). Proposers who make offers larger than strictly required might still 
be  egoistically  motivated.  They  might  fear  that  lower  offers  are  rejected, 
ultimately leaving them with nothing. However, this is no longer the case in so-
                                                 
75 Other definitions all come down to the same. Gintis (2000: 313), for example, defines 
strong reciprocity as “a propensity to cooperate, respond to cooperative behavior by 
maintaining or increasing co-operation, and respond to noncooperative free-riders by 
retaliating against the ‘offenders’, even at a personal cost”. Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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called Dictator games, where proposals cannot be rejected at all. While purely 
self-interested proposers would clearly keep everything for themselves in such 
cases, only some proposers actually do (Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 8-9; Henrich 
et. al. 2004: 27, 72, 373). The fact that most of them offer something is best 
explained in terms of strong reciprocity (Gintis 2003: 168-170; Gintis et al. 
2005: 12). 
Similarly, responders in Ultimatum games who reject positive offers cannot be 
understood as trying to serve their self-interest (Bowles & Gintis 2002: 125). 
Accepting any proposal is always more beneficial than rejecting it. Most of the 
responders report that they consider low offers to be unfair and that they want 
to punish unfair behavior. The fact that equivalent offers by a computer are 
more likely to be accepted than offers by a person also suggests that low offers 
are  rejected  not  because  they  are  disadvantageous  but  because  they  are 
perceived as unfair (Bowles & Gintis 2000: 42). Responders typically react to 
the  intentions  of  others  rather  than  that  they  are  instrumentally  concerned 
about the outcome itself.  
 
3.3. Standard accounts of the evolutionary origins of prosocial actions  
 
Up to here, I have focused exclusively on the considerations and reasons that 
motivate individuals to act as they do. These form the so-called proximate 
causes  of  their  actions.  In  what  follows,  however, I  want  to  lay  bare  their 
ultimate causes, which refer to the evolutionary origins from which actions 
spring:  “the  task  is  to  identify  the  ultimate,  not  proximate,  causal  factors, 
because it is entirely straightforward to identify some proximate causes: the 
beliefs and desires of the agent at the time of acting (…). Dissatisfaction with 
this type of explanation arises because it leaves unanswered the question of 
where those beliefs ultimately come from (…). A search for the ultimate causal 
factors is thus a search for the real reasons that people cooperate, trust, and so 
on” (Alexander 2005: 106).  
Sober and Wilson distinguish between three accounts of such ultimate causes. 
First,  hedonism  stipulates  that  the  only  ultimate  preferences  are  to  obtain 
pleasure  and  to  avoid  pain  (Sober  &  Wilson  1998:  224).  Second,  egoism 
stipulates  that  ultimately  only  self-interest  matters,  which  includes  not  only 
psychological but also material benefits (Sober & Wilson 1998: 226). In this 
view, every individual’s ultimate goal is to benefit himself. It does not deny the 
existence of altruistic preferences but claims that these are only instrumental to 
fulfilling  ultimately  egoistic  preferences  (Sober  &  Wilson  1998:  2).  Third, 
altruism claims that some ultimate desires are aimed at the well-being of others Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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for their own sake (Sober & Wilson 1998: 228). In sum, “the theories agree that 
people sometimes want others to do well; the debate concerns whether such 
desires are always instrumental or are sometimes ultimate” (Sober & Wilson 
1998:  201).  To  decide  this  debate,  I  will  now  analyze  more  fully  the 
evolutionary origins of prosocial and cooperative actions. 
From Charles Darwin (1871) on, evolutionary thinkers have been puzzled by 
the  fact  that  people  who  help  others  and  thus  sacrifice  their  chances  to 
reproduce  have  been  able  to  survive  natural  selection  (Gintis  2003:  156; 
Richerson  et  al.  2003:  387).  While  classical economists  focus on the broad 
definition of cooperation, it should be clear that I focus here on the narrow 
one. Self-sacrificing – rather than self-interested – cooperators bear the costs of 
their actions, while egoists freeride on their efforts. At first sight, one would 
thus  expect  egoists  to  be  relatively  fitter  and  thus  to  outcompete  altruists. 
Indeed, “altruism is the very opponent of the survival of the fittest” (Sober & 
Wilson 1998: 19). In what follows, I will analyze the standard solutions to this 
apparent “puzzle of prosociality” (Gintis 2003). They try to show that genuine 
altruism is an illusion and that its origins can be framed in ultimately egoistic 
terms (Fehr & Gächter 2002: 137; Fehr & Henrich 2003: 55).  
 
3.3.1. Kin selection 
 
Accounts  of  kin  selection  are  based  on  the  existence  of  a  “selfish  gene” 
(Dawkins  1989)76.  According  to  these  accounts,  cooperation  has  evolved 
among  people  who  are  genetically  related.  It  argues  that  the  genetic 
constitution of humans has developed over hundreds of thousands of years in 
which people lived in small groups with lots of relatives. Over time, they have 
developed a cooperative disposition, which ensures the survival of both the 
individual  and  his  relatives.  Since  genes  have  not  yet  adapted  to  current 
circumstances  –  large  societies  with  one-shot  anonymous  interactions  with 
strangers  –  people  still  tend  to  cooperate,  even  with  nonkin.  In  this  view, 
widespread cooperation in modern societies is largely irrational.  
                                                 
76 Bowles and Gintis (2003: 441) argue that Dawkins employs the term ‘selfishness’ in a 
tautological way, defining selfish behavior as behavior that arises from traits that on 
average  generate  higher  payoffs  and  that  will  thus  be  favored  by  natural  selection. 
Dawkins’ selfish gene model does not justify the use of the assumption of universal 
egoism:  “the  “selfishness”  of  the  gene  and  the  selfishness  of  the  person  are  quite 
different matters” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 32). As I will show more fully later on, 
natural selection operates at multiple levels. Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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However, anthropological research shows that prehistoric humans did not live 
in groups of relatives closed off from the rest of the world. They have always 
traveled a lot, thereby often encountering strangers (Fehr & Henrich 2003: 74-
75; Gintis et al. 2005: 26). As I will show more fully later on, this has enabled 
humans  to  develop  a  capacity  to  detect  whether  they  are  interacting  on  a 
repeated basis or not. 
 
3.3.2. Direct reciprocity 
 
The basic rationale of the second strand, labeled direct reciprocity, is simple: I’ll 
scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine. This account focuses on short-term 
benefits  as  the  main  factor  in  explaining  cooperation.  As  I  have  already 
suggested,  however,  not  all  forms  of  reciprocity  are  so  direct  and  strict. 
Moreover,  stressing  mutually beneficial  exchanges, direct  reciprocity  fails to 
explain  why  people  take  on  costs  in  order  to  punish  others  who  do  not 
cooperate. If there is nothing to gain from such punishment in the short run, 
direct reciprocators will leave it at that, in contrast with strong reciprocators 
who will invariably react to antisocial behavior. 
 
3.3.3. Reciprocal altruism 
 
According  to  the  third  strand,  which  Trivers  (1971)  labeled  “reciprocal 
altruism”, individuals help others if it is probable that they will be repaid in the 
future.  Their  altruism  is  thus  contingent  upon  the  altruism  of  others.  The 
underlying mechanism is the same as that of direct reciprocity. Even though 
the benefits are more loosely connected to each other, they constitute material 
incentives for cooperation in long-term interactions (Fehr & Gächter 2002: 
137).  
The problem here is that a lot of relationships typically do without the sort of 
bookkeeping that is predicted by this account. Joan Silk distinguishes between 
exchange relationships, in which “benefits are given with the expectation that 
they will be reciprocated” (Silk 2003: 37) and communal relationships, in which 
“benefits are given according to the other’s need, and receiving a benefit does 
not create an obligation to reciprocate” (Silk 2003: 44). Partners in communal 
relationships tend to cooperate without counting. Among friends, help is given 
because  it  is  needed,  not  because  reciprocity  is  expected.  Experimental 
evidence shows that a calculating attitude is widely considered to be antithetic 
to friendship (Silk 2003: 44-46).  Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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In the same vein, it is crucial to see that reciprocal altruism cannot explain 
strong reciprocity (Bowles & Gintis 2004: 26). Expecting long-term benefits 
from cooperation, reciprocal altruists act in a forward-looking way. In contrast, 
strong  reciprocators  are  backward-looking  in  that  they  simply  react  to  the 
actions  of  others,  cooperating  with  cooperators  and  punishing  freeriders. 
Moreover, reciprocal altruism is limited to small groups of people who interact 
frequently.  In  large  groups,  freeriding  thrives  and  cooperation  based  on 
reciprocal altruism inevitably declines. In addition, people often do not know 
whether the interaction they engage in will recur on a repeated basis. In light of 
these problems, reciprocal altruism cannot explain the large scale of human 
cooperation in modern societies (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 432; McElreath et al. 
2003: 136-140). 
 
3.3.4. Indirect reciprocity 
 
The  fourth  account,  labeled  indirect  reciprocity,  stresses  the  importance  of 
reputation in explaining cooperation. When interactions are not one-shot and 
anonymous, people can acquire a positive image by acting cooperatively. In 
such situations, cooperation does indeed tend to increase (Henrich et al. 2003: 
448). A more specific account views cooperation as a costly signal of some 
hidden but valuable characteristic of the cooperator (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 
437). Refusing low offers, for example, can be a way of sustaining a reputation 
of being tough. Precisely because this behavior is costly (in the short run), it 
signals to others that one has specific valuable characteristics. The fact that one 
is able to take on such costs shows that one’s chances of survival are large: 
“many nonhuman organisms make costly displays to signal their qualities to 
others. Costly signaling theory suggests that advertising costly traits indicates 
phenotypic quality because only individuals of such quality can exhibit maximal 
expression of these traits (…). For such behaviors to be stable signals, they 
must be observable, costly, reliable in the sense that they must vary with the 
quality of the trait being communicated, and of course, they must ultimately 
provide some benefit to the sender” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 424). Even though 
cooperation is costly in the short run, it is advantageous in the long run, which 
allows the individual and his cooperative disposition to survive and flourish in 
the evolutionary struggle for life. 
The  problem  here  is  that  both  indirect  reciprocity  and  costly  signaling  are 
plausible only in small groups. Whereas the former assumes that parties keep 
track of past behaviors of others, the latter assumes the presence of a public 
that can interpret the signals. Both accounts thus fail to understand why people 
cooperate on a large-scale with anonymous strangers of whom they have no Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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information whatsoever (Henrich et al. 2003: 453-457). To explain this thought 
more  fully,  I  will  now  focus  on  a  more  general  flaw  shared  by  all  of  the 
abovementioned accounts. 
 
3.3.5. Strong reciprocity as a maladaptive trait 
 
While all of these accounts have some explanatory force, they fail to provide an 
exhaustive  explanation  of  human  cooperation.  The  basic  problem  of  these 
accounts  is  that  they  are  plausible  only  in  relationships  between  a  limited 
number of people who interact frequently. They are inapt to explain large-scale 
cooperation between anonymous strangers in one-shot interactions (Boyd & 
Richerson 2005: 160; Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 7).  
There is a widespread tendency to view strong reciprocity “as a by-product of 
one of these other ultimate accounts of human cooperation” (Fehr & Henrich 
2003: 60-61). However, I agree with Fehr and Henrich (2003: 55) that the latter 
“do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. 
The problem with these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity 
only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior, whereas the evidence suggests that 
it is an adaptive trait”. People are motivated by a cooperative disposition, the 
argument goes, which makes evolutionary sense in repeated interactions but 
not in one-shot interactions with strangers. Humans have long lived in small 
groups  where  interactions  are  typically  repeated.  In  such  circumstances,  a 
cooperative disposition indeed enhances the fitness of both the group and the 
individual. Since humans have not evolved genetically in recent history, they 
still tend to cooperate, even though such behavior is no longer adapted to 
current  circumstances.  After  all,  one-shot  interactions  with  strangers  have 
become the rule rather than the exception.  
Nevertheless,  humans  have  developed  a  capacity  to  detect  and  take  into 
account whether they are interacting repeatedly or not (Fehr & Fischbacher 
2005:  14-16).  Indeed,  cooperation  decreases  if  one  moves  from  repeated 
interactions with people one knows to one-shot interactions with strangers, 
even though it remains quite pervasive among the latter. Similarly, cooperation 
gradually breaks down over time if the subjects have no possibility to build a 
positive reputation (Fehr & Henrich 2003: 65-69; McElreath et al. 2003: 139-
140). In a particular series of experiments, subjects play an iterated Ultimatum 
game. While responders in the first condition could not build up a reputation, 
they  could  in  the  second  condition,  because  proposers  there  knew  the  full 
history of their behavior. The results suggest that people are clearly capable of 
distinguishing  between  one-shot  and  repeated  interactions  (Henrich  et.  al. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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2004:  79).  Clearly,  they  are  not  fooled  into  thinking  that  cooperation  will 
ultimately pay off in situations where reputation effects and the corresponding 
long-term benefits are in fact impossible.  
Even  though  all  of  the  abovementioned  accounts  refer  to  evolutionary 
circumstances that humans share with non-human animals like primates, there 
is little evidence for them among other animal species. If such self-sacrificing 
behavior proves beneficial in the long run, why is it not more widespread in the 
animal world (Bowles & Gintis 2004: 17; Henrich et al. 2003: 445; McElreath et 
al.  2003:  127-130;  Richerson  et  al.  2003:  379)?  While  there  is  a  lot  of 
cooperative behavior that humans share with other mammals, the level and 
scope of cooperation among humans is vastly greater than that among other 
species.  People  cooperate  on  a  scale  that  is  unique  in  the  animal  world: 
“perhaps the most singular feature of Homo sapiens is the scale on which 
humans cooperate. In most other species of mammals cooperation is limited to 
close relatives and (maybe) small groups of reciprocators” (Boyd & Richerson 
2005:  133).  In  addition,  the  intensity  of  cooperation  is  unparalleled  in 
nonhuman animal species. It is safe to say that humans cooperate in ways, 
settings and degrees unequalled in the animal world (Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 
6; Henrich et. al. 2004: 410-411). 
In this respect, I want to argue that strong reciprocity is a uniquely human 
phenomenon and thus particularly apt to explain the uniqueness of human 
cooperation.  It  forms  the  solution  to  the  evolutionary  puzzle  of  human 
cooperation with nonkin strangers in large groups (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 
241). 
 
3.4. The evolutionary origins of strong reciprocity 
 
Experimental  evidence  from  Ultimatum,  Dictator  and  Public  Goods  games 
overwhelmingly shows that a majority of people act prosocially, even in one-
shot and anonymous interactions (Bowles & Gintis 2002: F425; Kahan 2005: 
344-345; McElreath et al. 2003: 126). Crucial in this respect is that cooperation 
“occurs among genetically unrelated individuals and under conditions that rule 
out direct reciprocity and reputation formation” (Fehr & Gächter 2002: 137). 
While  selfish  genes,  direct  reciprocators,  reciprocal  altruists,  indirect 
reciprocators and costly signalers all receive benefits from cooperation, strong 
reciprocators take up costs even though repeated interaction and reputation 
effects  are  impossible:  “the  essential  feature  of  strong  reciprocity  is  a 
willingness to sacrifice resources in both rewarding fair and punishing unfair 
behavior,  even  if  this  is  costly  and  provides  neither  present  nor  future Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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economic rewards for the reciprocator” (Fehr & Henrich 2003: 57). While the 
standard accounts of the evolutionary origins of prosocial actions can explain 
some  forms  of  cooperation,  they  fail  to  account  for  this  specific  form  of 
reciprocity and thus do not live up to their own aspiration of explaining the 
whole range of human cooperation (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 430). 
 
3.4.1. Cultural group selection 
 
If one wants to explain the uniquely human phenomenon of strong reciprocity, 
one should refer to uniquely human characteristics. An adequate account of 
human cooperation should thus refer to “capacities that are unique to, or at 
least much more highly developed in, Homo sapiens” (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 
429). I want to argue that culture is a good candidate, since it is based on a 
number  of  distinctively  human  cognitive,  linguistic  and  psychological 
capacities.  As  such,  it  is  unique  to  humans  who  are  capable  of  devising, 
learning and enforcing a wide range of social norms (Richerson et al. 2003: 379; 
Sober & Wilson 1998: 158). In what follows, I want to show how this focus on 
culture makes plausible a specific variant of group selection in the evolutionary 
process of natural selection. 
When internalized, social norms lead to the emergence of groups based on 
nonkin characteristics. They enable people to suppress differences within the 
group they belong to (thus limiting competition within groups) and enlarge 
differences with other groups (thus increasing competition between groups). 
All this leads to fewer and less intense conflicts within groups and more and 
more intense conflicts between groups (Bowles & Gintis 2004: 25-26; Henrich 
et al. 2003: 463; Richerson & Boyd 2004: 57). Ultimately, groups will clash and 
face  the  threat  of  dissolution.  At  such  moments  in  evolutionary  history, 
mechanisms inducing cooperation on the basis of long-term benefits become 
less relevant, since the probability of such benefits will decrease sharply over 
time. In the end, cooperation based on direct reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, 
indirect reciprocity and costly signaling will break down. In contrast, strong 
reciprocators  will  continue  to  cooperate:  “a  small  number  of  strong 
reciprocators,  who  punish  defectors  without  regard  for  the  probability  of 
future  repayment,  can  dramatically  improve  the  survival  chances  of  human 
groups”  (Bowles  &  Gintis  2003:  434).  Circumstances  of  low  within-group 
competition and high between-group competition thus allow individually costly 
but group-beneficial behavior to arise (Henrich et al. 2003: 464; Richerson & 
Boyd 2004: 202, 214). Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Bringing about benefits at the level of the group, strong reciprocity has been 
able to develop and survive (Fehr & Henrich 2003: 77; Gintis et al. 2005: 30). 
The basic rationale is that groups with strong reciprocators will outcompete 
those without them. Because of the increased survival chances of their group, 
strong reciprocators are not outcompeted by egoists (Bowles & Gintis 2004). 
This mechanism of group selection was already defended by Darwin (1871: 
166)  in  his  attempt  to  explain  human  morality:  “a  tribe  including  many 
members  who,  from  possessing  in  a  high  degree  the  spirit  of  patriotism, 
fidelity,  obedience,  courage,  and  sympathy,  were  always  ready  to  aid  one 
another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious 
over  most  other  tribes;  and  this  would  be  natural  selection.  At  all  times 
throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes and as morality is one 
important element in their success, the standard of morality and the number of 
well-endowed  men  will  thus  everywhere  tend  to  arise  and  increase”.  As 
Howard  Margolis  (1984:  26)  notices,  “the  groups  whose  members  have  a 
propensity to act in group interest will have a selection advantage over the 
groups deficient in that propensity”. 
However, the idea of group selection is controversial. During the 1960’s and 
1970’s, it came under vigorous attack among evolutionary theorists (Sober & 
Wilson  1998:  6).  The  argument  goes  that  groups  would  have  trouble 
distinguishing themselves. Nevertheless, empirical research clearly shows that 
vast  differences  between  different  societies  (Henrich  et.  al.  2004:  18-22). 
Indeed,  characteristics  at  the  group  level  are  much  more  important  in 
explaining differences in behavior than characteristics at the level of individuals 
(Henrich et. al. 2004: 33). While people are genetically almost identical, cultural 
factors enlarge between-group differences and can thus make group selection a 
strong force even in the absence of genetic relatedness (Sober & Wilson 1998: 
192).  
Here, I want to stress that behavioral and motivational traits are handed down 
from generation to generation not only through genes but also through cultural 
factors such as education and socialization (Henrich et al. 2003: 459). While 
quite  a  few  mechanisms  in  human  cooperation  are  innate,  cultural  and 
institutional factors play a crucial role as well. People do not only inherit the 
genes of their ancestors, but also their language, norms, habits, institutions or, 
in short, their culture (Richerson et al. 2003: 361)77. It is therefore perfectly 
                                                 
77  According  to  Peter  Richerson  and  Robert  Boyd  (2004:  132),  these  capacities  first 
evolved about half a million years ago, when hominids had brains that were about the 
same size of ours. Since culture did not exist prior to this, one can argue that some form 
of biological group selection played a role in human evolution until then. However, most 
evolutionary biologists question the plausibility of biological group selection. The main 
problem  is  that  it  ignores  that,  next  to  competition  between  groups,  within-group Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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possible for cultural factors to play a role in natural selection: “the fact that a 
behavior  is  transmitted  culturally  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  it  is 
nonheritable. Cultural differences between human groups are often stable over 
long periods of time and are faithfully transmitted to descendant groups. They 
are heritable in the sense that offspring units resemble parent units, which is all 
that matters as far as the process of natural selection is concerned” (Sober & 
Wilson 1998: 114).  
To further illustrate that cooperation is often based on cultural factors like 
norms, I want to refer to experimental evidence from Ultimatum games. The 
finding “that kindergarteners accept minimal offers about 70 percent of the 
time, third and fourth graders 40 percent of the time, and adults < 10 percent 
of the time, implies that any fairness-based norms or cooperative strategies are 
learned” (Henrich et al. 2004: 219). 
For natural selection at the level of groups to be relevant, two requirements 
must  be  fulfilled.  First,  members  of  one  group  should  behave  uniformly 
different than members of other groups. Second, these differences should be 
inherited. Both requirements can be fulfilled through the working of genetic or 
cultural  mechanisms.  Groups  can  behave  very  differently  without  being 
genetically different and these behavioral regularities can be transmitted from 
generation  to  generation  through  social  norms  and  institutions  (Sober  & 
Wilson 1998: 149). Natural selection thus incorporates selection not only on 
genetic but on cultural variation as well (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 400).  
 
3.4.2. Multilevel selection 
 
Selection  at  the  level  of  groups  forms  an  alternative  to  kin  selection  and 
selection at the level of individuals, since the latter focus exclusively on genetic 
evolution.  While  selfish  gene  accounts  are often  considered  to be  the  fatal 
criticism to group selection, it actually shows the plausibility of selection at 
levels other than the individual one. Just like individuals are vehicles for genes 
to reproduce themselves, so are groups vehicles for individuals to reproduce 
                                                                                                                                            
competition between individuals remains relevant. While a group of altruists may thrive 
better on the whole, their fitness gains will be shared by egoists who invade the group. 
Altruists thus tend to be exploited by egoistic freeriders, so that natural selection can be 
expected to eliminate altruists from the gene pool (Dawkins 1989: 7-8). As Todd Zywicki 
(2000: 88) rightly stresses, “the ability to control free riding is the fundamental hurdle to a 
group  selection  theory”.  Here,  it  is  crucial  to  see  that  social  norms  and  the  human 
abilities to enforce and transmit them can explain how opportunities for egoists to invade 
groups of altruists can be reduced. Once more, cultural factors thus render selection at 
the level of groups more plausible. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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themselves. To capture the insight that natural selection occurs not only at the 
individual level, but also at the level of groups, Sober and Wilson (1998: 331) 
speak of “multilevel selection”. While group selection is a relevant factor in the 
survival of the fittest, it does not imply that other accounts are useless. They all 
offer perspectives that generate different insights (Sober & Wilson 1998: 98).  
Self-sacrificing  cooperative  behavior  is  simply  incomprehensible  if  selection 
operates only at the level of individuals. If selection only plays within a group, 
egoists will outcompete others. However, if selection between groups plays a 
role,  then  prosocial  and  cooperative  behavior  is  more  likely  to  evolve. 
Consequently, if selection occurs at different levels, the final outcome depends 
on  the  relative  importance  of  both  evolutionary  forces:  “between-group 
selection favors the evolution of altruism; within-group selection favors the 
evolution of selfishness. These two processes oppose each other. If altruism 
manages to evolve, this indicates that the group selection process has been 
strong  enough  to  overwhelm  the  force  pushing  in  the  opposite  direction” 
(Sober & Wilson 1998: 33). The conclusion is simple: prosocial behavior can 
evolve only if group selection mechanisms are sufficiently strong. 
The basic tenet in the debate on the importance of nature and nurture is to 
assume that behavior is either genetically determined (nature) or learned by the 
individual (nurture) (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 7-9). The concept of cultural 
group  selection,  however,  allows  one  to  see  that  both  cultural  and  genetic 
elements fit the evolutionary framework. After all, the latter is broad enough to 
accommodate the insight that natural selection produces adaptations that have 
nothing to do with genetic adaptations (Sober & Wilson 1998: 337). The fact 
that cultural variation, next to genetic variation, can give rise to group selection 
can explain why human cooperation is unique in both scale and intensity (Boyd 
& Richerson 2005: 204). 
 
3.4.3. The role of norms and emotions 
 
If one allows for selection at the level of groups, cooperative behavior is more 
plausible, since groups in which cooperative behavior is prescribed will have an 
evolutionary advantage over other groups. In this respect, it is useful to analyze 
more fully the role of social norms in motivating prosocial behavior. Neither 
positive  nor  negative  strong  reciprocators  are  motivated  by  instrumental 
considerations. Instead, they adhere to particular social norms (Fehr & Henrich 
2003: 55). Whereas positive strong reciprocity motivates people to cooperate 
with those similarly disposed, negative strong reciprocity motivates people to 
take on costs to punish norm-violators. Because punishment of defectors is Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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anticipated  by  potential  defectors,  it  substantially  increases  norm-guided 
cooperation, thereby enabling groups to maintain levels of cooperation much 
higher than those in a society of egoists (Gintis 2003: 160-166; Gintis et al. 
2005:  15-16;  McElreath  et  al.  2003:  141).  The  presence  of  negative  strong 
reciprocators who sacrifice their own interests to enforce prosocial and thus 
group-beneficial norms  is  thus  crucial  in  explaining cooperation  (Bowles & 
Gintis 2004: 17).  
It  might  be  raised  that  norms  do  not  necessarily  prescribe  prosocial  or 
cooperative behavior. Norms of revenge, for example, prescribe behavior that 
is aimed at decreasing rather than increasing the well-being of others. Other 
norms – like those surrounding etiquette – prescribe behavior that is costly for 
the individual itself and does not confer any benefits whatsoever. Nevertheless, 
I  want  to  argue  that  they  decrease  within-group  differences  and  increase 
between-group  differences  through  the  use  of  seemingly  arbitrary  symbolic 
traits like styles of dress, cuisine or dialect. Such norms thus play a crucial role 
in creating behavioral homogeneity among the members of a group: “human 
social groups are never genetically uniform, but they are often quite uniform 
behaviorally, especially when the behaviors are reinforced by social norms” 
(Sober & Wilson 1998: 150). They ensure that behaviors in a group remain 
more or less uniform, even though its members are constantly changing. As I 
have suggested, this behavioral homogeneity matters rather than its underlying 
mechanisms:  “group  selection  “sees”  only  the  behavioral  product,  not  the 
process that creates the product” (Sober & Wilson 1998: 156). Norms thus 
produce the behavioral regularities needed for group selection to be plausible. 
In  addition,  the  ability  of  humans  to  imitate  the  behaviors  of  successful 
individuals has the effect of homogenizing groups, which further supports the 
plausibility  of  group  selection:  “since  selection  operates  on  any  form  of 
heritable variation and imitation and teaching are forms of inheritance, natural 
selection will influence cultural as well as genetic evolution” (Richerson et al. 
2003: 366).  
While this is not always the case, social norms generally prescribe prosocial 
behavior.  They  motivate  members  of  a  group  to  avoid  conflict  with  and 
practice benevolence and generosity toward their fellow members (Sober & 
Wilson 1998: 172). After all, such norms will generally improve the fitness of 
the group and will thus be favored by natural selection: “groups with prosocial 
internal  norms  will  outcompete  groups  with  antisocial,  or  socially  neutral, 
internal norms” (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 440). 
Strong  reciprocity  and  norms  mutually  support  each  other.  Motivated  by 
internalized norms, strong reciprocity ensures that such norms are upheld and 
enforced. Taken together, both factors and their mutual interaction explain a Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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substantial part of human cooperation: “cultural group selection and moralistic 
punishment  are  both  important  to  explaining  cooperation.  Cultural  group 
selection will favor groups with high frequencies of moralistic punishment, and 
it  helps  ensure  that  moralistic  punishment  enforces  functional  norms. 
Moralistic punishment, as we have said, plays a considerable role in maintaining 
between-group  variation  on  which  cultural  group  selection  acts”  (Boyd  & 
Richerson 2005: 144). 
Internalized  norms  of  fairness,  for  example,  induce  the  strongly  reciprocal 
disposition to reward fair and punish unfair behavior, which in turn helps to 
maintain such norms. The relatively costless mechanism of monitoring and 
sanctioning  by  peers,  which  allows  groups  to  uphold  cooperation,  gains 
importance  in  situations  where  contracts  are  incomplete  or  where  their 
enforcement is very costly. In both cases, informal norms are in general more 
rather  than  less  efficient  than  formal  enforcement  mechanisms  (Fehr  & 
Gächter 2000: 168, 178). Informal norms thus often provide a cost-efficient 
solution to collective action problems (Kahan 2005: 347-362). The public good 
of establishing civil order, for example, can be achieved voluntarily on the basis 
of  internalized  norms,  whereas  it  takes  a  lot  of  monitoring,  policing  and 
enforcing measures if such norms are absent. Later on, I will show more fully 
that it is important not to undermine but to support social norms. 
There  is  a  close  link  between  norms  and  emotions,  which  is  crucial  to 
understand the behavior of those who violate norms (and experience shame), 
those  who  suffer  from  this  (and  experience  anger)  and  third-party  group 
members  (who  experience  moral  outrage  towards  violators  and  empathy 
towards victims). Emotions are crucial in motivating adherence to norms and 
stimulating cooperation (Bowles & Gintis 2003: 433; Henrich et al. 2003: 446; 
McElreath et al. 2003: 144). With respect to positive strong reciprocity, I want 
to  refer  to  individuals  who  do  not  live  up  to  the  existing  norms  and  are 
therefore devalued in the eyes of their fellow group members. With respect to 
negative strong reciprocity, I want to refer to individuals who suffer from the 
violation of a norm and to other group members. Both will be prepared to 
punish norm-violators, simply because it allows them to express their moral 
outrage  with  such  behavior,  which  they  consider  to  be  unfair.  Strong 
reciprocity  is  thus  best  understood  as  the  expression  of  specific  emotions, 
which are triggered by the fact that one has internalized certain norms that help 
constitute one’s identity (Alexander 2005: 111). 
Here, I want to argue that the central role of emotions does not make strongly 
reciprocal  and  norm-guided  behavior  irrational.  The  standard  “view  of 
emotions popular in the social and biological sciences is that emotions should 
be invoked to explain deviations from the norms of rationality” (McElreath et Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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al. 2003: 142). In this view, emotions are motivational forces that tend to lead a 
rational person astray. In contrast, I want to think of emotions as indispensable 
parts of human decision-making that can but do not necessarily impede its 
rationality (Damasio 1994: 194; Elster 1999: 156-159). 
 
3.5. Complementing Homo Economicus with Homo Reciprocans 
 
Strong reciprocity cannot be understood within the egoistic and instrumental 
framework of economics. The strongly reciprocal willingness to cooperate and 
punish those who do not cooperate arises from an adherence to internalized 
social  norms  (Kahan  2005:  343).  Norm-guided  behavior  should  not  be 
understood as means towards the realization of an individual’s goals but as 
based on principles and commitments he deems important. It goes against the 
instrumental character of the economic conception of rationality, according to 
which people care only about the consequences of economic interactions and 
not about the processes through which these arise (Gintis 2000: 316; Gintis et 
al. 2005: 18-20). Against the general tenor of conventional economics, which is 
to  define  rationality  in  terms  of  self-interest  and  outcome-orientation,  I 
continue  to  defend  that  actions  are  rational  if  they  arise  from  what  the 
individual himself considers to be good reasons. Consequently, the fact that 
strongly  reciprocal  behavior  is  norm-guided  does  not  necessarily  make  it 
irrational. 
Strong  reciprocity  thus  forms  an  anomaly  for  the  instrumental  Homo 
Economicus  model.  While  I  clearly  grant  that  both  pure  egoism  and  pure 
altruism can occur, strong reciprocity cannot be reduced to either of these 
extremes or to some hybrid composite of both. Rather, it is situated beyond 
this motivational dichotomy. In this respect, it has been argued that a majority 
of people behave more like Homo Reciprocans than like Homo Economicus 
(Bowles  &  Gintis  2003).  In  contrast  with  the  latter,  “H.  reciprocans  is  a 
conditional cooperator whose penchant for reciprocity can be elicited under 
circumstances in which personal self-interest would dictate otherwise” (Gintis 
2000: 316). His backward-looking disposition to react friendly to friendliness 
and hostile to hostility lies beyond the motivational dichotomy that is situated 
completely within an instrumental framework: “people are not generally the 
self-interested actors of neoclassical economics, since they value treating others 
fairly and will incur personal costs to do so. Nor are people the unconditional 
altruists  of  utopian  thought,  since  they  want  to  hurt  free-riders  and  other 
norm-violators” (Gintis 2000: 316). In contrast with the former who freeride 
no matter what, strong reciprocators are prepared to take on costs even if this Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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yields no personal gain whatsoever. In contrast with the latter who cooperate 
no matter what, they cooperate only if others do their fair share as well. 
In sum, the available experimental evidence in Ultimatum and other games 
shows that a majority of people act like Homo Reciprocans. In contrast with 
Homo Economicus, “Homo reciprocans cares about the well-being of others 
and about the processes determining outcomes – whether they are fair, for 
example, or violate a social norm. He differs in this from the self-regarding and 
outcome oriented Homo economicus” (Bowles & Gintis 2000: 37). Whereas 
the classical Homo Economicus is a full-blooded egoist, Homo Reciprocans is 
willing to benefit others, even when this yields no present or future rewards 
whatsoever.  Whereas  the  neoclassical  Homo  Economicus  always  acts 
instrumentally to achieve certain goals in the future, Homo Reciprocans reacts 
to  the  past  behavior  of  others,  even  if  this  inhibits  the  realization  of  his 
personal aims.  
To further indicate the empirical adequacy of this Homo Reciprocans model 
one can refer to iterated Public Goods games. These are typically characterized 
by initially high levels of cooperation that decay towards the end. According to 
most economists, subjects only understand the nature of this game and the 
superiority of the egoistic freeriding option after playing it a number of times. 
However, this does not fit the empirical finding that cooperation decays less 
when the number of repeated interactions is increased to the knowledge of the 
players. In this light, strong reciprocity provides a more plausible reason why 
cooperation decays: “public spirited contributors want to retaliate against free-
riders and the only way available to them in the game is by not contributing 
themselves” (Gintis 2000: 317). There are two possible evolutions if strong 
reciprocators  are  confronted  with  freeriders.  First,  cooperation  can  start  to 
unravel,  since  increasingly  more  people  refuse  to  contribute.  If  others  no 
longer  cooperate,  why  should  I?  Second,  cooperation  can  be  upheld  when 
freeriders are punished by strong reciprocators who feel that they are being 
treated  unfairly.  The  latter  evolution  is  likely  if  people  have  the  means  to 
sanction freeriders (Bowles & Gintis 2000: 43; Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 13-
14; Gintis 2003: 165-166).  
In this respect, I want to stress that both the Homo Economicus and the 
Homo Reciprocans are best understood as ideal types. They are abstractions 
that  highlight  certain  characteristics  of  individual  motivation  that  are  often 
closely  intertwined  in  reality.  Real-life  people  who  are  motivated  purely  by 
egoism,  altruism,  public-spiritedness  or  strong  reciprocity  are  rare.  Instead, 
most of  them  are  motivated  by  a  whole gamut  of considerations  that gain 
different relative weight in different contexts. Some of these differences can be 
traced back to the fact that they belong to different groups, while others are Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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purely  individual.  Both  forms  of  motivational  heterogeneity  suggest  the 
usefulness of different models complementing rather than replacing each other. 
I thus do not want to substitute one all too simplistic model for another: “it is 
tempting  to  react  to  the  widespread  experimental  evidence  of  non-selfish 
behaviors  by  replacing  the  selfishness  axiom  with  some  equally  simple  and 
universal assumption about human behavior. If Homo economicus has failed the 
experimental  test,  maybe  Homo  altruisticus,  Homo  reciprocans,  or  some  other 
simplified  version  of  a  panhuman  nature  will  do  better.  The  diversity  of 
behaviors we have observed leads us to doubt the wisdom of this approach” 
(Henrich et. al. 2004: 50).  
 
4. Normative implications of Bowles’ and Gintis’ 
theoretical assumptions 
 
In this section, I want to think through the argument that different explanatory 
models of individuals have different normative implications in that they justify 
different  institutions  and  policies.  Like  I  have  done  in  my  analysis  of 
Buchanan’s  views,  I  will  now  address  the  normative  issues  surrounding 
institutional design. As I have argued extensively, these should be based on 
empirically adequate models of individuals and their motivations. It should by 
now be clear that the latter are not as homogenous as economists suggest: 
“policy-making, no less than the grand projects of constitutional design, risk 
irrelevance if they ignore the irreducible heterogeneity of human motivations” 
(Bowles & Gintis 1999: 3). In my view, the pluralism at the individual level is 
reflected at the institutional level, where a combination of various institutional 
mechanisms is to be favored. 
 
4.1. The institutional dichotomy 
 
Here,  I  want  to  show  in  what  sense  the  abovementioned  motivational 
dichotomy  between  self-  and  other  regarding  preferences  has  led  to  a 
dichotomy in normative thinking about institutional design. This institutional 
dichotomy,  which  dominates  conventional  debates  in  modern  political 
philosophy,  concerns  the  proper  task  division  between  markets  and  states 
(Bowles & Gintis 2002: F419). In short, it consists of two contending camps 
“advocating laissez faire on the one hand or comprehensive state intervention 





As I have shown in my analysis of Buchanan, theorists who assume universal 
egoism tend to praise markets for their capacity to coordinate self-interested 
actions into socially desirable outcomes: “for them, the safest assumption to 
make when constructing government institutions and formulating government 
policy is Hume’s maxim that everyone is a knave. Inevitably, therefore, they 
endorse the competitive market as the principal means for organising economic 
and social production; for, as we know from the works of David Hume’s near 
contemporary, Adam Smith, the market is the method by which self-interest 
can be harnessed to serve the common good” (Le Grand 2003: 12). Their 
focus on the invisible hand mechanism typically leads to a predilection for 
laissez-faire  politics.  They  tend  to  be  wary  of  governments,  because  public 
servants can be expected to serve their private interests rather than the public 
interest.  The  state  should  be  constitutionally  constrained  to  a  minimum  in 
order to avoid the excesses of unbridled rent-seeking. Its only task is to allow 
markets  to  function  properly  and  to  correct  for  their  failures  by  providing 
additional external incentives, like rewards for compliant citizens and sanctions 




In contrast, theorists who model individuals in their public roles as altruistic or 
public-spirited tend to favor a quite pervasive state. Public-spirited government 
officials can be trusted to do what is needed to serve the common good. In 
addition, the fact that such citizens are willing to serve the interests of others 
suggests that they can be expected to pay the taxes to realize the public interest 
they agree on (Le Grand 2003: 13).  
Recently, however, consensus has grown that neither the market nor the state 
is perfect. Markets fail in achieving unanimously agreed on goals because of 
freeriding  problems  and  negative  externalities.  This  is  where  governments 
come into play. Because of rent-seeking behavior, however, these fail as well. 
As a result, twentieth century theorists have been debating the extent to which 
markets  and  states  should  complement  each  other.  There  is  an  implicit 
consensus among these theorists that the main function of both institutions is 
to bring into correspondence the private and the public interest through the 
provision of material incentives. Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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As a disclaimer, I concede that I leave out a number of theoretical possibilities 
here. First, there is Thomas Hobbes (1651: chapter XVII) who argues that 
egoistic  individuals  need  a  state  with  absolute  and  unlimited  authority  to 
prevent  a  war  of  all  against  all.  They  mutually  consent  to  obey  to  such  a 
Leviathan,  since  they  realize  that  it  is  a  necessary  evil  to  make  social  life 
possible at all. However, the question remains whether self-interested people 
will actually consent to such a dictatorial regime. After all, one can expect it to 
serve nothing but its own self-interest. Second, there are anarchists who argue 
that public-spirited individuals do not need a coercive state, since they will 
achieve a harmonious society on a voluntary basis. However, a society where 
order is achieved without formal rules and constraints is a romantic fiction 
(Buchanan  1999:  VII,  5-9).  Since  disagreement  can  persist  among  public-
spirited  citizens  as  well  –  for  example  on  what  the  public  interest  exactly 
consists of – the necessity of some enforcement mechanism is evident. This 
mechanism can be a formal one like the state or a more informal scheme of 
social norms. In what follows, I want to make clear what I mean by the latter. 
 
4.2. Beyond the institutional dichotomy 
 
The crucial role of strong reciprocity and the norms on which it is based shows 
the  inadequacy  of  the  conventional  debate  on  markets  and  states.  More 
specifically, I want to show that it gives rise to a third basic institution that is 
neglected  all  too  often,  namely  that  of  communities78.  This  forms  the 
institutional  counterpart  of  strong  reciprocity  and  the  still  unconventional 
Homo Reciprocans model.  
Bowles  and  Gintis  (1998:  3)  define  a  community  as  “a  structure  of  social 
interaction  characterized  by  high  entry  and  exit  costs  and  nonanonymous 
relationships among members”. The crucial difference between markets and 
states  on  the  one  hand  and  communities  on  the  other  hand  lies  in  the 
impersonal, anonymous and occasional character of social interactions within 
the former: “market interactions are characterized by ephemerality of contact 
and anonymity among interacting agents while idealized state bureaucracies are 
characterized by long-term anonymous relationships” (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 
                                                 
78 This by no means implies that there are only three institutions in modern societies 
(Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 1994: 216; Bowles & Gintis 1998: 22). Partly for reasons of 
space, I will not go into the role of institutions like families, churches, classes, clubs and 
firms. While some can be fitted in the category of communities quite well, a number of 
differences remain. For example, whereas churches and firms typically have a formal and 
hierarchical decision-making structure, communities are based on informal norms and 
sanctions. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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6). In contrast, communities can be defined as groups of “people who interact 
directly, frequently, and in multi-faceted ways” (Bowles & Gintis 2005: 381). As 
such, they are based on fundamental aspects of the identities of their members. 
Traditional definitions of communities by sociologists and social psychologists 
systematically  stress  the  sense of  belonging  to  a  group of  people  who  feel 
related to each other (McMillan & Chavis 1986: 4).  
 
4.2.1. Egoistic preferences and their amendments 
 
In such informal networks, interactions are primarily based on the strongly 
reciprocal willingness of members to cooperate with others so disposed and to 
punish those who violate shared norms. As I have shown, this clearly suggests 
that the assumption of universal egoism has its limits. In my view, communities 
should not be perceived as some leftover from premodern societies, doomed 
to fade away in modern societies (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 23). Their usefulness 
lies in their ability to solve the governance problems that markets and states fail 
to address: “why do communities persist despite their inability to exploit the 
efficiency-enhancing  properties  of  markets  and  the  advantages  of  universal 
enforcement  of  rules  provided  by  states?  One  reason  is  the  capacity  of 
communities to foster cooperative behavior” (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 3). Like 
markets and states, communities provide solutions to coordination problems 
that arise within social interactions in modern societies. Since they are able to 
partly  solve  the  failures  of  markets  and  states,  they  provide  a  desirable 
complement to both. Even though they do not allow individuals to achieve 
direct mutual benefits – like markets do – and they do not have a monopoly 
over coercive enforcement – like states do – communities have the capacity “to 
avert  or  attenuate  costly  coordination  problems  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma 
type” (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 22).  
One  could  question  whether  communities  are  a  desirable  form  of  social 
organization: “communities work because they are good at enforcing norms, 
and whether this is a good thing depends on what the norms are” (Bowles & 
Gintis 2002: F428). As I have shown, however, norms in general prescribe 
prosocial behavior towards fellow community members. Because communities 
are typically characterized by high entry and exit costs, interactions occur on a 
repeated and enduring basis and, as a result, community members tend to treat 
each other decently: “communities as we have defined them structure social 
interaction in ways that foster: (a) frequent interaction among the same agents; 
(b) partly as a result, low-cost access to information about other community 
members; (c) a tendency to favor interactions with members of one’s own 
community  over  outsiders;  and  (d)  restricted  migration  to  and  from  other Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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communities. These structural characteristics, we will show, contribute to the 
ability of communities to promote pro-social behavior” (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 
6).  
The capacity of communities to deal with freeriding problems without having 
to resort to costly enforcement schemes allows societies to achieve high levels 
of cooperation on a voluntary basis. Generally accepted informal norms make 
more  formalized  enforcement  mechanisms  and  incentive  schemes  largely 
superfluous.  They  reduce  the  need  for  coercion  by  a  large  bureaucratic 
apparatus.  Where  social  norms  are  present,  governmental  intervention  is 
needed to a lesser extent. As such, societies can achieve cooperation without 
heavily relying on the coercive power of the state (Etzioni 2000: 177). 
As  I  have  shown,  informal  norms  and  more  formal  institutions  mutually 
support each other. Where emotions like shame are common, punishment of 
norm-violators will be particularly effective and, above all, cheap. All one needs 
to induce shame is a simple frown (Fehr & Henrich 2003: 77). As a result, high 
levels of group cooperation are achieved and sustained at limited cost (Bowles 
&  Gintis  2003:  439).  Informal  and  formal  compliance  mechanisms  thus 
complement  –  rather  than  substitute  –  each  other  in  inducing  prosocial 
behavior. 
All  this  suggests  a  number  of  ways  in  which  communities  can  solve  the 
coordination problems that characterize market and state failures. First, since 
members  interact  repeatedly,  the  costs  of  gathering  information  of  others 
decrease and its benefits increase. Because they interact frequently and directly, 
community members have information about each other that is not available in 
anonymous  relations  within  markets  and  states.  Second,  since  community 
members know that they will continue to interact in the future, they have an 
incentive  to  act  favorably  towards  their  partners  in  order  to  avoid  future 
repercussions. This is enhanced by the limited mobility between groups, which 
arises from their high entry and exit costs. 
However, this suggests another problem communities face. They rely heavily 
on the distinction between insiders and outsiders: “membership has boundaries; 
this  means  that  there  are  people  who  belong  and  people  who  do  not” 
(McMillan & Chavis 1986: 4). Cultural group selection and the communities to 
which it gives rise tend to cause malign behavior towards member of other 
groups:  “group  selection  favors  within-group  niceness  and  between-group 
nastiness”  (Sober  &  Wilson  1998:  9).  If  based  on  race,  religion  or  sex,  this 
inherently exclusive rationale of a shared identity can lead to morally repugnant 
situations.  
However, while communities are based on a divisive rationale of ‘us’ versus 
them’, they do not automatically give rise to a completely fragmented society. Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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As  I  have  already  suggested,  I  do  not  favor  an  anarchistic  ideal  in  which 
communities are the only institution to govern social interaction. Some form of 
government is needed to enforce a minimal framework of rules and make sure 
that  basic  human  rights  are  not  violated.  In  addition,  there  are  wider 
communities, like those at the level of the nation-state, which prevent such 
morally  troublesome  situations  to  arise.  They  allow  people  to  think  of 
themselves as members of a society with a shared concern for the public good: 
“participants must share a common identity as citizens that is stronger than 
their separate identities as members of ethnic or other sectional groups” (Miller 
1990: 284). If a community exists at the level of the nation-state, its members 
will conceive of themselves as parts of that collectivity. Although identification 
with smaller-scaled communities tends to be more intense, nationality often 
constitutes an important part of people’s identity79. It allows one to empower 
communities, while avoiding their possibly perverse logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
(Bowles & Gintis 2002: F431-432). 
 
4.2.2. Exogenous preferences and their amendments 
 
The importance of communities in modern societies shows the inadequacy of 
the assumption of exogenously given preferences as well. Bowles and Gintis 
argue  in  this  respect  that  liberalism  –  including  its  variant  defended  by 
neoclassical economists – neglects the role of communities in governing social 
life. It focuses on the moments when individuals know what they want, but 
neglects  the  moments  when  their  preferences  and  identities  are  still  being 
formed: “liberalism claims that the marketplace and the ballot box allow people 
to get what they want. But liberalism is silent on how people might get to be 
what they want to be, and how they might get to want what they want to want” 
(Bowles & Gintis 1986: 125). Liberalism thus has a huge blind spot. While it 
shows that people make choices, it ignores the fact that choices also make 
people. Ignoring the impact of people’s actions on their own preferences and 
identities, liberalism remains “indifferent or hostile to the formation of those 
loyalties and social bonds upon which a vibrant democracy must depend. This 
is nowhere more clear than in its devaluation of decentralized autonomous 
communities” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 139).  
                                                 
79 David Miller (1990: 239) aptly describes the importance of a community at the national 
level, in which people share a common national identity: “each member recognizes a 
loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal goals to advance 
its interests”.  Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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The  institutional  structure  of  a  society  should  not  be  narrowed  down  to 
markets and states but include communities as well: “a democratic society must 
foster the proliferation of vital and autonomous self-governing communities 
standing between the individual and the state” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 139-
140). Focusing exclusively on the state as the realm where power is exercised, 
liberalism neglects the opportunities for people to organize themselves in a vast 
number of ways at this intermediate level. As I have shown, communities allow 
individuals to actively participate in public life, thereby reducing the need for 
an expansive state, which ultimately – as Buchanan’s worst case scenario of the 
Leviathan  shows  –  poses  an  inevitable  threat  to  individual  freedom  and 
democratic accountability.  
 
4.3. Normative implications at the level of the state 
 
At the policy level, theorists employing the Homo Economicus model agree 
with governmental measures only if they offer the prospect of mutual benefits 
in the long run (Bowles & Gintis 1999: 4). In contrast, the Homo Reciprocans 
model shows the importance of cooperation that is contingent not upon the 
presence of long-term benefits but upon a perceived balance between rights 
and obligations (Bowles & Gintis 2000: 44). Most people feel that the benefits 
and burdens of public arrangements should be distributed more or less evenly.  
Crucial in this respect is the notion of desert. Most people regard redistributive 
and compensatory government measures as fair and legitimate when they favor 
people who are not responsible for their own suffering. They are generally 
considered legitimate if aimed at the poor who cannot do much about their 
situation and thus do not deserve to be poor. The other side of the same coin 
is that most people do not support such measures if they favor people who 
make no effort whatsoever to engage in socially valued work. Hence, there is 
some truth in the cliché that hardworking taxpayers do not like being duped by 
people who could work but lazily choose not to. The perceived legitimacy of 
welfare programs thus crucially depends on “one’s views of why the poor are 
poor,  and  specifically  one’s  beliefs  about  the  relative  importance  of  effort 
rather  than  luck”  (Bowles  &  Gintis  2000:  47).  If  people  oppose  welfare 
programs and egalitarian policies, it is not because they do not want to pay for 
them, but because they offend their strongly reciprocal adherence to norms of 
fairness: “policies that reward people independent of whether and how much 
they  contribute  to  society  are  considered  unfair  and  are  not  supported” 
(Bowles & Gintis 1999: 16).  Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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According to Bowles and Gintis (1991: 1), public policies should thus tap the 
public’s sentiments: “the welfare state is in trouble not because selfishness is 
rampant (it is not), but because many egalitarian programs no longer evoke, 
and  sometimes  now  offend,  deeply  held  notions  of  fairness,  encompassing 
both reciprocity and generosity”. In order to devise desirable institutions, such 
motivations should not be neglected. In this respect, Philip Pettit (2002: 290-
307) argues that there are two strategies to design and implement institutions in 
a  world  of  rational  individuals,  namely  the  managing  and  the  motivating 
strategy. The managing strategy aims to devise public policies by taking into 
account the fact that people often act in altruistic, public-spirited and strongly 
reciprocal ways. In contrast, the motivating strategy stresses that self-interest 
motivates  people  not  to  comply  and  concludes  that  institutions  should  be 
organized  in  such  a  way  that  compliance  becomes  more  attractive  in  self-
interested terms. However, since individuals differ in the extent to which they 
voluntarily comply and since it is hard to rig the pay-offs in a personalized way, 
the argument goes, one “should look to the most self-interested person we can 
imagine – the knave, in traditional parlance – and make sure that that agent will 
face penalties that are harsh enough, or rewards that are high enough, to elicit 
compliance  with  the  institution  in  question”  (Pettit  2002:  276).  This 
corresponds to Buchanan’s defense of the assumption of universal egoism for 
normative purposes. Partly due to Buchanan and other Public Choice theorists, 
this egoistically motivated Homo Economicus has become the standard model 
of individuals for theorists who engage in institutional design (Le Grand 2003: 
9). Not only has it led to a general predilection for markets over states, it also 
cleared the ground for the conventional policy strategy of promoting the public 
interest  by  materially  rewarding  prosocial  behavior  and  punishing  antisocial 
behavior.  
Pettit  (2002:  276-277)  mentions  three  problems  this  line  of  reasoning 
encounters:  “first,  many  agents  will  comply  with  the  demands  of  a  public 
institution  on  the  basis  of  a  spontaneous,  non-egocentric  pattern  of 
deliberation. Second, the introduction of sanctions apt for knaves is likely to 
switch these people out of such non-egocentric deliberation into more self-
interested reflection (…). And third, this being so, the introduction of knavish 
sanctions is likely to reduce the level of compliance overall, not to increase it. 
These  propositions  are  empirical  in  character  but  are  borne  out  in  much 
research”. Whereas the first problem refers to the fact that not all preferences 
are  egoistic,  the  others  refer  to  the  fact  that  preferences  can  change 
endogenously under the influence of institutions and policies. I will go deeper 
into both issues in what follows. 
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4.3.1. Egoistic preferences and their amendments 
 
The  conventional  strategy  among  politicians  and  their  advisers  is  the 
motivating one: “the belief that people are relatively self-regarding (…) may be 
behind the assumption of economic policy-makers and institutional designers 
that  no  proposal  is  plausible  unless  it  can  be  shown  to  be  ‘incentive-
compatible’: that is, unless it can be shown that people will have self-regarding 
reasons for going along with what the proposal requires” (Pettit 2002: 227). 
However,  this  does  not  always  produce  optimal  outcomes  if  people  are 
motivated  by  other  than  self-regarding  considerations.  That  is  why  the 
managing strategy tries to detect, support and reinforce the motivations that 
guide the behavior of most people most of the time. It aims to achieve social 
order and cooperation on the basis of the wide array of considerations that 
motivate most people (Pettit 2002: 277). It is thus to be employed if one wants 
to take people as they are and not as the knaves they might be: “the managing 
strategy would give us a world fit for ordinary, more or less virtuous people, 
the motivating strategy would give us a world fit for knaves” (Pettit 2002: 305). 
Only after getting the most out of the citizens who comply voluntarily, will it 
try to motivate the more self-interested citizens through sanctions and rewards.  
Since people are motivated by a mix of considerations of which the relative 
weight varies from individual to individual and from context to context, it is 
important  to  rely  on  a  combination  of  both  managing  and  motivating 
strategies. However, given the omnipresence of motivations that induce people 
to spontaneously cooperate, the managing strategy is generally superior to the 
motivating one. The fact that social norms have an impact on individuals and 
their preferences thus clearly has normative repercussions: “the more one is 
blind to the importance of internalization, the more one would be inclined to 
increase  fines  and  jail  sentences  to  curtail  crime.  But  if  one  understands 
internalization  and  the  ways  it  can  be  enhanced,  one  would  rely  more  on 
character education, shaming, and peer groups to change people’s behavior” 
(Etzioni  2000:  165).  To  be  sure,  while  exclusively  relying  on  monetary 
incentives is not always ideal, a complete absence of sanctions is likely to lead 
to  corruption  as  well  (Pettit  2002:  299-300).  In  this  respect,  it  is  useful  to 
introduce a system where second-time and third-time offenders of rules receive 
progressively harsher penalties for not complying. This sends a signal to all 
citizens that freeriding behavior does not pay off. 
Embracing the insight of motivational heterogeneity opens up a number of 
options  that  are  unthinkable  under  the  assumption  of  universal  egoism: 
“institutional  arrangements  can  affect  the  pattern  of  social  outcomes  by 
selecting among agents of different types as well as by altering incentives for Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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agents” (Brennan 1996: 272). The fact that not all people are purely egoistic 
suggests the desirability of screening procedures that aim to select people who 
tend to cooperate without a costly sanctioning scheme (Brennan 1996: 258-
262; Pettit 1996: 81; Pettit 2002: 297-298). If some people voluntarily act in 
socially desirable ways, one might want to search the right man for the right 
job. It is, for example, useful to attract more public-spirited individuals to hold 
public offices. In this respect, it may be sensible not to pay politicians and 
public servants too generously, since this would attract people who are only in 
it for the money. If, however, the wages are too low, incompetent candidates 
might be attracted, which increases the risk of corruption and bribery (Brennan 
1996: 273-274). The issue here is that of finding the middle road between two 
extremes. Putting aside the issue where exactly this lies – this should be decided 
on an empirical basis – I want to stress that such considerations simply cannot 
pop up if one assumes universal egoism, as Buchanan does in his theory of 
constitutional choice.  
 
4.3.2. Exogenous preferences and their amendments 
 
Bowles and Gintis (1986: 10) stress that “politics produces people”. In contrast 
with Public Choice theorists like Buchanan, they deem it wise to drop the 
assumption  of  exogenously  given  preferences  when  analyzing  the  political 
domain: “we argue that an adequate conception of action must be based upon 
the notion that people produce themselves and others through their actions 
(…). Individuals and groups, accordingly, act not merely to get but to become. 
The politics of becoming, we believe, provides a central corrective to both the 
normative  and  the  explanatory  dimensions  of  traditional  political  theory” 
(Bowles & Gintis 1986: 22). In order to show more fully what the implications 
of  all  this  are,  I  return  to  the  more  specific  issue  of  the  role  of  prosocial 
motivations in a political context. 
If other- and process-regarding preferences exist and induce socially desirable 
behavior, one should take precautionary measures to support and guarantee 
their continued existence. As James Madison writes in ‘Federalist Paper’ no. 57, 
“the aim of every political constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for 
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the 
common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual 
precautions for keeping them virtuous” (Pettit 1996: 81). This interpretation of 
the  Founding  Fathers  as  trying  to  devise  a  constitution  by  detecting  and 
supporting non-egoistic motivations in politicians could not diverge more from 
Buchanan’s focus on the need to keep egoistic politicians in check by means of 
strict constitutional limitations. Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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4.3.2.1. Crowding effects: definition 
 
The insight that the presence of prosocial motivations is not to be taken for 
granted is especially relevant when thinking about institutional issues. Crucial in 
this  respect  is  the  notion  of  crowding-out,  which  means  that  non-egoistic 
dispositions and preferences disappear under the influence of institutions and 
policies that reward egoistic behavior. The opposite effect, which is labeled 
crowding-in, occurs when institutions and policies support and strengthen non-
egoistic  dispositions.  Bruno  Frey,  an  author  well-known  for  his  work  on 
crowding effects, distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations and 
argues  that  introducing  the  former  can  lead  the  latter  to  decline:  “external 
interventions  undermine  intrinsic  motivation  under  identifiable  conditions. 
This  effect  is  theoretically  and  empirically  well  grounded”  (Ben-Ner  & 
Putterman 1998: 439).  
 
4.3.2.2. Crowding effects: evidence  
 
Frey and Jegen (2001: 589) analyze the evidence surrounding the existence and 
relevance of crowding effects: “there exist a large number of studies, offering 
empirical evidence in support of the existence of crowding-out and crowding-in. 
The  study  is  based  on  circumstantial  evidence,  laboratory  studies  by  both 
psychologists and economists, as well as field research by econometric studies”. 
As for circumstantial evidence, they refer to the example of parents paying 
their children to mow the lawn. Once this practice is established, children tend 
to perform household tasks only if there is some material benefit attached to it. 
With respect to laboratory evidence, studies by psychologists like Edward Deci 
and  economists  like  Ernst  Fehr  and  Simon  Gächter  clearly  suggest  the 
relevance of crowding-out effects (Frey & Jegen 2001: 597-600). As for field 
evidence, one can refer to a school’s daycare center that decided to sanction 
parents who came late to pick up their children. The number of late-coming 
parents actually increased, because of the changed perception of the service. 
After a monetary fine was introduced, the intrinsic motivation of parents to 
show up in time was reduced, because they felt that the teachers were being 
paid for the trouble of having to stay longer (Frey & Jegen 2001: 602). 
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4.3.2.3. Crowding effects: psychological mechanisms  
 
In order to understand crowding effects, it is useful to analyze the underlying 
psychological mechanisms. External interventions can reduce the individual’s 
self-determination  if  they  are  interpreted  as  a  form  of  control  and  thus  as 
neglecting his intrinsic motivation (Frey & Jegen 2001: 594). The fact that he is 
offered money to perform some task may lead him to feel that his authentic 
involvement is not really appreciated (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 481). In 
general,  more  uniform  interventions  will  tend  to  crowd  out  the  intrinsic 
motivations at play, since these are not properly recognized. Paying everyone to 
perform an action that some would have done out of an inner sense of duty, 
may actually push the latter to do so simply for the reward. 
The main problem is thus that external interventions can shift the so-called 
“locus of control” (Deci 1971: 105). Whereas people perceive of themselves as 
being in charge when performing an action on a voluntary basis, they no longer 
do so when they start to receive money for it. If one wants to avoid crowding-
out effects, one should make sure that external interventions are perceived as 
supporting  intrinsic  motivations:  “external  interventions  crowd-out  intrinsic 
motivations  if  they  are  perceived  to  be  controlling  and  they  crowd-in  intrinsic 
motivation if they are perceived to be acknowledging” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 
1998: 444). People who receive positive verbal support do not feel bought out 
and are more likely to continue to act on the basis of their intrinsic motivation. 
Experimental evidence supports the view that it is the nature of the external 
interventions that largely determines their impact on intrinsic motivation: “(a) 
when money was used as an external reward, intrinsic motivation tended to 
decrease, whereas (b) when verbal reinforcement and positive feedback were 
used, intrinsic motivation tended to increase” (Deci 1971: 105).  
According  to  Pettit  (1996:  73-77),  crowding-out  effects  occur  when 
institutional contexts induce virtual self-interest to come into play and – as a 
manner of speech – to shift from the back of their head to right before their 
eyes. Material rewards and sanctions might induce individuals to shift from 
their  usual,  norm-guided  routines  to  a  more  calculating  attitude.  The 
introduction of penalties and rewards can thus trigger people into thinking in 
more egoistic and outcome-oriented ways (Pettit 2002: 293). Aiming explicitly 
at the individual’s self-interest, such incentives cause the salience of egoistic 
considerations to arise or to increase. 
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4.3.2.4. Crowding effects: normative implications  
 
The  main  point  is  that  crowding-out  effects  can  cause  the  conventional 
motivating strategy to produce counterproductive results: “the introduction of 
deviant-centered sanctions would tend to switch agents from a nonegocentric 
to  an  egocentric  mode  of  deliberation.  Conclusion:  The  introduction  of 
deviant-centered sanctions is likely to do more harm than good” (Pettit 1996: 
73). It forms the main argument in favor of the managing strategy, which aims 
to  design  policies  that  support  those  socially  desirable  actions  that  are 
performed  voluntarily.  This  complier-centered  strategy  explicitly  aims  to 
strengthen rather than undermine such spontaneous compliance (Pettit 1996: 
81-87). 
In what follows, I try to show in what ways crowding-out effects affect the 
relation between citizens and politicians. Crowding out can occur if policies 
and  laws  are based  on  the principle  that  citizens  are  not  to be  trusted:  “a 
constitution  implying  a  fundamental  distrust  of  its  citizens,  and  seeking  to 
discipline them, tends to crowd out civic virtue and undermines the support 
which citizens are prepared to give towards the basic laws” (Frey & Jegen 2001: 
604). Citizens who perceive the state and its employees as trustworthy and fair 
will comply more readily to its rules, laws and decisions than citizens who have 
a negative perception of the governmental apparatus. While there is a general 
willingness to pay taxes among the former, the latter generally consider taxes to 
be unjustly high and thus try to evade them. In Frey’s words, “the intrinsic 
motivation to pay one’s taxes – or tax morale – depends strongly on the extent 
of trust the citizens have in the political system. When individuals are alienated 
from government and do not think that they are treated fairly by the political 
process, they are more inclined to pursue their self interest, i.e., to evade taxes, 
taking into account only the expected probability of being punished” (Ben-Ner 
& Putterman 1998: 452). 
Policy-makers should therefore try to support and promote the trust citizens 
have in each other and in public institutions (Gintis et al. 2005: 30, 33). If 
people trust each other, they tend to cooperate more extensively, making costly 
government intervention largely superfluous. If this is needed after all, citizens 
tend to believe it is justified. As a result, there is considerable room for large-
scale collective action by means of the state (Richerson et al. 2003: 377). If 
government officials can ensure that a vast majority of citizens contribute their 
fair  share  to  the  public  good,  their  policies  will  generally  be  perceived  as 
reasonably fair and legitimate, which harbors the trust citizens have in politics. 
If,  for  example,  almost  everybody  pays  his  taxes,  these  are  perceived  as 
justified, which helps uphold high levels of tax compliance. If, however, people Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
 
224
believe that an increasing number of citizens no longer contribute, their own 
inclination to do so will gradually erode. Here too, it is strong reciprocity that 
motivates people rather than self-interest, which would spur them to evade 
their tax duties altogether, regardless of what others do. 
With  regard  to  politicians,  it  is  crucial  to  see  that  treating  them  as 
untrustworthy knaves might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Goodin 1996: 
41; Pettit 2002: 295). If implemented in the design of institutions and policies, 
the assumption of universal egoism might actually induce them to look for 
opportunistic occasions, making them less and less virtuous. In Frey’s concise 
words, “a constitution designed for knaves tends to drive out civic virtues” 
(Frey  1997:  44).  This  constitutes  perhaps  the  most  important  problem  of 
Buchanan’s theory of constitutional choice, since it undermines his argument in 
favor  of  constitutional  constraints  that  limit  rent-seeking  in  politics.  The 
vicious cycle all this gives rise to can be broken by focusing on non-egoistic 
motivations: “the strong reciprocity model thus underscores the anxiety that 
too readily accepting the public choice picture can make it the reality of our 
political life” (Kahan 2005: 364).  
There are indeed a number of informal norms that discourage the tendency of 
politicians to serve only their own interests (Kahan 2005: 364). In fact, it is the 
institutional constellation of democratic politics that requires them to publicly 
justify their actions and opinions in other than purely self-interested terms. 
Even though politicians referring to the public interest might be hypocritical at 
first  –  they  do  not  really  care  about  it  –  the  psychological  mechanism  of 
cognitive  dissonance  reduction  leads  them  to  adjust  their  opinions  to  their 
utterances  (Elster  1998:  104).  Jon  Elster  (1998:  12)  has  labeled  this  the 
“civilizing force of hypocrisy”. The largely public nature of political decision-
making processes thus ultimately induces them to act honestly, sincerely and 
impartially. 
 
4.3.2.5. Crowding effects: theoretical relevance  
 
As  I  have  shown  in  my  analysis  of  Buchanan’s  views,  “the  assumption  of 
universal self-interest is an analytic device designed to test out the incentive 
properties of alternative institutional arrangements” (Brennan 1996: 257). This 
exercise is subverted if one assumes altruism or public-spiritedness on the part 
of the people. However, Brennan (1996: 258) stresses that the conventional 
motivating  strategy  that  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  universal  egoism  is 
appropriate only if two requirements are fulfilled: “first, that agents do not 
invariably pursue the public interest (properly identified) for its own sake (…); Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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and second, that the institutional devices so designed do not undermine any 
public-interested motivations that may be in place”. As I have shown, both of 
these  conditions  are  problematic.  First,  at  least  a  number  of  people  are 
intrinsically motivated to serve the public interest. While this does not justify an 
assumption of universal public-spiritedness, it does suggest that the assumption 
of universal egoism is inapt to say the least. Second, institutional measures that 
rely on material incentives to motivate self-interested people to act prosocially 
can  be  counterproductive.  Crowding-out  effects  thus  clearly  undermine  the 
assumption of egoism when thinking about desirable institutions. If different 
institutional  schemes  induce  different  motivations,  the  whole  rationale  of 
modeling  each  and  every  individual  as  egoistic  in  order  to  evaluate  these 
schemes is rendered superfluous.  
Crowding-out effects provide a serious anomaly for the economic conception 
of rationality, since they go against the so-called relative price effect. By making 
a  particular  behavior  more  rewarding,  economists  assume  that  this  option 
becomes  more  attractive  and  hence  that  more  individuals  will  perform  it. 
However, if crowding-out occurs, an increase in rewards leads to a decrease in 
the behavior at hand (Frey & Jegen 2001: 590). A clear example is that of a 
community in Switzerland that had to decide whether or not to allow a nuclear 
waste repository being sited in their town. While half of the respondents agreed 
to  accept  it  without  compensation,  only  a  quarter  agreed  to  accept  it  with 
compensation (Frey & Jegen 2001: 603-604).  
Since both effects can occur simultaneously, the final outcome can vary: “in 
general, both the relative price effect and the crowding-out effect are active, so 
that external intervention has two opposite effects on the agent’s performance. 
Whether intervening is beneficial from the principal’s point of view depends on 
the relative size of the two countervailing effects” (Frey & Jegen 2001: 593). It 
thus has to be analyzed empirically what the net result will be in different 
situations (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 455). According to Julian Le Grand 
(2003:  40,  168),  empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  provision  of  material 
incentives does not automatically reinforce egoistic considerations. Instead of 
turning all knights into knaves, such incentives can crowd in more altruism and 
public-spiritedness if they are perceived as a symbolic recognition of valued 
actions.  As  I  have  suggested,  all  this  largely  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
incentives provided. In most cases, a mix of different kinds of measures will 
prove optimal.  
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4.4. Normative implications at the level of the market 
 
4.4.1. Egoistic preferences and their amendments 
 
The fact that not all people act like knaves holds not only in the public but also 
in the private realm. If the assumption of universal egoism were to apply in real 
life, one would expect crime, theft and cheating to prosper everywhere. In fact, 
for markets to function properly there is need not only for a set of coercive 
governmental  rules  but  also  for  a  minimal  morality  among  its  participants. 
Even  though  it  cannot  be  framed  in  exclusively  egoistic  terms,  a  minimal 
amount of trust is needed for social order to be possible at all (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman 1998: 417; Brennan 1996: 259-260). Smith’s invisible hand does not 
rely exclusively upon knavish motives but on a proper mix of egoistic and 
moral  motivations  (Ben-Ner  &  Putterman  1998:  9).  As  I  have  already 
suggested, it is thanks to trust and social norms (communities) that markets can 
function  as  well  as  they  do:  “large-scale,  market-based  societies  could  not 
function without well-coordinated norms for dealing with anonymous, one-
shot, monetary interactions” (Henrich et. al. 2004: 163).  
 
4.4.2. Exogenous preferences and their amendments 
 
Providing material incentives to induce people to cooperate might diminish 
mutual  trust,  which  in  the  end  may  undercut  the  positive  effect  of  such 
incentives altogether. Consequently, this conventional strategy may turn out to 
be a self-defeating one: “field and laboratory research suggests that incentives, 
far from solving collective action problems, can sometimes actually magnify 
them by dissipating trust” (Kahan 2005: 343). After all, they tend to mask the 
motivations of one’s fellow citizens, which may lead one to question whether 
or  not  they  will  continue  to  cooperate  voluntarily.  Why  else  would  such 
material incentives be provided? Material incentives (which characterize both 
governmental policies as well as market relations) can thus crowd out strongly 
reciprocal and norm-guided actions (which typically characterize interactions in 
communities) (Gintis et al. 2005: 20). 
In this respect, I want to refer to the phenomenon of crowding out in the labor 
market. Punctual workers can become clock-watchers after harsh penalties are 
imposed for arriving late at the office. This can lead to a reduction in work 
morale and effort. Moreover, material benefits tend to attract money-seekers to 
positions that were previously taken by people who performed their job right Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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because they felt it had intrinsic value or because this was required by their 
work ethics. Take the example of caring labor. If one increases the pay, this 
does not automatically result in more and better care: “a higher price may even 
have a crowding out effect by eroding the kind of values which underlie the 
motivation for caring labor” (Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 181). Once more, 
the managing strategy is clearly superior to the motivating one. 
Max  Weber  (1914:  40-41)  distinguishes  between  associative  relationships, 
which  are  based  on  a  congruence  of  one’s  interests,  and  communal 
relationships, which are based on the feeling that one belongs together. Market 
interactions  belong  to  the  former,  because  they  primarily  allow  parties  to 
improve  their  situation.  In  this  respect,  Weber  (1914:  636)  notices  the 
potentially  disastrous  effects  of  anonymous  market  interactions  on  socially 
desirable motivations: “the market community as such is the most impersonal 
relationship of practical life into which humans can enter with one another 
(…). Where the market is allowed to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its 
participants do not look toward the persons of each other but only toward the 
commodity; there are no obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of 
those spontaneous human relations that are sustained by personal unions. They 
all would just obstruct the free development of the bare market relationship, 
and its specific interests serve, in their turn, to weaken the sentiments on which 
these obstructions rest”. While not explicitly, Weber questions the assumptions 
of  egoistic  and  exogenously  given  preferences.  He  clearly  argues  that  the 
egoistic reasoning that dominates market behavior is antithetic to the nobler 
motivations that dominate personal relationships.  
Conventional economists praise the market for its ability to optimally allocate 
goods  and  services  without  assuming  benevolence  or  altruism.  Bowles  and 
Gintis (1986: 130) cast doubt on this conventional view of the role of the 
market as exclusively concerned with the production and distribution of goods: 
“a constitutive theory of the economy must address not only the question of 
who gets what and why, it must also ask who gets to become what and why. A 
theory that focuses exclusively on production runs the risk of seeing economic 
activity as simply a process of getting rather than also a process of becoming”. 
They thus stress that markets can have an impact on its participants as well. 
Markets  reduce not  only  the need  for non-egoistic  considerations,  but  also 
these considerations themselves (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 129). 
According to Jean Ensminger, there are two distinct and opposite effects that 
markets can have on its participants (Henrich et. al. 2004: 357). First, markets 
can induce more self-interested behavior and erode nobler motivations. Since 
egoistic  behavior  tends  to  be  rewarded  in  market  settings,  the  Homo Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Economicus model works as a self-fulfilling prophecy here80. Second, it has 
been argued that markets induce considerations like honesty, good manners 
and a concern for reputation. People who engage more frequently in market 
relations  are  more  likely  to  follow  norms  of  cooperation,  fairness  and 
reciprocity  than  others,  since  they  are  familiar  with  anonymous,  one-shot 
interactions and the mutual benefits these can produce (Henrich et. al. 2004: 
356). People who never engage in such interactions, the argument goes, tend to 
distrust people who they do not know personally and are thus less willing to 
cooperate. Indeed, in Western, highly developed societies, where markets play a 
prominent role in everyday life, cooperation is abundant.  
Ensminger is rather optimistic about the overall effect of markets, stressing 
that  they  can  reinforce  socially  desirable  motivations.  She  concludes  that 
people’s concern for reputation may become so entrenched that it emerges in 
anonymous, one-shot interactions as well (Henrich et. al. 2004: 380). While 
some would argue that this implies that everything can ultimately be reduced to 
self-interest, I think it is warranted to conclude that norms of cooperation, 
fairness  and  reciprocity  have  an  autonomous  impact  on  behavior  that  can 
override egoistic considerations. As I have suggested earlier on, it is thanks to 
such norms that market exchanges can generate mutual benefits (Henrich et. al. 
2004: 429).  
Bowles and Gintis clearly do not share Ensminger’s optimism in this respect. 
In their view, the market can be valued both positively and negatively: “it is 
exactly  the  anonymity  of  the  market  that  renders  it  so  attractive  when 
considered from the standpoint of instrumental action and so ominous when 
considered as a formative influence on human development” (Bowles & Gintis 
1986: 129). They argue that the anonymity in market exchanges renders less 
likely the evolution of social norms that are crucial in solving coordination 
problems  (Bowles  &  Gintis  1993:  95-96).  Behavior  based  on  norms  of 
cooperation becomes less viable and stable if markets spread81. This thought 
has been succinctly formulated by Bowles and Gintis (1993: 97): “it has been 
suggested  that  homo  economicus  produced  capitalism,  meaning  roughly  that 
human nature being what it is, the evolution of the capitalist rules of the game 
is both likely and desirable. But this may be just backwards, or at least one-
sided; one could equally argue that capitalism produced homo economicus”. While 
                                                 
80 This phenomenon also comes to the fore in experiments that show that students tend 
to act more egoistically after taking economics classes (Frank et al. 1993). 
81 An additional consequence might be that people become less concerned with politics if 
markets become increasingly more important in social life: “markets might undermine 
democratic  political  participation  through  limiting  the  stakes  and  reducing  the 
opportunity costs of not participating” (Bowles & Gintis 1986: 135). Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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the first sentence summarizes Buchanan’s position, the second largely coincides 




5.1. Summing things up at the individual level  
 
Experimental evidence shows not only that strong reciprocity motivates people 
to  reward  prosocial  and  punish  antisocial  behavior  in  anonymous  one-shot 
interactions,  but  also  that  they  do  so  to  a  greater  extent  in  repeated 
interactions. In addition, less people act in strongly reciprocal ways if the costs 
of doing so increase (Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 19). This immediately suggests 
that the Homo Economicus model is not without value (Alexander 2005: 108). 
The  fact  that  non-egoistic  preferences  are  widespread  in  social  interactions 
throughout the world by no means implies that egoism plays no role at all. 
Experiments  provide  substantive  evidence  that  a  minority  of  people 
systematically serve their own interests. In addition, accounts of kin selection, 
direct reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity and costly signaling 
do explain some forms of human cooperation. They show that egoism can be 
behind reciprocity when interactions are repeated or when reputation building 
is possible (Fehr & Fischbacher 2005: 16). Stressing the importance of strong 
reciprocity, however, I have aimed to criticize the general tendency to explain 
all  forms  of  cooperation  as  based  on  purely  egoistic  and  instrumental 
considerations.  
Most economists and evolutionary psychologists implicitly argue that strong 
reciprocity is irrational. As I have already shown, however, there is no need to 
claim that rationality presupposes self-interest or outcome-orientation (Gintis 
2000: 320; Gintis et al. 2005: 5). The minimal conception of rationality only 
stipulates that rational actions are based on what the individual considers to be 
good reasons. As such, it is perfectly possible to think of the dutiful and norm-
guided aspects of strong reciprocity as rational.  
The evolutionary perspective is valuable in that it analyzes where such reasons 
come from and how they are formed. It shows that they should be modeled in 
ways  that  do  not  fit  the  conventional  Homo  Economicus  model.  Insights 
gained from evolutionary theory thus lead Bowles and Gintis to criticize and 
amend the all too strict requirements of economic rationality. Pointing towards 
the  importance  of  both  genetic  and  cultural  factors  affecting  individual 
preferences and identities, evolutionary insights are crucial in understanding Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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not  only  individual  behavior  but  also  the  social  and  institutional  structure 
people live in.  
 
5.2. Summing things up at the institutional level  
 
The  central  argument  in  this  dissertation  is  that  decisions  concerning 
institutional design and reform should take people as they are. Because of their 
all too narrow theoretical assumptions, conventional economists fail to address 
some of the most crucial normative issues in modern societies. Bowles, Gintis 
and their collaborators remedy this problem by providing a richer view of the 
multitude of individual motivations. In this respect, they try to live up to the 
requirement that normative views on institutions should take into account the 
wide motivational array of individuals: “within most social actors, self-seeking 
impulses exist alongside principled and even altruistic motives. In designing our 
institutions we ought at least to take account of that fact, which might (as a 
further  principle)  be  describe  as  sensitivity  to  motivational  complexity”  (Goodin 
1996: 41). Pointing towards the value of communities, Bowles and Gintis show 
that  the  conventional  debate  on  the  tasks  of  markets  and  states  is  to  be 
rephrased  if  it  is  to  be  relevant  for  institutional  issues  that  concern  actual 
individuals. 
Communities have both an instrumental and an intrinsic value. First, they are 
able to partly address the freerider problems that markets and states inevitably 
face:  “communities  solve  problems  that  might  otherwise  appear  as  classic 
market failures or state failures” (Bowles & Gintis 2002: F422). Through the 
enforcement of prosocial norms, they help to achieve and sustain levels of 
cooperation higher than would be expected on the basis of the assumption of 
universal egoism (Bowles & Gintis 1998: 4). The fact that community members 
have  internalized  shared  norms  allows  them  to  engage  in  collective  action 
without having to resort to costly and coercive state intervention (Bowles & 
Gintis  2000:  46).  In  short,  communities  can  render  coercive  and  costly 
governmental intervention superfluous. Governments can thus save themselves 
a lot of trouble simply by welcoming and supporting the informal norms that 
ensure high levels of cooperation in communities.  
Second,  communities  also  have  intrinsic  value.  People  are  essentially  social 
creatures who define themselves as members of a group. Seeing their own 
origins and destinies as inextricably bound up with those of that group, they 
feel  isolated  without  it:  “community  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  sentimental 
attachment to other persons, but enters deeply into identity in such a way that, 
cut off from the relevant community, a person’s life would lose an important Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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part of its meaning” (Miller 1990: 234). Crucial to speak of communities is the 
emotional connection that accompanies the group member’s identification with 
a  shared  history,  tradition,  language  or  symbol  (Margolis  1984:  128-129; 
McMillan & Chavis 1986: 8). Because of their purely formal and anonymous 
nature,  interactions  in  markets  and  states  do  not  allow  people  to  act  on 
fundamental  aspects  of  their  identities.  Communities  provide  a  suitable 
antidote  to  such  alienating  contexts,  since  they  enable  people  with  shared 
identities to express who they are. In contrast with both markets and states, 
which are based on the liberal goals of mutually beneficial cooperation and 
moral  neutrality,  communities  thus  allow  individuals  to  act  on  their 
comprehensive doctrines.  
As people engage less and less in repeated and personal interactions, they “may 
develop fewer loyalties and affections and may thus feel less regard for others” 
(Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 49). The very fact that an individual finds himself 
in circumstances where self-regarding preferences prevail may lead to a gradual 
erosion of his other- and process-regarding preferences. However, there is no 
reason  to  despair,  since  these  effects  can  be  countered  and  even  reversed: 
“interactions within families and small groups may permit desirable other- and 
process-regarding  preferences  to  be  rewarded  (…).  Habituation  to  other-
regarding or virtuous behavior in the small-group setting may (…) predispose 
individuals to behave similarly in situations involving outsiders” (Ben-Ner & 
Putterman 1998: 43). The personal relations within communities can thus serve 
as a counterweight against the impersonal ones within states and markets (Ben-
Ner & Putterman 1998: 324). 
It has been debated to what extent one can speak of an increasing process of 
individualization in modern societies. In order to show the need for reacting to 
the dissolving bonds between the members of a society, I want to refer to the 
example of care for the elderly. Whereas this used to be done on an informal 
and  voluntary  basis  by  neighbors  and  family  members,  one  can  argue  that 
people nowadays rely more heavily on more formalized public arrangements. 
However,  these  have  a  number  of  downsides,  like  the  increased  costs  for 
society in general and, more importantly, the deteriorating well-being of the 
elderly themselves. After all, placement in large homes often leads to increased 
isolation and ensuing depressions. Once more, one can see both the purely 
instrumental and the more elemental value of communities coming to the fore.  
As this chapter’s opening quote by John Plamenatz suggests, the notion of 
communities  is  indispensable  as  soon  as  one  sees  that  the  economic 
conception of rationality is too narrow to capture the essence of what it is to be 
human. Because of the impersonal character of interactions within markets and 
states, these institutions hardly leave room for the aspects that characterize Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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expressive rationality. In contrast, communities allow people to express who 
they are and to form themselves in ways they deem desirable. After all, an 
important part of their identity is still defined by the groups they belong to: 
“people  see  themselves  not  merely  as  individuals  with  essentially  private 
interests and concerns, but as tied to social units in such a way that in answer 
to the question ‘Who are you?’ they will say, among other things, ‘I belong to 
…’” (Miller 1990: 234).  
What matters is that one finds a suitable combination in which each institution 
performs  its  own  valuable  tasks  in  mutually  supporting  ways.  Take,  for 
example, David Miller’s defense of market socialism. While he gives a central 
role to markets, which efficiently provide the goods and services people want, 
he realizes that these need to be complemented by a state that sets the basic 
rules, rectifies income inequalities and supplies the public goods that markets 
fail to provide (Miller 1990: 295-298). Yet, Miller (1990: 319) stresses that such 
a state does not necessarily turn into an ever increasing bureaucratic apparatus: 
“it should not be the benevolent colossus of socialist myth; but nor, for the 
same reason, need it be the malevolent leviathan of libertarian nightmare”. In 
addition, he stresses the value of communities, especially at the national level: 
“it is because they share a common identity that citizens are able to reach a 
genuine consensus on matters of policy; without this underlying identity the 
other components of the system would fall apart” (Miller 1990: 18-19). This 
shows that it is perfectly possible to combine (the advantages of) a free market, 
a quite extensive state and a comprehensive community. 
 
5.3. Bringing together the individual and the institutional level 
 
The  view  of  individuals  as  serving  the  public  interest,  which  used  to  be 
dominant amongst political philosophers, has recently been replaced by the less 
naïve view of individuals as serving their private interests. I have argued that 
both extremes of this motivational dichotomy are inappropriate for normative 
purposes. As Le Grand (2003: 2) puts it: “policies designed on the assumption 
that those who work in the public sector are basically knights are likely to have 
disastrous consequences if in fact most of those individuals are predominantly 
knaves. But the same may be true for policies fashioned on the basis of a belief 
that people are knaves if the consequence is to suppress their natural altruistic 
impulses and hence destroy part of their motivation to provide a quality public 
service”. Theorists should take into account a wider array of motivations when 
aiming to improve institutions and policies (Fehr & Gächter 2000: 161, 178; 
Kahan 2005: 366). While empirically adequate models of individuals need to be Chapter 6: The Alternative of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
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developed  more  fully,  I  believe  the  Homo  Reciprocans  model  provides  an 
appropriate basis in this respect. 
This  shift  in  the  way  individuals  are  modeled  is  likely  to  have  significant 
normative  repercussions:  “good  policies  and  constitutions  are  those  that 
support socially valued outcomes not only by harnessing selfish motives to 
socially valued ends, but also by evoking, cultivating, and empowering public 
spirited motives” (Bowles & Gintis 2002: F430). Even though I have stressed 
the  superiority  of  the  managing  strategy  that  takes  such  motivations  into 
account, the motivating strategy has its value as well. Even though policies 
providing  material  incentives  to  induce  citizens  to  cooperate  can  be 
counterproductive, this is surely not always the case. They can be useful in 
preventing a completely lawless situation to arise. If they are explicitly targeted 
at freeriding knaves, they can strengthen the trust that more knightly citizens 
have in the institutions that govern their lives. As such, they can bolster rather 
than undermine the widespread predisposition to cooperate (Kahan 2005: 346-
351). 
Whereas  liberal  theorists  tend  to  view  other-regarding  dispositions  and 
motivations  like  altruism  and  public-spiritedness  as  scarce  resources  that 
should not be relied upon too heavily, Bowles and Gintis show that a lot of 
people act in a number of ways that cannot be understood in self-interested 
terms. In addition, they show that institutions should cultivate prosocial actions 
and motivations, because they might disappear if not exercised on a regular 
basis. The analogy with scarce resources that are used up if employed too often 
is misleading in that prosocial motives can actually fade away if they are not put 
into practice.  
At the individual level, I have focused on strong reciprocity as falling beyond 
the  motivational  dichotomy.  At  the  institutional  level,  I  have  focused  on 
communities  as  falling  beyond  the  institutional  dichotomy.  Failing  to 
incorporate  the  empirical  evidence  supporting  the  widespread  presence  of 
strong  reciprocity,  the  conventional  debate  on  the  task  division  between 
markets and states is outdated. In this respect, I have stressed that welfare 
economists  and  normative  political  thinkers  should  focus  more  on 
communities.  
People generally act according to the roles attached to the institutional context 
within which they act. In the market, egoism is the central motivation. In the 
state,  people  tend  to  act  in  more  public-spirited  ways.  In  communities, 
motivations  like  strong  reciprocity,  generosity,  loyalty,  solidarity,  trust  and 
shame  are  crucial.  If  one  assumes  universal  egoism,  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  the  importance  of  families,  states  and  communities  in  modern 
societies.  If  one  wants  to  explain  and  appreciate  the  central  role  these Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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institutions  continue  to  fulfill,  one  should  allow  for  more  motivational 
heterogeneity than conventional economists tend to do (Ben-Ner & Putterman 
1998: 54-57). 
I acknowledge that the individual and the institutional level do not correspond 
as neatly as I may have suggested. All of the abovementioned notions are best 
understood as ideal types that do not actually exist in their pure form. Just like 
individuals are typically motivated by a multitude of considerations, societies 
always  consist  of  a  complex  mixture  of  elements  that  characterize  these 
institutional ideal types. Moreover, such an amalgam of institutions mutually 
complementing  each  other  is  highly  desirable,  since  they  simply  cannot 
function properly without each other (Miller 1990: 249-251). A governmental 
framework is indispensable for smooth market relations, just as much as norms 
(communities) help govern the interactions between consumers and producers, 
employees  and  employers  (markets)  and  citizens  and  their  political 
representatives (states). Markets and states would simply break down if it were 
not for the widespread tendency of individuals to adhere to the informal norms 
that form the backbone of their communities. The main challenge thus lies in 
“developing  an  institutional  structure  such  that  states,  markets  and 
communities are mutually enhancing” (Bowles & Gintis 2002: F431). CONCLUSION OF PART III 
 
 
“Social actors are transformed by their very acts (…). Social choice transforms not 
only the rules of the game, but the subjects of social life themselves”  
(Bowles & Gintis 1986: 118) 
 
1. Conclusions at the explanatory level  
 
As should be clear by now, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis diverge from 
James  Buchanan  in  their  analyses  of  individual  behavior,  motivation  and 
rationality. This goes for all the levels I have distinguished in the first part of 
this  dissertation.  Whereas  Buchanan  focuses  on  the  instrumental  nature  of 
actions  and  the  egoistic  and  exogenous  nature  of  preferences,  Bowles  and 
Gintis amend all of these assumptions. As their empirical research on strong 
reciprocity  shows,  people  often  act  on  the  basis  of  internalized  norms  of 
cooperation, reciprocity and fairness, regardless whether this benefits them or 
not. This clearly demonstrates that they do not aim to achieve some goal but 
simply want to express their adherence to such norms and their attachment to 
the community they live in. It also shows that people often are not egoistic, not 
even  in  some  indirect  way.  In  addition,  the  fact  that  such  cooperative, 
reciprocal  and  fair  actions  can  be  crowded  out  under  the  influence  of  an 
inappropriate  use  of  monetary  incentives  suggests  that  people’s  preferences 
should not be taken for granted (which is what one does if one assumes these 
to be exogenously given). 
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on institutions in a broad 
range of scientific disciplines. More and more economists, sociologists, political 
theorists and philosophers embrace the insight that social action is always set 
within  an  institutional  context.  These  institutions,  however,  not  only  form 
external constraints on individual choices, but also have a more internal impact 
on people: “the same contextual factors that constrain individual and group 
actions also shape the desires, preferences, and motives of those individual and 
group agents” (Goodin 1996: 20). Perhaps the main conclusion of the third 
part of this dissertation at the explanatory level is thus that institutions alter 
both people’s choice options (by constraining them) as well as their preferences 
(by shaping them).  Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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Individuals  and  institutions  mutually  influence  each  other.  First,  the 
institutional  structure  of  a  society  is  formed  through  the  decisions  of  its 
members.  Individual  behavior  merges  into  social  norms  and  institutions. 
Second, individuals are in turn affected by the institutions that constitute the 
environment within which they are socialized. According to Douglas North, 
the social sciences should focus explicitly on “the underlying interrelationships 
between  the  rules  of  the  game  that  humans  devise  to  structure  human 
interaction and the way those rules evolve in the interaction between humans 
and their environment, an environment which changes as a result not only of 
external natural forces, but also of changes induced by the players themselves” 
(Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998: 491). In order to get an adequate understanding 
of the complex interplay between both individuals and institutions, one thus 
needs an adequate model of both.  
This perfectly ties in with my points of criticism towards the all too narrow 
economic  conception  of  rationality:  “an  understanding  of  this  two-way 
relationship  requires  a  more  comprehensive  characterization  of  human 
motivation  than  that  which  lies  at  the  core  of  standard  economic  models” 
(Ben-Ner & Putterman: xvii). While the first part of this dissertation hints at 
ways in which the economic models can and should be amended, this third 
part shows that this should always be done in a way that incorporates the 
impact of institutions. I have tried to show that institutions, rules and norms 
have some sort of robustness that makes them a relevant factor in any model 
within the social sciences. 
It is interesting to see whether all this has repercussions for the assumption of 
methodological individualism. I believe the insights of Bowles and Gintis show 
the need to amend Buchanan’s all too individualist approach to institutions. 
Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman (1998: 45) pose this issue as follows: “a 
full  understanding  of  the  effects  of  preferences  on  institutions,  and  of 
institutions on preferences, requires a view of their relationship as operating in 
two directions at once. But researching such a two-way relationship rigorously 
presents serious methodological challenges. If both institutions and values are 
endogenous, what can be the starting point for one’s analysis?”. In this respect, 
one could say that orthodox economists typically cling on to methodological 
individualism, whereas sociologists typically stress that the basic explanatory 
force is primarily situated at the institutional and thus structural level. In this 
respect, I want to follow the middle road, which is described by Goodin (1996: 
17): “even the staunchest advocate of rational choice models as explanatory 
tools must concede that people’s preferences (which are the driving force in 
that model) (…) come, ultimately, from structures of past experiences, prior 
socialization or social location. And even the staunchest advocate of structural 
explanations  cannot  escape  the  fact  that  there  have  to  be  agents  –  albeit Conclusion of Part III 
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“socially constructed” ones – to serve as the carriers and enforcers of those 
structural imperatives, which those agents inevitably reshape in the process of 
reapplying and reinforcing them”.  
In the first part of this dissertation, I unambiguously adopted the principle of 
methodological  individualism,  according  to  which  social  phenomena  should 
ultimately  be  explained  by  referring  to  individuals  and  their  actions.  After 
studying the works of Analytical Marxists like Bowles and Gintis, however, a 
more sophisticated view seems to be in order. The fact that individuals are 
shaped by social factors such as institutions leads one to question whether the 
former  indeed  form  the  ultimate  basis  for  explanations  within  the  social 
sciences. After all, what do preferences, beliefs and intentions – or, in short, 
reasons – matter, if they result from social, institutional and structural factors 
in society? Should we not replace the methodological individualist stance with a 
structuralist one? 
Michael  Taylor  (1988:  94)  convincingly  argues  that  “a  pure  individualist 
explanation would have the field to itself only if the causes of the attitudes and 
beliefs which cause action are themselves nothing but actions and properties of 
individuals”.  In  this  case,  the  individual  is  indeed  the  ultimate  explanatory 
variable. This view assumes that social structures are nothing but individuals 
interacting with each other. This reflects Buchanan’s view of institutions as 
resulting from voluntary exchange relations between rational individuals. In his 
view,  institutions  exist  only  because  they  serve  the  purposes  of  these 
individuals and will collapse if they no longer do so.  
While  Taylor  (1988:  95)  grants  that  structures  do  not  exist  completely 
independently  from  individuals,  he  believes  that  such  a  purely  individualist 
view is too radical: “certainly, a structure typically emerges as a result of, and is 
maintained or transformed by, the actions of individuals. But it is not the same 
thing  as  these  actions”.  However,  this  immediately  suggests  that  a  purely 
structuralist account is inapt as well. While structural factors like institutions 
play an important role in society, they are partly formed through intentional 
actions  of  individuals:  “these  structures  and  situations  are  themselves  in 
significant part the products of intentional actions” (Taylor 1988: 97). That is 
why I have repeatedly stressed the value of Buchanan’s optimism regarding 
people’s capacity to change the structural aspects of society for the better. 
The basic conclusion is that neither individuals nor institutions can provide the 
ultimate rock-bottom foundation for explanations within the social sciences. 
One should try to find the middle road between an exclusive focus on free and 
intentional individuals on the one hand and an exclusive focus on structural 
factors on the other hand. After all, the fact that individuals, their preferences 
and  identities  are  partly  formed  by  structural  factors  does  not  make  them Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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irrelevant. Similarly, the fact that these structural factors are in part result from 
individual  actions  does  not  make  them  irrelevant.  Consequently, one needs 
“both individualist explanation of structures (and other macrophenomena) and 
structuralist  explanation  (amongst  other  kinds  of  explanation)  of  individual 
attitudes and beliefs. To deny either side of this supposition is to deny any 
causal force either to structures or to individuals, to attach all the explanatory 
power  to  one  or  the  other”  (Taylor  1988:  94).  Since  the  individual  and 
structural levels determine each other, both kinds of explanations are necessary 
(Mayer 1994: 211). 
This leads me to nuance my views regarding individualism. At the ontological 
level, Philip Pettit (1993: 123-155) convincingly argues in favor of what he 
labels holistic individualism. While he does not deny the existence of social and 
structural regularities (holism), he remains an individualist in claiming that these 
do not eliminate or dominate intentional regularities (individualism) (Cuypers 
2002:  93-97).  Pettit  stresses  that  an  individual’s  actions  are  not  completely 
determined by structural factors (individualism), while acknowledging that his 
beliefs  and  preferences  essentially  depend  on  the  people  surrounding  him 
(holism) (Van Liedekerke 2002: 116). At the methodological level, I endorse 
Pettit’s defense of “explanatory ecumenism, according to which intentional, 
structural,  historicist,  and  rational  choice  styles  of  explanation  are 
complementary  enterprises”  (Pettit  1993:  229).  As  I  have  shown,  both 
intentional and structural explanations are valid and can mutually complement 
each other. There is no reason why the validity of either sort of explanation 
would undercut that of the other (Pettit 1993: 253). The notion of holistic 
individualism allows one to bring together both the individual (part I) and the 
institutional level (part III).  
 
2. Conclusions at the normative level 
 
The works of James Buchanan and Analytical Marxists like Bowles and Gintis 
provide  a  number  of  useful  insights  in  normative  issues  surrounding 
institutional  design.  As  Buchanan  himself  stresses,  “there  are  important 
normative implications to be derived from the public choice perspective on 
politics,  implications  that,  in  their  turn,  carry  with  them  an  approach  to 
institutional reform” (XIII, 19). In the end, his aim is not merely to analyze 
what individuals and institutions look like, but to suggest how things can be 
changed for the better (III, 306). 
As I have shown, Buchanan ends up defending a libertarian social order that 
heavily relies the market’s invisible hand mechanism. The only task the minimal Conclusion of Part III 
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state has to fulfill is to make sure that the market functions well. Governmental 
intervention  is  thought  of  as  a  necessary  evil  only  to  be  employed  if  its 
alternative of free market interaction leads to even worse outcomes. In contrast 
with Buchanan who explicitly bases his theory of constitutional choice on the 
Homo Economicus model, Bowles and Gintis (1999: 2) focus on motivations 
that  lie  beyond  this  model  in  order  to  create  more  room  for  legitimate 
government  intervention.  A  more  sophisticated  view  of  rational  individuals 
shows that the conventional debate between defenders of either the market or 
the  state  is  grossly  outdated  and  incomplete.  Stressing  the  importance  of 
actions based on social norms prescribing cooperation, reciprocity and fairness, 
it enables one to argue in favor of less market and state and more community.  
As  I  have  shown,  James  Buchanan  applies  a  catallactic  perspective  to  the 
constitutional choice of a basic institutional structure. Bowles and Gintis (1986: 
117) show that the assumptions that are implicit in doing so have a blind spot: 
“among the more compelling metaphors for society is the market (…). This 
view admirably captures the intentional aspect of human activities reflected in 
the act of choice, but it ignores structural determination; the systematic way in 
which the rules of the game produce social outcomes independently of the 
wills of the actors themselves”. Buchanan fails to adequately understand the 
impact of institutions and norms on society and its members, which is exactly 
the main focus of most Marxist and structuralist theorists. However, the latter, 
in turn, fail to capture the fact that people can act freely within the rules and 
even intentionally change these rules. 
In order to take both aspects into account, Bowles and Gintis (1986: 118) 
propose to understand society as “an ensemble of games. The game analogy is 
immediately attractive as it evokes both action and structure (…). We integrate 
choice, structural determination, and history by conceiving of realms of social 
action  as  games  in  which  both  the  rules  and  the  players  are  continually 
transformed  (…).  The  rules  of  the  various  games  define  the  meaning  and 
effectiveness of action on the part of the players, but these rules are in turn 
altered by the players themselves”. As this conclusion’s opening quote suggests, 
Bowles  and  Gintis  make  use  of  this  analogy  in  order  to  stress  the  mutual 
dependence  of  institutions  of  a  society  and  its  members.  They  argue  that 
neoclassical economists – primarily because of their assumption of exogenous 
preferences  – have  focused  exclusively  on  the  rules of  the  game:  “political 
theorists  and  constitutional  thinkers  since  the  late  eighteenth  century  have 
taken Homo economicus as a starting point (…). Good rules of the game thus 
came to displace good citizens as the sine qua non of good government” (Bowles 
&  Gintis  2005:  379).  Since  people  are  assumed  to  have  exogenously  given 
reasons,  the  only  way  to  improve  society  is  to  change  its  structural Part III: The Rationality of Institutional Design 
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characteristics. With Bowles and Gintis, I want to revive attention to the fact 
that well-ordered societies consist of good citizens as well as good institutions. 
While Bowles and Gintis make use of the same analogy as Buchanan, their 
normative  conclusions  diverge  completely.  This  results  from  their 
acknowledgement  of  the  fact  that  individuals  can  change  when  playing  the 
game of life. Their empirically more adequate views of both individuals and 
institutions show that Monty Python’s lyrics are too simplistic in presenting the 
whole issue as a dilemma. As their focus on cultural factors in natural selection 
shows,  people  are  not  “simply  spirally  coils  of  self-replicating  DNA”. 
However, neither “is life just a game where we make up the rules while we are 
searching for something to say”. It is simply absurd to believe that individuals 
can freely and intentionally choose the rules that guide their lives. Nevertheless, 
even though people are partly determined by their genetic, cultural, social and 
institutional backgrounds, there is room for constructivist attempts to improve 
society. I will go into this thought more fully in the general conclusion. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
“For myself, I am an optimist – it does not seem to be much use being anything 
else”  
(Churchill 1954: 8603) 
 
This dissertation is based on the conviction that the notion of rationality is 
crucial if one wants to explain human behavior. I hope it furthers the search 
for  consistent  and  philosophically  pertinent  alternative  conceptions  of 
rationality  that  criticize  and  complement  the  conventional  –  but  alas  still 
dominant – economic one. Each of these alternatives captures aspects that are 
essential to understand human beings as rational creatures. Whereas expressive 
rationality stresses that people have good reasons to act upon the things they 
care about, the value of instrumental rationality is based on the simple fact that 
rational people often care about the consequences of their actions. While it 
would be grossly irrational for people not to honor the basic commitments that 
constitute their identities, the meaning of their lives does not hinge entirely 
upon the accomplishments they achieve. In what follows, I try to sum up some 
general conclusions and show the relevance and value of this dissertation’s 
research project.  
 
1. Avoiding a pessimistic determinism 
 
As should be clear by now, I strongly believe in the capacity of people to 
design  and  reform  the  institutions  that  govern  their  lives.  This  optimistic 
attitude  seems  to  be  some  kind  of  necessity  if  one  wants  to  engage  in 
normative political philosophy. As this conclusion’s opening quote by Winston 
Churchill aptly suggests, it does not seem to be much use being anything else 
than an optimist. If one does not believe that individuals can improve (the 
basic institutional structure of) their society, one ends op in passive resignation.  
To  explain  this  thought  more  fully,  I  want  to  bring  into  remembrance  the 
quote by Monty Python cited in this dissertation’s general introduction: “is life 
just a game where we make up the rules, while we are searching for something 
to say? Or are we just simply spirally coils of self-replicating DNA?”. As I have 
suggested, the question it raises is a genuine and interesting one. Are human General Conclusion 
 
242
beings able to deliberately change the rules and institutions that guide their 
lives or will such attempts inevitably encounter the strict boundaries of human 
nature? However, I want to argue that its formulation is misleading in that it 
presents this issue in a dichotomous way. The lyrics suggest that people are 
either completely free to think up whatever rules they deem desirable or that 
they are completely determined by their genetic constitution. Instead, I want to 
argue that both sides of the story are relevant. When thinking about desirable 
rules and institutions for modern societies, one should thus take into account 
human nature as it has evolved. While it would be absurd to deny that people 
are – to some extent – determined by their genes, this does not imply that they 
have no control whatsoever over the ways in which they organize their lives.  
In a highly insightful article, Thomas Christiano argues that rational choice 
approaches to the public domain inevitably fall victim to the trap of what he 
labels  “basic  structure  determinism”.  Referring  to  institutions  like  markets, 
states and communities, Christiano (2004: 124) defines this as “the thesis that 
the development, maintenance, and decline of basic structural institutions in 
society is determined by forces that are beyond the capacity of human beings 
to  guide  and  design.  Political  institutions  do  not  develop  the  way  they  do 
because human beings think that this is the best way for them to develop (…). 
Political and social institutions are the product of the cumulative effects of 
many  people  acting  with  a  great  variety  of  different  purposes,  and  the 
development of the institutions overall cannot be said to be determined by any 
kind of design, choice, or plan”.  
The crux of his argument lies in claiming “that individuals rarely have much 
impact on the social and political institutions in which they live. So individuals 
do not have incentives to try to change the constitutional order under which 
they live. The expected value of their actions is so low in this area that the self-
interest of individuals inclines them to concern themselves with other issues” 
(Christiano 2004: 128). According to Christiano (2004: 132), it makes sense 
from a rational choice perspective to find out which institutions are desirable, 
but not to expect that individuals will do what is necessary to bring about these 
institutions: “the combination of the assumption of homo economicus and the 
exhortation to bring about the best basic structural political institutions seems 
to be a self-defeating approach to politics if basic structure determinism is true. 
And the reason for this is that it is simply not within the power of human 
beings  voluntarily  and  by  design  to  bring  about  desirable  basic  structural 
change”.  
Accepting this kind of determinism thus generally leads to a pessimistic stance 
in issues surrounding institutional design. After all, it is hard to see what the 
use would be of articulating ideal institutional schemes if no rational individual General Conclusion 
 
243
will try to achieve them. Basic institutions, the argument goes, are typically 
formed and reformed as the unintended result of the interactions of a lot of 
people. No single individual has control over this process. This lays bare a 
strange kind of tension in the views of liberal theorists like James Buchanan. 
Whereas  they  systematically  stress  the  ability  of  individuals  to  freely  and 
intentionally change the rules and institutions of society, they have to admit 
that  people,  whom  they  model  as  economically  rational,  have  no  incentive 
whatsoever  to  employ  this  ability  and  to  engage  in political  or  institutional 
matters. 
There are two ways out of this pessimistic trap. First, one can stress that basic 
structure  determinism  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  individuals  to  act 
intentionally and freely to achieve their goals (Christiano 2004: 125). After all, it 
only argues that actions intended to change institutions in deliberate ways are 
doomed to fail. While the basic institutional framework is not subject to the 
deliberate planning of individuals, the latter can still make marginal changes. 
This line of reasoning implies that the room for institutional design and reform 
is limited. Nevertheless, it allows one to remain optimistic and to put one’s 
hopes in small but incremental changes to the institutional structure. After all, 
such deliberate and conscious efforts to make the world a better place are 
precisely what politics is all about. 
Second, one can argue that individuals are not rational in the sense implied by 
Christiano. Since people do not act like Homines Economici, they may well be 
motivated  to  do  what  is  needed  to  implement  the  institutional  scheme  the 
deem  desirable.  Most  people  tend  to  act  upon  other  than  self-regarding 
preferences whenever the circumstances do not allow them to serve their self-
interest. This is what characterizes both large-scaled elections (part II) and the 
context  of  institutional  design  (part  III).  Here,  motivations  like  altruism, 
public-spiritedness, fairness and reciprocity are more likely to be decisive, since 
the opportunity cost of forgone satisfaction of egoistic preferences is typically 
low (Brennan & Hamlin 2000: 19). 
In this respect, it should be clear that people can have good reasons to act 
collectively and cooperatively. In addition, such actions typically have socially 
desirable effects – they confer benefits to the group in which one lives (and 
thus also to one’s fellow members) – and thus make perfect evolutionary sense. 
Both voting and acting in strongly reciprocal ways typically have small costs for 
the individual at hand but potentially large benefits for society. Christiano is 
perfectly  right  in  pointing  out  that  such  a  situation  leads  to  motivational 
problems among Homines Economici, which will be tempted to freeride on 
the contributions of others. Nevertheless, people who identify to some extent General Conclusion 
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with their community and have internalized its norms will have good reasons 
to contribute to its public good.  
As  I  have  stressed  repeatedly,  cooperative  and  prosocial  dispositions  are 
especially relevant in contexts where people have little or no incentive to base 
their  decisions  on  self-interested  considerations.  Since  individuals  cannot 
directly  further  their  own  interests  when  voting  or  deciding  on  basic 
institutional issues, they tend to take on such occasions to express what they 
care  about.  This  entails  a  different  picture  than  that  of  basic  structure 
determinism, in which political outcomes arise as the unintended outcome of 
social interactions: “if expressive voting cannot operate as an invisible hand it 
could,  at  least  in  principle,  operate  as  a  visible  hand.  That  is,  voters  might 
systematically vote their views of the public interest” (Brennan & Hamlin 2000: 
176). The fact that a lot of people base their public choices on expressive 
considerations  leads  to  me  doubt  the  pessimistic  conclusion  that  they 
necessarily lack the motivation to reform institutions. 
Christiano (2004: 138-139) is critical of this optimistic story. First, he argues 
that the expressive account of voting does not explain why individuals decide 
to vote. However, I have shown that it is, in fact, better able to do so than the 
instrumental account, according to which no economically rational citizen will 
vote.  Second,  he  argues  that  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  people  vote 
strategically  rather  than  expressively.  However,  my  emphasis  on  expressive 
considerations  does  not  exclude  that  instrumental  considerations  have  a 
marginal impact on voting decisions and electoral outcomes. As I have shown, 
an  account  that  relies  exclusively  on  instrumental  considerations  –  which 
Christiano seems to defend – is downright false. 
According to Brennan and Hamlin (2000: 177-180), a democratic system tends 
to  select  morally  motivated  politicians.  After  all,  citizens  are  expected  to 
express  in  elections  their  support  for  the  candidate  whose  principles  and 
character they identify with. This, in turn, motivates politicians to speak and act 
in ways that appeal to the electorate. Again, Christiano expresses his doubts. 
First, he argues that voters may well decide to express more flimsy or even 
malign feelings in the voting booth. Second, he stresses that voters have no 
incentive  whatsoever  to  inform themselves about  political issues, parties  or 
candidates.  Third,  this  leads  to  politicians  being  “chosen  on  the  basis  of 
superficial displays of virtue and crude political appeals at best (…). The voters 
will simply not have the necessary information to evaluate the real characters or 
platforms of politicians” (Christiano 2004: 140).  
Concerning the first criticism, I have argued that the expressive considerations 
that  can  motivate  voters  should  not  be  understood  as  a  tendency  to  vent 
superficial feelings and tastes. After all, if one wants to explain why people take General Conclusion 
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the trouble of going out to vote, one should refer to the fundamental things 
that underlie their preferences and identities. The second criticism is beside the 
point in that it continues to refer to economically rational individuals and thus 
neglects the ways in which expressive considerations can motivate people to 
become  involved  in  politics.  Since  the  point  is  exactly  that  voters  are  not 
primarily  self-interested,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  inevitably  remain 
politically  apathetic  and  ignorant.  If  they  care  about  the  fate  of  their 
community, they will have a good reason to inform themselves on all things 
political.  Christiano  seems  to  ignore  this  in  his  third  criticism  as  well.  In 
addition,  he  does  not  take  into  account  the  possibly  civilizing  force  of 
hypocrisy.  If  politicians  are  elected  (at  least  partially)  on  the  basis  of  non-
egoistic considerations, they will have an incentive to speak in impartial terms. 
As I have shown, this may ultimately lead (initially hypocritical) politicians to 
actually become less self-regarding or help (honest) politicians getting elected. 
Moving away from the economic conception of rationality thus enables me to 
avoid the pessimistic stance it entails with regard to institutional design. 
 
2. The value and limitations of this research project 
 
As always, this dissertation, which is the result of four years of research, has its 
strengths as well as its shortcomings. While I do believe that it contains a 
number of valuable insights, it would be pretentious to deny that it has its 
limitations as well. In what follows, I mention only a few of them in order to 
open up a number of prospects for further research.  
First, this dissertation offers no specific suggestions with respect to measures 
or reforms that would improve the basic institutional structure. While I do 
hope that it points to some general directions on the route towards a realistic 
utopia,  I  believe  it  is  up  to  policy  makers  and  their  advisers  to  try  and 
implement  the  insights  of  political  economists  and  philosophers  at  the 
pragmatic level of real-world politics. 
Second, while I have stressed the importance of good citizens – next to good 
institutions – in such a realistic utopia, it is still up for discussion what exactly 
this entails. I have not specified in any detailed manner which motivations and 
actions can or should be labeled moral, noble or virtuous. Making use of the 
general phrase of socially desirable motivations and actions, I hope to have 
circumvented  discussions  on  such  matters.  After  all,  under  some 
circumstances, altruistic and public-spirited preferences can lead to unintended 
side effects in the sense that they do not make others better off. Well-intended 
actions  can  thus  result  in  socially  undesirable  outcomes.  While  one  should General Conclusion 
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analyze more fully the mechanisms that may thwart or pervert good intentions 
and take them into account when designing institutions and policies, I refuse to 
believe that they cannot be remedied. 
Third, while my emphasis on both good citizens and good institutions as parts 
of a realistic utopia perfectly fits Paul Ricoeur’s attention to both individual and 
social ethics, one should remain cautious that it does not give rise to social 
engineering in which the formation of virtuous citizens becomes a policy goal 
in itself. To avoid deliberate attempts to form citizens on the basis of some 
ideal, I have stressed the need to uphold and support those norms prescribing 
prosocial action that are still present in modern societies. 
Throughout  this  dissertation,  I  have  relied  heavily  on  different  theoretical 
models to analyze both the individual and the institutional level. In this respect, 
I believe that these perspectives – which are all incomplete when considered on 
their own – should ultimately be combined when one wants to explain human 
behavior in all of its aspects and think about ways in which societies should be 
structured.  I  hope  this  dissertation  opens  up  a  number  of  possibilities  for 
theorists in the ‘human sciences’ to join forces.  
In  addition,  I  have  tried  to  show  the  need  for  alternative  conceptions  of 
rationality  to  complement  the  all  too  narrow  economic  one,  which  fails  to 
incorporate the basic fact that people’s complex motivational arrays can change 
endogenously under the influence of institutional reforms. It is up to social and 
political  scientists,  experimental  economists,  evolutionary  theorists  and 
psychologists  to  fill  in  this  broad  theoretical  framework  on  the  basis  of 
empirical  studies.  While  economists  indeed  tend  to  delegate  issues  of 
preference formation and change to other disciplines, I think they should give 
up  some  of  their  central  assumptions  if  they  want  to  benefit  from  such 
research. If this dissertation is to convince the reader of anything, I hope he 
will be persuaded by the need for more interdisciplinary research within the 
broad domain currently constituted by psychology, evolutionary theory, social 
sciences, psychology, political theory, moral and political philosophy. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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